
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Myth, Metaphysics and Dialectic in Plato's *Statesman*
David A. White
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MYTH, METAPHYSICS AND DIALECTIC IN PLATO'S *STATESMAN*

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Myth, Metaphysics and Dialectic in Plato's *Statesman*

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ASHGATE

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Preface

Plato's late dialogue, the *Statesman*, has enjoyed a Renaissance of recent scholarship. Several new translations, with commentary, as well as a number of book-length interpretations—with widely diverse conclusions—have added to understanding this seemingly eccentric yet intriguing work. The present study approaches the *Statesman* based on the conviction that its imaginative myth of the reversed cosmos is indispensable to the teaching of the dialogue and that this teaching is primarily aporetic—intentionally leading its students into realizing the need for further reflection rather than presenting substantive doctrine. To analyze such a complex work from this direction suggests a Preface devoted to preliminary remarks orienting the reader for what follows.

The primary interpretive assumption is that the dialogue stands as a unified narrative whole. This may seem too self-evident to mention; however, if Plato organized the dialogue to make a point or series of points, then the structure of the dialogue, distinctive in its narrative twists and turns, should be in full view as a prerequisite for appreciating the lessons thus taught. In sum, the dialogue should be assumed to display a unity such that all its elements, however disjoint they may appear when juxtaposed with one another, also constitute a narrative and philosophical unity.

The Introduction to this work previews the approach taken toward the dialogue as a unified whole by describing its primary structural features. Attention is directed toward the inchoate status of philosophy as depicted in the *Statesman* in conjunction with the fact that the dialogue explicitly registers a comprehensive account of reality and incorporates this perspective in various ways throughout the dialectical discussion. The dialogue, constituted entirely by exchanges between an Eleatic Stranger and a youthful namesake of Socrates, is also marked by circular structure in terms of dialectical results with, it is argued, significant consequences for understanding the purpose of the dialogue. The Stranger's decidedly checkered progress as a philosopher is sketched and implications from this dramatic detail are noted in conjunction with the implied directive, voiced in general terms by young Socrates, to continue inquiring into the nature of statecraft beyond the letter of that account finally established in the dialogue proper.

Although the Platonic dialogues contain many examples of sustained discussion justifying the conviction that Plato is a rationalist, a number of the most powerful and far-seeing dialogues also include myths—*Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Statesman*. The Introduction discusses the location of the myth within the narrative structure of the *Statesman* as well as the myth's concern to articulate aspects of the cosmos, an articulation with explicit and implied consequences for the systematic grasp of the full range of reality. The understated but essential function of the Good is sketched in its relation to knowledge and also with respect to a series of

anticipations detailing the importance of the Good in art, psychology and education. The Introduction concludes by reviewing several strategies of interpretation for analyzing such a complex work.

The Introduction prepares a setting for developing the structure of reality so that the subsequent Chapters (1–5), reviewing the dialogue as narrated, can be appreciated from this interpretive dimension. The purpose of this commentary is twofold: (a) to emphasize the subtle yet sustained concern for what, in contemporary terminology perhaps alien to the spirit of the Platonic dialogues, would be classified as metaphysical considerations; (b) to indicate numerous moments when the dialogue involves itself in situations, both dramatic and dialectical, culminating in a series of fundamentally aporetic positions. Chapter 6 establishes an essential transitional analysis by demonstrating the close affinity between the aporetic character of the *Statesman* and the complex and diversified account of the Good in the *Philebus*. Chapter 7 then develops dominant themes of the *Philebus* sketched in Chapter 6—highlighted by the quest to identify or at least approximate the Good—in order to detail the aporetic range of the *Statesman*. As a result, the *Statesman* may be understood as primarily an aporetic exercise, drawing on lines of thought concerning fundamental concepts and questions in metaphysics which originated in the *Phaedrus* and *Parmenides* and extended themes fundamental to the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. The aporetic character of the dialogue is such that the interpretation presented here does not comment on possible implications for Plato's later political theory derived from the position on that subject explored by the Stranger. However, an Epilogue reviews the main lines of argument in the *Laws*, Plato's final dialogue on political matters, consolidating methodological and metaphysical elements developed in that epic work which reinforce the aporetic character of political positions evinced in the *Statesman*.

If the argument in this study is given a hearing, the *Statesman* emerges as a seminal document in a reoriented approach toward crucial metaphysical issues—the status of Forms, the relation between Forms and particulars, and, most vitally, the need for an articulated yet necessarily provisional account of the Good as underlying and animating the philosophical concerns of the later Plato.

The more study afforded the *Statesman*, the more evident becomes the remarkable tightness and rigor with which the dialogue was constructed. One also discerns, although not without concerted effort, the profundity of the work from the standpoint of metaphysical insight and the inherent link to methods requisite for voicing that insight. The *Statesman* has been dismissed by some students as dull and diffuse in design and execution. I have another view entirely. My hope is that this commentary will not only explain and justify the admiration and respect which should be accorded the work in these regards, but also, and more importantly, offer a glimpse into the dialogue's remarkable metaphysical vision.

***

The translation of texts from the *Statesman* is based on H. N. Fowler's Loeb Edition, although the more recent translations by Robin Waterfield and Christopher Rowe have been consulted. I have modified existing translations when necessary. Also reviewed was D. Robinson's discussion of the new Oxford Text of the *Statesman* (a discussion appearing in the anthology *Reading the Statesman*).

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Introduction

The *Statesman* and Metaphysics

The Question of Structure

No special insight into the later Platonic corpus is won by asserting that the *Statesman* is a perplexing dialogue. In this regard, two facts about its structure stand out: first, Socrates speaks, as he does in the *Sophist*, but only in a cameo appearance; the dramatic and argumentative action is directed by another character, an Eleatic Stranger—devoted to philosophy—who converses with a youthful namesake of Socrates. Second, some steps in the activity of dialectic are flawed, but flaws introduced by intent since the dialogue explicitly seeks to rectify earlier missteps made by the Stranger and his respondent. If, however, other errors or discrepancies remain seemingly unremedied, then either the dialogue is inherently flawed or these features are, presumably, integral to its structure. These structural characteristics may then be aporetic, intentionally producing blockages in thinking and therefore inviting members of the Academy as well as modern readers to investigate statecraft in more philosophically appropriate directions. A third fact should also be noted—an extended exercise in dialectic at the beginning of the dialogue occurs immediately prior to an equivalently extensive myth. This complex narrative depicts the origin and structure of the cosmos defined by counter-rotating cycles and a reversal of the aging process during one of those cycles. The Stranger announces to young Socrates that this myth will afford them "entertainment," a description which could mean that some, perhaps all, of the myth has not been seriously tendered with respect to the substantive philosophical issues arising elsewhere in the dialogue. If so, however, then why is the myth there at all? But this description could also mean that each and every element in the myth is indeed relevant to these issues, yet only to a limited degree. In other words, the myth will direct attention to problematic areas and elicit or "entertain" responses to these problems, but only in an imagistic or indirect way and thus without the precision and dialectical rigor that could be expected from a more technically discursive account.

The significance of the myth in the *Statesman* becomes evident if the structure of the dialogue is arranged as follows: the initial problem is defining the statesman—(a) a dialectical account of what the myth later reveals as a form of divine rule is used, erroneously as it turns out, to define by the method of division the nature of the statesman; (b) the myth is told as the fundamental principle grounding subsequent discussion concerning the nature of the statesman, including all divisions describing that nature; (c) a definition of the statesman is eventually produced which young Socrates proclaims to be complete. According to this schematic, the myth becomes the pivot of the entire dialogue—the divisions leading to it are faulty, the divisions following it are secure, or at least more secure than those occurring prior to the myth.

If therefore the myth is central to the soundness of the applied methodology of the dialogue, it should be possible to indicate, even only in outline, how the myth has been so deployed.

If Plato constructed the *Statesman* with the same attention to internal unity and coherence marking the great middle period dialogues, then any interpretation doing justice to the full complexity of the *Statesman* must address these three facts and show, to use an apt image, how they are woven into one dramatic and philosophical whole. However, such a task is even more daunting given that the manifest concern for dialectical method in the dialogue is mirrored by a comprehensive, if intermittently developed, interlacing of metaphysical elements marked by considerable generality. This dimension of generality may be situated thus: the *Sophist* concerns the definition of the sophist; the *Statesman* essays the definition of the statesman. But the two dialogues also force attention on the method requisite for securing these definitions. Furthermore, the chief protagonist of both dialogues is not Socrates, schooled in and (presumably) sympathetic to Platonic modes of thought, but an unnamed Eleatic visitor, a Stranger who also happens to be a philosopher. This Stranger, it may be assumed, is imbued with Eleatic principles; as such, he may or may not be sympathetic to a purely Platonic position. However, as both Eleatic and philosopher, he has had considerable practice with terms of wide generality—he is educated, in modern parlance, in the lofty subtlety of metaphysical discourse.

The Quest for Philosophy

The myth in the *Statesman* asserts that philosophy is essential for human happiness (272c–d). However, nowhere in the myth—nor, indeed, anywhere in the dialogue—is philosophy clearly defined or even characterized. An interpretation of the *Statesman* should therefore, if possible, at least sketch from the dialogue itself what the pursuit of philosophy entails. For until the nature of philosophy—its method (if any) and function—is specified or even merely approximated, it is not possible to determine whether the dialogue's promise of human happiness resulting from philosophy can be realized.

At 285d, the Stranger asks young Socrates whether their investigation of statecraft has been undertaken just for the sake of this subject or to make them "better dialecticians" concerning all things. Young Socrates responds that clearly this investigation is being pursued for the sake of all such issues. This exchange suggests that however important defining the statesman may be, it is even more important to be certain about procedures employed in securing this definition in order to be capable of applying these procedures to matters of equivalent, perhaps even greater, import. These procedures should also be used, presumably, in defining the philosopher, since securing this definition was posed at the beginning of the dialogue as a problem waiting to be addressed (257a). However, an intriguing version of the paradox of inquiry appears to emerge for this object of investigation—how can one define the philosopher without already knowing what philosophy itself is? For if definitions of sophist (specified in the dialogue preceding the *Statesman*) and statesman (about to be addressed) are philosophically correct, then it is surely idle to

define the philosopher, since naming and defining realities other than the philosopher would display, through the very process of securing those definitions, precisely what the philosopher is and does.

Furthermore, what standards could measure a definition of the philosopher? For whatever processes controlled deriving this definition must surely be identical to the processes indicated in the definition proper—a quixotic instance of self-reference on the move, as it were. Thus, it would seem inconsistent to define the philosopher as, for example, "seeker after truth using the method of collection and division," without using that very method to produce this definition. In short, if philosophy requires a method, then consistency entails that this very method be used in defining philosophy itself. For if this method were not used, there would be no reason to believe that the conclusion, if offered as a definition of philosophy, had been secured with due philosophical correctness. As a result, the *Statesman* poses a problem in definition which, given the comprehensive scope of the method for securing that definition, requires that philosophy itself be examined as a prerequisite for determining and evaluating the definitions of activities—for example, statecraft—other than philosophy. Thus interpreting the *Statesman* entails reflecting on the nature of philosophy[1] while concurrently attempting to analyze the nature of the statesman by at least plausibly effective philosophical means.

The Range of Reality in the *Statesman*

The question of structure and the problematic nature of philosophy must also be considered in relation to the types of reality animating the dialogue. A brief representation of the expansive content of the *Statesman* will indicate, in broad measure, the boundaries of these metaphysical concerns:

Forms

The dialogue refers to realities characterized by immutability, eternity, and incorporeality (269d). It appears that these realities are Forms, although the Stranger never explicitly names them *as* Forms. The Stranger is not reticent, however, to introduce language typically denoting Forms—εἶδος, ἰδέα, γένος. In one case, however, an *idean* is said to have been produced (308c), but the eternity of Forms entails that no Form can have an origin. Also, the realities referred to by these terms are divisible into parts (262b), but whether Forms, canonically understood, possess a type of unity which admits of parts is not clear. Furthermore, some of these realities are spoken of as if they were merely heuristic (262b–c). Finally, the realities are deployed (in discussions concerning paradigms) in ways strongly suggesting that they differ from one another by degree (277d; 278e). Thus, in the hands of the Stranger, the Forms—if, indeed, he intends Platonic Forms—appear to behave quite differently than they typically do when Socrates employs them.[2]

Gods

The gods play a critical role in the *Statesman*, although most of what is said about them occurs in the myth. A kind of demiurge, divine in nature, establishes order in the cosmos (273b–d). Then, once the cosmos is ordered, the gods exercise various supervisory and dispensatory functions with respect to other forms of life (271d–e).

Two metaphysical characterizations of deity should be noted. First, a hierarchy exists among the gods, with some deities more powerful and influential than others (271d). Second, the cosmos is so ordered that one of its cycles of rotation runs counter to that given to it by the demiurge (269c–d), implying that forces exist in the universe superceding those fashioned by divine station.

Cosmos

The cosmos, understood as an ordered unity, displays beauty and goodness bestowed by a divine creator, or more literally, by a producer of harmony (273b–d). Furthermore, the cosmos is alive (269d), in continuous motion (270a), constituted in part by a corporeal principle (273b), and subject to "destiny" in its manner of rotation and in the consequences of this destined variation (272e). These assertions concerning the cosmos must cohere with the metaphysics explicitly developed in the dialogue.

Natures

Cognition of entities in the world depends, in part, on the structure of these entities. The Stranger frequently appeals to "natures" (for example, 259d, 260c7, 265b) of entities, presumably a sort of whole of parts. To affirm that a thing has a nature presupposes the relevance and importance of unity, since a whole of parts will not cohere as a whole unless unity underlies that configuration. How then to determine the relation between natures and Forms? Furthermore, if individual entities are defined by exemplifying natures, then the order of the cosmos understood as the sum total of individuals is, in effect, an ensemble of natures formally intertwining with one another as natures.

Particulars

The dialogue primarily concerns definition, and therefore types rather than individual particulars. But there is concerted if subtle interest in appearances and also resemblances (286a–b). These resemblances are relations between particulars, not between realities of which particulars are instances. Also, one of the Stranger's divisions is justified on the grounds that it produces distributive equality, that is, an equal number of individuals of two distinct types (262e). Finally, the Stranger argues against the relevance of law because it cannot attend to the goodness of individual persons, since their lives undergo incessant change (294b). The concern for particulars is evident, but in contexts including both plurality and the unity inherent in individual natures.

Matter

Matter, referring to that type of being proper to bodies (typically the material element of living bodies), appears in the myth as an essential element in forming the cosmos. Matter is connected with change (269e) and is also the source of disorder, if not impending chaos (273b).

Measure

Measure is characterized as the mean between extremes (284e), as a woven cloak embodies the mean between extremes of the cloth's warp and woof from which that cloak is woven. Furthermore, measure is a necessary condition for the existence of anything produced by art, τέχνη (283d). Since statecraft is an art (258e, 259b and *passim*), measure becomes crucial as underlying a possible definition of statecraft. In this regard, measure must be examined in relation to Forms.

As noted, this array of metaphysical elements and terminology is remarkable for its breadth and diversity. Since this concern pervades the dialogue, a sustained inquiry into the metaphysical doctrines and positions introduced and developed in the *Statesman* is at least warranted, if not required, in order to clarify the relation between metaphysics and the adventure of philosophy itself.[3] Furthermore, the myth in the *Statesman* plays an essential role in all phases of this study.

The Circular Structure of the *Statesman*

The point of the *Statesman* seems obvious—to define the subject of its title, the statesman. This goal is stated at the beginning of the dialogue and the discussants, the Stranger and young Socrates, relentlessly if not courageously pursue this definition throughout the work. Once the definition has finally been secured, the dialogue abruptly concludes. These structural facts, although evident and readily stated, conceal the internal philosophical drama of the dialogue. The *Statesman* has been perceived as structurally amorphous, thus lacking the formal fineness of its middle period predecessors. However, adopting a certain interpretive perspective reveals an organizational strategy in the dialogue which exhibits a remarkable blend of philosophical imagination, narrative rigor and theoretical expansiveness.

The myth in the *Statesman* describes a cosmos eternally rotating through alternately opposed cycles. The movement of dialectic within the dialogue mirrors this circular motion. The initial exercise of dialectic concludes, unwittingly and apparently mistakenly, with an account of a statesman who is, as attested to by the myth, in fact a god (275a). However, at 275c, the Stranger alerts young Socrates to the possibility that the exponent of statecraft they have been seeking may just as much resemble the "divine shepherd" as a strictly human protagonist. Consequently, the Stranger insists that the *schema* of the statesman must be examined in order to determine whether the nature exhibited through that *schema* somehow shares in those properties ascribed to the divine ruler during the initial process of division. The Stranger introduces this possibility immediately after he indicates to young

Socrates why they have embarked on the myth and just before he begins the revised account of the statesman. Much later, at 305d, and after considerable dialectical exercise, the Stranger concludes that the "true" statesman "ought not to act itself," but rather should rule over arts that have the power of action. It turns out therefore that in these and other respects, the true statesman characterized at the conclusion of the dialogue closely resembles the divine ruler described in the initial division of the dialogue—both are intellectual (258d–e), directive (260b), and originary (260e). Thus the final version of statecraft appears to run full circle back to the beginning of inquiry into the nature of statecraft. How then has the Stranger advanced in his philosophical quest?[4]

The parallel between the divine shepherd at the beginning of dialectical proceedings and the true statesman at dialogue's end has been filtered through the teachings of the myth. Circular dialectic in the *Statesman* thus reflects the circularity characterizing the movement of the cosmos within which occur all exercises in dialectic. And it is the myth, the narration of the cosmic drama, which effectively differentiates the final definition of statecraft from the initial attempt; indeed, the Stranger explicitly asserts that the myth will clarify the nature of the king (269c). The myth thus serves as a pivot around which rotates the analysis of the statesman, an analysis which is circular in its seemingly errant introduction of but ultimate return to divinity as the locus of statecraft.

Another narrative parallel is relevant to the dialogue's structure. The final account of the true statesman (306a–311c) reverses the direction of analysis characterizing the myth—the former, the account driven by dialectic, proceeds *from* separated and unlike elements and various settings of fragmented multiplicity and opposed personalities *to* how the statesman weaves these elements so that they all harmoniously coexist. By contrast, the myth begins by depicting the harmonious interplay of natures within the cosmos but then shifts to its gradual disintegration, the cosmos dissolving from unity to the verge of chaotic difference with the degenerative process halted only by demiurgic intervention. The myth goes from unity to diversity; dialectic moves from diversity to unity. The reversed directions of these juxtaposed narratives thus mirror the two reversed directions of cosmic rotation described in the myth. Dialectic and myth are moving in opposite directions but ultimately toward the same goal—exhibiting the nature of the highest type of statesman available to the style of philosophical inquiry employed by the Stranger and young Socrates. Furthermore, these counter-rotating narrative cycles suggest an important conclusion about the movement of dialectic and myth working in sequence to define the statesman.

Upon careful scrutiny, it becomes evident that the true statesman imitates in practicing statecraft what the demiurge has achieved within the cosmos as a whole by blending opposites with respect to humanity as the primary resident of the cosmos. However, the demiurge effects a blended cosmos only by a stopgap measure. In the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge knows its powers and effectively executes them—as a result, the cosmos is fully and completely formed. If we then question why the Stranger's myth has the divine counterpart to the Demiurge complete only a partially unified cosmos, it may be suggested that either the demiurge's knowledge or power was in some sense lacking. Furthermore, if the activities of the true statesman are modeled after those of the mythic demiurge, then the true statesman's governance is commensurately incomplete, reflecting

the incompleteness with which the demiurge fashioned the cosmos. These structural considerations suggest that the point of the *Statesman* is to show that its account of the "true" statesman is in fact not complete and that this incompleteness depends on what the myth exhibits about the parallel activity of the demiurge. On this interpretation, the myth becomes just as central to the overall point of the dialogue, including the seemingly secure nature of statecraft, as are all its overtly dialectical sections.[5]

The Stranger as Philosopher

The Stranger develops a method of dialectic and the Stranger narrates the myth. Although the Stranger lays out a route toward the nature of the true statesman, he cannot define that nature in its completeness. The reason for this deficiency is that the Stranger remains essentially cut off from the requisite knowledge to discern and develop such an account. This concerted incompleteness is betokened by the overall philosophical performance of the Stranger, as the following survey demonstrates. The limits of the Stranger as a philosopher must be set in relief so that it becomes possible to move beyond the far-reaching but ultimately circular thinking displayed throughout the *Statesman*.

The leading philosophical protagonist in the *Statesman*, as in the *Sophist*, is a Stranger from Elea. After Socrates makes a brief introductory appearance and then retreats from the dialectical scene, the Stranger pursues the definition of the statesman through various discursive and narrative approaches. What was Plato trying to show by having Socrates appear at the beginning of the *Statesman* and promise to reappear (although, as it happens, not in the *Statesman* itself), then allowing a Stranger to develop every substantive philosophical position in the dialogue? Why has this "Stranger" advanced the principal positions in both *Sophist* and *Statesman*?

It is instructive to trace the path of the Stranger through the complex issues arising in this dialogue. How discriminating and rigorous is the Stranger when practicing dialectic? On balance, the Stranger's philosophical performance is checkered, and one does not know whether to be more impressed with his successes or concerned with his failures. At the beginning of the *Sophist*, the Stranger is described as "divine" (216b–c) in his pursuit of philosophy. However, if this epithet is double-edged, both honorific and descriptive as well as marking a limit of sorts, then although the Stranger has been set off from the many with respect to philosophical insight, he should not be taken as endowed with an unalloyed vision of the truth.

Here are the Stranger's apparent successes:

a. by continuing the approach initiated in the *Sophist*, he discerns the need for method in order to secure truth;
b. he recognizes the need for a correct methodological start when the method turns to the practice of division;
c. he appreciates the need to ground this correct start in an account—a mythical account, but perhaps mythic by necessity—concerned with the structure of the cosmos;
d. he realizes, gradually and with perhaps a measure of hesitance, the need to shift from division solely by dichotomy to division according to a thing's natural elements.

Consider also, however, the Stranger's philosophical misadventures:

e. his initial divisions are, by his own admission, erroneous—for example, he confuses a divine ruler for a human one—and incomplete, lacking in sufficient detail to be persuasive;
f. again by his own admission, he is uncertain how to formulate dialectical method;
i. precision in the differentiation division produces is lacking;
    ii. exhaustive division is stated as an ideal but without effective procedure for securing it,
    iii. the distinction between class and part, a distinction crucial to the accuracy of division, cannot be clarified,
    iv. paradigms, required to exhibit the nature of the most important realities, result in "true opinion"—not knowledge;
g. these methodological gaps are reflected in the underlying structure of the myth. Although the myth compels us to think about gods, the "most divine" realities (presumably Forms), natures and a principle of materiality, all these elements from a cosmic perspective, the myth as a whole lacks a principle of order unifying this complex diversity. In the terminology of the *Phaedrus* on rhetoric, the myth requires a cosmological and metaphysical "head" (264c). The *Statesman* myth lacks a fully informed vision of reality, a lack which affects not only what is said in the myth but also, more broadly, the entire methodology circumscribing the Stranger's attempt to define the statesman. In view of this decidedly uneven performance, it would be premature, perhaps even naive, to assume that the Eleatic Stranger is merely a Socratic mouthpiece or covert Platonist.

One potentially fruitful way to take the Stranger's divagations is to read them as if Plato wanted to speak through a Stranger because things which had been relatively clear to the Socrates of the middle period dialogues were clear no longer—that is, the philosophically familiar had become "strange", at least to a certain extent. Thus a Stranger, a philosopher explicitly identified as such who nonetheless remains unnamed throughout two protracted and complex dialogues, is introduced in order to initiate inquiries pointing toward destinations which glimmer in importance but are currently unattainable through a directly stated discursive format. In short, the *Statesman* is exploratory and provisional rather than a vehicle delivering straightforward Platonic doctrine.[6]

Art and the Necessity of Inquiry

At 299e–300a, young Socrates insists that if a law prohibited investigation of the arts, then the arts would be ruined and life, "which is hard enough now, would then become absolutely unendurable." This perceptive and fertile claim belies the youthful Socrates' philosophical inexperience.[7] If this claim is correct, then art will atrophy and ultimately wither away completely—without the possibility of being resurrected

by hopeful and needy humans—unless the arts are and, importantly, continue to be reinvigorated by continuous investigation of their fundamental principles. It also follows that the art of statecraft, however its structure has been determined in the *Statesman*, must be reexamined as well.

There are, in fact, additional reasons embedded in the argument of the *Statesman* entailing the need for such continued analysis. First, the definition of the art of statecraft and the account of what the true statesman does in virtue of this art are both explicitly based on paradigms. But paradigms deliver only "true opinion." If therefore knowledge is higher and more reliable than true opinion, then there is ample reason to reinvestigate what has been said about statecraft simply because its substance has not been rendered secure. Even if young Socrates had not asserted the continuous reexamination of art, the art of statecraft should be reexamined since its nature has been determined according to what, in canonic Platonic epistemology, is only a derivative degree of cognition. Second, the Stranger indicates that further inquiry into the structure of dialectic is required. These problematic aspects of method suggest, if not imply, that results obtained when applying an incompletely defined method may be equivalently incomplete. Thus even if the method of dialectic is not an art in the sense statecraft is, this method must also be subjected to additional inquiry in order to guarantee the reliability of the various collections and divisions producing the definition of statecraft. Furthermore, if dialectic is indeed an art, it follows that unless investigation of this art continues, then dialectic itself would wither and die, just as all other arts would if they were stringently and exclusively regulated by whatever present rules and practices dictated. In sum, there may be more, possibly much more, to learn about dialectic both as far as method itself is concerned and with respect to the objects of dialectic, including statecraft.

Myth and Totality

The implication for dialectic as formulated and practiced in the *Statesman* is that investigation into its principles must continue, regardless whether dialectic is directed at statecraft or any other reality. The most obvious source for additional study is the pivotal function of true opinion, that is, determining what must be done in order to achieve and solidify knowledge as an inherently superior type of cognition. The myth of the cosmos, in terms of content and placement in the dramatic structure of the *Statesman*, serves as the structural locus for formulating an approach toward realizing knowledge.

The fact that the Stranger delivers the myth without uttering a word concerning its origin or the source of its inspiration suggests that he alone is responsible for its content. If so, then it is important to realize that the myth is *cosmic* in scope. This spontaneous narration testifies to the depths of the Stranger's awareness of the fundamental importance of totality when the philosopher seeks definitions. It has somehow become clear to the Stranger that in order for dialectic to reorient itself concerning the definition of statecraft—a single definition, although admittedly of a crucial type of reality—it is essential not only to traverse an account affecting the substance of the entire cosmos but also to devise an explanation for the origin and

career of all living things as members of that totality, an explanation encompassing a diverse pantheon performing a variety of functions.

Realities which appear to be Forms are first mentioned in the myth. But why does the Stranger introduce the Forms in a myth, and in a fragmented and incomplete way? Recall the myth in the *Phaedrus.* That narrative depicts souls resting on the circular rim of the cosmos, looking "out" in order to experience *ta onta*, the realities—Forms—which guide knowledge and conduct of both mortals and deities (247d). The parallel emerging when the *Phaedrus* myth is juxtaposed with its counterpart in the *Statesman* is that the same kind of vision allowing the Stranger to account for the formation of the cosmos is essential so that the lover of wisdom "sees" those realities which must be beheld in order to produce knowledge. In other words, in order to define a reality as important as statecraft—and, by extension, any reality of equivalent or greater importance—the setting of the myth teaches that an appropriately fundamental perspective on that reality must be adopted. Thus a sense of totality must be in hand before any one dimension of or element in that totality can be approached epistemologically and properly described in its nature.

Plato inserts the myth where he does in the cycle of dialectical divisions to emphasize the need for such vision, with subsequent discussion bringing out more readily the implied presence of these realities. We may infer that if dialectic is pursued without the guidance of an appropriately fundamental level of reality, the results of dialectic will be circular and fail to achieve anything higher than true opinion. As things stand in the cosmos circumscribed by the narrative of the *Statesman*, no hope of breaking out of this circle is available, since according to the myth the two types of cosmic motion are eternal. The transition from true opinion to knowledge therefore requires some sort of fundamental transition, a leap outside the circularity of cosmic motion detailed in the myth and reflected in the dialogue's dialectical movement. This is not a philosophical leap which the Stranger ever feels confident to essay.

Knowledge and the Good

Stipulating, as the Stranger does, that true opinion is the highest degree of cognition that dialectic in conjunction with paradigms can achieve has crucial consequences for interpreting the metaphysics of the *Statesman.* The extent of these consequences—and a direction for future inquiry—may be derived by reviewing passages on related issues in other dialogues. These passages concern the connection between true opinion and knowledge.

Consider, for example, Socrates' assertion to Adimantus in *Republic* VI: "Have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things? The best of them are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?" Adimantus replies: "They do not differ at all" (506c). The *Timaeus* clarifies the connection between true belief and knowledge:

> If intelligence [νοῦς] and true belief [δόξα ἀληθής] are two different kinds, then these things—Forms that we cannot perceive but only think of—certainly exist in themselves; but if, as some hold, true belief in no way differs from intelligence, then all the things

> we perceive through the bodily senses must be taken as the most certain reality. Now we must affirm that they are two different things, for they are distinct in origin and unlike in nature. The one is produced in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one can always give a true account of itself, the other can give none; the one cannot be shaken by persuasion, whereas the other can be won over; and true belief, we must allow, is shared by all mankind, intelligence only by the gods and a small number of men (51d-e).

The *Republic* asserts that true opinion without intelligence is equivalent to the blind reaching their destination by dint of good fortune. True opinion is true, but it does not know why it is true and can therefore be readily dislodged. The *Timaeus* states a series of characteristics justifying this fundamental epistemological distinction—thus, immaterial Forms exist and are the proper object of intelligence. Furthermore, after Socrates compares true opinion with blindness in the *Republic*, he immediately (506d) begins his discussion of the Good, *to agathon*. This account discloses that the Good is essential not only in knowledge based on apprehending the Forms, but also in the existence of the Forms themselves (506e ff). Thus, according to *Republic* VI, the Good confers existence on the Forms (509b). In sum, true opinion is blind unless superceded by knowledge, knowledge requires Forms and Forms exist in a dependency relation on the Good.

What then must be added to objects of cognition in the *Statesman* to achieve the transition from true opinion to knowledge?[8]

Anticipations of the Good

In the *Republic* and to a lesser degree the *Phaedo*, the Good is fundamental to the existence of Forms. Since realities which appear to be Forms are only mentioned and not developed in the *Statesman*, it may seem obvious that the Good, *to agathon*, is not a part of the *Statesman*'s metaphysical framework. It is undeniable, however, that a determinate sense of the Good plays a variegated role in the *Statesman*. Describing these senses indicates the range the Good occupies in the *Statesman*. This dimension of the Good, cosmic in scope, remains incompletely characterized, although, as will become evident, such incompleteness is doubtless by design.

Art

At 293a, the Stranger refers to statecraft as an art, a *technē*. In this case, the art of statecraft blends certain types of human beings who possess true opinions concerning the good and the beautiful. More is said about these true opinions below (Chapter 7). However, the connection between art as such—any art—and the Good is even more intimate than this passage suggests. (Two different dimensions of the good are employed in this study, distinguished by upper-case and lower-case orthography. The Good, upper-case, represents the reality aporetically present to the argument of the *Statesman*, that is, a reality of singular metaphysical importance but requiring development—see Chapters 6 and 7 for additional analysis. The good, lower case, will be employed where "the good" appears in the dialogue without a palpable sense

that it is a privileged reality. Context, in addition to this orthographic device, will clarify which dimension is intended.)

In analyzing the two types of measurement identified in the dialogue—quantitative and mean (or "due" measure)—the Stranger insists that whenever arts preserve the standard of the mean, "all their works are good and beautiful." Unless establishing the standard of the mean is achieved, "neither the statesman nor any other man who has knowledge of practical affairs can be said without any doubt to exist" (284c). Therefore the art of statecraft requires the standard of the mean. It is also clear that if this or any art uses the standard of the mean, "good and beautiful" works of art result. If the philosopher, as statesman, has knowledge of practical affairs—for example, ethical conduct—then the philosopher also requires the standard of the mean. In fact, according to 284c, the existence of the philosopher depends on the existence of the standard of the mean. But this implication seems to presuppose the Forms as fully defined, since, at least according to the *Republic*, philosophers have Forms as the only proper object in their quest for knowledge. The juxtaposition of *Republic* and *Statesman* suggests an intimate relation between the standard of the mean and Forms.

That art is essentially directed at the good and the beautiful receives additional reinforcement later, and in a context bringing out another aspect of the importance of the Good. The Stranger has shown that when in the course of seeking the nature of statecraft we look for the "right kind of rule," we should do so "in one or two or very few men" (293a) because the many lack the requisite character and knowledge to fulfill this important function. When such an individual (or individuals) has been secured, he or she should exercise rule "according to some kind of art" and should do so whether those ruled are willing or unwilling to undergo the prescriptions laid down. The Stranger offers a parallel example—the physician, administering a cure whether or not patients agree to it as long as the physician "preserves them by making them better than they were" (293c). In the same way, as long as rulers through knowledge preserve the state "by making it better than it was" (293d), this, says the Stranger, is the only right form of government. In sum, the ultimate goal of these arts is making things better than they were—to approximate whatever is good for the subject of these arts. To affirm that the cosmos and each living thing in it are good and beautiful is not to say that a dimension of the Good exists equivalent in metaphysical stature to *to agathon* as developed in the *Republic*. Nor would improving an existing type of government necessarily entail that the Good underlies this improvement. However, the fact that goodness pervades the cosmos is *prima facie* reason to determine, if possible, whether other elements of the Good emerge in the *Statesman*.

Psychology

Toward the conclusion of the *Statesman*, the Stranger describes how the statesman emulates the weaver in composing the most appropriate type of citizen. First, he says, the statesman "binds the eternal part of their souls with a divine bond, to which that part is akin, and after the divine it binds the animal part of them with human bonds" (309c). A clear distinction exists between the eternal part of soul and parts of soul bound to it—the divine and, in due course, the human. The highest reality

explicitly mentioned in the *Statesman* is named "most divine" (269d), a type of reality characterized by immutability and immateriality. These properties pertain typically to Forms. But the Stranger has just asserted that the divine bond is "akin" to the immortal part, implying that the immortal part of soul remains distinct, although related to, the divine part. He then says that the divine is "true opinion" with respect to beauty, justice, good, and their opposites (309c).

The kinship between the divine and the eternal implies difference between them as well as a sameness or similarity. But if the divine part of soul circumscribes true opinion, then the eternal part of soul can be—perhaps must be—the receptacle of something cognitively higher than what is accessible to soul through its divine corridor. If therefore only knowledge is higher than true opinion, then the distinction between eternal and divine advanced in a psychological context points toward the possibility that soul has the capacity to know in the most complete sense. It also follows that the statesman does not function with this knowledge in hand since the direction provided by the only available type of statecraft is based on true opinion—not knowledge. But it should be possible to bind soul's eternal part to its divine and human parts by displaying that eternality instead of merely reflecting it through binding which represents a derivative degree of knowledge. This contrast between eternal and divine in a psychological context thus raises the possibility of investigating the relation between soul and knowledge, of which true opinion is only a reflection.

The Stranger has asserted that the divine includes true opinion concerning justice, beauty, goodness—and "their opposites." The Good, *to agathon* of the *Republic*, is apparently unique, that is, it lacks, and necessarily lacks, an opposite. Therefore this good is not equivalent to *to agathon*, since not only is it accessible through true opinion but it also has an opposite. In fact, no distinction in kind appears to obtain between the good and either beauty or justice—all are on a par metaphysically in that all exemplify the divine, that is, true opinion. Therefore if the eternal part of soul is "akin" to true opinion, then its proper objects must be akin to—but higher than—those "divine" objects grounding true opinion. At this level, justice, beauty and the good become Forms, along with the possibility that this Good—if equivalent to or even approximating *to agathon*—would in some way transcend in metaphysical importance the Forms justice and beauty.

Education

Again toward the conclusion of the *Statesman*, the Stranger discusses how the highest available type of statesman will rule and he enunciates the following principle: "really true and assured opinion about honor, justice, the good and their opposites is divine, and when it arises in men's souls, it arises in a godlike race" (309c). This principle is coupled with the claim that "those whose natures are capable, if they get education, of being made into something fine and noble and of uniting with each other as art requires" (309b) will constitute the primary population receiving the statesman's guidance and control. Once this sharing of a common nature and education occurs, then the members can be blended into a political unity producing the highest degree of happiness for all. Shortly thereafter, the Stranger concludes

(310e) that the statesman's "one" work is weaving together a citizenry from opposite characteristics, and that such bonds will not be difficult to create "provided that both classes have one and the same opinion about the beautiful and the good."

The having of opinions referred to in this passage could mean that the statesman will not even begin to weave a unified citizenry until human beings are available all of whom have indicated in some way that they possess appropriate opinions concerning the beautiful and the good. But it could also mean that the statesman himself will educate those under his purview with these opinions; then, once they have been properly schooled, he will begin blending their diverse personalities into a unified state. The first interpretation implies that someone other than the statesman will educate people to become candidates for citizenry; the second points to such education as an essential responsibility of the statesman *qua* statesman.

Upon consideration, however, this difference presupposes a basic identity. For in either case, such fundamental education rests on a different basis than the education employed by the statesman in properly forming the polity. According to the *Republic*, inquiry into the Good is a distinctive concern of philosophy. Thus if this education rests on or is equivalent to philosophy itself, then on the first interpretation, the educators would be philosophers separate from but under the control of the statesman, while on the second interpretation, the statesman simply *is* the philosopher, as the *Republic* proclaims in a celebrated passage (473d–e). Either way, having opinions concerning the good and the beautiful points toward a type of inquiry and reflection essential for producing such opinions which is more fundamental than the cognitive dimensions of statecraft coming into play when the statesman plans and executes diverse practical affairs of state.

However this procedural matter is resolved, successful government requires that individuals under the statesman's control necessarily be aware of, and share the same true opinions about, the good and the beautiful. It will then be crucial for the ruler of such government to oversee a comprehensive understanding of goodness and beauty, otherwise regardless how well-born and receptive to education the populace may be, the statesman will be unable to control and direct their education in ways essential for active cooperating as members of the polity. This good is, however, only one among a series of such fundamental realities—honor, justice, beauty (and, significantly, their opposites)—included in the reservoir of true opinion essential for citizenry. From this perspective, having opinions about the unjust is no less important as having opinions about the just. As a result, this series of passages does not assert that goodness is somehow metaphysically privileged; the good is merely one of a set of crucial realities which must be part of the cognitive experience of prospective citizens in a well-run state producing happiness for its citizens.

References to the good and the beautiful occur in each of the above analyses of art, education and psychology. This pattern suggests that the Good, in some fundamental sense, pervades these activities as well as their proper objects. However, determining the connection between the Good in its universal but currently inchoate state and the structure of dialectic in the *Statesman* is complex and requires additional discussion. To adopt the most congenial interpretive approach is a significant element of this complexity, as the following preliminary review shows.

Strategies of Interpretation

On one end of the interpretative spectrum, A. E. Taylor reads the *Statesman* as straightforward Platonic justification of "certain fundamental points of constitutional theory"[9] while on the other end, Stanley Rosen speaks of Plato's "sense of humor," which gives "a baroque costume to his usual irony" (p. 66), adding that although it "may seem frivolous to suggest that the *Statesman* is an elaborate Platonic joke," the joke will be on those interpreters "who lack the wit to appreciate Plato's elegance or the playful seriousness that is required to penetrate the initially tedious details of the *Statesman* in order to enter the presence of its enigmatic author" (p. 8). For Julia Annas and Robin Waterfield, the *Statesman* "is in some ways a record of complication and even confusion," although the authors grant that the dialogue "is a record of the entanglements that only a very great and original thinker, defending and qualifying his boldest work at the same time, could get into" (p. xxii). In sum, Plato is either maintaining serious dogma, involving the appropriately astute reader in an elaborate philosophical joke, or recording his own confusion for posterity's sake.

The aporetic character of the *Statesman*—the approach employed in this study—multiplies the possible interpretive approaches toward eliciting and describing its metaphysical dimension. Thus it may be argued that this metaphysics, if viewed as a unified whole, is (A) aporetic in all respects; (B) aporetic in some respects and substantive in others; (C) substantive in all respects.

Consider alternative (C) first. One reason to suspect its inappropriateness is that the proponent of this metaphysics is Eleatic, his exact identity left in anonymity. After all, since Socrates participates in the *Statesman*, why doesn't he develop substantive Platonic doctrine, if such is the dialogue's goal? Because, it might be argued, Plato is revising a previous position or exploring alternatives to that position and he wants a new representative to introduce these changes. But if so, why is Socrates even present at such an enterprise, much less as a spectator who, although primarily a passive witness to the exchanges between the Stranger and young Socrates, actively states his intention to return to the argumentative fray once the Stranger concludes his portion of the inquiry (258a)? For if Plato broached significantly new notions under guise of an Eleatic Stranger, it would surely have given greater weight to such a change to drop Socrates from the proceedings altogether. If Socrates is absent, there would be no reason to suspect that he might even hear about anything said by the Stranger; but if Socrates is present, then it is hardly an imaginative stretch to envision him desiring to ask the Stranger, or someone taught by the Stranger, just "one or two small questions." An additional reason against alternative (C): a namesake of Socrates, the Stranger's respondent in the *Statesman*, is young, tractable, and all things considered, inexperienced philosophically. The fact that he is so unversed suggests that ready acceptance of the Stranger's positions as straightforward Platonic teaching is ill-advised on the part of the dialogue's students, lest they be justifiably assessed as no less inexperienced in these matters than young Socrates himself.[10]

These reasons collectively suggest that alternative (C) will not provide a fruitful reading of the *Statesman*.

Interpretive approaches (A) and (B) appear more viable alternatives. Consider (A), that the dialectic is completely aporetic.

From this perspective, the *Statesman* contains no positive doctrine whatsoever (except, perhaps, incidentally); its purpose is to present a series of serious philosophical positions, more or less soundly argued, *all* of which must be subjected to further critical scrutiny. If, for example, dialectical method in the *Statesman* is to a certain extent botched both in theory and practice (as seems evident), then questions worth further reflection based on this incomplete statement and development of method can still be formulated, especially in view of explicitly maintained positions on related subjects in dialogues both earlier and later than the *Statesman*.

Approach (A) has merit, but can readily be carried to self-destructive extremes. Thus from excessive weight on the fact that the central protagonist of the *Statesman* is an Eleatic philosopher, it is possible to argue that *any* apparent assertion of philosophical substance is, and is intended to be understood as, ironic or, as the Stranger says of the myth, merely a dialectical *jeu d'esprit*. Consider, for example, the passage at 285d, when the Stranger presents what is usually read as an exposition of the method of collection and division. Does Plato want us to dismiss this statement of method, and then to infer the irrelevance of method in philosophy? This consequence is surely self-destructive to the overall sense of the dialogue; thus the interpretive assumption giving rise to it must be rejected.[11] Less drastically, does he want us to recognize flaws in this method insofar as these flaws are paraded as apparent dogma in the *Statesman*—but then substitute another method in its stead? Or does he want us to think through this method more accurately than the Stranger has and then retain that method with appropriate modifications?

This final alternative leads directly to approach (B), in my belief the most justified and potentially fruitful alternative. The interpretation developed in this study is based on assuming that the dialogue is aporetic in only some respects. It is therefore all the more reasonable to study the *Statesman* as a document in metaphysics—or more accurately, in *implied* metaphysics—since such a study must distinguish between positions carrying authority and those which are only provisional and require additional investigation.

From this perspective, the Stranger develops a distinctively Platonic position only in part; he is also, however, exploring aspects of this position with complementary relevance to Platonic concerns in order to force attention on principles requiring additional reflection. Furthermore, these principles are at a level of generality such that an Eleatic philosopher—conversant with abstract concepts and lines of argument—would serve as an appropriate agent of inquiry. The Stranger would then develop doctrine both Platonic in overall scope and in its main configuration congruent with an Eleatic approach to reality, but lacking a dimension or dimensions which a distinctively Platonic position would identify and integrate within an already existing philosophical schematic.

This study will describe these dimensions in the course of interpreting the dialogue as a whole, in the process outlining areas requiring additional thought before an "official" Platonic metaphysics can be stated: the nature of a Form (given that in the *Statesman* a Form can be divided into classes and parts); distinguishing between greater and lesser realities; the relation between Forms and particulars; a principle for determining value. Furthermore, the interplay between these issues and a series of problematic senses of unity will depend on the Good, *to agathon*, as a

metaphysical horizon receiving only hints, but highly suggestive hints (noted above), in the *Statesman*. We shall demonstrate that the omission of *to agathon* as an element in the Stranger's reflections, occurring as it does within a systematic metaphysical whole, has an equivalently detrimental affect on both the method and application of dialectic throughout the *Statesman*.

The *Sophist* strongly suggests that defining the sophist is part of an intended trilogy, with definitions of statesman and philosopher comprising the other two components. One can readily imagine the *Philosopher*—the unwritten *Philosopher*—as a discussion involving Socrates, his younger namesake and perhaps the Stranger as well, in which it is shown that a fully articulated definition of sophist and statesman presupposes philosophy, that is, philosophy rightly understood and explained, and that to define the philosopher is to show *what* the philosopher thinks about and *how* the philosopher goes about such thinking. It is also possible that during the course of this discussion, whatever appeared to pass for dogma in both *Sophist* and *Statesman* would be analyzed—and exposed to appropriate philosophical, that is, Socratic, criticism.[12]

We do not have the *Philosopher*, but we do have the *Philebus*. In the *Statesman*, the Stranger leads the discussion and admits that the method of dialectic has not yet been adequately stated (262c; also 263a); in the *Philebus*, however, Socrates leads the discussion and presents a method he knows full well but cannot apply adequately as required in specific cases (16c). If these two methods are equivalent in purpose and principle, then it will be relevant to understanding the *Statesman* to determine what the *Philebus* adds to the structure of this method which has been omitted in the *Statesman*.[13] When the *Statesman* is approached from this perspective, the myth of the reversed cosmos assumes decisive importance. Its cosmological setting, treatment of certain immutable realities, derivative status of the divine, subtle but unmistakable application of "due measure"—all contribute to establishing, or more accurately, *pointing to*, the need for a fundamental metaphysical principle on the order of the Good. Also recall that at a crucial point in the *Philebus*, Socrates identifies and develops apparently the closest approximation of the Good that he can put into words (65a). An additional contrast: in *Republic*, a dialogue defining the true statesman as the philosopher-king, Socrates offers, after some hesitation, highly speculative yet seminal claims on the status and effects of the Good; in *Statesman*, the Stranger is silent on this fundamental sense of the Good. This study will show how the Good is relevant to the myth and how, by appealing to the Good developed in the *Philebus*, the absence of the Good is crucial to understanding both the incomplete method of dialectic and the equally incomplete results of that method as propounded in the *Statesman*.

The *Statesman* will now be analyzed in detail from this interpretive point of view.

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Chapter 1

The Dialectical Road to Myth
[257a–68d]

Socrates and Value [257a–c]

The *Statesman* begins with Socrates thanking Theodorus for introducing him to the Stranger and Theaetetus. Theodorus replies that Socrates will be "three times" as grateful after they develop definitions of statesman and philosopher. The implication is that sophist, statesman and philosopher are each of unit value; therefore, Theodorus reasons that if Socrates is grateful for learning about the nature of the sophist, one member of this trio, he will be three times as grateful for learning about all three types.

In reply, Socrates asserts that Theodorus erred in making sophist, statesman, and philosopher of equal value. Rather, they are "farther apart in value than your mathematical proportion can express." Theodorus, swearing by Ammon, takes Socrates' reproof to concern his "faulty arithmetic," suggesting that correct arithmetic would produce the right evaluation among the three types; Theodorus then promises to get even with Socrates at a later date. Theodorus' comparison suggests that, for him, determining value is an entirely formal exercise readily reducible to mathematical computation. On Theodorus' principles the philosopher might be, for example, three times as valuable as the statesman rather than of equal value; in other words, it is possible that Theodorus the mathematician has made a simple error in computation. However, Socrates' comment might mean that value, when ascribed to these three types, is not amenable to mathematical determination. Thus no mathematical proportion can convey how value applies to these types. If so, how is such value discovered? For if value differences among these types cannot be achieved arithmetically, they will be derivable only in terms of "greater" or "less"; for example, the philosopher is more valuable than the statesman or the sophist is less valuable than the philosopher. But how should a theoretical dimension encompassing the possibility of such value judgments be determined?[1]

This brief introductory exchange locates the question of value squarely within the horizon of dialectical discourse. It is Socrates who mentions value and Socrates who contends that value is not reducible to computational formulae. Socrates has very little to say in the *Statesman*, although his promise (made at 258a) to return when the Stranger and young Socrates conclude their colloquy should be noted. What he does say sets a foundation for assessing the extent to which subsequent conversation attends to the question of ascribing value, and also to the more fundamental question of specifying the basis on which value should be determined. This foundational backdrop may be recalled when the Stranger says, at a crucial juncture in dialectical

discussion, that value plays no role whatsoever in determining through philosophical method "the most perfect truth" (266d).[2]

Relation and Reality [257c–8b]

The Stranger asserts that their conversation concerning the philosopher and statesman must not cease until they have reached "the end" of the matter, a termination which, as it happens, will take considerable time and collective energy. The Stranger appears to assert that their converse must complete the cycle of inquiry, that is, that they must define both the statesman and the philosopher just as they have recently defined the sophist; if so, then this end will not be reached in the present dialogue since it concludes with an apparently successful definition of the statesman but does not take into account the nature of the philosopher, which will remain unanalyzed. He then suggests that Theaetetus, the primary respondent in the *Sophist*, be given a rest and that his classmate, the young Socrates, replace him.

The philosophical dimension of language is not a topic immediately imposing itself on the student of the *Statesman* but its presence is virtually constant, subtle—and metaphysically incisive. Socrates now asserts that Theaetetus and young Socrates "are both related to me after a fashion." Theaetetus is like Socrates in physical appearance and young Socrates shares "the same name" as his older compatriot, a fact that Socrates asserts "implies some sort of kinship" (258a). Socrates is emphasizing that one proper name, "Socrates," can be applied to two different things. Kinship exists between distinct individuals so linked but such kinship is strictly nominal and the drama of the *Statesman* effectively underlines that point. For, as things turn out, young Socrates and Socrates the elder share the same name but few of the same human characteristics. In fact, they are in many ways polar opposites of one another, especially with respect to the demands of philosophy.

The nature of kinship—or, more abstractly stated, relation—is also thrown into question, at least indirectly, since two of the most common and evident types of relation, physical appearance and names, at best evoke only a superficial kind of sameness. It should come as no surprise then that a higher level of generality, sameness itself, becomes philosophically crucial later in the dialogue, since sameness is one of the key elements in the definition of a paradigm, the cognitive vehicle asserted by the Stranger to be virtually a prerequisite in exhibiting the nature of certain important realities (277d). A passage at the outset of the dialogue, readily taken as scene-setting without philosophical import, initiates the need for reflection on what happens metaphysically when relations connect things, whether those relations are, initially, linguistic or perceptual.

This point is reinforced when Socrates says that the company must be "eager" [προθύμως] to debate what is so related, suggesting that relations are inherently puzzling and worth close thought. Indeed, Socrates fully intends to interrogate his youthful namesake when the young man and the Stranger have completed their discussion (258a). Thus whatever conclusions young Socrates accepts during the course of the lengthy exchange with the Stranger will be eligible for interrogation by Socrates the elder. The fact that Socrates intends to return and question his younger

namesake should be kept in mind throughout since this future interchange, had it ever occurred and been fully pursued, might have altered, perhaps drastically, the stated results of the present dialogue.[3]

The Advent of Method and Metaphysics [258b–d]

The Stranger asks young Socrates whether the statesman should be ranked "among those who have knowledge [ἐπιστημόνων]." When young Socrates agrees, the Stranger asks whether knowledge should be divided as it was when examining the sophist (in the dialogue of that name which occurred "just now," that is, shortly before on the same day). The young student of philosophy hesitates and the Stranger then insists that the present division will not be along the same lines.

This initial relocation is dialectically significant. The *Sophist* begins by assuming that the sophist has its own unique Form (217b) and then contending that the activity of the sophist is clearly an art of some sort (232a). The *Statesman* begins by assuming that although statesmanship is a type of knowledge, its nature must be determined from knowledge understood in a broader context. Once the "pathway" leading to the science of statesmanship has been duly separated from other possibilities, we must "imprint upon it the seal of a single class [ἰδέαν]." Then, when the unity of this class is established, "it is necessary to set the mark of another single class upon all the other paths that lead away from this, and to make our soul [ψυχὴν] conceive of all sciences as of two classes" [εἴδη]. The Stranger insists that all other paths leading away from the statesman should also be designated as "one" class regardless of their number so that the soul conceives all these branches of knowledge to be completely exhausted by two classes. Preserving the dichotomous aspect of this division here at the outset is apparently important, even if the other class and any of its possible subdivisions ceases to be relevant for subsequent dialectical concerns.

The *Statesman* does not merely assume that statecraft is a type of knowledge; rather, this aspect of statecraft must be shown by analyzing statecraft through dialectical means in relation to knowledge understood as a class of wider scope. Furthermore, if it can be so shown, then the Stranger emphasizes that the class from which statecraft is derived will display unity, that is, it will be *one* class. The fact that the Stranger literally says that we imprint or stamp this pair of unities onto knowledge then becomes relevant, since it raises the possibility that the important distinction between "theoretical" and "practical," which the Stranger is about to introduce, produces only names, more or less readily available in inquiry, but names not necessarily corresponding to realities (or, perhaps, to the correct realities). Thus, the "stamping" could be imposing language where its referents do not possess appropriate metaphysical pedigree. The usage of standard Platonic terminology in this context then becomes potentially misleading, since the formal elements would refer only to linguistic units arbitrarily generated rather than to more stable metaphysical realities.

However, the imprinting in question could bear the sense of ratification, that is, giving a class a name only ratifies the mode of existence of the class as a class rather than, as the other reading of this passage maintains, generating the unity of the class

merely through an application of unifying discourse. The immediate context of this passage does not present conclusive evidence on this crucial matter. The point is that the use of typically technical terms at this early juncture of the dialogue does not necessarily imply that Forms, understood canonically, have entered the discussion. A substantial gap may exist between words employed with the intention of illustrating methodological rigor and realities seemingly referred to by these words.[4]

The *Statesman* nonetheless emphasizes the activity of naming realities, and it may be observed that such naming is also one way to approach questions arising from the classic metaphysical issue of participation. Forms and particular beings can share the same name but they do not exhibit the same reality; the problem, perennial and crucial, is determining the metaphysical relation between a Form named F and a particular, named after and participating in F-ness. If the concern is for realities rather than just their names, then the question of unity arises—how are we to understand the "oneness" of the classes we seek to produce by division. After the extensive and penetrating survey of "the one" which drives the *Parmenides*, this question must be taken with due deliberation by the student of the *Statesman* if it should happen that the dialogue's protagonists sidestep the issue.[5]

Finally, knowledge is apparently understood as a collected body of truths; however, the structure of knowledge, what makes knowledge to be what it is—as opposed to, say, true opinion—is left undefined. The assumption, made by both discussants, is that knowledge is readily available. Furthermore, emphasizing "the soul" as recognizing the division into two sciences is especially noteworthy, given that in all later divisions moving toward determining the nature of statecraft—and unlike the detailed account of soul presented in the *Republic*—the only specific analysis of the nature of soul will be a distinction between the divine and immortal parts of soul asserted by the Stranger much later in the discussion (309c). For the Stranger, it is essential to indicate that soul must discern the products of division; it is apparently not essential that soul be considered when division concerns the nature of human beings as a relevant factor in determining the nature of statecraft.

The Split between Theory and Practice [258d–e]

The Stranger now claims that arithmetic and related arts exist apart from practical consequences and merely provide knowledge, whereas the arts pertaining to handicraft "create physical objects which did not formerly exist" (258e). Thus the Stranger proposes that all knowledge be divided into two parts, practical and intellectual, and young Socrates concludes that they can assume that all knowledge is "one" and that these are its two types.

Although intellectual knowledge creates objects which did not formerly exist, these objects are not material in any sense; for if such knowledge did produce this kind of objects, then in this respect no distinction would obtain between the two types of knowledge presently characterized. Thus the "body politic" is not a body in the ordinary physical sense, although it certainly exists. After establishing this division, the Stranger does not identify from which class statecraft will be derived—does the ruler of a state employ intellectual or practical knowledge? For if the ruler

uses either intellectual or practical knowledge to the complete exclusion of the other type, then immediate problems arise for the regime's success—if practical without theoretical, then decisions lack a firm foundation in terms of moral and political principles; if theoretical without practical, then this base, although intellectually solid, will confront the inherent obstacles presented by the brute here-and-now, continually changing quality of the "real" world and the need to make "pragmatic" decisions in the face of this fact. Either way, the competence if not the success of the ruler is threatened if the current dichotomous split in types of knowledge should turn out to be irreducible.[6]

Collection and the Kingly Science [258e–9c]

Before addressing the question of which type of knowledge the ruler possesses, the Stranger asks whether statesman, king, master and householder are "all one, to be grouped under one title, or shall we say that there are as many arts [τέχνας] as names"? The Stranger raises the possibility that there might be a straightforward one-to-one correlation between names and arts; thus if different names exist, then there may be as many arts as there are names, each art different from the other arts just as their names differ from each other.

In the case at hand, however, only one art covers all named activities and the Stranger's exchanges with young Socrates now assume the form of an argument. First, the Stranger elicits the point that if a private citizen were capable of advising a king, then the private citizen would have the art which a king should possess. Then the Stranger asserts that someone possessing this art would be called "kingly" solely with respect to this art, whether they were in fact a king or only a private citizen. Thus the predication of "kingly" depends on having knowledge, not on exercising it. As a result, the advisor is kingly whether or not the advisor ever has the ear of the king just as long as the advisor knows what the king knows, or what the king should know in order to function as a king. This example illustrates the split between theory and practice; a private citizen, possessed of the theory of statecraft, need not practice that theory in order to be appropriately dubbed "kingly."

The Stranger now claims, and young Socrates agrees, that the householder and the master of a family are the same. At this point the Stranger asks a pivotal question: is there any difference between the grandeur of a large house and the majesty of a small state? No, is the response. Thus the valuational aspect of a large house, its grandeur, becomes for present purposes indistinguishable from the valuational aspect of a small state, its majesty. That there might be a considerable difference in the number of people residing in a large house and a small state—with commensurate effect on their governance—is discounted; for the Stranger, what matters is the status of these two groups with respect to value and, he asserts, no appreciable difference between them obtains in this regard.

The Stranger concludes his assessment of this collection of what originally appeared to be disparate entities. Whether this art is called kingship, statesmanship or householding is immaterial: all are objects of "one knowledge." If this identity is allowed, then the Stranger may justifiably interchange any of these types of

organization—kingship, statecraft, householding—throughout the subsequent discussion since all these types reflect and name one and the same type of knowledge. This important conclusion follows on condition that the swiftly accomplished collection of types of social organizations into a single cohesive whole is allowed. For if this collected whole is composed of disparate parts incompatible with one another in some fundamental way, then fragmented results may ensue if division is directed at the inherently unstable unity so gathered. The important question of appropriate procedures for establishing a reliably unified collection arises here, albeit in an understated way.[7]

Nature and Division [259c–60c]

The Stranger claims that the king is more like the class of intellectual things than the class of practical things since the king can do little with his body to maintain rule compared with what he can do with "intelligence" and "strength of soul." This phase of collection concludes by situating the political art and the statesman, the royal art and the king, all together "as one." The Stranger reasons that if the political art and the royal art are the same, then the statesman as the practitioner of the political art and the king as the practitioner of the royal art all belong to one and the same unity. Thus any apparent distinctions between political art and royal art, or between the statesman and the king, are effectively eliminated under the rubric of unity which the Stranger has now imposed.

The concerted emphasis on unity should be noted during the phase of discussion which concentrates on collecting materials for determining the nature of statecraft. However, the Stranger claims only that the ruler is "more like" one of the two classes produced by division. But if, as suggested above, intellectual and practical are exhaustive classes, then how can something be more or less like either of these two classes? Including something in one class would seemingly preclude in all respects its appearance in the other class. For if something could share in both classes, then how can the two classes be truly exhaustive? It appears that the initially sharp dialectical severance of theory from practice has already begun to break down with the implicit admission that the ruler possesses degrees of resemblance to both classes.

Knowledge has been divided exhaustively into two classes: practical and intellectual. Since according to the Stranger the king is more like the intellectual than the practical, the Stranger now investigates the intellectual class for requisite divisions. We should look to see whether any divisions are available "by nature" [διαφυὴν]. In the intellectual class, the Stranger discerns "a sort of" art of calculation, namely arithmetic, described as "finding out the difference between numbers" and passing judgment on them when these differences are discerned (259e).

In contrast to arithmetic, an architect rules workers by supplying them with knowledge; thus architecture also belongs to intellectual science. The Stranger proposes that intellectual science as a whole now be divided into two classes [γένη], calling one part [μέρος] commanding and the other judging. This, contends the Stranger, is a "fitting" [ἐμμελῶς] division. This division is dichotomous but also by nature, if the inquiry has followed the Stranger's original injunction at 259d.

At least in some cases then, division by dichotomy and according to nature may both be properly used within a single dialectical inquiry. Also, the Stranger has conferred a valuational judgment on this division, pronouncing it fitting, although it is unclear whether the fit belongs to a nature properly divided or follows simply from a straightforward imposition of dichotomous division.

Command and Production [260c–2a]

Does the kingly person belong to the class of judging or commanding? The latter, says young Socrates. The class of commanding can also be divided into giving one's own orders or relaying the orders of others—a "measured" [μετρίως] distinction comments the Stranger. Although the former class "is virtually nameless," the Stranger contends that the king belongs there. In this case, the Stranger decides to give "to someone else the task of naming" those types (other than the king) who issue their own orders. But the point stands—this class is currently nameless and the Stranger voices concern whether dialectic should remedy this terminological lack by introducing a freshly coined name. The Stranger's procedure suggests that the existence of a class is independent of a name for this class; thus, all individuals who give orders on their own exist as a unity quite apart from whether language has acknowledged this existence as a single class with a determinate name.

The class of those who give commands can in turn be divided into two different types of production—living and non-living. The science of the king is "nobler" since it concerns the guidance of living beings, unlike the science of, say, the architect—although the principle which allows the Stranger to compare the two types of science in terms of nobility is left unstated and it is precisely the introduction of an implicit value hierarchy which allows the division to be drawn.[8] Furthermore, the king is more like someone tending a herd of cattle or drove of horses rather than the solitary driver of an ox; as a result, the Stranger suggests that since the king cares for many subjects, not one, it is appropriate to call statecraft the "art of tending a herd" or, perhaps, something like "community management." Young Socrates responds "whichever we happen to say." The Stranger is pleased, noting that if young Socrates maintains this indifference to names, he will turn out "richer" in "wisdom" [φρονήσεως] when he becomes old.

It is hardly self-evident how an indifference to names, and to language in general, will lead to wisdom in old age, as the Stranger promises. Furthermore, in a philosophical epoch where some seekers of wisdom still labor in the shadow of Wittgensteinian language games and other professionals revel in the more oracular inscriptions of Derrida, it will be asked how one can move beyond the words we use for realities—"texts"—to "see" these realities in themselves, apart from words describing them. That such vision is accessible to the philosopher is, however, a Platonic principle which should be taken seriously at least if dialogues such as the *Statesman* are assessed on their own terms. Recall that the *Cratylus* explores the apparent connections between the names for things and an underlying metaphysics—names of things bring out either that things are always changing or that they are always the same. The relevant point is not that a legitimate metaphysics

can be derived from this approach—the *Cratylus* effectively undermines this possibility by emphasizing the resulting clash between the mutually inconsistent metaphysical positions so derived. For even if a position formulated in this way were internally consistent, it might still be false, that is, misrepresent the nature of reality as such.[9] The point is to recognize the threshold position of language with respect to determining the structure of reality and to appreciate the need to penetrate the vagaries of language in order to understand realities in themselves, to the extent that such understanding can be secured.

Part and Species [262a–3e]

Answering a query from the Stranger, young Socrates divides the art of herding into the care of humans and beasts. The Stranger applauds the courage with which young Socrates ventured this step, but he cautions his youthful partner against falling again into error. The error is to "take a single small part and set it off against many large ones" and to do so "apart from classes [εἴδους]" in making a division. The Stranger insists that "the part must also be a class" [εἶδος]. To separate immediately the object sought for is a "very fine" thing as long as the division producing this object is correct. But cutting through the middle is safer, says the Stranger, since "in that way one is more likely to find classes" [ἰδέαις]. When young Socrates asks what he means, the Stranger replies that "at present it is impossible to make the matter entirely plain" but he will try to clarify the situation as best he can by commenting on the perceived error just made by young Socrates.

The Stranger contends that if the human race were divided into two parts in the popular manner, by Hellenes, then the parts would be the Hellenic race and the rest of humanity. But the Stranger points out that the second part of this division is extremely large and also that its members "have no relation in blood or language to one another." Hellenes seem to believe that if there is a single name—"barbarian"—then "because of this single name, they think it is a single type" [γένος]. The Stranger immediately reinforces the point by adding another example—when someone cuts off a myriad (the number 10,000) from all other numbers in order to make it "one separate class," gives one name to all remaining numbers and then because of that name thinks "that this also formed one type [γένος] distinct from the other" (262e).

If a single name exists then it does not follow that a single class also exists. Thus, "barbarian" as a single name does not presuppose an existing class, barbarians, to which this single name can be fittingly applied—we are beguiled into thinking that a single name denotes a corresponding single class (262d). The Stranger does not deny the existence of barbarians—their number is, presumably, legion—but rather that barbaric individuals may not share a sufficiently similar structure to justify introducing a single class uniting all those individuals.

The other case is drawn from the opposite end of the numerical spectrum. Whereas many barbarians exist, there is only one number 10,000. But this single number's name does not reflect the existence of a class corresponding to that name—a class which, if it did exist, would be identical to its sole member. Furthermore, the Stranger denies that the complement of the putative class 10,000 is itself a class.

"All numbers other than 10,000" groups an unlimited extensional membership, a grouping simple in that its members are identical in (a) being numbers and (b) not being the number "10,000." Nonetheless, this group apparently also lacks whatever qualities are required to constitute a class in the Stranger's sense of the term.

The Stranger insists that a "better [κάλλιον] division" would be obtained if the human race were divided into male and female, and number into odd and even. These divisions are better because they are more in accordance with classes, although the Stranger does not justify why dividing human beings into male and female produces classes instead of merely parts of a single class. Young Socrates nevertheless appreciates the tenor of the Stranger's point and he asks whether they can secure a clearer understanding of part and class in order to see how, in general, they differ from each other. The Stranger says that the matter is worth investigating but that they have strayed from the goal of their inquiry; thus the young man's question will be considered later, "when we have time." However, the Stranger does state as a matter of principle that class and part are never separate from one another; rather, "when there is a class of anything, it must necessarily be a part of that which it is said to be a class, but there is no necessity that a part be also a class." This important assertion shows not only that the object of dialectic is metaphysically complex in that different kinds of things exist within a given object of inquiry but also that a dependency relation exists between these kinds. Classes can be parts of presumably more inclusive classes but parts of classes need not themselves be classes.

Parts of a nature are dependent upon classes constituting that nature. However, although parts in this sense cannot exist by themselves, it is not clear whether it follows, from this passage alone, that classes exist by themselves. That a part presupposes a prior class is clear, but whether that class exists in a privileged sense is as yet undetermined. If classes are indeed self-sufficient, then an essential metaphysical difference obtains between classes and parts of classes, since the part lacks the self-sufficiency differentiating it from the class from which that part has been derived. But even if classes are not self-sufficient, metaphysical dependency remains between classes and parts. Given that a particular human being is a barbarian, the fact that this individual is human is more important to the nature of that individual than the fact that this human also happens to be barbaric. The stipulation of criteria for determining the difference between part and class—a stipulation the Stranger explicitly cites—cannot be supplied when young Socrates queries his teacher on the point.

According to the Stranger, young Socrates separated a part, human beings, from the class of living beings and then surmised that the rest of the class of living beings was one class because all members of this complement class could be given a single name—beasts. But the Stranger contends that

> if there is any other animal capable of thought, such as the crane appears to be, or any other like creature, and it perhaps gives names, just as you do, it might in its pride of self oppose cranes to all other animals, and grasp the rest, men included, under one head, calling them by one name, which might very well be that of beasts (263d).

This example shows that another thinking animal, if there were such, might lump human beings into the same class as all other animals naturally incapable of thought—thereby reducing humans to beasts. This division is incorrect but there would be no way for the crane to realize the error unless cranes somehow discovered that humans, like cranes, could think.

The introduction of cranes into a division purporting to define statecraft may not be entirely serious, but its point must be appreciated. We do not believe that cranes can think (or at least that cranes think the way we think), but can we be certain of this belief? For if thinking is not unique to humans, then the capacity to think is not the *differentia* separating humans from other types of animal. If cranes were capable of thought in a relevant sense, it would be incorrect to divide living beings into two classes, thinking and non-thinking, and then subsume *only* human beings under the former class.

The Stranger's objection shows the potentially dangerous self-centeredness of human beings thinking they are the fulcrum for all such divisions. In one sense, of course, such bias is unavoidable given that division is a distinctively human endeavor and the recommended procedure to establish truth. However, the warning may be that natures simply are what they are, regardless what any human investigator might assert them to be, and that we should always place ourselves in a position of humility, as it were, before these natures if there is serious intent to discern their structure.

The preceding examples have illustrated some of the problems in correctly distinguishing classes, including the natural yet sometimes mistaken tendency to connect the existence of a naming term with the independent existence of a single class named by that term. One consequence is evident: the development of the naming relation in the *Statesman* is so variegated that it would be ill-advised to pursue a coherent doctrine of predication based just on this dialogue. The naming relation virtually compels the student of the *Statesman* to examine the nature of what is named in order to discern as much of this nature as possible through whatever means are available, whether analytical or otherwise. Determining the precise structure of a class is clearly relevant to this problem, since articulating this structure might provide criteria to distinguish between names properly associated with existent classes and names which are only names without substantive referential function.[10]

The Two Paths [263e–5b]

The Stranger begins this phase of dialectic by warning against dividing the entire class of living beings. Earlier, intellectual knowledge had been divided into a part which gives commands to animals in herds. But the Stranger notes that this class, animals in herds, had concealed the distinction between tame and wild animals. So a more correct division would have produced the class of tame animals in herds. The Stranger suggests that they begin again to divide this class, adding that what young Socrates desires in terms of this inquiry may come more expeditiously from ordinary conversation than by other means.

The Stranger notes that fish preserved in the Nile, in the ponds of the Persian king and in fountain pools, as well as goose and crane farms on the plains of Thessaly show

that rearing herds is partly aquatic and partly land-based. Since humans naturally live on land, they fall into the latter class. Land-livers are then divided into flying and walking animals, with statecraft to be sought for, again, in the latter class. At this juncture, the Stranger halts for what appears to be a significant methodological observation. He sees "two ways leading in that direction in which our argument has started"; the first, the quicker way, separates the class into a smaller and larger part, the second, the longer way, continues to divide as "nearly in the middle" as possible. Young Socrates wants to follow both paths; the Stranger agrees, but after insisting that this process cannot be done simultaneously but only as a sequence. Since they have almost reached their dialectical destination, it will be easy to pursue both paths. That the two paths lead to the same destination is a reasonable supposition, although the Stranger says only that the paths lead in the "direction in which our argument has started." Strictly speaking then, although the two paths both head toward a definition of statecraft, they may produce seemingly dissimilar definitions. This is precisely what happens.

The Longer Way: Method and Value [265b–6d]

The class under scrutiny may be named as tending tame herd animals which walk. The Stranger says that this class is divided "by nature"[φύσει] into the horned and the hornless; as a result, he suggests that they divide the art of tending these herds into two parts and then characterize the parts, for "if you try to give them names, the matter will become needlessly complicated." Presumably describing the respective elements in the definitions of each part is easier than naming the class as a unity from which each part is produced. A series of names—a description—will thus convey the significance of the parts of this class even if a single name denoting the class as such is not currently available. In this case, division by dichotomy again corresponds with the structure of a nature, since according to the Stranger the class in question is naturally divided into horned and hornless.

The king governs a herd lacking horns, but which part of that herd? The Stranger asks young Socrates whether the class of hornless animals should be divided on the basis of "having or not having cloven hoofs, or on that of mixing or not mixing the breed." When young Socrates is puzzled, the Stranger explains that horses and asses breed from each other but the rest of the class of hornless tame animals cannot cross-breed. The Stranger proceeds to divide the class of hornless animals so that the statesman cares for the class of unmixed breed.

The disjunction of classes—having cloven hoofs or interbreeding—the Stranger offers to young Socrates should be noted. The first disjunct, based on having or not having cloven hoofs, is not pursued either by the Stranger or young Socrates, but that it is tendered at this point in the process of division suggests that this class could serve just as well as the class actually adopted. If so, then apparently *any* characteristic which applies to the class of hornless tame animals—for example, having a tail—will accomplish the desired division.[11] Thus human beings would just as readily fall into the class of not having tails as they fall into the class of not having cloven hoofs. But if selecting a *differentia* is arbitrary in this way, whatever class

is produced by the final division will fail to reveal the complete nature of what has been divided. All that will be shown is that human beings belong to a class which lacks a property—the cloven-hoofed, the mixed-breeding or a number of other possibilities—possessed by other members in the class which has been divided.

At this point, the class of hornless tame non mixed-breeding animals must itself be divided. The Stranger contends that "all but two species" are left. Since young Socrates and Theaetetus are both interested in geometry, the Stranger invites them to generate this division by using their common interest to divide by the diameter and again by the diameter of the square of the diameter. But recall the strictures concerning mathematics given by Socrates—not the Stranger—at the beginning of the discussion. For if applying mathematics is inappropriate to determine the value of philosopher, statesman, sophist, subsequent results of dialectic, if based on a mathematical model, may yield implausible, perhaps even ludicrous, results.

The Stranger asks whether human nature is "related to walking in any other way than as the diameter which is the square root of two feet?" If the answer is yes, then the nature of the class of human beings is related to walking as the length of the diagonal is to a unit square. But the length of the diagonal of a unit square is root 2, that is, irrational. Therefore if the analogy holds, the members of the class of humans are irrational.[12] In other words, to analyze our nature by considering the fact that we are bipeds yields a nature which is irrational; human nature becomes a surd, as is root 2. This nature, although determinate given its dialectical starting point, cannot be measured according to these basic mathematical realities. Thus the nature of the human race cannot be determined simply by examining the fact that humans can walk. It also follows (given the same geometrical model) that the nature of the remaining species is rational, that is, it will be twice two or four. This division exactly reverses the truth since it makes human beings, by nature rational, into non-rational beings and transforms a species of animals, (putatively) by nature non-rational, into rational beings. (This reversal parallels, and anticipates, the reversal of growth in human beings which the Stranger envisions during the narration of the cosmological myth.)

This division also produces a "popular joke," an account of human nature rendering it indistinguishable from the nature of the pig. In other words, the Stranger generates the *differentia* of human beings—two-leggedness—by a concept which implies, when considered in a mathematical context, that humans are irrational when compared with four-legged pigs. Furthermore, an inference noted by the Stranger, the ruler of human beings becomes equivalent to the swineherd as someone "most in training for a life of careless ease."

These seemingly inappropriate conclusions do not, however, distress the Stranger. At 266d, he reminds young Socrates of something shown "before" (that is, at *Sophist,* 227b)—this method of dialectical argument "pays no more heed to the noble than to the ignoble, and no less honor to the small than to the great, but always goes on its own way to the most perfect truth" [τἀληθεστατον]. The Stranger refers to the concluding steps of a series of divisions, highlighting humans as bipeds and pigs as quadrupeds, assayed in pursuing a definition of the statesman. However, the implications of this statement of principle concerning dialectical method range far beyond the single exercise of defining statecraft. Although the distinction between

noble and ignoble—which, according to the Stranger, the method of division can freely ignore—is a straightforward instance of dichotomy, separation of jointly exhaustive classes, the classes divided are normative. The question then is whether such a dichotomous cut can be executed apart from a concomitant value dimension. In formal terms, no apparent distinction obtains between the complementary classes horned/unhorned and noble/ignoble; in terms of content, however, the difference between the two types of class is qualitative—and considerable. The first division is based on a natural difference, empirically determinable, while the second is based on a value determination.

If all such divisions are based solely on formal elements, then the classes of noble and ignoble can be generated with nothing more than the name "noble" and class negation. But if the division is based on both form and content, then it must be possible at some point to give an account of noble and ignoble. In general then, any division according to value-categories requires that the dialectician state or at least point to the realm of value insofar as value pertains to the classes produced. In fact, this position presupposes not only recognizing, but in some way describing, what it means for things to be valued. This capacity has far-reaching consequences. Students of the *Parmenides* will recall Socrates' hesitation about affirming a Form for dirt and similar realities, then being chided for such metaphysical elitism by Parmenides (130d–e). But the passage at 266d suggests that every existing thing is worth knowing and also, presumably, that every existing thing is in some sense knowable.

Precluding value from whatever falls under the scope of dialectic also, however, raises a potential problem. For if, in analyzing anything regardless of its value, dialectic should also prescind from assessing the value of what is so analyzed, then dialectic becomes an inherently "value-free" form of inquiry—merely describing its subject matter without determining the value or significance of whatever has been discovered about that subject matter. Such methodological abridgement would be arbitrary and unjustified in a proper Platonic universe since the value-dimension of existence is thereby systematically excluded from cognitive consideration. If therefore recognizing value is crucial to understanding realities examined through dialectic, then it should not be unexpected to witness value-free dialectical exercises in the *Statesman* pursuing an errant course. A dramatic—and at the same time comical—indication of such errancy is the definition of human nature just produced and the correspondingly low-level transcription of the ruler as an easy-living swineherd.[13]

If dialectic does fail in principle to discriminate value considerations,[14] such failure could occur in at least two contexts:

A. If, for example, in dividing forms of government, no provision is made for the fact that some forms are "better" than other forms: thus if monarchy is a better form of government than tyranny, then this evaluative fact must be stated or somehow displayed. Furthermore, if various types of government exist between the extremes of monarchy and tyranny, then a dialectician marking each type but failing to note the respective degree of value displayed by all such types indulges in value-free analysis. Such analysis would be accurate as far as it went, but seriously flawed in failing to connect the description of each type with a determination of the value of all such types.

B. If in dividing natural wholes into parts, no provision is made for determining whether some parts are "more important" to the whole than other parts: thus dialectic as formulated is apparently oblivious to significant value-differences between and among things which are in other respects similar or identical. If, for example, *not* being two-legged affects the nature of a crane more than such a lack affects the nature of a human, then it would be premature to assume that this single property, common to both types, can be abstracted and introduced into dialectic without taking into account its relation to the nature of the being as a whole. The "most perfect truth" the Stranger claims for this method at 265d thus lacks the element of value in determining the structure of natures under its purview, commensurately affecting the reliability of the division so produced.

The missing element of value has crucial consequences for philosophy in the *Statesman*. If philosophy is equivalent to dialectic[15] and dialectic is an art, then philosophy is an art—indeed, the greatest of the arts, as Socrates has affirmed (*Phaedo* 61a). But if philosophy is not equivalent to dialectic, then even if dialectic is an art, philosophy itself would be an art only if the additional, unspecified component is conjoined with dialectic into a unified process possessing the characteristics of art. Such a unity need not be the case. For if philosophy involves intuitive "seeing" which cannot be accommodated by the controlled vision proper to formal technique and such "seeing" is essential to determine value, then philosophy is not an art (even if dialectic as a part of philosophy is an art).

How then are value-determinations produced? A reality or standard must exist independently of the nature or constituent elements of the nature being evaluated, a standard also to some degree accessible to human cognition. The question becomes one of locating and identifying the source of such value. The impending myth addresses the question of the origin of value, but obliquely, and through a narrative deployed along dimensions of the highest generality.

The Shorter Way [266d–7a]

Of his own accord, prior to young Socrates making an explicit request, the Stranger now provides the shorter way to define the statesman.

The Stranger discerned two paths of inquiry when division had produced the class of walking animals. According to the Stranger's stipulation (265a), the shorter way begins by "separating a relatively small part and a larger." If the Stranger has followed this stipulation, then small and larger refer to the number of types in the class to be divided. Therefore, instead of dividing this class into horned and hornless, the initial move made by the longer way, the Stranger asserts that the class of walking animals be immediately divided into bipeds and quadrupeds. There are a larger number of types of quadrupeds—for example (types mentioned in the dialogue): pigs, horses, donkeys, dogs and, of course, many other types. The smaller part is bipeds; in fact, this part has only two members: humans (excluding primates) and birds. So the Stranger must only isolate a characteristic of birds lacking in humans—for example, feathers—and the last division has been secured. Thus human beings are defined as

featherless bipeds. Once this division is made, the statesmanlike and kingly man should be placed as "a kind of charioteer" ruling the state with such science.

The fact that the shorter way leads to a ruler as quasi-charioteer handed the reins of the state is an analogy which, if pressed, suggests that the subjects of such a ruler are less than human, since strictly speaking charioteer's reins control horses, not humans. Furthermore, the charioteer analogy is reminiscent of the mythic account of soul in the *Phaedrus*.[16] According to this account, soul in its nature is governed by a winged charioteer (246a); however, through some mischance or evil, soul loses its wings, falls to the earth and, in some cases, inhabits human beings (248d); thus soul is by nature feathered but when it initially animates a human being soul has lost its feathers. Furthermore, the feathers of the soul begin to regrow once the soul has beheld the beauty of this world, an experience reminding soul of the Form beauty (249e). According to the *Statesman*, humans are by nature featherless—which, of course, they are, at least externally. But in concert with the image of the feathered soul in the *Phaedrus*, the suggestion emerging from the shorter way is that the king as charioteer rules over featherless bipeds with featherless souls, souls which have not yet seen any reality, anything of the Forms. These subjects are externally human—they are shaped like humans and animated by souls which belong within humans. But these souls, given what is said about them at this juncture of dialectical reasoning, lack the analytical specification provided by the treatments of soul in the *Phaedrus* or, perhaps even more relevant in the present context, in the *Republic*.

Definition and Naming the Statesman [267a–c]

As the initial exercise in dialectic concludes, the Stranger says they will "go back to the beginning and join together the definition of the name of the statesman's art link by link to the end." Taken literally, this passage implies that the extended division, from 258b to 267a, has defined the *name* of statecraft rather than the art itself; if so, this division evoked a nominal rather than real definition. If, however, the analysis is only of names of realities rather than realities as such, then this version of dialectic reduces to a proto-ordinary language philosophy; the Stranger and young Socrates are, in effect, organizing and cataloging how Greeks speak about such things as statecraft.

It will be assumed, therefore, that a name, correctly identified during the process of division, presupposes that what is named constitutes a unity existing in its own right. Preserving, if possible, the oneness of naming with respect to division also appears important. As the Stranger is summarizing the previous divisions before positing the initial definition of the statesman, he reaches the point at which the art of rearing hornless animals was determined and then asserts that "of this in turn one part will have to be treated as no less than threefold, if it is to be called by one comprehensive name..."(267c). Even though statecraft (as the Stranger currently defines it) possesses three distinct elements—(1) the science or knowledge (2) of tending herds (3) which do not cross breeds—the relevant part of the class from which this tripartite description is derived, the science of rearing hornless animals, should still be referred to through "one comprehensive name." In general then,

one name (for example, "statecraft") may denote several, perhaps many, distinct elements which must be included when defining that to which the name refers. The art of "herding human beings" is the only subdivision remaining, and the Stranger asserts that this is the desired definition of that one art which is "both kingly and statesmanlike."

In his recapitulation of their dialectical endeavors, the Stranger follows the longer way, apparently because it is dichotomous. However, when he introduced the two paths the suggestion was that either path would lead to the desired definition, and he added that the method's value-free character would produce "the most perfect truth" (266d). If both paths are equally reliable then presumably both paths should state this degree of truth.

The class of featherless bipeds contains bipeds lacking feathers; human beings are the only such bipeds. Similarly, the only hornless walking bipeds who do not interbreed are human beings. The definitions are therefore identical in their referent. According to the longer way, human beings lack horns as well as the property of interbreeding; according to the shorter way, human beings lack feathers. If human beings are the only members of each of the two classes reached by these divisions, regardless which way was followed, then dialectic has succeeded. So if the method has been rigorously applied, the Stranger can justifiably claim that it produces the "most perfect truth." However, this superlative degree of truth must be viewed ironically. For with the exception of the final division, human beings are defined by what they lack, not by what they possess. Furthermore, examining the two ways reveals that the respective accounts subtly indicate characteristics which dialectic has overlooked: a human soul and rationality.[17] The Stranger will say, after narrating the myth, that his original account of statecraft erred greatly in describing the king of the prior rotation of the cosmos, a king who is in fact a god. This god-king rules by shepherding the humans under his purview. And the god "shepherds" these beings precisely because these humans are indistinguishable from other animals—save for lacking feathers (shorter way) or lacking horns and not interbreeding (the longer way). Thus dialectic has discerned human beings existing only as a certain sort of animal. But biped animals lacking feathers, horns, and the ability to interbreed remain only animals; as such, they require a "shepherd" to lead them—albeit a divine one—as the myth will show.

Furthermore, since nothing has been said about rationality, the soul, and discourse as essential to human beings, it is open for the Stranger to posit—as he will in the myth—that humans and animals can discuss matters philosophical (272c). The possibility, asserted in the myth, that during the Cronos cycle human beings can discuss philosophy with cranes, dogs, horses and sheep is perfectly plausible since nothing so far has been said about either humans or sheep to warrant the inference that such discourse would be strained, much less impossible by virtue of fundamental generic differences. For according to present definitions, no generic difference obtains between human beings and animals with respect to soul and rationality as characteristic of a certain type of soul. Thus humans discoursing with animals about philosophical subtleties such as the one and the many is theoretically possible because current dialectical conclusions characterize the members of both classes in such a way that nothing said about these classes precludes this possibility.

Definition and Schema [267c–8d]

After defining the statesman as the herder of human animals, the Stranger immediately wonders whether this position is as true as young Socrates avows it to be. We have given, says the Stranger, an account of the statesman "after a fashion," but have not left it "complete" [τελέως]. The Stranger then criticizes the definition because merchants, farmers, gymnastic trainers and physicians could also claim to "take care of" humanity; in fact, these individuals tend not only the common herd but also the rulers themselves. By contrast, a herdsman not only feeds the herd, he is also their physician, matchmaker, midwife, and soother with music or play. No one would contest that the herdsman is the perfect caregiver by virtue of tending to all the needs of the herd—but the ruler of human beings does not perform such a universal function. How then can the concluding definition of the statesman be correct if it isolates the ruler as the *only* herdsman and tender of the human herd while many other caregivers (of various sorts) will inevitably contest this claim? The Stranger concludes: they have outlined a "sort of kingly shape" [σχῆμα] but have not yet given an account of the ruler with required precision [ἀκριβείας].[18] They must separate the ruler from competing contenders and render the nature of the ruler clearly apparent. In order to prevent the inquiry from falling into "disgrace," the Stranger proclaims that they must begin again, but "from a new starting point and along a different road."

The Stranger's self-critique suggests that the object of what has been analyzed so far is in some sense deficient in reality, hence the incomplete account of its nature. The "shape" of the king limned during dialectic remains only an outline and the account stated by apprehending this shape lacks the rigor which, had it been in place, would have obviated the objection just raised by the Stranger. Care provided by the king has become indistinguishable from care provided by many types of individual devoted to human concerns. A definition of statecraft depending solely on such an understanding of care must therefore be deficient.

Summary

The Stranger and young Socrates are attempting to define statecraft by a specific method. One reason the Stranger must start anew in this quest is that the method may not be clearly formulated, a suggestion reinforced by the fact that when young Socrates requests clarification of division by dichotomy and the difference between a part and a class, the Stranger acknowledges but does not answer, postponing such matters because, he claims, of the pressure of current discussion.

If these questions are unresolved because the Stranger is uncertain of their solution, then subsequent dialectical exercises might not secure the desired results. The Stranger's approach shows something about the structure of this method and also, by extension, about the nature of what the method has attempted to analyze. But if the method has been inaccurately or incompletely conceived, then it would be prudent to expect that conclusions reached through applying this method will also be inaccurate or incomplete (or both). This much is safe to say: The Stranger

is sensitive to language and the connection between names and what is named. The Stranger is aware of the importance of preserving the unity of what is named, even if that unity encompasses multiple elements. The Stranger deems the value of what is analyzed dialectically irrelevant to its results—dialectic is, it seems, "value-free." The Stranger identifies the goal of dialectic as a schema, but it is not evident whether "schema" is merely another name for *eidos* (Form), whether it refers to a different type of reality, or perhaps even to an *eidos* but one of diminished degree, if such a difference is possible at this level of reality. Finally, the question of the unity of such entities becomes even more prominent once an *eidos*, as the subject of dialectic, emerges as metaphysically complex when construed as consisting of classes as well as parts which depend on these classes for their existence as parts.

Much is problematic, both methodologically and substantively, in what the Stranger and young Socrates have said so far. In fact, philosophical pressure is building for a revamped approach to the matter at hand—that is, defining statecraft. The Stranger is true to his word; the "road" on which we now must travel is indeed very different.

Chapter 2

The Cosmos: Motion, Matter, Measure [268d–74e]

The Necessity of Myth [268d–9c]

The new point of departure or principle [ἀρχῆς] leading toward the definition of statecraft offers some "entertainment" [παιδιὰν], traversing as it does a "large part" of a "great myth" [μεγάλου μύθου] but the Stranger insists that "it is necessary" to add this narrative to the discussion. Once this narrative has been completed, they can proceed as before, by eliminating "part [μέρος] after part" until they reach the "highest point" of their final destination.[1] Young Socrates agrees with this proposed procedure.

The Stranger prefaces the myth by asserting that "no one has told the tale" he is about to relate. Where then did the Stranger learn or hear of this momentous account? Did he fabricate it solely on his own? The absence of an indicated source for the myth suggests that its origin, whether human or divine, may be irrelevant—the myth's function is, at this juncture, more crucial than its point of origin.[2] The myth depicts a set of complex cosmic circumstances pointing the way toward rectifying the initial collection in the dialectical exercise devoted to defining statecraft and kingship. The Stranger realizes the need to correct the dialectical beginning apparently because his soul has adopted a standpoint for discerning such correctness; if so, the correct pursuit of dialectic presupposes that soul must be ordered in a certain way in order to achieve reliable results. This requirement is hinted at when the Stranger alerts young Socrates to attend to the myth with his "mind"—[νοῦν]—only the most cognitively alert dimension of soul will appreciate what the myth tells us about statecraft and the complex process of defining it.

The myth is indeed "great" in scope, detailing the origin and career of the universe and accounting for long-standing tales told by Greeks concerning the change in the rising and setting of the sun and other heavenly bodies. If, however, it also affords entertainment, then parts or aspects of the narrative will apparently be more ornamental than philosophically orthodox. The discussants must nonetheless add this story to the discussion—not all of it, but a "large part"—suggesting that even if some aspects of the myth are incidental to the point of present inquiry, other aspects are essential in order to put dialectical inquiry on the right track. Once this excursus into myth has been completed, then dialectic can resume as usual, analyzing the nature of statecraft according to division, part by part. This resumption suggests that the method is fully competent to attain its philosophical goal as long as it is headed in the right direction. In other words, dialectic aimed at defining the statesman, at least as practiced so far, requires that a sufficiently expansive narrative

be related to explain certain cosmic eventualities. But why interrupt dialectic with such a drastically different form of discourse? Why a myth at this juncture rather than, for example, simply revising previous divisions by more appropriate divisions? What will a myth focused on the origin and structure of the cosmos show about the nature of statecraft that the method of division has failed to show? The initial stages of an answer to these questions will emerge by the end of this chapter.[3]

The Structure of the Cosmos [269c–70d]

Cause and kingship

At 269c, the Stranger says that the "cause" [αἴτιον] of several traditional mythic heavenly portents, such as Zeus reversing the setting sun to favor the claim of Atreus and the ancient story that under Cronos humans were earthborn and not begotten of one another, must be revealed since that will help us to "exhibit" [ἀπόδειξιν] the nature of the king. This cause is mythic to the extent that the events which it accounts for are mythic. But even if the underlying context is a mythic narrative, the Stranger alerts us that the cause so presented will perform serious philosophical labor—properly understood, it will help exhibit the nature of the ruler, a nature the dialogue as a whole is intended to disclose. This qualification implies that the most relevant portion of the myth will describe the circumstances underlying the causality compelling the cosmos to rotate in opposite directions. *This* account will clarify or exhibit the nature of the king—not the mythic descriptions of the ruler during the reigns of Cronos and Zeus.

Measure and wisdom

The myth states that "the god himself" goes with the cosmos to guide its allotted "measure" [μέτρον] of cycles. This deity then releases hold on the cosmos, whereupon "of its own accord" the cosmos rotates in the opposite direction, since "it is a living creature and is endowed with wisdom [φρόνησιν] by the one who synthesized it in the beginning." The notion of measure is thus introduced at the outset of the myth and in a context of fundamental significance, since the relation between deity and cosmos is contoured by a given measure of cycles. Who, or what, determines this measure? The source of measure could be self-imposed—deity recognizing its inherently limited power to control the cosmos, thereby assigning to itself a certain set number of cycles to provide the cosmos with divine accompaniment. But such measure could also be imposed on deity by an external source; if so, then this source clearly exceeds the functional nature of deity since it limits deity's power with respect to governing the cosmos as a synthesized and harmonized unity. Furthermore, the wisdom vouchsafed to the cosmos animates the cosmos—itself a living being—so that it continues to display wisdom even when not under the direct supervision of deity, indeed when the cosmos rotates in a direction counter to that when deity is in cosmic attendance. This conjunction of measure and wisdom defines the structure of the cosmos and, as we shall see later in the dialogue, is also essential to the

natures of realities existing in the cosmos to the extent that the Stranger is capable of articulating these natures.

Deity and demiurge

The account refers to the god who accompanies the cosmos as it revolves and also to the one, presumably a deity, who synthesized it [συναρμόσαντος—269d1]. Are these distinct deities or one and the same god?

If it is the same deity, then the god bestowing harmony on the cosmos by synthesizing it must also at a certain point relinquish the role of accompanying the cosmos while it revolves. This implication suggests strongly that two deities are at work, the first harmonizing the cosmos and departing while the second then guides the cosmos throughout its orderly period, since it appears implausible for a god to harmonize the cosmos but (as we shall learn shortly) stand by while watching it gradually yet ineluctably return to primordial chaos. However, the harmony granted to the cosmos could also either exhaust the harmonizing and synthesizing capacity of this deity or be based on an incomplete, albeit divine, awareness of what is required to institute cosmic harmony, a pair of possibilities accounting for the counter-rotation of the cosmos (in addition to the possibility suggested earlier). In either case, the deity is at some point compelled to retire, at least for a spell.

Since the synthesizing deity must withdraw, the elements induced by deity to harmonize with one another seem to have a life of their own, as it were, and must eventually be allowed to display the full dimension of that life. But in this case, the harmonizing deity and the accompanying deity could be one and the same—a single deity recognizing the limits of what has been cosmically harmonized and, once these limits are reached, duly stepping aside. Assume for the moment then that only one deity harmonizes the cosmos and also accompanies it at the beginning of its rotation.

In addition, "the god himself" is not drawn from the official Greek pantheon. Later in the myth, the god reigning over the reversed cosmic cycle is identified as Cronos (271c; cf. 272b) and the god in charge of the cycle following its current rotation is identified as Zeus (272b). Therefore, if the god accompanying the cosmos during its allotted number of cycles and the god who releases the cosmos are one and the same, this god cannot be either Cronos or Zeus, since each of these gods is explicitly assigned only one of the two cosmic cycles.[4] This implication indirectly establishes an existing deity who, although apparently lacking a proper name—reflecting in this respect "the Stranger"—exercises power unavailable to any member of the standard pantheon, including Cronos and Zeus. For the sake of convenience (and without prejudging any connection between the *Statesman* and the *Timaeus*), call this deity the demiurge, since even if this deity significantly differs from the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*, it achieves a similar formative function with respect to the origin of the cosmos.[5] As we shall see, the divinity serving as the source of the mythic "paradigm" (275b) for the human ruler is precisely this demiurge, the deity actively overseeing the cosmos, not Cronos or Zeus identified as superintendents of successive rotations of the cosmos.

Cosmos and wisdom

The initial phase of mythically explaining the opposite rotation of the cosmos once the demiurge releases control is that wisdom guides the cosmos so that when it, a living being, functions on its own and without the guidance of deity, its motion runs *opposite* to the motion defining its existence while in the company of deity.

But why, assuming the cosmos is unique, should it need wisdom in the first place? After all, there would be no need for the cosmos to be wise unless the cosmos were faced with situations requiring wisdom or, more generally, that wisdom should be present to the overall functioning of the cosmos. The cosmos, harmonious and ordered in form and structure by virtue of demiurgic power, apparently then enjoys this status only contingently and in fact is subject to circumstances jeopardizing this status. Indeed, the Stranger has insisted that this reversed motion is "necessary," since such motion is part of the nature [ἔμφυτον] of the cosmos (269d).

This confluence of wisdom and cosmic opposition should be noted. It seems possible that upon losing divine guidance, the wisdom bestowed on cosmos by deity would depart, just as deity itself has departed. If so, then cosmic motion could become immediately chaotic, without any semblance of order, much less the order marked by uniform and directly opposed motion. The latent wisdom within the cosmos seeks a certain kind of motion presumably because it is wise for the cosmos, a living thing without divine guidance, to do exactly the opposite of what it had been doing.[6]

Wisdom and motion

The Stranger's explanation for the necessary reversal of motion of the cosmos is complex, with implications of long-range significance for both the metaphysics and epistemology developed later in the dialogue, as well as for the specific determination of statecraft.

A. The immutability factor As the first step in the explanation, the Stranger asserts that "absolute and perpetual immutability" pertains only to the "most divine" things, and that body does not belong to this type of reality. What we call heaven and the cosmos have received many "fine" [μακαρίων] qualities from the demiurge but the cosmos also "partakes of" a bodily nature with commensurate effects with respect to change (269d).

This is the first mention of a dimension of reality which can refer to Platonic Forms, since canonic Forms are immutable and also are described (in other dialogues) as "divine" or "most divine."[7] The Stranger also specifies that this dimension lacks a body or anything material, although the fact that the Stranger identifies immateriality by appealing to the lack of its opposite mirrors, in a mythic context, the discursive gambit introduced in the initial account of statecraft of delimiting a subject by what it lacks rather than by what it possesses. This fixed and stable dimension of reality appears at the beginning of the account, but the Stranger offers nothing directly to amplify its nature or purpose. However, the close textual conjunction joining the appeal to immutable reality and the claim that the cosmos has received many fine qualities intimates a connection between the most divine reality and these qualities,

that is, that the demiurge has somehow produced such qualities for the cosmos by means of the most divine realities. Strictly speaking, however, the myth says nothing about the possible formative function of such realities nor does it disclose or even imply anything about the most divine realities other than what has just been asserted by the Stranger.[8]

B. Matter, change and motion The cosmos combines two distinct elements, one produced by the demiurge, the other because the cosmos possesses a bodily [σώματος] character, or to use a modern term, because the cosmos is, in part, material (corporeal matter since the cosmos is alive). The cosmos has "blessed" qualities from the demiurge. But since the cosmos also "partakes" of the bodily, what is of the body—or matter—exists independently of both the demiurge and properties the demiurge instills in matter. Thus either unformed matter is eternal or it exists in some sense prior to the demiurge imposing avowedly blessed properties on it.

In addition, "therefore" [ὅθεν—269e1] implies that change exists precisely because the cosmos is partially constituted by matter. But that the cosmos undergoes change is tempered by its uniformity: a "single" motion in "the same" place and in "the same" manner. From this perspective, the cosmos approaches the stability and in a sense the perfection of the "most divine" beings mentioned earlier in the myth. However, the cosmos is *always* rotating, in this respect antithetically opposing the mode of existence of what is immutable—presumably Forms. The Stranger does not specify what "blessed" qualities the creator bestows on matter. But later in the myth, at 273b7, the Stranger asserts that "from its composer the cosmos has received only fine things" [καλὰ]; and, a few lines later (273c4), the Stranger adds that while the cosmos was under the guidance of the pilot deity, "it produced little evil and great good" [ἀγαθά]. Thus, the blessed qualities engendered by the creator may be specified as *kala* and *agatha*, things or attributes beautiful and good.

In sum, the cosmos is alive, it has wisdom, beauty and goodness, and is material as an embodied entity. But in addition to these characteristics, the cosmos also is in motion, a characteristic of singular complexity and metaphysical significance, for the following reason.

The myth asserts that since the cosmos has a material component, the cosmos must change. However, the cosmos moves with a single motion in the same place and the same manner. Now if the cosmos is envisaged as spherical, then this shape enables something to exist "outside" the cosmos (as asserted of the Forms in the *Phaedrus* myth at 247c–d), and to bestow on the cosmos its own "place." Although the original motion of the cosmos guided by the demiurge exemplifies change, indeed continuous change, it is change only of a sort; furthermore, such motion does not adequately satisfy the demands of change required by the material component of the cosmos. The requisite change therefore involves "the reverse motion in a circle," since such motion displays the "least deviation" from the cosmic motion instilled by the demiurge. In all other aspects of motion, the cosmos rotating in reverse mirrors, at least initially, the cosmos in its original rotation.

The Stranger carefully shows that the reversal of motion must originate from the indicated cause. First, it is impossible for the cosmos to turn itself, such capacity belonging only to the power "that guides all moving things." Thus the demiurge can

turn itself forever during the periods when it guides the rotating the cosmos, but the cosmos itself is incapable of such motion unless caused to do so by the demiurge. Furthermore, the demiurge cannot turn in one direction and then another since this is "contrary to divine law." The Stranger does not justify why such divine motion is contrary to laws governing the gods. But if this claim is axiomatic, then it is impossible to assert that the cosmos is always turned in two opposite directions *by the demiurge* since if the demiurge did accomplish such a reversal then the demiurge itself would be moving in these two directions (either actually or potentially) and this, as just asserted, violates divine nature. Also, the reversed rotations are not caused by two deities working in opposition to one another. The reason is again unstated but since two deities, even if distinct in some respects, are indeed divine, then such contrary motion still violates divine law because the underlying principle of divinity would run counter to itself through the activity of these two opposed and opposing gods. The only alternative, stresses the Stranger, is the one already indicated: the cosmos is guided by an extrinsic divine cause and then, at another time, it is left to itself so that it "moves by its own motion" through immense ages because "it is immensely large and most evenly balanced, and turns upon the smallest pivot."

The care and precision marking the diversity of alternatives establishing that nothing divine has any hand in the reversed movement of the cosmos—implying that the cosmos moves in reverse entirely by itself—suggests not only the importance of cosmic behavior during this period of reversed motion but also that this behavior fundamentally contrasts with the mode of existence bestowed on the cosmos by divine agency. What the cosmos does on its own, as it were, must be seen in close apposition to what the cosmos does because the demiurge has fashioned it to behave in a certain way. As noted, the wisdom possessed by the cosmos is due to the deity who has synthesized and harmonized it. But if the reversed rotation of the cosmos is necessary "by nature," then what happens to the cosmos during its reversal appears to be derived from, or to reflect in some way, the wisdom animating the cosmos during its initial rotation. Thus the presence of wisdom throughout the cycles of reversed rotation implies that this reversal both manifests wisdom and is also essential to the nature of the cosmos as a whole. The wisdom displayed by the cosmos recognizes the necessary existence of matter and the effects of that necessity on the order and harmony enjoyed by the cosmos. It will become evident how the cosmos is "wise" to move ineluctably toward self-destruction in that such motion fulfills the material part of its nature and also underlines the contingency of natures insofar as principles of order constituting natures dwell within the cosmos.[9]

Reversal and causality

The narration of the myth now ceases to be a monologue and becomes a dialogue between the Stranger and young Socrates. Their discussion reveals that the cause of the mythic portents cited at the beginning of the myth is the sudden reversal in the direction of the cosmos. The Stranger will describe the reversal in general terms here; shortly thereafter, he will depict more graphically the events transpiring when the cosmic reversal occurs.

Since this reversal was the greatest change that can befall the cosmos, its severity will affect those living beings who dwell within the cosmos. The Stranger argues that the greatest changes affect those animals living under the heavens. Since animals cannot endure many great and various changes all at once, there is extensive destruction of animals and "only a small part of the human race survives." These survivors experience something "wonderful and strange" when the cosmos begins to rotate in the direction opposite to that of the previous direction of revolution.

Why does the sudden reversal necessitate severe consequences, that is, the destruction of life, including human life, on an almost global scale? Since the myth has suggested that the cosmos continually rotates at uniform velocity, the cosmos does not decelerate prior to the onset of reversed rotation. Imagine a sphere rotating on its axis and then—instantaneously—reversing the direction of its spin. Any living thing on the sphere would surely be dramatically and violently shaken by this sudden shift in direction (assuming a high rate of surface velocity). The drastic destruction of life is therefore justified, given the mythic contours of the cosmos. Not immediately clear is why the reversal of direction should cause "wondrous" changes; indeed, why it should produce changes at all, since it seems possible for the details of life to remain the same for the animals who manage to survive even if the cosmos itself begins moving in the opposite direction. The answer to this question derives from the unique characteristics of life generated during the counter-rotation of the cosmos.

The Cronos Cycle [270d–2b]

After the Stranger describes in general terms what happens when the cosmos reverses its rotation, he begins to relate the wondrous effects of the cosmic shift on all animals. In a word, everything living stopped growing older and began to grow younger. Humans became children, then infants, then wasted away altogether, as did those who died violently. Young Socrates asks an important question—how did animals initially come into existence? The Stranger replies that begetting offspring was not part of the natural order during that period. The human members of the earth-born race emerge from the earth from whence they go after the body has become progressively younger, with the memory of this journey preserved by our earliest ancestors, those born immediately after the cessation of motion in this direction. The sole exceptions, not subject to rebirth, are those whom "god" [θεὸς] removed to some other destiny. Young Socrates asks whether the reign of Cronos occurred during the previous or present rotation. During the previous rotation, says the Stranger. In the beginning, "the god" [ὁ θεὸς] ruled and "took care of" [ἐπιμελούμενος] the entire revolution of the cosmos. Furthermore, all sectors of the cosmos were divided among gods who ruled them, and the animals were arranged by "species" [γένη] and "flocks" [ἀγέλας] among lesser deities acting as "independent guardians" for each type so that no creature was wild, ate its fellows, made war or suffered any strife.

The demiurge, referred to here neutrally as "the god," cares for the entire cosmos. This activity—caring for something—will be reintroduced immediately after the myth's conclusion as a more appropriate class for locating the true ruler of humans.

Furthermore, other animals were divided into species and then assigned to lesser deities, each of whom acted autonomously in caring for the type of animal under his or her jurisdiction. Thus when animals were born from the earth, they came into existence not randomly and radically unique, but grouped according to types. However, natures derived directly and solely from the earth are surely as distant and opposite from natures understood in a purely formal sense as it is possible to suggest. If the earth is, as the myth contends, basically an assemblage of material stuff, then since such matter is also the seat of inherent chaos (stipulated at 273b), matter provides, presumably at one and the same time, both the principle of cosmic disorder and the locus for existing particulars of a certain natural kind. How matter can, by itself alone, engender this or any level of formal stability is unstated in the myth; what the myth does say explicitly is that the demiurge raises instances of such natures by direct divine formation.

The deities assigned to care for the types of animals inhabiting the cosmos do so in a manner replicating the independence and autonomy characterizing the demiurge's relation to the cosmos as a whole. There are, in effect, a series of demiurges ranked according to the hierarchy of living animals. The existence of diverse animals under the care of these deities is irenic and serene, with each individual animal protected from all other animals and the entire environment of living things displaying a degree of perfect internal harmony. God, presumably the demiurge, was in charge of humans, humans—"more divine" than other animals—watch over the lower types of animals. Thus divinity is predicated of greater and lesser deities as well as human beings, at least with respect to care and shepherding, thereby reinforcing the importance of the relation of caring.

Under this god's supervision, humans had no governments or statecraft of any sort, and no wife or children since everyone came to life directly from the earth. However, they enjoyed fruits and plants from the earth without the need of agriculture, living for the most part in open air (because of the mild climate) and sleeping on soft grass. Humans also did not require *eros* in order to reproduce since all humans, as all living things, originated from the earth. Humans had every essential need fulfilled under the divine shepherd—a condition, we recall, explicitly characterized as lacking any need for governance, thus delimiting a context which appears to run counter to the Stranger's stated purpose for introducing the myth, that is, to clarify the nature of the king. In any event, such was life in the age of Cronos; the present era, identified as the age of Zeus, is known by our own experience and does not require description or elaboration. It is self-evident, assumes the Stranger, that human existence during the era of Zeus is far distant in complexity and hardship from the parallel existence experienced during the counterpart cosmic cycle.[10]

The Question of Happiness [272b–d]

After describing the human condition during the reign of Cronos, the Stranger wonders which of the two cosmic epochs, that controlled by Cronos or the present era under Zeus, provides their human inhabitants with "more happiness." When young Socrates says he cannot answer, the Stranger responds to the question. This response begins

with a reference to the "foster children" [τρόφιμοι] of Cronos—a subtle familial designation reminding us that human beings owe their existence to the demiurge, our true father, whereas Cronos only supervises our tending and residence within a given cosmic cycle. If these children, gifted with leisure and ability to converse not only with humans but also with beasts, used these opportunities to pursue "philosophy," talking with animals and one another and learning from each other—through some distinctive "capacity" [δύναμιν]—in order to increase their store of "wisdom," it would be easy to determine that these people were much happier than those of our era. If, by contrast, all they did was eat and drink until sated, swapping gossip with other animals and telling "stories" [μύθους] told even now, then, says the Stranger, it would be very easy to reach a verdict concerning which era enjoyed the greater degree of happiness. But since no one now living can report accurately concerning their "desires" [ἐπιθυμίας] toward knowledge and their use of speech, the Stranger concludes that this question cannot be reasonably resolved.

The Stranger insists that during this period, happiness requires the pursuit of philosophy. But it is not clear, says the myth, whether humans who live and will live during this cycle, wanting for nothing in terms of all other basic needs, in fact attempt this pursuit. By implication, however, happiness cannot be equated with merely satisfying basic needs and living a comfortable, care-free existence. In the era of Cronos, no distinction obtains between humans and animals with respect to discourse, apparently even discourse on philosophical subjects (if, of course, the denizens dwelling during that cycle should attempt such discourse). Indeed, since it is hypothesized that humans and animals can converse with one another during this era, animals are either qualitatively higher in terms of intellectual capacity than they are in the era of Zeus or this phase of the myth is inadequate in failing to distinguish between humans and animals. But regardless whether humans can philosophize with animals or only with each other, it remains a question what philosophy would be about in this cosmic era and, equally important, how philosophy as a distinct activity would be pursued and practiced. No direct answer to this question appears possible at this point in the myth, but the Stranger will offer hints of suitable philosophical topics shortly, topics which go to the heart of both methodology and metaphysics as preludes to articulating the nature of statecraft. For now, the myth emphasizes that the demiurge teaches all living things in the cosmos—not just human beings—how to continue to exist as the type of thing they have been so far during the cosmic drama.

The Twilight of the Gods [272d–3a]

The reason this myth has been introduced must now be told, says the Stranger, so that progress can be made later in determining the nature of statecraft. The Stranger underlines the purpose of the myth, given the goal of their dialectical pursuit, and also indicates that its key moment in this regard is now at hand.

As soon as the soul of each earth-born animal had consumed its allotted number of births, the "helmsman" of the cosmos withdraws to an observation post; "destiny and natural desire" [σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία] then compel the cosmos to rotate in the

opposite direction. In addition, all deities, each in his or her own sphere, who share in the highest spirit release those parts of the cosmos which had been under their "care" [ἐπιμελείας]. It was noted earlier in the myth that an interpretive problem concerns whether the cosmic harmonizer and the god who oversees the cosmos are one and the same deity. But the Stranger refers to "all the gods" who share the rule of the "highest spirit" [μεγίστῳ δαίμονι—272e7]. This passage suggests that the Stranger conceives of all deities comprising a kind of unity. Thus the synthesizer of the cosmos and the overseers of its respective cycles are, so to speak, all of a piece, as are the deities who respectively care for humans and other types of animals here on earth. The problematic identification of the god (or gods) at the beginning of the myth (269d) becomes in effect an idle question, since the myth makes clear that all gods share the same fundamental divinity. This coalescence of divine function focuses attention on the gods, all gods, as bestowers of care toward whatever type of reality has been entrusted to them. Furthermore, the coalescence abstracts from the individuality of deities and emphasizes divinity as a principle of cognition and order—an emphasis which, as we shall see in Chapter 6, becomes fundamental in grounding the metaphysics of the *Philebus* (thereby indirectly commenting on the incomplete metaphysics in the *Statesman*).

The fact that destiny has a hand in cosmic motion suggests that forces are at work transcending the effective domain of reason and mind even when this domain originates from a divine source. But the myth pairs destiny with desire, and since the cosmos is alive and has, by nature, wisdom, then the counter-motion of the cosmos cannot be simply a non-rational reaction, imposed by blind destiny, to the rule of cosmic reason. Nonetheless, such motion is expressly against the will of the deity setting the cosmos in motion. It must therefore originate from a source other than the demiurge, a source possessing forces equal, if not superior to, those exhibited by the demiurge.

Emerging is the image of rotating cosmos responding to a reality which appeals to the inherent reasonableness of the cosmos. The cosmos turns in its (current) direction—with the consequent annihilation of life and utter disruption of the natural order—because in its own way, such motion is no less rational, or natural, to the cosmos than what is experienced as rational during our cycle of the cosmic drama. Furthermore, if the cosmos as wise has an innate desire to turn backward, then its innate desire and created wisdom are consonant with rather than antagonistic to one another. It is wise, indeed, necessary, for the cosmos to allow whatever makes its presence felt during the cycle of cosmic counter-motion to realize a dimension inherent to the cosmic drama.[11] Finally, what holds *all* these forces together so that a cosmos characterized by such radical instability remains *one* cosmos? On this point the myth remains silent. Perhaps the demiurge recognizes that the cosmos as a living being is necessarily composed in part of matter and, as a result, the cosmos displays a desire which requires, or destines, the demiurge's retreat even given the fact that the cosmos assumes its form precisely because of the creative agency of the demiurge.

What is the connection between destiny so interpreted and desire? The counter-rotation of the cosmos exhibits a desire for something, and this desire must encompass the presence of matter. Furthermore, this desire must be for something which the coordinating deity cannot provide, since if the cosmic synthesizer were capable of

providing it there would be no need (a) for the cosmos to rotate in the opposite direction and (b) for that deity to step aside while it does so. It may be inferred then that the wisdom of the cosmos answers to a rational awareness on the part of the cosmos, itself a living being, of the need for matter to attain a certain possibility. Thus the wisdom of the cosmos is in a sense higher than that of its creative synthesizer, since the living cosmos is aware of possibilities inherent in matter in such a way that the demiurge must step aside while the cosmos realizes these possibilities—in brief, the myth suggests that the cosmos as a whole and in its own way acts and exists "for the best." In essence, the demiurge is limited, in different ways, by matter, destiny, and measure. The myth develops a narrative forcing attention on something other than deity which must be present in order to answer the demands emerging from the behavior of the cosmos.[12]

Reversal of the Cosmos—the *Kairon* Moment [273a1–4]

The Stranger asserts that "as the universe turned back and there came the shock of collision, as the beginning and the end rushed in opposite directions, it produced a great earthquake within itself and caused a new destruction of all sorts of living creatures," repeating the point in the earlier account of cosmic reversal when "there is at that time great destruction of animals in general, and only a small part of the human race survives" (270d). This moment at which the direction of rotation ceases and reverses itself is precisely the moment when limits converge—or, as the Stranger puts it, when "the beginning and the end" rush in opposite directions. Earlier, at 270a, the Stranger had described this moment in more muted tones: the cosmos "then moves by its own motion, being left to itself at such a moment that it moves backward through countless ages, because it is immensely large and most evenly balanced, and turns upon the smallest pivot." In this, more general account of the reversal of motion, the phrase "at such a moment" [κατὰ καιρὸν—270a6], incorporates the temporal dimension cited at 284e6, when the Stranger will give examples of due measure (one of the two types of measure)—"the moderate, the fitting, *the opportune* [τὸν καιρὸν], the needful, and all the other standards that are situated in the mean between the extremes." Furthermore, recall from the beginning of the myth that the demiurge guides the cosmos according to the "measure" [μέτρον] of its allotted time (269c–d). The demiurge's formative activity is guided by a sense of measure. Indeed, the moment when the cosmos terminates motion in one direction and begins its counter-rotation is described in a way suggesting that this moment exemplifies, or is intended to point to, that which is opportune *as a mean between extremes*. If so, then the demiurge has constructed the cosmos with an eye toward due measure: at one extreme, the rotation of the cosmos in one direction; at the other extreme, the counter-rotation of the cosmos. The *precise instant* when the cosmos completes one motion and begins to rotate in the opposite direction is the "opportune" moment in realizing the nature of the cosmos with respect to motion. Thus the cosmos, as a unified and living whole, must move to satisfy diametrically opposed types of rotary motion. This intersection of opposites is inherent to the cosmos; it is part of the nature of the cosmos insofar as that nature has been determined by the formative activity

and wisdom derived from the demiurge in conjunction with the natural desire also inherent in the cosmos, a living being formed with a material base.[13]

That measure is crucial is reinforced by the description of the cosmos at 270a—the cosmos is "immensely large and most evenly balanced, and turns upon the smallest pivot." In other words, the cosmos is the "largest" entity, it rotates with the "most even balance" as well as upon the "smallest" point of matter; thus the cosmos is defined by limit conditions in three respects—size, balance, and point of pivot. But why, given contrary rotations, must the cosmos undergo such drastic consequences at the *kairon* moment, the moment when the direction of rotation is reversed?

Recall that the cosmos rotates at a constant high speed (273a; cf 269e); therefore, the rotary motion of the cosmos neither decelerates as it completes one cycle nor accelerates as it begins the opposed cycle. The shock of collision at the *kairon* moment must therefore be understood as totally cataclysmic. When the cosmos begins to reverse itself (that is, given the two cycles, reversal in either direction), the end of one cycle rushes headlong into the beginning of the other complementary cycle. The result is a sudden and stark coincidence of that which, given the "natural" progression of cosmic cycles, should be kept separate—opposed rotary motions. In fact, at this juncture in the cosmic drama, beginning and end are effectively nullified *as* beginning and end. Therefore, the primary purpose of the cosmos—to support life in myriad forms, the cosmos itself being alive—is, if not nullified, seriously compromised since during the period when cosmic reversal occurs, life in all its forms suffers a radical degree of extinction. Only a few individuals from the various types of living thing—including human beings—survive. Indeed the cosmos itself suffers an "earthquake" (273a2) that is, the cosmos as a whole is threatened with self-destruction as a result of this confluence.[14]

What is the import of the confluence of opposite cosmic motions, the "opportune" moment of cosmic due measure coterminous with the virtual omnipresence of death? Consider the situation from a metaphysical perspective: almost everything living suffers death at this moment because an especially fundamental set of opposites has become virtually coextensive. This dramatic confluence of life and universal death is an intersection of opposites, except in this case the complete cessation of life would seemingly obviate the restoration of living things within the cosmos. The myth handles this difficulty by positing wholesale—yet not quite universal—destruction of life. Plato depicts the cosmic result at such a moment to be dislocation, destruction, death—the exact opposites of the order, form and life provided to the cosmos by the demiurge. The cosmological point may be that the natural order requires opposites to remain apart, indeed as far apart as is necessary in order to preserve the required distance inherent to opposition. But in the cosmos depicted in the myth, opposite cosmic motions have become almost coextensive.

On the one hand, this conjunction of motions is an appropriate natural order defined by divine wisdom; on the other hand, however, at the moment when such a confluence reaches its greatest intimacy, the heart of the cosmos—life—is threatened. If therefore the cosmos had been properly ordered according to due measure, the *kairon* moment would not be a mere temporal instant—it would be *the duration of the cosmos itself*, since the organization of the cosmos would have been arranged according to "what is fitting" with respect to instituting and sustaining types of

living things. In the myth, however, the cosmos is a never-ending cycle of opposing motions, each heading toward an omega point which, if its directional potential were realized, would result in the cosmos in anything like its current form, as well as every inhabitant of the cosmos, ceasing to exist.

The Zeus Cycle [273a4–e]

The divine legacy and the birth of natures

In the Cronos cycle, the demiurge accompanies the rotating cosmos; in the Zeus cycle, the demiurge withdraws and allows the cosmos to rotate on its own, and in the opposite direction. After a certain amount of time has passed during the Zeus cycle, the seismic disturbances of cosmic reversal disappear and the cosmos follows its accustomed course, "exercising care [ἐπιμέλειαν] over itself and all within itself" and "remembering" the teaching of the "demiurge and father."

Since the demiurge has withdrawn from directly overseeing the activities of the cosmos, all inhabitants of the cosmos have apparently established their reality to ensure their identities as individuals of a certain type or class. The demiurge has left each cosmic inhabitant defined by a nature which controls what that individual is and does. Furthermore, the appeal to remembering [ἀπομνημονεύων] as the source of this identity recalls the doctrine of anamnesis so central to the *Meno* and *Phaedo*, which in turn evokes the object of anamnesis—the Forms. However, the inhabitants of the cosmos do not remember a primordial epistemic apprehension of Forms; rather, they are remembering what they, individual instances of natures, have been taught by the demiurge and father. With the standard Platonic account of anamnesis serving as a metaphysical backdrop, it becomes a question how the demiurge could have produced order defining each inhabitant as an instance of a nature, as well as the cosmos itself as a unified whole serving as receptacle for these natures and their instances. In short, how were natures established?[15]

Cosmos and chaos

At first, remembering what the demiurge imparted to individual beings is "more precise" [ἀκριβέστερον] but gradually the cosmos suffers from carelessness in this regard. This metaphysical forgetfulness is caused by matter. Matter, inherent in "primeval nature," is permeated with disorder prior to the current attainment of order in the cosmos. In our cosmic epoch, that of Zeus, matter continues to make inroads on the formal dimension of reality, and only the demiurge can restore the natural boundaries of this dimension to individuals. As depicted in the myth, matter is *dynamic*—it naturally desires to reach a state in which form of any sort cannot survive, and it continues this drive contemporaneously with the imposition of formal structure provided by divine concern and supervision. Even during the current cosmic period, when human beings are vouchsafed the possibility of happiness, the material dimension of the cosmos actively combats the residual divine impetus to impress

natures upon it. In fact, the dynamic character of matter is so powerful that curtailing its inherent drive to engender disorder requires divine intervention.

The restoration of natures

The composer of the cosmos gave it nothing but "fine" [καλὰ] things but the material element preserves and creates in animals those elements of harshness and "injustice" [ἄδικα] which originate in the heavens. When the pilot of the cosmos was in charge, the cosmos produces "little evil and great good" [μεγάλα...ἀγαθά]. However, after separation from the pilot, the cosmos, although faring most excellently during the period immediately after the separation, eventually becomes "forgetful." As a result, the aboriginal condition of disorder becomes more prominent and reaches its nadir when the cosmos mingles "little good" and much of the opposite sort of reality. Indeed, the cosmos verges on suffering destruction, both in itself as a single living thing and distributively, affecting every instance of every type of thing within it. Cataclysm beckons. Thus the god who instituted order in the cosmos, realizing that it might sink into—in Fowler's fine phrase—a "boundless sea of diversity," resumes his position as helmsman and reverses what became "sick" [νοσήσαντα] when the cosmos had been left to itself, thereby restoring order and again elevating the cosmos to immortality. Although at the onset of the second cosmic cycle natures exist autonomously, their formal structure gradually decays, so much so that the demiurge must step in to restore order just prior to the utter dissolution of natures. Recall, however, that the restoration of this natural order remains finite, since the era of Zeus, the current cycle, will inevitably end and be followed by the next cycle, the era of Cronos, and so on for perpetuity.

The Cosmos and the Nature of the King [273e–4e]

The Stranger now proclaims that this phase of the account has completed the myth, and he adds that in order "to exhibit the king," that is, to show the nature of statecraft, it is necessary to recall the earlier moments of the account—when the cosmos reverses its direction of rotation and initiates our time, the era of Zeus.

Nature and imitation

At this point in the cosmic drama, the "age of individuals" has ceased and new processes begin. Animals which had been growing smaller reversed this process and began to grow larger and all other things changed and reflected the condition of the cosmos as a whole. Pregnancy and birth and nurture "necessarily" appeared and "no living creature could any longer come into being by the union of other elements" as happened during the era of Cronos. Just as the cosmos was ordered to be its own ruler, so all its parts were ordered, as far as they could, "to grow and beget and give nourishment of themselves under the same guidance," since no longer could any living creature emerge from the earth by sheer convergence of earthly elements. Note the implied link between *eros* as the impetus for begetting and the generation

of form; the desire to beget is entwined with a specific end resulting from satisfying that desire—formal reproduction.

In the first cycle, that of Cronos, the demiurge is omnipresent; in the opposed cycle, that of Zeus, the demiurge has vanished. However, in the absence of the demiurge, the cosmos begins to forget what it had learned from its creator, so much so that the center does not hold and the cosmos as well as everything within it begin to self-destruct. In order to halt this dissolution, the demiurge returns and restores stability to all living things, including human beings. In this cosmic arrangement, Zeus is reduced to a figurehead deity, a mere surrogate for the demiurge who has withdrawn from the scene. Since Zeus is seemingly powerless to halt the gradual dissolution of cosmic structure, the implication is that by comparison with the demiurge, Zeus becomes a shadow deity. In effect, god is dead during the era of Zeus since the real power shaping and preserving the cosmos, the demiurge, no longer presides and the cosmos is threatened with destruction as a result of this divine absence.

It is also evident that *eros* does not become functional until human beings have been endowed with a nature. Only then does *eros* makes its presence felt, since the stated necessity of pregnancy presupposes intercourse and intercourse presupposes the desire for intercourse. Thus, since each "part" of the cosmos is representative of a distinctive type or nature, during this cosmic cycle these natures must reproduce by themselves, without the direct guiding agency of the demiurge, such agency serving as a prerequisite for the origin of living things during the prior period of cosmic rotation. Each nature must behave in this way as imitating the cosmos, a unique living thing, in continuing to generate itself by following the schematic instruction of the demiurge.

The human condition

The myth nears its intended dialectical purpose, with the Stranger prefacing the final section by noting that they have reached "the point for the sake of which the whole discourse was begun"—to exhibit the nature of the king (274b1, cf 269c).

As a prelude to stating this nature, the myth must describe the human condition in the current cosmic cycle. Much might be said, the Stranger proclaims, about the other animals in terms of the changes besetting their shape but about humans there is less to say and it is more relevant to the inquiry in question. In the era of Zeus, humans beget in kind and grow from youth to old age. However, the deity who had possessed and shown "care" for humans remains absent. As a result, humans find themselves threatened by a harsh environment and harsher beasts, since during this period humans were "without resources or arts" (274c). The gods then step in and, as the old stories tell, provide gifts to humans—fire from Prometheus, the artisan arts from Hephaestus and his fellow goddess, seeds and plants from other deities. Then, the Stranger asserts, "from these has arisen all that constitutes human life," since the absence of deity—the demiurge—compels humans to fend for themselves, a state of independence characteristic of the entire cosmos which "we imitate and follow through all time." The reference to temporal totality is a reminder that the human condition just described, although currently our lot, will also be of finite duration since the era of Zeus eventually becomes the era of Cronos given that cosmic rotation is, according to the myth, eternally cyclical.[16]

Natures and the mean

The human condition—our nature as we understand and see it defined during the era of Zeus—is therefore in a fundamental although mythic sense only temporary. Given this arresting feature of the myth, it is worth reflecting on the status of natures in general insofar as they emerge from the details of the myth. The following account reviews and situates natures as a thematic concern of the myth, a concern which provides tangible evidence of the aporetic character saturating this phase of the dialogue, especially since the stated purpose of the myth is to demonstrate the pivotal nature of the king.

In general, the existence of a nature depends on unity. If an entity such as a tree or human being has a nature, there are limits to what it is, how it functions, and what can happen to it in its interactions with other inhabitants of the cosmos. These contouring specifications are actualized by individuals exhibiting that nature. Therefore what is fitting for such individuals will depend on a kind of natural unity insofar as this unity is deployed over a range of possibilities inherent in and grounding variations displayed by these individuals. The limits of these possibilities are determined by the type—or nature—which an individual thing instances. But unity, as a fundamental character permeating a set of diverse characteristics, guarantees that such a nature can exist in the first place.

Existence Early in the initial exercise of division, the Stranger appeals to a "natural line of cleavage" [διαφυήν—259d] which should guide division in articulating the intellectual sciences. Thus walking animals which live in herds can be divided "by nature" [φύσει—265b]. These passages suggest that natures exist and, as a result, that one of the explicitly stated functions of dialectic is dividing its subject matter in accordance with the structure of these natures.

Origin But according to the myth, natures display a complicated mode of existence. When describing the career of living beings during the reign of Cronos, the Stranger contends that "being begotten of one another was no part of the natural order [φύσει] of that time" (271a). The reason: each living being as it grows younger and younger eventually decomposes into a material aggregate and then becomes reborn, as from an "earth-born race," into the same—or, perhaps, another—type of living being. Thus the age of Cronos was (and will be again) an age of discrete individuals virtually unmarked by any sort of natural imprint or succession. There were apparently sustainable family resemblances among particular beings, but nothing which could properly be called a class or nature understood as a unified and autonomous structure.

In fact, natures as such begin to exist only in the age of Zeus when "no living creature could any longer come into being by the union of other elements" (273e–4a). In other words, the age of Zeus finds living creatures produced only from other living creatures of the same type, unlike the age of Cronos when living creatures of all types simply emerge from the earth as a sort of cosmic mixing bowl containing a mass of primordial "stuff" which presumably included all ingredients of all living creatures—but without any elements guaranteeing type specification. In the age of

Cronos any mélange of matter could, both in theory and in fact, produce a particular entity of any kind—not so in the age of Zeus, when natures exist autonomously. However, natures come to exist because they "remember" what the demiurge has taught them (273b). Indeed, the mythic treatment of natures indicates that they owe their existence to the demiurge—directly in the era of Cronos (as discrete individuals begotten from the earth), indirectly in the era of Zeus (begotten from their own kind).

Stability Their origin is not the only aspect of natures thrown into indeterminacy by the myth. At the *kairon* moment, the two cosmic cycles have reached their omega and alpha points—the end of the first cycle and the beginning of the second cycle. During the second cycle, natures exist autonomously but indirectly. Since, however, the supervision of the demiurge was lacking in the era of Zeus, the metaphysical memory of individuals begins to fade, with the threat of natural dissolution becoming more real as this era inevitably and necessarily runs its course. At the outset of the cosmic reversal, changes in living beings are minimal. However, the longer the cosmos continues to rotate in the opposed direction without the guidance of deity, the greater the changes affecting the formal character of these beings. Thus natures gradually "forget" what they have been taught by the demiurge and particular instances of natures threaten to be reduced to a sea of formless and indeterminate difference, thereby losing their uniqueness as individuals of a specific natural type. As a result, the demiurge must step in to restore order just prior to the utter dissolution of natures, not to mention the complete fracturing and disintegration of the cosmos as a whole.

But consider the period between the onset of divine intervention at a point toward the end of the Zeus era and the subsequent conclusion of that era. During this period, natures exhibit a degree of organizational stability which is midway between (a) the complete control of the demiurge during the era of Cronos, where the tangential dimension of natures was constituted and preserved by direct divine activity and all individual instances of natures emerged directly from the earth, and (b) the era of Zeus, when natures exist explicitly and autonomously but only because at the beginning of this era, the cosmos and everything in it exercised care over itself due to its ability to remember and practice, to the best of its ability, the teachings of the demiurge (273b). In other words, the demiurge acted as "father" to the cosmos by teaching formal structure to types as independently existing entities, with particular individuals instantiating each type "remembering" that they were defined as members of that type. Since the cosmos, itself a living being, as well as everything within the cosmos had become "sick" (273e) from the pervasive and penetrating presence of matter, the only remedy for this metaphysically debilitating condition was the active and ordering presence of the demiurge.

This restoration of order does not endure, however, since the era of Zeus will end and be followed by the next cycle, the era of Cronos. But during that privileged period in the Zeus era when the demiurge has reestablished formal structure, natures enjoy a degree of autonomy. Thus since the material factor of the cosmos continually erodes the formal factor of natures, natures as unities are inevitably—and necessarily—headed for dissolution, until divine intervention preserves them

as natures. In sum, natures are preserved during our era only because deity has reintroduced order. Therefore natures *require* deity in order to subsist as autonomous types displaying a measure of unity. The implication for natures is crucial. The processes affected by variations in cosmic rotation are played out along a continuum moving from one extreme to the other, stretching to the edges of possibility without any sense that the continuum must be halted at some point so that beings deployed along its contours can be stabilized as beings of a certain essentially fixed type. If it is asked whether, for example, human beings "naturally" grow old, this question cannot be answered until a given cosmic cycle is specified, for during the age of Cronos human beings will "naturally" grow younger, not older. The myth clearly states that processes essential for life, such as growth and aging, are reversed from one cosmic cycle to the next with commensurate effects on the beings affected by these processes. However, these reversals do not affect all elements of a given entity. Thus, human beings do not change from one cosmic cycle in terms of, for example, number of limbs (as suggested, although for other reasons, in Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium*). With respect to this dimension of stability, human beings exhibit typical characteristics of a nature since despite cosmic oscillation in some respects, all human beings continue to have two arms and two legs "by nature." But the growth processes to which these limbs are subject do change, as the myth makes vividly and dramatically evident. In essence then, human beings have natural stability in some but not all respects.

During that privileged period in the Zeus era when the demiurge has reestablished formal structure, natures display a degree of autonomy. It is vital to recognize that this degree of autonomy occupies *a mean between extremes*—between natures fully under control of the demiurge and natures left alone, without divine guidance of any sort. During this period, the demiurge strikes a balance between divine activity exhibited in the era of Cronos, when the demiurge is completely in control of the duration of each individual living thing as a thing of a certain type, and the parallel divine function in the opening segment of the era of Zeus, when the demiurge is completely absent. Furthermore, the itemized gifts of pantheonic deities contributing to the (current) human condition reflect the degree of demiurgic intervention in the cosmos as a whole. During the Cronos cycle, all desires of humans were satisfied by the bounty of nature established by the demiurge; during the Zeus cycle, various members of the Greek pantheon provided some of this bounty, but not all of it. As a result, the human condition during this cycle exists as a mean between extremes, only the divine contributors to this mean are emissaries of the demiurge rather than the demiurge as such.

These cosmic concerns, although abstractly formulated, become directly relevant to statecraft as the nature of statecraft will be formulated in subsequent dialectical investigations of the *Statesman*.

Cosmos, natures and the good

The myth emphasizes that the Good remains throughout the range of variations displayed by the cosmos while rotating through its two cycles. Despite such variability, the presence of natures establishes a "wise" alternative to the virtual

absence of natures as independently existing entities—coupled with the production of all particular living things from the earth—during the era of Cronos. The principles of coalescence imparted by the demiurge to formless matter suggest that these natures, even if they exist independently for only a segment of a given cosmic cycle, display a measure of wisdom in relation to the continually oscillating cosmos.

The myth carefully stipulates that when the divine pilot directly controls the cosmos, it shows a great degree of good but when the pilot has retreated, the cosmos shows "little" good—variability suggesting that during the Cronos era, the level of the good remains constant. However, the Good persists throughout the cosmos even at the very moment when the cosmos is threatened with internal dissolution. If matter is the source of disorder (cf. 273b) and if the presence of types, or natures, is due to introducing a principle of order and structure on this matter, then a connection may be inferred between order exhibited throughout the cosmos and the Good permeating the cosmos during its cyclical variations. Order, stability and the Good appear then to intersect. The apparent connection between natures and the Good is one of the avenues explored in Chapters 6 and 7 below.

Myth and the nature of the king

When the narration of the myth is complete, the Stranger announces that its import will divulge two errors made in the initial attempt to define the king. Discussion of these errors leads directly into the analysis of paradigms and, as such, will be an appropriate topic to begin the next chapter. However, a provisional account showing how the myth has clarified the nature of the king will help establish discursive direction through the complex web of analyses preceding the final definition of statecraft offered at the conclusion of the dialogue.

The Stranger will note at 275b that he embarked on the myth not only to demonstrate that "everyone" competes for the care of the herd with the ruler we are now seeking but also to show more clearly the only person, according to the paradigm of shepherds and cowherds, who should care for the human herd and thus alone properly bear the name of ruler. This statement of purpose should be taken in conjunction with the Stranger's assertion in the myth (273e) that the nature of the king will be exhibited by returning to that moment in the myth when "the cosmos was turned again into the present path of generation." In other words, the precise moment when cosmic rotation shifted from the cycle governed by Cronos to that governed by Zeus will show the nature of the king. But this moment functions so decisively only if the circumstances leading to its necessity are brought fully into view. The Stranger himself underlined this point when he asserted, at the conclusion of the myth, that human beings imitate and follow the "whole universe" insofar as they are born and live "now in our present manner and in that other epoch in the other manner" (274d). Therefore, to understand how the myth exhibits the nature of the king, it is necessary to consider the complete sequence of human lives described mythically in both cosmic eras.

The reference to "paradigm" [παράδειγμα—275b] is vital to note since the Stranger will conclude the comprehensive account of the nature of statecraft only after using a paradigm, that of weaving, the dialectical analysis of which will soon

take center stage. It is essential therefore to identify and describe the relevant paradigm occurring in the myth in order to appreciate why weaving will be selected as the paradigm for exhibiting the nature of statecraft.

The Stranger takes as evident, based on paradigms contained in the myth, that the ruler for whom they have been searching should function as do shepherds and neatherds tending their charges. At the conclusion of dialectical inquiry, the Stranger will assert that statecraft is defined as weaving together certain opposites (310e, 311c). But neither Cronos nor Zeus provide the divine substance of the paradigm which, according to the Stranger, the myth has employed to show who alone should care for the human herd. How then does the myth provide such a paradigmatic function?

Consider that opposed cosmic rotation produces commensurately opposed life cycles:

Cycle 1: In the prior cycle, guided by Cronos, human beings come to life from origins in the earth, become younger rather than older, and have everything provided for them by gods and a beneficent earth, the entire process suffused with relaxing pastimes which may include conversations with lower animals (270e–2b).

Cycle 2: In the present period of revolution, overseen by Zeus, all animals cease becoming younger and begin to age, generation originates from an animal's own kind through *eros* rather than from the variegated earth, birth is marked by infancy rather than maturity, and the earth becomes recalcitrant, causing increased hardships for humans, including the need for labor and, ultimately, divine assistance to guarantee survival (273e–4d).

Considered broadly, this pair of cycles represents a study in excess and deficiency. In the first cycle, life begins defined by completion in terms of all natural provisions for sustaining such completion. Humans lack for nothing in Cycle 1. In Cycle 2, life runs in what is, as we see things now, the accustomed temporal order but the cosmos as a whole is gradually drained of its educated wisdom to the point where all natural things threaten to whirl completely out of control and sink to the brink of self-destruction (273e). All natures during this cycle gradually lose their identity, their structures decomposing and dissolving. But before everything merges indiscriminately into a morass of pure difference, a deity steps in and restores order to the cosmos, in addition to bestowing certain gifts allowing humans to bear life's burdens during this cycle, a bestowal required since divine care has failed us and we must learn to fend for ourselves. In sum: Cycle 1 is excessive by way of complete external contentment—life is ordered satiety; Cycle 2 is excessive by way of increasingly profound hardship—life's deficiencies inevitably lead to disrupted order verging on chaotic despair.

This cyclical sequence of opposites becomes essential in determining the nature of the king. When viewed thus, the mythic complement of naturally opposed motions becomes a blending of opposites. In fact, a process of divine weaving has been effected—the demiurge has woven together some of the divine dispensations granted during the cycle of Cronos with an explicitly introduced remedy for the

innate tendency of things in this, the Zeus cycle, to lose their natural structure. The result is a delicate harmony of opposites balancing the static perfection of a cosmos defined by unlimited divine beneficence (the era of Cronos) and the chaos of complete cosmic dissolution (the era of Zeus). The human animal oscillates between a cycle when deity bestows everything for our apparent well-being and a subsequent cycle when deity is absent and eventually provides nothing.

Observe then that the cosmological "mean" would obtain at a juncture where, minimally defined, the gods had given us some things but not everything. But such a mean is surely recognizable, for it represents the common fund of human experience *in this, our own time during the continual cyclical oscillations of the cosmos*. Thus, fire is readily available to us (thanks to Prometheus), also the various arts and crafts (Hephaestus), as well as seeds and plants for agriculture (from other deities—274d). The life led in Plato's Greece as well as present life—grandiloquently referred to as "the human condition"—is in fact characterized, at a fundamental cosmological level, by weaving together the extremes of the two cosmic cycles mythically depicted by the Stranger until, through the process of such weaving, a condition defined by the mean results. This degree of divine support constitutes a mean between extremes in that what the demiurge and deputy deities provide hovers midway between (a) the full measure of bounty present in the Cronos era and (b) the complete lack of support in the Zeus era. Thus the myth both entertains and educates by suggesting that the weaving of cosmic extremes will play a pivotal role in forming the cosmos, especially in terms of the relation between the present status of human beings and the cosmos.[17]

Furthermore, this unity prefigures the unity of opposite characteristics essential in governing a well-ordered state. At the conclusion of the dialogue, after much difficult dialectical labor, the statesman is defined as one who combines opposites in order to produce the best polity, that is, a conjoint assembly realizing a mean between extremes and omitting nothing which ought to belong to a "happy" state (311c). It is true that the demiurge does not actively combine opposites; rather, the demiurge produces one set of opposed properties, then watches from a distance as the cosmos by virtue of its own measure of wisdom produces the opposed set. In the myth, the *processes* of nature run in opposition but they do so sequentially; by contrast, the true statesman must blend opposite *products*, the elements of virtue which, according to the Stranger's dialectical analysis, are at some fundamental level opposed to one another. In a sense then, the task of the true statesman is more difficult since the types of opposition subject to the statesman's techniques of resolution must temporally coexist, in some cases within the same individual—for example, rule by committee vs. rule by an individual king. According to the myth, when natural opposites approach confluence on a cosmic scale, wholesale destruction results; when opposites in virtue and character converge in a human ruler, they must be made to interact and blend for the well-being of the governing individual or group and then, importantly, for all citizens under the charge of such sovereignty.

From this perspective, the overall condition of the cosmos—the unity of opposites—is the "cause" which helps exhibit the nature of the king, the ruler guiding a state by combining the opposites resident in this totality. The cosmos exhibits completeness even though, to state the point arithmetically, the demiurge

directly governs only one-half of its cycles. A human ruler is like a divine ruler in that the human ruler combines opposites whereas the divine ruler oversees the unity of opposites by creating, then withdrawing from the cosmos, returning only to establish cosmic harmony as a mean between extremes. Therefore, the *demiurge* serves as divine pole for the paradigm of shepherd mentioned by the Stranger (275b) as decisive for determining the nature of the ruler, since the demiurge has synthesized the cosmos to require this radical shift in circular motion. The true statesman resembles the divine shepherd identified by the myth's complex narrative as the demiurge—not Cronos and Zeus, who function mythically as divine but derivative emissaries of the demiurge.[18]

The paradigm of weaving which will become the dominant schematic for further dialectical inquiry is derived from the myth, from the account of the demiurge preserving the order of the cosmos and presenting gifts to humans so they can control disintegrating forms of life in nature and pursue the attainment of happiness. The Stranger divined from his account of the demiurge mediating between the all-encompassing rule of Cronos and the rule of Zeus—effectively the absence of rule—that a ruler caring for human beings as if they were a herd of animals must "weave together" a series of opposites according to the mean, just as the demiurge approximated a mean in preserving the life of human beings within the opposing cycles of the cosmic drama. The demiurge tends to the fate of his human herd by striking a mean between providing for each and every need of humans (Cronos) and leaving them entirely on their own at the mercy of an unattended and ultimately feral cosmos (Zeus). The way that the demiurge and divine emissaries dispensed gifts to human beings in order to stabilize and fortify their existence under the domain of Zeus represents a model for how to care for human beings. Thus the myth does precisely what the Stranger says it will do—help clarify the nature of the king. The myth has achieved this end through the paradigm of the demiurge caring for humanity by realizing the mean between extremes through "weaving" together the polar opposite worlds characterizing the cosmos.[19]

Myth, metaphysics and philosophy

According to this interpretation, the myth provides the paradigm for determining the nature of the king. But why must the Stranger embark on a myth of considerable length and cosmic content in order to remedy what appears to be a seemingly straightforward lapse in dialectically determining the nature of statecraft? The Stranger's philosophical instincts apparently have conveyed to him that only from a standpoint of the broadest possible dimension—a cosmic perspective—will it become possible to discern, with sufficient precision, the nature of a ruler of human beings derived from the paradigm of a shepherd controlling a herd of animals. The Stranger is now in position to recognize a more appropriate dialectical beginning for securing this definition because his soul has adopted the standpoint from which such correctness can be discerned. In this regard, the import of the myth as a narrative whole is a simulacrum to the doctrine of anamnesis advanced in the *Meno* and other earlier dialogues, and importantly evoked in the myth itself when it describes natures "remembering" the teachings of the demiurge (273b).

The myth also explicitly tells us that philosophy is a real possibility in the era of Cronos (272c). But the precise nature of philosophy is left in silence, including whether a method is required for anyone desiring to pursue philosophy during this era. Consider then this possibility. If entities characterized by immutability are more fundamental than mutable entities, the pursuit of philosophy may encompass reflection on and study of these realities, since immutable entities are at least theoretically capable of bestowing stability to any beings related to those entities. The object of philosophy in the reversed cosmic era may thus be identical to that in our era, since perpetual immutability as a property of the most divine things (269d) must hold during that era just as much as during our own. For if the countermotion of the cosmos somehow affected these most divine realities, then their immutability vanishes. Two provisional conclusions may be drawn: first, if these realities remain immutable throughout all cosmic perturbations, then these divine things are surely Forms (although, as noted, they are not named as such). Furthermore, if the most divine things remain the same in both eras, then if philosophy were to exist in that era, its object would be the Forms if the object of philosophy during our era is the Forms. Be that as it may, however "unnatural" cosmic order in its reversed cycle may appear, the myth indicates that at least some elements within the potential philosophical dimension of human existence in that era remain the same in our era. This identity holds open the possibility that metaphysical principles grounding both eras will be the same.

At the outset of the myth, the Stranger alerts young Socrates to follow its narrative through the use of *nous* (268e). If *nous* represents a high level of cognition—indeed, the highest—then the Stranger is saying, with considerable subtlety, that the myth will become fully accessible only when understood as if its structure and details surveyed the most fundamental reaches of reality. The problematic status of natures, described above, is only one area with vital metaphysical implications addressed in the myth, and an area on which it provides educational direction. The complete range of ramifications of the myth for both metaphysics and method will be analyzed, with assistance from the *Philebus* (Chapters 6 and 7), as soon as the *Statesman* has completed its journey.[20] The next step in that journey is the analysis of paradigms—the proper vehicle (with certain crucial qualifications) of philosophical demonstration when the objects in view are the greatest realities.

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Chapter 3

Paradigms: Knowledge and Reality [274e–83b]

Myth and Dialectical Error [274e–5b]

At 268c, the Stranger asserted that it was necessary to embark on a myth because he and young Socrates had only outlined a schema for the king without sufficiently analyzing that schema in order to distinguish the king from a number of challengers for that position. At 274c, immediately after the myth, the Stranger says that the myth will be employed to determine the "great error" made in the initial dialectical analysis of statecraft. In fact, two errors occurred, one relatively slight, the other major and significant. The greater error was to describe "the shepherd of the human flock" for the reverse cycle of the cosmos rather than for the present cycle, an error compounded by the fact that this shepherd was depicted as divine, not human. The lesser error was to claim that this ruler governed the whole state but not to describe in detail how the state was governed—that claim, unlike the first, was true but neither complete nor clear. An adequate account of statecraft must therefore comprehensively describe the manner of rule.

Greater error

The Stranger was seriously off the mark because the previous exercise in dialectic defined the shepherd of the human flock in the prior cosmic order, under Cronos, rather than the present cosmic order, under Zeus. Furthermore, this ruler was divine, not mortal. The greater error has two dimensions. First, the myth taught the Stranger that he effectively failed to distinguish between a divine and a human ruler, hardly a trivial lapse. Second, he also had analyzed the "human flock" living during the previous cosmic cycle rather than the present cycle. This aspect of the error is distinguishable from the first aspect because humans in the Cronos era are not identical to humans in the Zeus era; as the myth makes clear, the former emerge directly from the earth and have all their basic needs provided whereas we, living in the era of Zeus, suffer considerable hardships during our tenure on earth and reproduce, necessarily, through natural—and erotic—generation.

Lesser error

In the summary account of statecraft at 267b–c, the Stranger connects a demiurgic ruler and the herd of humans ruled, but says nothing about what the ruler does, as a practical matter, for this herd. As a result, the Stranger asserts that a "complete"

[τελέως] description of the ruler will be established only when they define the manner of rule over the state. Much later, at 305e, the Stranger says that they must discuss statecraft after the paradigm of weaving, since at that point all classes constituting the state have been made plain through dialectical inquiry. However, only at the end of the dialogue does young Socrates announce, without dissent from the Stranger, that they have provided a "most complete" [ἀπετέλεσας] description of the ruler. Thus the desired account of statecraft requires the rest of the dialogue, from 275b when the need for such completeness is noted until 311c, when that completeness has finally been secured. The ruler does control the "whole state," but an adequate account must detail how the ruler exercises such control.

The Stranger will presently address the first error, but the myth has substantially responded to the second error (275a), the incomplete account of the statesman, through the paradigm of weaving, which will guide the Stranger to his final statement of the statesman's nature. Weaving was not identified in this regard in the myth. However, as argued in Chapter 2, the formative agency of the demiurge exhibits the preservation and establishment of the cosmos as we know it through weaving elements which, if the cosmos is an unending revolution of opposed cycles, remain separate. The Stranger has therefore not only discerned through the myth the general relevance of paradigms as a methodological device for describing and clarifying important realities, he has also divined the precise paradigm which, in due course, structures a complete description of statecraft.

Myth, Paradigm and Definition [275b–c]

The Stranger repeats the purpose for developing the myth as stated prior to its onset: "to show that all individuals compete for the care of the flock with him whom we are now seeking." The Stranger realized that dialectic had defined the ruler in such a way as to invite the charge by many care providers within a state—merchants, farmers, gymnastic trainers, physicians—that they have as much right to rule as the putative ruler defined by dialectic. Thus the original definition of statecraft was far too broad. However, the Stranger adds that another reason for fashioning the myth was to see more clearly the individual who alone ought to care for human beings "according to the paradigm of shepherd and neatherd."

The Stranger explicitly asserts that the myth contained a paradigm, and that this paradigm involved (a) shepherd and sheep in relation to (b) ruler and ruled. The paradigmatic elements in the myth must be noted, given the theoretical importance of paradigms which the Stranger underlines in subsequently exhibiting the nature of statecraft. Furthermore, this particular paradigm has significant implications for the forthcoming definition of statecraft. Recall the Stranger's admission that humans analyzed in the original dialectical exercise existed during the prior cosmic order and were virtually indistinguishable from animals. They became, in effect, pets of the gods, a relation culminating in the joking play on bipeds and quadrupeds at 266c–d. But if human beings are not equivalent or even analogous to sheep, then the relation between ruler and ruled differs from that just stated. For if human beings are fundamentally misrepresented because they are more complex than sheep, then

the shepherd/sheep paradigm animating the myth—if it underlies dialectical inquiry into statecraft through the paradigm of weaving—will necessarily skew the nature of its subject.

The Revised Definition of Statecraft [275c–7a]

The Stranger asserts, as a matter of principle derived from considerations pertaining to the myth, that the "schema" [σχῆμα] of the divine shepherd is "greater" than that of the king whereas the mortal leaders sought for are much more like their subjects in nature and education. He adds, however, that mortal leaders will have to be investigated with the same care "whether their nature be like that of their subjects or like that of the divine shepherd."[1] The Stranger now clearly sees that the sought-for definition of statecraft must produce a human rather than a divine ruler. The myth has taught him this need, as evoked in the greater error revealed by the myth. But the proviso just introduced as a preamble for the scope of investigation hypothesizes that the nature of the ruler may be similar, at least in some respects, to that exhibited by the divine shepherd depicted in the myth. Thus even a human ruler may emulate the demiurge, the cosmic supervisor of all divine shepherds. The interpretation of the myth developed in Chapter 2 shows the Stranger's prescience in this regard.

The Stranger now returns to the point in the original division where the art of statecraft gives its orders to living beings in groups—the art of the herdsman. Here the error in division will emerge. For reflection reveals that herdsmen feed their herds while rulers do not. Therefore, rulers will not be found in this class. A more inclusive class will encompass herdsmen as well as rulers—this class the Stranger identifies with the name "care" [ἐπιμέλειαν]. Thus herdsmen and rulers both care for their charges but presumably not in the same way. The Stranger tells young Socrates that they might proceed using the same kinds of divisions employed in dialectic prior to the myth—for example, foot/winged, mixed/unmixed, horned/hornless—only this time embracing both the kingship of the present time (Zeus) and that of the time of Cronus. Clearly then no other art would advance a stronger claim than kingship to be the art of "caring for the whole human community and ruling all mankind." The suggestion is that this ruler is divine, since (a) the Stranger has just mentioned Zeus and Cronos, each ruling humanity since both rule the cosmos and (b) the Stranger says that the ruler in question cares for "all mankind" [πάντων ἀνθρώπων]. In question is one ruler—if such exists—governing every person on earth, not one ruler controlling a given population among other rulers charged with controlling other groups of people.

In the original dialectical exercise, feeding the herd is introduced at 268a, where the Stranger is objecting that many others would claim to "take care of tending to humanity." But now the Stranger says that we should not have held the belief that feeding the biped herd was the art of kingship. Rather, we should have changed feeding or nurturing to "care" and then divided this art. The first division of caring should be into divine as opposed to human care-taking. Then, the human side of care-taking should have been divided into compulsory and voluntary (276d), since without this distinction no difference obtains between king and tyrant. The Stranger

notes that they have been simple-minded by collecting these two types of rule—clearly they should be distinguished. The Stranger concludes by asking rhetorically, "may we not declare that he who possesses this latter art of care-taking [that is, when members accept it voluntarily] is really the true king and statesman?"

The Stranger has aimed dialectic in a new direction once he learned from the myth of the two errors made in the original attempt. Now we confront an explicitly defined human ruler, not a divine shepherd. Also, this ruler governs human beings who have accepted this control voluntarily, not compulsorily—not like unthinking sheep forced to follow a shepherd. The Stranger has invested human beings with free choice and in this regard he is working with a much more complex sense of human nature. But has a reliable definition of statecraft now been achieved?

Myth, Paradigm and Measure [277a–d]

Young Socrates proclaims that the present account of the statesman is "complete." But the Stranger demurs. The schema of the king is not yet complete, he insists, surmising that the myth's "great paradigms" [μεγάλα παραδείγματα] were perhaps too long to provide the requisite clarity for the desired definition of the king. In sum, the discussion produced so far is accurate in outline but deficient in detail. The problem raised by the Stranger concerns the form rather than the content of the myth, an important aspect of the question especially since the Stranger introduces the mean at 277d ff to respond to the possibility that the myth is simply too long. For now, rectifying that account must follow another path, into the realm of the paradigm. The myth contains paradigms apparently essential to exhibit the nature of the ruler. However, paradigms are also problematic, ultimately engendering the doctrine of the mean to resolve—by measuring—this uncertainty.

The Definition of Paradigm [277d–8e]

At this juncture, it is not evident that paradigms will become central to the Stranger's methodology. But this strategy begins to emerge at 277d, when the Stranger asserts, as a prelude to further discussion, that "it is difficult" to "exhibit any of the greater [ones]" without using "paradigms." The kind of reality named "greater" [μειζόνων] is not clear, although the Stranger eventually adds various properties to this reality. Chapter 2 argued that the myth paradigmatically foreshadowed the development of statecraft. For now, the Stranger initiates the theoretical structure of paradigms with examples in order to prepare young Socrates, as well as the student of the *Statesman*, for the subsequent account of statecraft produced through paradigms. It appears, says the Stranger, that each of us knows whatever we know as if in a dream and then, when we are awake, knows nothing at all. Young Socrates, puzzled, asks the meaning of this comparison. The Stranger replies "I seem at present and very absurdly to have touched upon our experience in regard to knowledge" (277d). "How?" asks young Socrates, and the Stranger concludes, "Why, my friend, the very paradigm I employ requires another paradigm."

What does the Stranger mean by saying he has "very absurdly" [μάλ' ἀτόπως] touched on our experience concerning knowledge? The answer derives from young Socrates' unseeing response to the dream/waking relation. The Stranger has, in fact, offered a paradigm illustrating our relation to knowledge. The sole purpose of this and every paradigm is, as the Stranger just asserted, to exhibit or explain some reality which is greater and therefore presumably both important as well as difficult to grasp. When young Socrates hears the paradigm, however, he is confused. Thus the waking/dreaming paradigm aimed at illuminating our relation to knowledge has not only failed to clarify, it has produced befuddlement, the opposite of clarity. It is surely "absurd" then for the Stranger to be required to fashion one paradigm in order to explain a paradigm intended to show why paradigms are needed in the first place! The Stranger must therefore introduce another example of a paradigm in order to explain his first example of a paradigm.

Learning our letters

The Stranger develops a second paradigm based on the letters of the alphabet. Fowler wonders (Loeb translation, pp. 76–7) whether Plato has been guilty of a "dramatic slip," since this paradigm is "employed also in the *Theaetetus* 202 ff., but the Stranger cannot properly refer to that, as he was not present at the time." However, there is no dramatic slip once the relevant paradigms are identified. The first paradigm the Stranger refers to—although not explicitly cited as such—occurs at 277d, and it concerns knowledge. The Stranger asserts that we know what we know as if in a dream; thus the interplay between dreaming and wakefulness is paradigmatic for hazy, ungrounded awareness and fully articulated cognition. Further evidence of the use of this paradigm occurs at 278e, when the Stranger analyzes wool weaving, a "lesser thing," so its results can be transferred to the "great Form" of the king, thus producing "waking knowledge for us, not dream knowledge." We are currently "dreaming" about the statesman; the paradigm of wool weaving will "awaken" us to the true nature of this art. Thus the paradigm about the learning of letters has become necessary in order to clarify the paradigm relating (a) dreaming/waking with (b) hazy awareness/clear knowledge. Using letters for a similar paradigmatic purpose has indeed already occurred in the *Theaetetus*;[2] however, the fact that the Stranger does not appear in that dialogue does not bear on the pair of references to paradigms in the *Statesman*. Fowler, not recognizing the two paradigms broached in close proximity to one another, has prematurely introduced—and overemphasized—the importance of the *Theaetetus*.

The Stranger begins his explanation of paradigms by positing that children "recognize the several letters well enough in the short and easy syllables, and can make correct statements about them," but that "in other syllables they are in doubt about these same letters, and err in opinion and speech about them." The easiest and best way to teach them letters which they do not yet know, says the Stranger, is to lead them to those instances in which they had right opinions about those same letters and then connect this awareness to groups of letters which they did not recognize. Comparing the two groups exhibits that their nature is the same in both combinations. Applying this method will show children that their true opinions are

correct in all cases in which they presently are ignorant. The original letters thereby become "paradigms," producing awareness that "every letter is in all syllables always called by the same name," either because these letters differ from the other letters in the syllables or because the specified original letters are the same as the target letters (278b–c). Their opinions will be the same regardless whether the letters are recognized aurally or visually.

When the discussion of letters as paradigm is completed, the Stranger generalizes a definition (278c): "a paradigm is formed when that which is the same in some unconnected thing is rightly conceived and compared with the first, so that the two together form one true opinion."[3] This definition of a paradigm epitomizes a relation[4]—the problematic notion introduced at the beginning of the dialogue—since such cognition results from juxtaposing distinct entities with respect to an observer. Furthermore, if this definition of paradigm is compared with the usage of the same term in the *Republic*, its complexity in this regard becomes obvious. In the *Republic*, paradigm typically names the Form in relation to an instance of that Form, the relation characterized as imitative or copying (for example, 592b)—an exclusively metaphysical usage.[5] But the definition of paradigm given in the *Statesman* contains both implicit metaphysical and explicit epistemological components. First, paradigms produce "true opinion"—not knowledge; second, the paradigm based on letters shows that juxtaposing two paradigmatic components generates only a sameness shared by the two methodologically linked realities. These abstract implications become crucial when weaving is used as a paradigm to exhibit the nature of statecraft at the dialectical culmination of the dialogue.

Truth and the Soul

After defining the paradigm, the Stranger poses the following question:

> Should we therefore wonder that our soul, whose nature has been affected in the same way concerning the elements of all things, is sometimes in some cases firmly grounded in the truth about every detail, and again in other cases is all at sea about everything, and somehow or other has correct opinions about some combinations, and then again is ignorant of the same things when they are transferred to the long and difficult syllables of life? (278d).

Implications from this complex passage reveal key elements in the epistemology and metaphysics embedded in the dialogue. The Stranger contrasts (a) soul existing with respect to truth versus soul in complete confusion about all things, and (b) soul having "correct" [ὀρθῶς] opinions about some things versus soul being ignorant of transferring these correct opinions to more complex "syllables of life." The Stranger then adds that no one starting with false opinion can ever expect to attain even a small measure of truth and wisdom. Thus to be wise, one must already have some degree of truth in hand, even if that truth is only the derivative truth proper to true opinion.

It is in the "nature" [φύσει] of soul to be affected in the same way concerning the elements of all things. Although the Stranger does not stipulate how "elements" [στοιχεία] should be understood, he proceeds to describe the relation between soul

and "truth" [ἀληθείας]. Now if truth means knowledge based on Forms, then the elements of all things must be those aspects of things constituted by Forms. But if the Stranger intends a non-Platonic truth, there would be no need to recognize Forms as the implied "elements of all things."[6]

If elements do refer to Forms, then soul's nature is such as to be aware of Forms. Soul is sometimes in some cases grounded in the truth concerning every detail—that is, soul knows, in truth, every aspect of some thing at certain times. This kind of awareness was described, mythically, in the *Phaedrus*. Socrates asserted that soul animating a human body must have seen at least something of the Forms when soul existed by itself, journeying to the rim of the heavens in the company of a divine counterpart (249c; cf.248a–b). Thus soul could presumably give an account of every constitutive element of some thing, at least at a certain period in the history of soul's interaction with that thing. However, the Stranger also indicates that in some cases soul is all at sea—for some things, soul is not cognizant of any formal elements of a thing to the point of being able to articulate an account of that thing. This state of affairs may also be glossed with the *Phaedrus* myth; when the head of soul dips beneath the rim of the heavens (248a), that soul will not experience whatever Forms were beheld during the period when the head of soul enjoyed primordial experience of those Forms. When such a soul animates a human body, then this human will not respond cognitively if confronted with instances of those Forms because the soul of that human lacked prior experience of the Forms grounding these instances.[7]

What does the Stranger mean by "combinations"? These refer to the elements when they exist in relation to one another. We have correct opinions about these combinations, that is, where soul discerns in particulars Forms existing in relation to one another. But we find it difficult to preserve these opinions when shifting from such readily discerned combinations to the "long and difficult syllables" of life. Thus, we readily understand weaving, that is, blending different things, as an intersection of combining and separating materials, but we find it difficult to connect this understanding to the "long and difficult" matter of determining the nature of statecraft.

The contrast between truth and true opinion in this passage suggests that if paradigms produce, at best, only true opinion, then soul must attain truth some other way. The Stranger prefaced his discussion of paradigms by saying that it is "difficult" to exhibit the "greater" ones without using paradigms. But if exhibiting these greater entities is not equivalent to knowing them in truth, then truth of the greater ones may be acquired without appealing to the derivative character of paradigms. However, the fact that the Stranger continues his quest for statecraft through the epistemic medium of paradigms suggests that although he recognizes truth and can give a provisional account of its reality, he does not control the methodological means to attain truth. The best that the Stranger can provide young Socrates—and the student of the *Statesman*—is a paradigm establishing true opinion, a derivative degree of truth, about statecraft (278c). This line of interpretation suggests, again, that the way to attain truth lies elsewhere than in developing paradigms. The long-range implication from this passage: Plato is informing us through the Stranger's careful distinctions that truth is available, but he is also alerting us that the Stranger may be the kind of philosopher who, by the example of his own thinking in company

with young Socrates, can take us only part of the way towards truth—even, and especially, truth about the nature of statecraft.

A Paradigm for Paradigms [278e–9b]

The Stranger now asks young Socrates whether it would be advisable to "see in another small and partial paradigm the nature of paradigm in general." Once this demonstration has been accomplished, the paradigmatic method can be transferred "from lesser things to the great Form [μέγιστον...εἶδος] of the king" so that "this may be waking knowledge for us, not a dream." Young Socrates quickly assents to this strategy. The analysis proposed has a dual thrust: (a) the account of the paradigmatic paradigm (that is, wool weaving) will illustrate "the nature of paradigm in general"; (b) this account will then be applied to something "great" which possesses the same basic structure as wool weaving—the *eidos* of the king. The implication is that what it means to rule is already known, but through a glass darkly, as if in a dream. In fact, as argued in the previous chapter, we have indeed gleaned its basic form from the demiurgic activity depicted in the myth. The paradigm based on wool-weaving is intended to strengthen and vivify that awareness so that through the medium of true opinion, it approximates—but only approximates—full-fledged knowledge. However, this extended use of the paradigm of wool weaving is the second phase of its function and it will be employed later in the dialogue; the first phase—to illustrate paradigm in general—is now at hand.

According to the definition given at 278c, the two constitutive entities in a paradigm must be unrelated to one another. Therefore if the account of wool weaving is intended to illustrate the nature of paradigm in general, then this account must analyze wool weaving in relation to an entity unrelated to wool weaving as such. The Stranger must do the same thing with wool weaving as he just did with learning letters, that is, set up a relation between wool weaving as such and another reality revealing a sameness such that this other reality becomes clearer as a result.

Weaving: Definition as Paradigm [279b–83a]

The following account details the description of weaving with respect to its paradigmatic purpose and concludes with a commentary on the metaphysical principles and assumptions built into the structure of a paradigm. This structure has a key function in the *Statesman*'s final determination of statecraft and also, upon reflection, contributes to interpreting the dialogue as a predominantly aporetic exercise.

Weaving and statecraft

At 279b, the Stranger asks young Socrates what "paradigm" we could apply "which is very small but has the same kind of activity as statesmanship and would enable us satisfactorily to discover that which we seek?" The Stranger casually responds: "What do you say, by God [πρὸς Διός] Socrates, if we have nothing else at hand,

to taking at random the art of weaving, and, if you please, not the whole of that" but rather the art of weaving wool. A paradigm based on wool weaving satisfies the two conditions stated at 278e—the example illustrating the nature of a paradigm should be "small" and "partial." Wool weaving is asserted to be "very small" at 279b and its status in this regard is reinforced later, at 285d, when the Stranger says that no one having "good sense" [νοῦν] would pursue the *logon* of weaving for its own sake. Also, wool weaving is only "part" of the art of weaving (279b). Much later, at 305e, the Stranger announces that they shall discuss "statecraft" after the "paradigm supplied by weaving," thus fulfilling the promise made now, at 279b, when the Stranger states the rationale for introducing the art of weaving. The Stranger will conclude the paradigmatic application of wool weaving to statecraft at 310e–11a by proclaiming that "the whole business of the kingly weaving is comprised in this and this alone...weaving them together by common beliefs and honors and dishonors and opinions and interchanges of pledges, thus making of them a smooth and, as we say, well-woven fabric, and then entrusting to them in common for ever the offices of the state."[8]

The Stranger contends that wool weaving displays the "same" kind of activity as statesmanship (279b) and that using wool weaving as an element in a paradigm will allow them to "discover" [εὕροι] that which they seek. Indicating this sameness is apparently not sufficient by itself to provide every aspect of statecraft required; for if it were, there would be nothing left to discover. The Stranger knows, or, perhaps better, has an inkling of, how to proceed in this inquiry but once the paradigm has been laid out, dialectical work remains. In order to select the other element of the paradigm, the Stranger must have already discerned at least some aspects of statecraft, otherwise this element would not only be arbitrarily chosen but the nature of this element, whatever it turns out to be, becomes the dominant if not decisive factor in determining the nature of statecraft.

Chapter 2 argued that the myth provided the inspiration for addressing the second problem stated at 275a, the incomplete account of the statesman, through the paradigm of weaving. The Stranger, acting as divine surrogate (*Sophist* 216 b–c), recognized that divine agency had dealt with the inherent waywardness of the cosmos by weaving together elements from opposed dimensions. The Stranger then realized that he could instruct young Socrates concerning the human counterpart to divine statecraft by introducing wool-weaving, an activity familiar from Athenian life, and thereby shift from mythic grandeur to the goal of defining the statesman via the paradigm of wool weaving.

A subtle textual hint that the cosmic dimension of the myth is on the Stranger's mind appears at this point. After he selects weaving as the source for the paradigm illuminating the art of statecraft, he immediately qualifies that choice by saying, as noted, that they will not take "all" that art, only that part which encompasses the weaving of wool. To intimate that the entire art of weaving is much more inclusive—indeed, even cosmic in scope—the Stranger prefaces his restricted mention of weaving with the epithet *pros Dios*—"by Zeus." This interjection is not merely an incidental turn of phrase excitedly declaimed at the thought just verbalized; the Stranger literally calls to Zeus as the source of this awareness because the Stranger

has recognized what divine activity at the highest level has accomplished as revealed in the myth—during the era governed by Zeus himself.

The division of weaving

Since the immediate context is determined by the stated need to clarify the nature of a paradigm, it might be expected that discussion would begin with this topic. But this is not the case. The Stranger initiates a series of divisions, thereby reflecting the dialectical procedure begun at 275e. At that point, the Stranger began the revised analysis of statecraft after the educative direction provided by the myth, a process which eventually revealed the need for paradigms to supplement division.

The divisions leading to a definition of weaving begin with the assertion that everything we make or acquire is either to do something or to defend against something. The extreme generality of this initial dialectical move should be noted. The Stranger contrasts human beings defending themselves in some way and—doing something else. This is division by dichotomous classes, since whatever human beings make for themselves or procure through their own activity is either (a) doing something or (b) defending against something. The Stranger begins his quest for the nature of wool weaving by examining human beings from the most inclusive perspective, their function as tool-makers or, even more generally, insofar as they interact with nature and appropriate what is other than themselves to achieve their ends. The Stranger adopts a perspective of totality when he begins the divisions leading to the nature of wool-weaving, just as the myth showed that the appropriate point of departure for analyzing statecraft emerged from a narrative concerning cosmic totality.

After a series of divisions of things used for defense, the Stranger arrives at protective coverings fastened without extra material (such as glue), which he calls "clothes." He concludes these divisions (279d–80a) with an important qualification: weaving, insofar as its "greatest" part is concerned with making clothes, differs in name only from the art of clothes-making, just as the royal art differed in name only from statecraft. At this point, the Stranger suggests that someone might think this account of weaving was adequate because although it has not yet been distinguished from closely cooperative arts, it has been separated from many other related arts. When young Socrates does not recall which related arts, the Stranger temporarily halts the analysis and reminds him of the series of arts distinguished from 279c to 280b, but lists them in reverse order. The problem raised by the Stranger resembles the problem arising at the end of the first attempt to define the statesman. At that point (268a), the Stranger objected that their definition might be challenged by other care-givers; thus wool weaving, our present concern, has not yet been distinguished from other arts which might claim to be relevant to, if not constitutive of, the art of weaving as such. When the initial problem of defining the statesman arose, the Stranger responded by embarking on the grand myth of reversed cosmic cycles. Why now does the Stranger, in reviewing the sequence of divisions for young Socrates' benefit, proceed in reverse order?

The Stranger's review list does not accurately represent the original sequence of divisions, thereby perhaps indicating flawed remembrance of his own dialectical

work.[9] The Stranger concludes the reversed review by saying "it would seem" [δόξαιμεν] that the art we are seeking, weaving, "furnishes protection from the weather [and] manufactures a defense of wool." "So it would seem" echoes young Socrates. This concerted hesitation may indicate a mutual awareness that something is not quite right either with the execution of the review or its conclusion or, perhaps, both. But a more important aspect of interpretation concerns why the Stranger reviews the division in reverse order rather than merely reiterate the originally stated order. I suggest that the reason his lesson in refreshing young Socrates' memory takes this route is to duplicate, in a dialectical setting, the mythic activity of the demiurge in ordering the cosmos according to reversed cycles. After completing the review, the Stranger notes that the initial phases of weaving clothes include activities which are "the opposite" of weaving (281a), for example, the carder's art separating tangles from the wool. By indicating that an activity related to weaving—also one which might compete with weaving—is the opposite of weaving as currently defined, the Stranger situates young Socrates along a parallel setting to that of the opposition driving the cosmos in the myth. Now, however, they must resolve this problematic opposition dialectically rather than by telling mythic stories.

The practitioner of the opposing art of carding, as well as the arts of fulling and mending, will claim to have importance in producing clothes. If so, then the arts producing tools necessary for these collaborative arts will also claim to belong to the art of weaving. Although weaving is the "noblest and greatest" [καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην] art connected with fashioning woolen clothes, the Stranger contends that their account is neither "clear" nor "complete" until these other arts are distinguished from weaving. The same problem emerges as in the initial division of statecraft: dialectic must provide additional clarity and completeness, through appropriate divisions, if the account of weaving is to function as an element in a paradigm.

Two types of causality

To accomplish this phase of dialectic, the Stranger distinguishes between two types of cause: contingent and "the cause itself." Contingent causes are arts producing tools required to make the desired thing, such as the arts which make spindles and shuttles; those arts which generate the thing itself, including washing and mending of clothes, are causes in the primary sense. In sum, carding and spinning and all other processes associated with making clothing form one art well-known to all—the art of wool-working.

The reflective element in this division should be noted. The Stranger feels it essential to identify and describe types of causality, this while analyzing a reality, wool weaving, which does not appear to command such an inquiry. The Stranger has appealed to the notion of cause earlier, when he prefaced the myth by assuring young Socrates that it would reveal the cause of certain ancient tales about heavenly phenomena (269c). But now his account of causality is explicit and more subtle since he distinguishes types of cause marked by dependency. Thus secondary causes depend on primary causes[10]; spindles and shuttles serve no purpose if wool weaving, which requires such implements, did not exist. This dependency focuses attention on the cause itself and how such causality should be determined. Thanks to the myth

and its introduction of realities which are, or resemble, Forms, the Stranger now has available a range of reality which could function in a causal capacity—if, of course, Forms so function.

Weaving: composition and separation

The Stranger asserts that "wool-working comprises two divisions, and each of these is a part of two arts at once." Before identifying these two arts, the Stranger observes that carding and other crafts which separate things joined are part of the art of wool-working. At this point, the Stranger immediately, but without fanfare, shifts to a context defined by extreme generality, asserting that in "all things" [κατὰ πάντα] we find two "great arts," that of "composition [συγκριτική] and separation" [διακριτική]. He then stipulates that carding and the other related processes just mentioned are part of the art of separation. Thus carding, whether with the rod or by hand, is part of two arts at once—wool-weaving and the more inclusive, and "great," art of separation.

To parallel this connection, the Stranger suggests that they "again take up something which is at once a part of the arts of composition and of wool-working" and put aside all that belongs to separation. The Stranger says "again" [πάλιν] because he has just identified something—carding—as part of a "great" art, separation. He now repeats this identification. If the Stranger can do that, then he has shown that weaving includes processes sharing in *both* fundamental arts found in the production of all things. Furthermore, the relation to be established is sameness—and the something in question is "at once" [ἅμα] a part of the art of wool-working, as is carding, but also part of the art of composition, the other "great" art and, as such, an art unrelated to wool-working.

The Stranger initiates this step, "making two parts of wool-working, by applying the principles of division and of composition." In this case therefore, the part which belongs "at once" to composition and to wool-working must be divided again in order to get a "satisfactory" [ἱκανως] grasp of the art of wool-weaving. This division produces (a) the art of twisting threads and (b) the art of intertwining these threads, with the art of twisting threads then subdivided into the arts of producing the warp and the woof, both subsidiary arts requiring composition.

The definition of weaving: a paradigm for paradigms

The Stranger now concludes his analysis: that part [μέρος] of the art of weaving which we have chosen to discuss "is clear to almost everyone," that is, when that part [μόριον] of the art of composition included in the art of weaving forms a web by the "right intertwining of woof and warp," a woolen garment results and the art producing that garment is called weaving.

If, as argued above, this account of weaving demonstrates the general structure of a paradigm, then it must satisfy three conditions: (a) weaving must be related to something which is, as such, unconnected to it; (b) a sameness must be established on the basis of the relation so generated; (c) of the two relata, one is "greater" than the other.

Condition (a) is satisfied because weaving, or rather that part of it chosen for discussion, the weaving of clothes, has been analyzed in relation to the arts of composition and separation, and these two arts are found in the production of all things (282b). If composition and separation are indeed found in all things, then these two processes must function differently in producing things and artefacts other than woven clothes. Therefore, the two relata are unconnected to one another.

Condition (b) is satisfied if we summarize what the Stranger has shown:

(1) carding=that part of wool-working which belongs to weaving and at the same time to the art of separation;
(2) spinning—twisting thread into warp and woof + interweaving of the twisted threads=that part of wool-working which belongs "at once" to weaving and the art of combination. Thus the requisite sameness common to both dissimilar relata has been identified.

Condition (c) is satisfied since the Stranger carefully stipulates that composition and separation are both "great arts" (282b) and also, after stating the nature of weaving, that they will incorporate that nature in a paradigm including the "great" art of the king (278e). This contrast suggests that wool weaving is less than a great art, a conclusion reinforced when, later, the Stranger asserts that no one of "sense" [νοῦν] would pursue an account of weaving for its own sake (285d).

These three conditions, collectively as a set, justify concluding that when the Stranger discusses the connections between the two great arts and weaving, he is practicing division as a component of dialectic. But he also fulfills his promise to young Socrates to illustrate the structure of a paradigm by introducing something other than weaving—the "great arts" of composition and division—and then connecting these two arts and weaving. The resulting account clarifies the nature of weaving and also shows young Socrates a working example of a paradigm, thereby putting him in position to appreciate how weaving can paradigmatically apply to the exhibition of statecraft.

The Stranger's paradigmatic account of the paradigm of wool weaving also reveals the implicit presence of the myth. If composition and separation are found in "all things" and this includes the cosmos itself as well as everything in the cosmos, then composition and separation pertain not only to the production of the cosmos as a uniquely ordered and living whole but also to every ordered and living whole existing within the cosmos.[11] The myth speaks of a demiurge as a "harmonizer" (269d) and, later, as a "composer" [συνθέντος—273b]. To harmonize and to synthesize presuppose bringing together disparate elements to form wholes. The order produced in the cosmos encompasses positioning form, a principle of order, on matter, an essentially chaotic reality. The demiurge separates matter in at least two distinct senses: (a) to establish the different kinds of living things animating the cosmos, and (b), to locate places in which animals can exist.

The processes described in the myth may therefore be considered as divine exemplars of the great arts of composition and separation. The paradigmatic account of weaving has situated weaving in a context encompassing processes which constitute everything in the cosmos as well as the cosmos itself. Obvious differences

exist between a demiurgic practice of these arts compared to their human application. But the synthesis and harmonization of the demiurge are sufficiently similar to the arts of composition and separation to classify them as manifestations of these two great arts.[12]

On the Limits of Paradigms

Given the Stranger's insistence on the importance of paradigms as a methodological device for securing philosophical ends, it will be prudent to reflect on the structure and limitations of paradigms as currently defined and deployed. This discussion reinforces reading the *Statesman* as an aporetic presentation of fundamental questions and positions.

Paradigms and forms

It is clearly crucial to identify the "greater" ones, since they represent the objects toward which paradigms are directed and the Stranger says nothing to identify them when they are introduced in the initial characterization of paradigms. Thus if the greater ones are (or include) Forms, then it will be "difficult" to exhibit the Forms except by using paradigms. A paradigm is a relation. Of the two relata, one must be higher than the other (278e). The respect in which "higher" should be understood is not indicated, although it is suggested. Just before the analysis of wool weaving, the Stranger says that he will transfer lesser things—in this case, the description of wool weaving—to the "great Form" [μέγιστον...εἶδος—278e8] of the king. If *eidos* here refers to a canonic Form, then the paradigm juxtaposes wool weaving and statecraft to exhibit the "great" Form of the king. Therefore, if this instance of a paradigm is representative, then the greater ones are Forms.[13] The following textual considerations support this conclusion:

a. Later, at 286b, the Stranger asserts that "immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, can be exhibited [δέικνυται] by reason only, and it is for their sake that all we are now saying is said." This description implies that the greater realities are both immaterial and noblest, assuming that "all we are now saying" includes the earlier discussion of paradigms. By contrast, things with sensible resemblances can be easily "exhibited" [ἐνδείξασθαι], but the "greatest and noblest" (things) lack an image accessible to human vision. Thus exhibiting the greater ones will require an account knowable by the mind rather than merely a tangible demonstration immediately available to perception. This type of account is, of course, typical of cognition of Forms.

b. At 277d, in the initial statement indicating the need for paradigms, the Stranger contrasts knowledge in terms of dreaming and waking. This point is neatly glossed at *Republic* V(476c–d).[14] Dreaming refers to the hazy and confused way we know Forms whereas wakefulness refers to a state in which knowledge of Forms is manifest. When awake, we see the clear distinction between beauty itself, the

Form beauty, and particular beautiful things made beautiful because they participate in the Form beauty. When dreaming, regardless whether it is the actual state of dreaming or the surrogate dreaming which marks incomplete cognition, we reduce the participation relation from resemblance to identity, that is, we confuse beauty itself with the beauty found in particular beautiful things. If the same parallel holds in the *Statesman*, then the Stranger is obliquely referring to the contrast between soul having awareness of Forms (that is, being awake) and awareness clouded over and obscured by overlooking the fundamental difference between Forms and their instances. But when defining paradigm (278c), the Stranger insists that paradigms produce true opinion, not knowledge. As a result, although a successful paradigm will apparently "exhibit" a Form, such exhibition does not produce knowledge of the Form but only a true opinion derived from that Form. The Stranger's use of dreaming/waking as a proximate image of a paradigm is intended to show that paradigms are aimed at Forms but also, given the stated results of a paradigm at 278c, that they lack the perspicuousness and precision required to produce knowledge of these realities. Why they are lacking will be shown later in this chapter.

c. The myth describes some realities as most divine, immutable and without body (269d), although nothing is said there about how these realities function with respect to the cosmos. If these realities are Forms, then the references to realities with similar properties in the Stranger's discussion of paradigms reinforce the conclusion that paradigms exhibit Forms.

d. If paradigms produce true opinion, then their object must be either a Form or, minimally, a reality derived from a Form, since without such a dependency relation this opinion could not be described as "true." The latter possibility explains the Stranger's frequent appeals to "schema," a level of reality which, given the present argument, is more real than particulars or sets of particulars, but in some sense less real than Forms. The account of wool weaving produced by the Stranger amounts to a discursive representation of the Form of weaving or a simulacrum of that Form—its schema, perhaps. This account is offered rather than, say, a weaver's demonstration of weaving displayed visually to interested spectators. Commentators note that this phase of applied dialectic in the *Statesman* is considered the most accurate transcription of ancient Greek wool weaving.[15]

Difference and sameness

The Stranger says only that it is "difficult" to exhibit greater entities, Forms, without using paradigms. Presumably then it is possible—but difficult—to do so without paradigms. The supposed difficulty in exhibiting a Form without a paradigm suggests that Forms are best approached contextually, in relation to other realities. It might appear that this condition obtains only heuristically, a gambit required due to our benighted cognitive faculties. But even if this function is primarily heuristic, a prerequisite in order to exhibit or show the nature of a Form, exhibiting the Form still requires that sameness join the two realities involved in the paradigm. In short, epistemological conclusions hinge on metaphysical considerations.

The Form exhibited must be related to another reality "unconnected," or different, from that Form. At a high level of abstraction, the theory of paradigms requires that knowledge of a Form—to the degree that knowledge is possible—requires that the Form be filtered through difference. Thus it is evident that weaving as such is unconnected to or different from statecraft. But surely whatever can be known about a Form will be affected by its connection to the other relatum. Thus, the contextual character surrounding paradigmatic apprehension of a Form's nature through a relation to another and *different* reality will direct, and in the process limit, what can be known about that Form, as the following discussions demonstrate:

Paradigmatic selection Is there a *unique* correlate to be introduced in a paradigm to exhibit an instance of the "greater" ones? Selecting the lesser reality is clearly decisive, since the nature of the lesser reality will contour, if not determine, the nature of the greater Form. The Stranger never addresses whether, in a paradigm, a given greater Form has only one properly correlate lesser reality. When a plurality of more or less relevant relata suits this purpose, executing a paradigm must presuppose an inkling of the nature of the Form to be exhibited, otherwise the "random" character of the choice risks distorting that Form. In addition to the insight provided by the paradigms embedded in the cosmic myth, the Stranger must have had some sense—or, perhaps, recollection—of the nature of statecraft in order to select wool weaving as the lesser component in a paradigm to exhibit the nature of statecraft.[16]

Paradigmatic sameness That the Form and other reality are unconnected implies, minimally, that they are distinct from one another. The sameness the two realities share must therefore be broad enough to encompass what is common to the nature of two different realities, at least one of which is a Form. Assume that a paradigm involves two Forms, A and B. If so, then specifying what is the same in the Form to be exhibited pertains to only *some* aspects of the nature of that Form. What is the same between Forms A and B cannot pertain to *all* characteristics of both A and B, for then A and B themselves would be the same, thereby failing, and dramatically so, to satisfy the requirement that the members of a paradigm must be unconnected to one another. This consequence is important, since it implies that paradigmatic sameness between A and B must refer to "part" of A (as a whole) and to the same "part" of B (as a whole). Thus even a successful paradigm will exhibit only part of the nature of a "greater" Form, that is, that part which is the same as its counterpart in a "lesser" entity. True opinion resulting from a paradigm only partially reveals the greater reality to be exhibited. This reasoning implies that the final account of statecraft, produced explicitly as a paradigm, exhibits only some aspect or phase of statecraft and therefore does not reveal its true nature. Thus statecraft might *include* the blending of opposites (for example, opposed opinions on justice or other elements of virtue) but not be exhaustively *defined as only* such blending.[17]

The neutrality of paradigmatic sameness

To posit that a "greater" Form has a "lesser" reality so related to it that some aspect of the nature of the latter will be the same as the nature of the former is, it appears,

an assumption of considerable magnitude. However, this assumption will not be so great if the sameness specified is sufficiently broad. For at a high level of generality, it will be difficult *not* to find a sameness applicable to any two dissimilar relata in a paradigm. But such a sameness cannot informatively exhibit any of the "greater" Forms.

Saying that two things are the same makes a substantive metaphysical claim. If the two things are the same in all respects, then the two things are identical. If the two things are the same in only some respect (or respects), then the two things, as individual unities, exemplify both sameness and difference. Recognizing such properties is vital, for if they are not recognized then reality sinks inexorably into a Heraclitean flux where anything is everything and nothing is—or can be—the referent of true or false propositions. The *Sophist* established that philosophical discourse is possible given that the "greatest kinds," such as sameness and difference, either blend or do not blend in certain ways, thereby securing articulated discourse concerning the structure of reality. But sameness and difference are, as such, only *threshold* properties—they invite, indeed compel, further investigation into what is the same and what is different so that the ways in which given entities are the same and different may be described. The character of sameness does indeed lead to discussing the nature of statecraft by the blending which wool weaving shares with statecraft. But this sameness also indirectly shows the relative metaphysical barrenness of sameness as such when that notion is applied to articulating the nature of a Form, especially a complex and important Form.

The parallels between paradigms in the *Sophist* and in the *Statesman* are instructive—in the former, it is angling and the sophist; in the latter it is wool weaving and the statesman. And when, in the *Sophist*, the "greatest kinds" are introduced, this analysis of paradigms in the *Statesman* suggests that the intention is not to advance a substantive metaphysics, or to revamp the theory of Forms, but merely to continue eliciting the relatively barren implications from metaphysical notions inherent to the Eleatic tradition. The *Sophist* shows which greatest kinds "blend" with one another and which do not. But the blending of greatest kinds in the *Sophist* is, in its own way, no less metaphysically uninformative as the sameness in the *Statesman*'s notion of a paradigm. Furthermore, the sameness leading to the nature of statecraft indirectly shows the relative metaphysical neutrality of sameness as such. Weaving as part of a paradigm exhibits the fact that certain elements in statecraft must be "woven"—but which elements? How should these elements be woven? For what purpose? Such crucial questions are not resolvable simply by the way the Stranger has structured a paradigm. As a result, when at dialogue's end the Stranger finalizes his analysis of statecraft in terms of weaving, it remains unclear how he would address and attempt to answer these standard, indeed unavoidable, questions.

The sameness essential to the paradigm is open-ended in that it requires disparate entities to be connected only to produce true opinion. This usage of sameness mirrors sameness understood as a "greatest kind" in the *Sophist*. Thus sameness can obtain between Forms, between particulars, and between Forms in relation to particulars—as such, it occupies an ontological dimension unique to itself and to all other equivalent generalities. That a reality of such generality should produce opinion, albeit true opinion, should not occasion surprise. But to the extent that

the *Statesman* and the *Sophist* develop positions solely dependent on such greatest kinds, their overlaid metaphysical message gives point to the need for future and more substantive inquiry.

Paradigm and value

The distinction between greater and lesser elements of a paradigm must be valuational in some sense. A nation whose population was clad in the finest woolen clothing would not exemplify happy citizenry if the people so clothed were ruled by a despot. Conclusion: a difference in value exists between statecraft and wool weaving. Since presumably all Forms are identical *qua* Form, then this difference in value in paradigms characterized by relations between Forms cannot be determined on the basis of the nature of a Form *per se.* The doctrine of paradigm does not allow determining how this value-dimension should be understood.

This dimension of value concerns the elements of a paradigm. But there is another, equally fundamental dimension of value pertaining to what the paradigm can exhibit.

The description of wool weaving is paradigmatic for statecraft. The final definition of wool weaving refers to forming a web "by the right intertwining of woof and warp" (283a). And at the conclusion of the parallel account of the kingly art, the Stranger asserts that the "whole business" of this art is to blend self-restrained and courageous character, thus "making of them a smooth and, as we say, well-woven fabric" (311a). The words for "right intertwining" and "well-woven" are, respectively, εὐθυπλοκίᾳ and εὐήτριον. Both words begin with "*eu*"—, the prefix indicating "well" or "good." This terminological sameness reveals an essential aspect of blending—the elements of wool weaving and statecraft must not only be combined, they must be blended *well*. In other words, a value dimension exists in both arts.

To blend warp and woof of material is one thing; to blend them well is quite another matter. If the warp and woof of material crafted to be a cloak are not blended well, then the result is not a cloak but a confusion of cloth, suitable for no purpose whatsoever, much less the clearly evident purpose of protecting its wearer from the elements. Although blending has been determined paradigmatically as the same in both wool weaving and statecraft, blending the respective elements well emerges only when the relevant sameness is articulated, and then only at the end of each account, almost as an afterthought. And afterthought it cannot be if additional points made by the Stranger are taken into account. First, the value dimension permeates the object of paradigms—at 286a, the Stranger asserts that everything said has been directed at increasing our awareness of "the most noble" and "greatest things" [κάλλιστα ὄντα...μέγιστα]. If these most noble and greatest things are Forms, as argued in this chapter, then a paradigm accurately representing a Form must indicate the value aspects inherent in the Form. As it stands, however, the description of paradigm at 278c lacks this value dimension altogether since the sameness essential to a paradigm does not mention value or any way to determine value. Second, the Stranger will soon require as necessary to all production the existence of due measure—the "rightful, appropriate ... (284e)." Due measure thus directly depends on a principle of value.

The omission of value considerations indicates that the structure of a paradigm is deficient in providing for the rightness essential to production.

In sum: a paradigm is structurally unable to exhibit knowledge of its subject matter. A successful paradigm can seemingly display part of or an aspect of a Form but it cannot bring into view the inherent valuational dimension of that Form. Thus the Stranger correctly states that paradigms beget true opinion—they do not and cannot produce knowledge.

There are, however, many references to knowledge in the dialogue. When the Stranger says paradigms are sometimes required to exhibit the greater ones, knowledge strictly defined can apparently be obtained without using paradigms. Nonetheless, even if this supposition were true, the Stranger's own analysis of statecraft employs a paradigm. Therefore why would the Stranger resort to a derivative mode of establishing statecraft if it were possible to *know* that reality rather than merely *exhibit true opinion* about it? Why is true opinion the highest degree of cognition available in the cosmos circumscribing the *Statesman*? According to standard Platonic epistemology, knowledge is cognitively and valuationally higher than true opinion. If knowledge is possible in the cosmos described by the *Statesman*, then some factor or factors in or related to a paradigm are lacking with respect to paradigms producing knowledge. Although paradigms may be essential at times to exhibit greater realities, the best that can be achieved through such paradigms is true opinion.[18] Knowledge, given the cosmos and cognitive procedures described in the *Statesman*, must be arrived at in some other way. The Stranger initiates the pursuit of one such way through his complex and metaphysically fertile position concerning types of measurement.

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Chapter 4

Measurement and Dialectic
[283b–7b]

As the lengthy account of weaving ends, the Stranger, retrospectively eyeing this phase of the inquiry, wonders why they did not say immediately that weaving is simply intertwining warp and woof. Young Socrates replies that he thought nothing said was futile or wasted. This brief and seemingly insignificant exchange leads into the methodological core of the dialogue.

Logos, Value and Sickness [283b-c]

The Stranger responds to young Socrates' assertion about the justified length of the account with a comment combining approval and concern: "No wonder; but perhaps you might change your mind." He tells young Socrates that in order to avoid this "sickness" [νόσημα] if it should recur—which, the Stranger adds, is not unlikely—he will propose a principle applying to all such cases. This principle is derived from examining excess and deficiency as a basis for praising or blaming undue length or brevity in this kind of "discussion" [λόγος]. The Stranger adds length and brevity to excess and deficiency, since all might be factors belonging to measurement [μετρητικὴ] as it pertains to accounts of this sort.

The "no wonder" prefacing the Stranger's response to young Socrates may compliment the youthful thinker's philosophical instincts and awareness, since he recognized the relevance of everything said during the analysis and description of weaving. However, the Stranger believes that the tendency to think such accounts might be futile or at least overlong is a kind of "sickness" and the antidote for this malady must be administered in advance as preventive medicine.[1] The Stranger's response implies that the length of this account of wool weaving was indeed justified but another account, of similar length on a different subject, might seem unduly long when in fact its length might also be correct. To interpret an inappropriate reaction to a theoretical account as a sickness is perhaps unusual, since this kind of error strikes a modern reader as strictly intellectual—a mistake—rather than symptomatic of an illness. But here the Stranger is Platonic: serious reflection is essential to overall well-being so that a mistake concerning an account which reveals the nature of something is not just an error in conceptualization—it is, more fundamentally, a sign that the individual is sick. If so, then we should be aware of this fact, as of a bodily sickness, and do something about it, ideally to prevent such a sickness from occurring and damaging ourselves in terms of what we should know about reality and what decisions should or should not be made dependent upon this knowledge.[2] This procedural move is instigated by a palpable sense that the account of weaving is too

long, not that it is misleading or false. The notion of measure is therefore introduced to resolve a problem ostensibly about the form rather than the content of a discourse. Of course, the length of an account can be directly relevant to its intelligibility and purpose, so much so that an overly long discussion may be either misleading or not as persuasive as it could have been if duly abbreviated. The Stranger will raise this question concerning the length of his own myth.[3]

Since collection as a phase of dialectic will soon be formally introduced, it is well to note that the phenomena examined as integral to measurement—length, brevity, excess, deficiency—are subtly diverse. To describe the length or shortness of an object merely determines a quantity by some standard unit of measure—for example, a piece of wood is 12 inches long. But judging that such a length is excessive or deficient introduces a valuational dimension which, as such, is absent from the empirical quality displayed by length and brevity. Thus a 12-inch piece of wood is too long (excessive) for a toothpick and too short (deficient) for a baseball bat. The Stranger has covertly introduced value considerations into the collection funding his analysis of measurement as the components of that collection emerged from critical reaction to the account of wool weaving.

The Problem of Measurement [283c–4a]

The first step in the remedy to prevent inappropriate responses to the length of a discourse is dividing measurement into two parts [μέρη]: (a) relative greatness or smallness and (b) "that which is necessary for production [γενέσεως]." The Stranger explains: greater is determined only relative to less and less is determined only relative to greater; each of these types of measure is relative to its opposite. We must also, however, assert the actual existence of excess and deficiency "according to the nature of the mean" [τὴν τοῦ μετρίου φύσιν], whether such excess or deficiency occurs in words or actions. After all, the Stranger stresses, excess and deficiency constitute the primary difference between good and bad human beings. In general then, greatness and smallness are relative to each other, excess and deficiency are relative to the nature of the mean. The two types of measurement are therefore distinct and this distinction must be preserved. Furthermore, if greater has no relation to anything other than less, then greater will have no relation to the mean. But, the Stranger concludes, separating the two types of measurement in this way will destroy "the arts and their works," and, by implication, destroy (a) statecraft, the definition of which we seek, and (b) weaving, the eminently practical art we have just defined. If therefore these arts, and all other arts, do indeed exist, then we must describe the necessary connection between these two types of measurement.[4]

The first type of measurement determines whether something given is greater or less in magnitude than another given thing; the second type concerns what the artist or craftsman necessarily employs before producing a given thing. The possibility of an art existing thus depends on conjoining both types of measurement. The Stranger will soon refer to the "establishment" [γένεσιν] of the mean, that is, what is produced varies depending on the material and intention of the prospective artist

in fashioning an entity embodying a purpose. But whatever is so produced requires a mean, and establishing this mean is essential to such production.

The problem of measurement originated from questions concerning an account in words (that is, the myth), but the Stranger extends its relevance from words to actions. Note the strong ethical context introduced. Although the Stranger does not develop how excess and deficiency account for goodness and badness in humans, it is clear, stated abstractly, that whether a human being has acted in a morally good or bad way depends directly on measurement. Moral goodness and its opposite are preeminent instances of value. Therefore, this step heightens the fertile sense of value the Stranger has built into his discussion of measurement from the initial collection combining excess and deficiency with greater and less, followed by appropriate divisions derived from this collection.[5]

Arts and Measurement [284b-e]

The question of excess and deficiency in the arts is real, not just theoretically but also, as we have seen, in actually producing art. Furthermore, when arts observe the mean, their products are "good and beautiful" [ἀγαθὰ και καλὰ]. The Stranger recalls the *Sophist*, reminding young Socrates that just as we there had to "force" [προσηναγκάσαμεν] the conclusion that non-being existed, so now it is also necessary to force [προσαναγκαστέον] this second conclusion, that greater and less must be measured not only in relation to one another, but also in relation to the establishment of the mean. Without this admission, no one with "knowledge of practical affairs" can exist for certain.

If no art of statecraft exists, then no kingly art can exist, since the kingly art is one type of statecraft. Furthermore, this claim about the art of statecraft reorients, if not collapses, the distinction at the outset of the *Statesman* (258e), when the Stranger dichotomously divided all knowledge into two parts, practical and intellectual. It was noted that the Stranger fudged this division when he asserted that the statesman functions "more like" the person of intellectual control than the craftsman (259d). But now the Stranger claims that unless the two types of measurement intersect, knowledge of practical affairs is not possible, which seems to say that knowledge of practical affairs is essential for the art of statecraft. Thus theoretical knowledge may not be divorced in all respects from practical knowledge, as asserted at 258e. To account for this important dialectical shift, it may be noted that the Stranger now has at least tentative access to formal realities—that is, the myth's appeal to Form-like entities—and that knowledge of these realities is necessary so the statesman can deal effectively with the myriad practical matters involved in running a polity.[6]

It is vital to appreciate (a) that the desired conclusion must be "forced," and (b) the retroactive appeal to a similar forced procedure occurring in the *Sophist* regarding the establishment of the existence of non-being. Forcing a conclusion could mean that the results are produced under difficulty, as in a problematic birth requiring "forced" labor; on this interpretation, however, the results could still be reliable and unaffected by the method of delivery. But the meaning could also be that the results are prematurely produced by wresting or wringing them in some way and, in the

process, deforming what is so forced. If the latter is the intended sense, then the Stranger has alerted young Socrates, and his audience, that what follows should be examined with special care.

The task at hand, says the Stranger, is even more difficult and time-consuming than was the parallel task of establishing the existence of non-being in the *Sophist*. However, the Stranger says we can "with justice" adopt this assumption—that sometime the principle just stated, that concerning the generation of the mean in conjunction with measurement of greater and less, will be required for demonstration with respect to "precision itself" [αὐτό τἀκριβὲς]. If "precision itself" refers to demonstration according to the highest accuracy, that is, truth, then since the possibility of such demonstration is an assumption, adopting this assumption must be justified. Thus having the mean cognitively in hand becomes essential to demonstrating with "precision." But on canonic Platonic grounds, the only reality grounding such precision is the Form and our knowledge of it. However, the Forms are not yet fully at hand for the Stranger, a lack shown vividly by the Stranger's appeal to the future—that is, we "shall need [δεήσει] this principle of the mean." The Stranger has nevertheless asserted that when arts do observe the mean, the resulting productions are "good and beautiful"—the same pair of properties employed in the myth to describe all instances of natures fashioned by the demiurge for residence in the cosmos. This common universality suggests that whatever metaphysical associations are, or may be, inherent in the mean—for example, the Forms—should be connected to the good and the beautiful, a connection explored below (Chapters 6 and 7).[7]

In the meantime, the Stranger proposes that it is sufficient to adopt the following principle, which "magnificently" [μεγαλοπρεπῶς] supports the requirement with respect to measurement and the necessary presence of the mean just stipulated: it must be believed that "all the arts exist alike and that the greater and lesser are measured in relation not only to one another but also to the establishment of the standard of the mean." For, the Stranger adds, if the latter exists, then so do the arts and if the arts exist, so does the establishment of the standard of the mean, but neither can ever exist if the other does not. As a result, the Stranger proposes to divide measurement into two types: the first type encompasses all arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, and thickness in relation to their opposites; the second type includes all arts which measure them in relation to "the moderate, the fitting [πρέπον], the opportune [καιρὸν], the needful and all the other standards that are situated in the mean between extremes." In sum: belief in the generation of the mean is sufficiently, indeed "magnificently," justified by the following argument: all arts exist alike and the greater and less are measured not only in relation to one another but also in relation to the generation of the mean. For, the Stranger reasons, if the mean exists, then so do the arts and if the arts exist so does the mean, but, he concludes, neither of them can exist if the other does not.[8]

It will be noted that this justification is hardly longer or more strenuous to secure than the account of non-being advanced in the *Sophist*, immediately suggesting that the present justification may have taken a short-cut or, as the Stranger indicated, that the conclusion is somehow "forced." That the conclusion is indeed forced, and by strictly logical considerations, soon becomes apparent.[9]

The first belief on which the Stranger insists is that all arts exist alike or at least in a similar way. In other words, all arts must exist in a way closely related to one another so that a feature existing in one art will also be found in all arts. This condition is essential since, if accepted, it guarantees that whatever holds for one art will, *pari passu*, hold for all arts at least in that respect.

"At the same time" [ἅμα], it must be believed that, in the Stranger's summary statement, the arts and the mean are coimplicatory: if (M), measurement of greater and less with respect to the establishment of the mean, exists, then (A) the arts exist and if (A) the arts exist, then (M) so does measurement of greater and less with respect to the establishment of the mean. This reformulation of the Stranger's statement is, logically, a biconditional: M if and only if A. Thus the biconditional is equivalent to: (a) If M then A *and* (b) If A then M. It is evident that A is true, that is, arts exist. If so, then (a) is true. If, however, M is false then (b) becomes false (via the truth table for material implication). But the falsity of (b) renders the biconditional false since a biconditional is true if and only if its two conditionals are both true (or, of course, both false). Thus the only way the present biconditional can be true is if M is true. Therefore, truth-functional propositional logic *requires* that measurement of greater and less with respect to the mean must exist.

But how "magnificent" is this argument? This argument grandly justifies its conclusion solely due to basic logic—what follows for component propositions of a biconditional on assuming that the biconditional is true and one of its constituent proposition is said to be true. Establishing that measurement with respect to the mean does exist, as a matter of metaphysical fact, is the key step, precisely the step the elucidation and justification of which vanishes within the logical flourish of the Stranger's supposedly magnificent argument. The Stranger testifies to the elegance and logical precision of his own thinking, to be expected as *pro forma* from a "divine" philosopher. But the soundness of the Stranger's argument remains indeterminate. When the Stranger asserts axiomatically that measurement according to the mean is essential to producing art, subsequent discussion points precisely to explaining *how* this mean is established. Only clarifying this assertion will show how art as organized and purposive activity, and works of art as products, can exist.

We will assume, with the Stranger and young Socrates, that the foregoing argument has in fact justified the crucial assumption, and continue discussion. The next step is to divide measurement dichotomously: one part includes all arts measuring number, length, depth, breadth and thickness in relation to their opposites; the other part includes arts measuring in relation to the moderate, fitting, opportune, needful and all standards situated in the "mean" [μέσον] between extremes. The Stranger has clarified due measure by adding that this type of measure situates its reality in the mean between extremes. If the extremes of excess and defect are real as limits on realizing the mean, then the mean itself must be commensurately real. Even if the mean between extremes is initially determined by the artist or practitioner of a particular art (such as a statesman), this unity of mean-and-extremes exists not only in the artist's mind as a prospective "cut" in this continuum, but also in the material itself, material bounded by limits and admitting of a mean. "Material" in this sense must be understood broadly, encompassing such diverse realities as wool suitable for weaving into a garment, moral attributes constitutive of human goodness and

badness, and human personalities characterized by various attributes and suitable for blending into a unified political entity. Combining the two descriptions: the art determined by the mean between extremes is also the art serving as an essential condition for anything's existence. The emergent question concerns whether or not these spare accounts of measure—especially due measure as essential for production—are sufficiently developed to explain adequately what they purport to explain. This question is given preliminary discussion in the following comment.

The mean and the possibility of production

The Stranger has insisted that they "force" the conclusion that greater and less must be measured not only in relation to one another—the art of quantitative measure, but also in relation to the establishment of the mean—the art of due measure. The Stranger is speaking about the existence of the arts of measurement, not about what these arts measure. An art is an activity performed by humans. However, the art of quantitative measure presupposes something measured by that art—something in some sense material (again, understanding this term very broadly). Without the existence of something which has the capacity of being quantitatively measured, such measurement becomes otiose. Furthermore, since, according to the Stranger's dictum, the art of quantitative measure logically implies the art of due measure, the art of due measure also refers to something material.

It has been asserted that without due measure, the production of things is impossible (283d) and that due measure is the standard of the mean—that which is fitting, right and opportune between extremes (284e). Consider a cloak. What is fitting and right about a cloak is how its material elements are combined by proper weaving so that the result satisfies the nature of being a cloak. But characterizing due measure in terms of rightness is, in an important sense, uninformative since this specification introduces an evaluative component without establishing the existence of anything which admits of such value. How is the "rightness" inherent in a cloak connected with the mere fact that the cloak is composed of something material?

Without rightness, the "cloak" exists only as an assemblage of cloth without determinate form or purpose. In stipulating that the production of a thing depends on due measure, the Stranger has introduced a factor which, given a range of conditions, accounts more satisfactorily for rightness in this context. Cloaks do not appear by themselves, springing autonomously from natural processes. Furthermore, combining elements into a cloak is not ordered merely by artistic desire to combine just for the sake of combination alone. Such combination is directed *toward a given end*—producing something of a certain sort. But since the origin of the cloak cannot be derived solely from the material handled to produce it, the cause of the cloak as such exists in some sense apart from the material from which the cloak is produced and therefore belongs to a different dimension of reality.

If the reason for the existence of a thing is required, then inquiry enters, of necessity, the arena of causality. Thus the *idea* of a cloak will ultimately determine the rightness the cloak exhibits once it has been brought into existence. Furthermore, this causality presupposes intention, since, as noted, cloaks do not exist as a natural byproduct of trees. But an intention must originate in a mind, or some agency of

intellection. In sum, the rightness underlying a thing's existence ultimately appeals to a particular human mind—or, more generally, mind—responding to conditions for establishing such rightness in order to produce a given end.

A cloak satisfies the idea that human beings living in certain climactic conditions require bodily protection. This idea is an instance of final cause. But to realize such a cause, woven material must assume a certain design and shape—thus due measure leads to a conjoint final and formal cause. As a result, due measure points to something formal—and decidedly existing—which serves as a model for producing that entity known as and called a cloak.

The doctrine of the mean compels explanations insofar as things derive from causes formal in structure and which also account for the value ascribed to the nature of the thing produced. But although the doctrine of the mean emphasizes the "rightness" dimension of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects in producing a given type of thing, the stated development of this doctrine does not address a thing's *form* or structure. It may be inferred then that rightness is explicitly introduced to compel further inquiry into the nature of the thing and how that nature is to be determined.

This inquiry will strive to discover and describe how a thing of determinate structure can inhabit matter, a reality characterized quantitatively in terms of greater and less. If a cloak is woven too loosely or tightly, it will not function well as a cloak—indeed, such an entity is arguably not a cloak at all, merely an amalgam of matter resembling a cloak but, in reality, not functioning as a cloak. Material must rightly exhibit the form of a cloak in order for that material to *be* a cloak.

According to the Stranger, objects produced by art are the product of the mean between opposite extremes. Consider such opposition as a set of limits. Regardless what the entity might be, it exists as an intersection of many possible opposites. Strictly speaking then, stipulating that things originate by due measure—understood solely as the mean between extremes—leaves indeterminate which opposed limits constitute that thing. As a result, specifying precisely those opposites determining how that entity is realized through the mean depends on the nature of that entity. Before specifying how a cloak exists as means between extremes, the putative object must be determinable *as a cloak*, not something other than a cloak. What is the origin of this specification? It can be derived only from a form of cloak, a form which, as such, is fixed and stable.

The stability provided by such a form is nonetheless not determinately fixed in all respects—rather, it is fixed *between* limits. The limits are fixed, not the reality open to a range of specifications within those limits. Furthermore, if, as the Stranger maintains, due measure implies the existence of a mean between extremes, then an existing thing must display a nature occupying a certain limited stretch within a material substrate. If matter is characterized by continuity spread out between opposite extremes, then due measure guarantees that formal elements introduced into a material substrate will "inform" that substrate by producing a material thing *with a certain determinate form*. Thus unless a swatch of material is designed to fit the human body, this mass of stuff never exists as a cloak. To illustrate, with a heavy-handed example: even a well-woven cloak designed to protect twice as many limbs as the human body possesses is, strictly speaking, not a cloak.

Only when the form has been instantiated in matter does the mean-between-extremes factor come into play. In other words, opposition defined in terms of limits evokes a form insofar as the form is realized in a medium defined by continuity. Only a form determines the limits setting the oppositional boundaries for existing things of a certain type. Thus all things of a certain type are defined by sets of limit conditions which can be called opposites; in this sense, limits are common to existent entities. But specific limits characterizing a particular type of thing can be determined only by a formal reality. The notion of due measure, so tersely developed by the Stranger, is grounded in a formal dimension but this development lacks an explicit appeal to an autonomous entity serving as the formal cause for the material (or moral) entity in question.

The understated yet convoluted metaphysics adumbrated in the *Statesman* leaves open whether these realities are Forms, schemas, or natures determined as other than either Forms or schemas. Or are these realities formal only as isolated and, perhaps, idiosyncratic notions in the minds of individuals, as in the mind of an inventive person who fashioned the idea that what is now known as a cloak would be good to have when the weather becomes inclement? Is the mind the sole inventor of the idea of a cloak or, to use a Platonic image, does the mind recall an antecedently existing idea for such an entity? Hints in the text allow a tentative answer to these questions.

The Stranger maintains that when arts preserve the standard of the mean, "all their works are good and beautiful" (284b), recapitulating, as already noted, assertions made in the myth that the products of the demiurge are both beautiful and good (273b8, 274d2). This conjunction of properties suggests that the formal realities underlying the existence of works produced by art are Forms—assuming that the connection between Forms and the Good remains inchoate in the Stranger's metaphysical vision. Thus a cloak, realized as an instance derived from a Form, reflects goodness and beauty insofar as the Form of cloak depends on the Good for its essence and existence.[10] But is the formal reality grounding the rightness of due-measure-producing-a-cloak a Form in the canonic Platonic sense? Even if the degrees of tension defining warp and woof can be assigned a numerical measurement, the fact that due measure is a mean between extremes implies a range of possibility within which weaving of material for a cloak may fall and produce a finely shaped cloak. The mean thus represents a continuous segment which sets limits within which a cloak can be produced, and where anything generated "more" or "less" than these limits will fail to produce a cloak. If the mean as continuous implies that a part can always be divided and subdivided without exhausting that part, then a "good" cloak need not be woven following absolutely precise numerical measurements but only dimensions of "more" or "less." If the mean as such emerges as a reality defined by continuity, then due measure does not refer to a purely formal dimension in the canonic sense; for if the mean were divisible and equivalent to a Form then a Form *qua* Form would be divisible. Rather, due measure as mean between extremes refers to a formal character insofar as that character has been instantiated in a material setting.[11]

When the Stranger says that due measure must be established, he implies that the principle underlying the possibility of due measure must be brought into the open. Hence the references to "force" and "twisted" (284c)—these descriptions apply

because *something* in what makes the mean to be a mean has been seen only partially and must therefore be "forced" into the cognitive awareness of the investigators and then inserted as a component of reality. The concerted references to "forcing" bring out the difficulty of discovering the formal element within a material complexus. In fact, repeating the pivotal metaphysical point—to discern a Form in a material object is more difficult for philosophical inquiry than, as in the *Sophist*, to determine how non-being exists. This conclusion must be kept in view throughout the remaining dialectical exercises in the *Statesman.*

Measurement and Method [284e–5c]

Due measurement is necessary for the existence of anything produced by art. If the existence of an entity such as a cloak depends on a concept or idea, then a vital metaphysical question emerges from the distinction between quantitative and due measurement. As shown in the previous section, this subtle and far-reaching distinction evokes the presence of a formal element within the complex union of the two types of measurement. The *Statesman* offers a considerable range of content concerning this element of formality.

Young Socrates notices that the two types of measurement differ greatly. The Stranger agrees, adding that although all things produced by art exist within the province of measurement, people tend to lump together the two types because they are unaccustomed to divide "according to classes" [κατ' εἴδη]. They do the opposite of this when they fail to divide "according to parts" [μέρη].

The Stranger states appropriate procedure: first, if only the unity of a group of things is seen, the investigator must not give up until all "differences" within this unity are discerned insofar as these differences are represented "in classes" [ἐν εἴδεσι]. Second, when dissimilarities are recognized in a large number of things, the investigator must not shirk the responsibility of gathering into "one circle of similarity" [μιᾶς ὁμοιότητος] all the objects related to one another and including them into "some sort of class" [γένους τινὸς] with respect to their "essential reality" [οὐσίᾳ]. This is sufficient, says the Stranger, on the topic of excess and deficiency and he alerts young Socrates to remember this distinction and the two types of measurement.

This statement of method, collection and division, is introduced almost by the way and its prelude is significant. Many clever people, says the Stranger, occasionally—and correctly—note that measurement has to do with "everything that comes into being." However, they fail to distinguish the two types of measurement just introduced. In other words, the Stranger has realized the need to announce a method requiring this distinction as a result of general lack of awareness of the difference between the types of measurement he has just introduced. Thus people, at least clever people, are sometimes aware of the importance of measurement with respect to generating things, but they are not sufficiently aware to appreciate essential differences in the types of measurement required for such production. It is essential to recall that the two types of measurement fund the generation of "everything that comes into being." Strictly speaking then, the account of generation of the cosmos

and its inhabitants developed in the myth can be replaced by the doctrine of two types of measurement the Stranger has just introduced.

Recognizing the two types of measurement leads into a more general account of two methodological processes which, duly applied, secure not only requisite types of measurement but also, as we shall see, reveal the structure of what has come into being. Consider the two processes:

Division The process of division is described first. When in the presence of a unity, the investigator must persist in identifying all its differences insofar as these differences exist as classes. Thus, the unity in question may contain differences not amenable to articulation as classes; only differences resulting from classes are identified by division. Also, division must exhaust the classes so identified within the unity. Although the Stranger does not discuss how these classes exist as entities in their own right, he clarifies this point during the description of collection.

Collection The collection phase of dialectic will be satisfied when "all sorts of dissimilarities" have been gathered into "a circle of similarity" such that all the things[12] so related to one another form "some sort of class" based on their "essential nature."

If an observer observes a number of diverse things, how is it possible to move from experiencing such diversity to "seeing" [ἴδῃ] a unity which underlies these things? Such unity must be present in order to constitute a class—regardless how class will ultimately be defined—since the formation of a class is required in order to allow division to begin its work. In addition, the range of reality covered by the one class elicited by collection dictates the range of divisions executed on the basis of that unity. Since the Stranger has asserted that accurate division of a class must be exhaustive, such articulation presupposes collecting and then seeing the limits of the class to be divided as a prerequisite for locating all constitutive divisions of that class. But determining such limits may be problematic. For example, consider the Stranger's own unannounced use of collection at the start of this phase of the discussion when he gathered four types of measurement—greater, lesser, excess, deficiency—under one class. As noted above, the last two types encompass evaluative dimensions absent from the first two types; can a set of types characterized by both the presence and absence of value be combined without concern for what sort of class results from such collection?

The properties of a collected class *per se* are unspecified. However, the Stranger does assert that collection produces "some sort of class" according to the "essential" nature of the entities which have been collected. The indeterminacy in the reference to "some sort of" [τινὸς] may have several senses, referring either to the content or form of the class.

Content If a set of diverse things is collected to produce a group defined by similarities rather than by samenesses, then when division is directed at this set the resulting classes will be defined by nothing more stable than strands of these similarities. If therefore similarity refers to elements belonging to the members of the class rather than to an identity proper to all its members, then the class produced will

not exhibit sameness but only a set of characteristics similar to one another. Under this interpretation, "some sort of class" is defined only by sets of similarities—or, to use contemporary terminology, "family resemblances"—not by strict unity of internal structure.

Form If the nature intended is essential in the standard Platonic sense, then the classes collected will presumably be Forms. Under this interpretation, "some sort of class," would not mean that the class is indeterminate in terms of inherent properties, since the class *qua* class must be eternal, immutable, and so on—properties required by Forms in the canonic sense. The myth has proclaimed the existence of realities which share some of these properties, thereby providing textual evidence for interpreting the problematic sense of class as referring to these realities.

By contrast, the indeterminateness suggested by "some sort of" might refer to a class lacking some properties of a canonic Form. This "sort of" class would resemble a Form in some respects but not others—for example, being immaterial but not immutable. That the indeterminate character of the class to be divided may refer to properties inherent in the class is reinforced by other characteristics—that is, the drama of whole and part. Earlier, when young Socrates desired clarification on distinguishing in division between class and part, the Stranger said (263b1–2) that he had no time to pursue that distinction. But if both classes and parts are possible products of division, then distinguishing between the two elements is crucial since accurate division depends on having the difference between part and class clearly in view. Without this difference, the dialectician analyzes a given unity without being able to determine when it has been properly divided into subordinate but autonomous classes or into parts which, as such, must be derived from classes in order to exist as parts (cf. 263b7–9—where the Stranger claims that parts depend on classes).

Many questions arise from this spare account of dialectic as collection and division. It is safe to conclude that determining as precisely as possible the Stranger's broad appeal to essential reality [οὐσίᾳ—285b6] is crucial in describing the subject matter of collection as an initial phase of dialectic, with commensurate implications for the structure of classes subsequently produced by division, especially when these results are applied to determining the nature of statecraft.

Method, Reality and Truth [285c–7b]

After this extremely abbreviated statement of method and implied metaphysics, the Stranger suggests that they pursue a matter directly relevant to the present subject and all such inquiries. The Stranger asks whether children learn their letters for the sake of one word or for the entire lesson—clearly the latter, replies young Socrates. The Stranger insists that this parallel holds for the current investigation—they seek the definition of the statesman not just for its own sake but to become "better dialecticians about all things." The Stranger expands on this goal. No one of "sense" [νοῦν] would pursue the account of weaving for its own sake but most people fail to notice that some things have easily perceived sensible resemblances; thus to show someone about these things is simple and may not even require language. By

contrast, the "greatest and most valuable things" have no image for human vision; as a result, exhibiting their structure requires other means. Therefore, asserts the Stranger, we must practice giving and understanding accounts of these things; for "immaterial things," the "noblest and greatest," can be exhibited only by an account [λογῳ], "and it is for their sake that all we are saying is said."

This interlude situates the long-range significance of the Stranger's foray into methodology and metaphysics. Determining the nature of statecraft is obviously important. But the Stranger emphasizes that no less (and perhaps more) important is incorporating principles of dialectic as outlined so that investigators desiring to apprehend reality throughout the sum total of things can do so proficiently and accurately. All the more reason then to be as clear as possible concerning the structure of dialectic—collection, division, the specification and description of classes, and so on.[13]

The comment about weaving not being the sort of thing which should occupy the attention of someone with good sense does not patronize the weaver and the products of this art. Weaving is the kind of process which can be learned, at least theoretically, by observing a master weaver without necessarily requiring a verbalized or written transcription of this process. However, for immaterial things an account is essential, since what inquiry into this kind of reality intends to convey is not something, such as weaving, with a tangible material result. Weaving can be learned by watching a weaver and imitating what the weaver does; ruling a state requires articulating principles so that the ruler, facing a unique set of circumstances, knows what to do based on applying these principles. The more practice we get rendering such accounts, the better our success in transcribing all such realities into thought and language, and into practical decisions following from that thought.

The Stranger asserts that everything which has been said "now" [νῦν—286a] is for the sake of these "most noble and greatest realities" [κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα]. These realities have also just been described as "immaterial" [ἀσώματα] so that it is reasonable to assume that the realities he has in mind are identical to those cited in the myth (269d). In the commentary on paradigms in the previous chapter, arguments were offered claiming that these realities are Forms, and the outlines of collection and division reinforce that conclusion here, since it would again be reasonable to think that the classes referred to in the accounts of dialectic are identical to the realities just mentioned. If so, then the appeal to those realities in the myth should be connected to the current analysis of dialectical procedures, since although myth and dialectic are very different kinds of accounts, in the *Statesman* both the myth and the analysis of dialectic refer to Forms.[14]

Two additional points concerning the subject matter of dialectic: first, the Stranger has restricted the scope of dialectic to the most noble and greatest realities. These realities are identified here as Forms. But he also says that dialectic is intended to cover all things. Therefore, the Forms occupying the dialectician's concern are not just the moral Forms—justice, beauty, virtue, happiness, and so on. Rather, the Forms of all things in the cosmos owing their existence to Forms are no less significant, since these Forms underlie our experience of things in the world around us. Thus the dialectician should master as many Forms as opportunity and circumstances permit, not just Forms which appear to have the most immediate impact on human life.

Recall a passage cited earlier in a different context: Socrates, depicted as a younger man in the *Parmenides*, hesitates about the propriety of admitting dirt has a Form and the Platonic Parmenides gently chides him about his youthful inexperience in the full range of matters philosophical (130e). The significance of dirt in the present context is easily seen. Dirt is essential to agriculture, agriculture is essential to the state, therefore the philosophically-minded ruler must at least be aware of the relevance of a Form for dirt.

The second point concerns how these realities have been described. They are, proclaims the Stranger, "most noble" and "greatest." But if the Stranger is not just speaking hyperbolically, where has he derived the source for predicating evaluative properties of Forms? Earlier, in the initial attempt to define statecraft, the Stranger asserted that dialectic ignored all aspects of value in its quest for truth (266d), a position divorcing methodology from value altogether.[15] But now, after explicitly introducing collection and division, he appeals to properties suffused with value to describe the proper objects of dialectical method. This predication, if justified, presupposes that the Stranger is somehow in touch with a fundamental principle of evaluation allowing him to situate Forms in relation to material entities (such as the products of weaving) and then to recognize that all such immaterial realities are intrinsically greater and more noble than all other types of reality. By what principle has this important evaluative claim been made?

The original reason for this excursus into measurement, the Stranger recalls, was the discontent experienced from the lengthy discussions of weaving, the revolution of the cosmos and the *Sophist*'s extended harangue about non-being. These discourses were simply too long. Now we know, says the Stranger, that the brevity or length of discourses, as determined with respect to each other, should not justify either praise or blame; rather, that part of measurement based on the mean, in particular, that which establishes "fitness" [πρέπον] with respect to the length of a discourse, should govern our response. But even fitness should not be the final court of appeal in evaluating discourses. For fitness referring to the length of a discourse in terms of producing enjoyment in its audience will be a secondary consideration compared to the primary goal, promoting the "method" [μέθοδον] of dividing by classes [εἴδη]. Whether a discourse is very long or very short becomes irrelevant as long as the discourse allows us to discover truth. The burden is on anyone criticizing a discourse on the basis of excessive length, or with "roundabout" [ἐν κύκλω περιόδους] discussions, to show that a briefer account would make its listeners "better dialecticians" [διαλεκτικωτέρους] and thus more quick to discover the truth "of realities" [τῶν ὄντων] through a reasoned account [λόγῳ]. People who want to praise or blame discourses on the basis of other qualities can be ignored, since their concerns are without philosophical merit.

The Stranger originally voiced the suspicion that the myth was too long. At the time, young Socrates disagreed with this speculative stab at literary criticism. But now principles are in place for answering the question of appropriate length. If the myth began to pall after a spell, then judged from the standpoint of literary or aesthetic pleasure, its length posed problems. But if the myth was necessary, from start to finish, in order to make its audience better dialecticians, thereby rendering it easier to discover certain realities—presumably realities described earlier as immaterial, most

noble and greatest—then residual feelings of boredom are superceded by the fact that such length was necessary in order to secure the discourse's more significant metaphysical purpose. If a long account is required to achieve this end, then so be it. The Stranger also includes accounts which are "roundabout" (or, literally, which go in a circle—286e5) as subject to the same interpretive associations. I suggest that he may be slyly punning on the circular motion of the cosmos depicted in the myth, as well as, more fundamentally, referring to the structure of the *Statesman* as a whole, which the Introduction argued describes a dialectical circle of considerable amplitude. If so, then it is crucial to recognize this feature of the dialogue in order to appreciate what the Stranger and young Socrates have exhibited regarding the scope of dialectic. The question that arises is whether Plato could have shown what he wanted to show about dialectic and reality in a shorter, less elliptical way than by the interwoven complexity of the *Statesman*, a question explored in Chapters 6 and 7.

Dialectic, myth and philosophy

Young Socrates has maintained that the purpose of the dialectical exercise defining the statesman is to make us better equipped to practice dialectic about everything (285d). But if the myth is essential in redirecting the attempt to define the crucial nature of statecraft, then this same myth, properly understood, will assist in defining everything—just as defining the single reality of statecraft exemplifies defining whatever can and ought to be so defined.

From this perspective, the myth does not just elicit the error (or errors) in previous divisions so that division continues in the same ungrounded way it began at the beginning of the day's discussion. Rather, the myth also compels us to situate any subsequent development of dialectical method so that such development incorporates features shown through the same narrative foundation. In other words, the myth sets in metaphysical relief, as it were, *all* related methodological techniques and distinctions—for example, paradigms as well as the terse developments of collection and division. When the Stranger says (268d) that they must begin again from another *archē*, another fundamental principle, the *archē* in question grounds not only the immediate inquiry into the true statesman, but also *any* philosophical inquiry insofar as it relocates dialectic on a more expansive theoretical foundation. The point is not that the myth's grandiose details must be repeated at some juncture in dialectically defining any and every other nature, only that the lessons taught by the myth in this one exercise must be transferred to all other dialectical exercises, regardless of subject matter.

How is the myth related to dialectic insofar as both types of discourse pertain to philosophy? The Stranger insists, after suggesting the contrary, that the myth not be rejected because of its length and that it is, in fact, a necessary prelude for understanding the method for determining truth. To illustrate the fecundity of the myth in this regard, consider how the Stranger may have derived the theory of measurement according to the mean from details asserted in the myth. At 283d, measurement according to the mean is "something without which production would not be possible," and at 284b, when anything produced preserves the standard of the mean, "all their works are good and beautiful." Then, at 284e, he concludes that

one part of measurement measures things in view of "all the other standards that are situated in the mean between the extremes."

According to the myth, all things in the cosmos are produced by the demiurge. But with the withdrawal of the demiurge, things are threatened with complete dissolution. The demiurge returns, restoring and situating human beings in a mode of existence midway between the extremes of complete worldly satisfaction and virtual dissolution. Thus the "human condition" may be characterized as a mean between extremes. But if what applies to human beings applies throughout the cosmos and if all beings in the cosmos are restored according to these specifications, then the existence of *all* beings is a means between extremes, each type of being reflecting this mean in its own way. As the myth makes clear, without the restorative agency of the demiurge, all things—including human beings—would dissolve into chaos. An isomorphism thus emerges between how the demiurge fashioned and preserved the elements of the cosmos and the Stranger's later theoretical formulation of measurement. In a word, the Stranger was paying close attention to his myth. And, as an adherent of philosophy, he divined that what the demiurge did to preserve the cosmos may be recapitulated as essential in explaining the existence and measurement of all things produced by art.

In general, there are two seminal approaches to appreciating the myth's necessity for the philosophical enterprise depicted in the *Statesman*:

a. The principles of dialectic have not yet been sufficiently grasped not only by the Stranger and young Socrates, but by anyone convinced of the importance of such philosophical procedure. Here the myth is *epistemic*; it shows that human knowledge is not sufficiently attuned to either reality or dialectic (or, perhaps, to both in concert with one another). In this case, the fundamental principles evoked by the myth, although well-formed as elements of a myth, are so complex that they currently—perhaps always—transcend the powers of human cognition to apprehend and articulate within a stated structure. Hence a mythic narrative approximates what must remain hidden because of unavoidable structural considerations limiting how we acquire knowledge.

The myth could, however, serve a more optimistic epistemic function. Thus human cognition is not systematically cut off from knowing principles of reality, but the methodology underlying cognition as currently formulated—dialectic—must be supplemented by additional considerations. The myth functions by showing these considerations and hinting at how they might be met.

b. The second sense of necessity rests on the possibility that dialectic in the *Statesman* has gone askew because basic elements of reality have not been appropriately specified and integrated into the structure of dialectic. In this case, the myth is *metaphysical*; it delineates that cosmic order and design are exhibited only at a threshold level and that at a more fundamental level of reality the basic metaphysical components remain undetermined. Again, as with the epistemic interpretation, the myth could serve as a broad-based heuristic device, only in

this case to point toward what must supplement and be developed from the stated metaphysics in the *Statesman.*

The point is not that dialectic must include a myth somewhere in its divisions; rather, the myth at this juncture in the *Statesman* only exhibits key considerations which, properly integrated with methodology, will guarantee to the Stranger, and to any prospective dialectician, that dialectic can elicit the greatest degree of truth concerning its subject matter. The dialectic described and practiced in this dialogue requires mythic treatment—indeed, myth concerning the nature of the cosmos—before the complete nature of dialectic can become visible to the Stranger. But no student of philosophy need follow in the Stranger's mythic footsteps if dialectic is correctable by strictly methodological repair and without indulging in this kind of imaginatively epic and, at times, quixotic, tale. We shall see (in Chapter 6) Socrates provide such correction in the *Philebus*.

What sanctions the construction and scope of a myth serving such fundamental explanatory and philosophical functions? It cannot be the principles funding the cognitive insights produced by collection and division since if the same principles were involved, it would appear idle to fabricate a myth rather than merely to continue the process of division. The mythic insight provided to the Stranger must therefore originate from another source. In fact, the underlying principles animating the myth may be essential as the metaphysical source rectifying the lack of value permeating the practice of dialectic as the Stranger has currently defined it.

These matters can be resolved only by examining the details of the myth and showing whether or not they elucidate or point to producing definitions by a methodology which pursues knowledge rather than true opinion—the latter, true opinion, standing as the stated goal of dialectic in the *Statesman*. But these considerations reinforce the position, argued in the Introduction, that taking the myth in the *Statesman* to be no less serious in philosophical import as the grand myths in the *Phaedo*, *Republic* and *Phaedrus* becomes an essential principle in interpreting the dialogue. This study will demonstrate that the myth is imposed on the Stranger in order to evoke what is lacking in the metaphysics and epistemology of the *Statesman* and, by extension, the *Sophist*. If this lack can be remedied, then dialectic can achieve its goals, thereby bringing its practitioners the happiness promised in the *Statesman*'s myth. The significance of the myth in this regard is discussed, relative to the *Philebus*, in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5

The Art of Statecraft
[287b–311c]

This chapter reviews the argument in the final section of the *Statesman*, from 287b until the dialogue concludes at 311c. What is said therein about statecraft and issues related to statecraft covers a broad spectrum of topics; however, the organization of this section, although sparely indicated textually, is tight and clear.

Statecraft, Weaving and the Structure of the *Statesman*

A brief review will assist in determining the structure of the dialogue's climactic phase. At 275a, after recounting the myth and recapping its teaching, the Stranger says that he had erred in two ways, the second way in telling neither completely nor clearly how the statesman ruled. The implication is that a subsequent account of statecraft will rectify this error. At 279c, the Stranger announces that elucidating the nature of weaving, a necessary prelude to determining statecraft, requires cutting off "parts from parts" as in the initial attempt to define statecraft—in other words, division as usual. Then, at 287b, after discussing the structure of paradigms, the two types of measure and dialectic defined as collection and division, the Stranger says "let us go back to the statesman and apply to him the paradigm of weaving that we spoke of a while ago" (from 279c to 283a). Finally, at 305e, the Stranger asks young Socrates whether they should discuss statecraft "after the paradigm supplied by weaving, now that all the classes in the polis have been made plain to us." "By all means," replies young Socrates. The Stranger makes clear that the lengthy account from 287b to 305e has proceeded by division, separating constituent elements of the state class by class and exhaustively enumerating them since, the Stranger asserts (305e), "all" [πάντα] these classes have been made plain. The Stranger then examines the interrelation of these elements according to the paradigm of weaving. This account begins promptly at 306a, with the Stranger saying that "the kingly process of weaving must be described, its nature, the manner in which it composes the threads, and the kind of web it produces." The conclusion of this account ends the dialogue (311c).

The structure of the final section may then be summarized as follows:

A. 287b–305e—exhaustive division of classes constituting the state (paralleling the commensurately complete division of classes which constitute weaving);
B. 306a–11c—description of "web" woven by statecraft (based on classes established from 287b to 305e).

This summary shows that the account of weaving paradigmatically controls everything the Stranger says about statecraft and the ruler from 287b until the end of the dialogue at 311c. The section from 287b to 311c thus responds to the second error brought to light by the myth—the account of statecraft, from the outset until the myth, was neither "complete nor clear" (275a).

The parallels between weaving and statecraft collectively constitute a paradigm, as the Stranger says both at the beginning (287b) and at the end (306a) of enumerating the constituent classes of the polis. But the Stranger has also stated unequivocally that paradigms produce only "true opinion" (278c). Therefore the final definition of statecraft and the description of what the ruler does given this definition is a protracted statement of a true opinion. The Stranger can point to the nature of true statecraft and type of knowledge its practitioner must display and he will do so, gradually, during the enumeration of classes constituting the polis. But he does not know this nature and he never claims to know it; the Stranger claims only to provide a paradigm for statecraft and this he surely does. By implication then, if the nature of statecraft were known rather than merely made the subject of a true opinion, then the final analysis of statecraft and the ruler's activity might differ, perhaps significantly, from the account derived from the extended paradigm based on weaving. The Epilogue, by examining this possibility, reinforces that the *Statesman*'s account of statecraft, culminating in the text discussed in this chapter, is primarily an aporetic exercise.

Polis and Causality [287b–e]

After concluding the abstract discussion of measure and method, the discussants apply the paradigm of weaving to the statesman. Their investigation so far has separated the art of the king from all other arts pertaining to herds; now they must address arts specific to the state. The art of kingship differs from arts concerning the state as such, implying that what makes a ruler to be a ruler and what makes a state to be a state are distinguishable from one another. The Stranger insists that causes and contingent causes must also be distinguished, a distinction announced earlier, in the account of weaving (281e). At that point, the Stranger maintained that two types of art are causally involved in the production of existing things: (a) contingent cause, defined as arts producing tools without which no art could perform its prescribed work and (b) actual cause, producing "the thing itself."

The subsequent division of each of the two types of cause cannot be done by dichotomy but rather as when sacrificing an animal, "at the joints"; the Stranger insists, however, that "we must always divide into a number of parts as near two as possible." The Stranger is moving away from strict adherence to dichotomous division and towards division controlled by the nature of the reality to be divided, although he maintains that dichotomous division is still the ideal for division.

Types of Possessions [287e–9c]

Initially, causes are divided into two classes: actual and contingent. The Stranger points out that arts which "furnish any implement, great or small, for the state" must

all be classified as "contingent causes" (287d). However, the denotation of implements renders it "difficult" to distinguish the class of contingent causes from "the rest"—presumably either other contingent causes or the actual causes—since anything which exists can plausibly be maintained as the implement or tool for something. It will thus be "difficult" to distinguish the cause or causes of the state, given that instruments, the starting point for division, represent a very broad class. The reason for this dialectical difficulty may lie, at an even more fundamental level, in the fact that the Form of statecraft has not been clearly discerned by its current investigators—assuming that Forms approximating the Platonic sense function causally.

The Stranger apparently shifts the context of inquiry when he now says that "there are possessions [κτημάτων—287e1] of another kind" he wants to discuss, adding that some possessions do not, like instruments, produce things; rather, they "exist for the preservation of that which has been produced." This class is called receptacles, variously made of wet and dry material or wrought with or without fire. Before examining the remaining classes in this division, consider the connection between the Stranger's introduction of possessions and contingent causes. Kenneth Dorter maintains that the Stranger here makes a "silent bisection," that the class of contingent causes has been divided into "those that produce possessions and those that contribute in some other way."[1] But an interpretive approach based on the text can account for introducing possessions at this juncture.

Possessions refer to what human beings have or possess—humans are the subject, not the object, of the possessions. How did humans came by possessions, especially given their prominence in political life? This myth answers this question. Humans are endowed with the possessions being analyzed because, says the myth, at one point in the cosmic drama humans themselves were possessions of the gods. Toward the end of the myth, the Stranger spoke of humans at the point in their cosmic career when they were "deprived of the care of the deity who had possessed [κεκτημένου] and tended us..." (274b). The Stranger added that in order to preserve human life on the earth, the gods gave us gifts—fire, the arts (from Hephaestus and Athena), seeds and plants. From these gifts has arisen "all that constitutes human life" (274d). Thus the possessions divided at 287e—the second class directly referring to things "wrought by fire and without fire" (288a)—are ultimately due to divine agency, since the gifts of the gods have defined human life as we know it.

The possessions of humans in a polis—and, according to the myth, living under Zeus—are the legacy of the time when humans were themselves the possession of deity. Therefore, against Dorter's reading of a tacit division of contingent causes, the Stranger is not "silently" dividing contingent causes into those producing possessions and those producing something else; rather, he is *renaming* contingent causes "possessions" to remind us what the myth has shown about the human condition under Zeus, that is, that humans, possessions of the gods, have been endowed with their own possessions by the preservational agency of the demiurge and subordinate deities. Adopting this interpretation of the Stranger's shift to possessions as a rubric sanctions significant dialectical consequences once we conclude examining contingent causes, now renamed as possessions.

To continue the division: at 288a, the Stranger identifies the "third" class of possessions, vehicles—found on land and water, ambulatory and stationary, honorable

and without honor. This enumeration implies that the second class of possessions is receptacles and that instruments now more narrowly circumscribed comprise the first class, that is, entities producing things, large and small, which are essential in a functioning state. The fourth class provides forms of defense—clothes, most arms, walls of earth or stone. The fifth class includes things produced for pleasure, playthings—painting, music, all forms of ornamentation. The sixth class furnishes the materials from which all the arts mentioned so far "fashion" their products. This also is a very diverse class, including gold and silver, wood-cutting for basketry, stripping the bark from plants, skinning animals for leather, and arts making corks, paper, cords—in general, all arts allowing us to "manufacture composite classes from non-composite classes." The Stranger adds that this class is the "primary" and "simple" possession of human beings. The seventh and final class is possession of food and all things such as husbandry, gymnastics and medicine which work to keep the body healthy—in short, nourishment.

According to the Stranger, these seven classes encompass nearly all kinds of possessions except tame animals. He then reviews the seven classes, adding parenthetically that the sixth class, described as the primary possession, should have been listed first. Anything overlooked in the polis, such as coins and seals, can be made to fit some of the classes just identified, although the Stranger admits that several of these classifications may be "somewhat forced."

As noted, the Stranger insists that the "primary [πρωτογενὲς] and simple possession" identified at the end of the description of the sixth class "ought most justly to have been placed first," followed by the remaining classes in the same order. This revision is significant: first, this possession provides "materials" [σώματα] enabling us "to produce [δημιουργεῖν] composite classes [σύνθετα...εἴδη] of things from kinds [γενῶν] that are not composite." This activity, and the language describing it, parallels the demiurgic deity fashioning the cosmos since it includes producing, from a basic stock of material, composite things out of incomposite things. The appeal to composite classes should not be taken as humans producing Forms; in this way, however, human beings are like unto God—the demiurge—in making new things, in fact new *types* of things, from simple realities (in a sense of simplicity not explained) and derived from some basic material.

The Stranger's review and suggested reordering of the seven classes was not prompted by young Socrates, as was a similar review of class specification during the analysis of weaving (cf. 280b ff). The rationale for this review may be derived from the superlative, "most rightly" [δικαιότατα], as the underlying justification for relocating this possession first in rank. Toward the end of the enumeration of all possessions, the Stranger realizes that only by possessing these materials can humans fashion everything else listed in the other six classes of possessions. Thus both the stated order as well as the order of discovery of these classes may not be identical to the "real" order, with the corollary that the Stranger has sensed value as an integral element in division, since he is eager to relocate the sixth class and specify why it should have been stated first. If the classification of possessions is an instance of division, then the implication is that classes produced by this division—perhaps every division—are not "value neutral" when enumerated. As a result, division must incorporate a value dimension in discriminating the components of, presumably, whatever class is

to be divided, an incorporation the Stranger realized only after enumerating all the components of the division. The problem, again, is identifying a principle to ground such value functions, a principle invisible at this point in the day's conversation.

According to the stated method, division of a given class should be exhaustive (285b), however, the Stranger admits that it may be necessary to force implements or entities into some one (or several) of the seven articulated classes; if so, then the overall division of possessions is open to the additional criticism that it is not yet sufficiently precise, since forcing a given thing into any one of a set of pre-existing classes may not do justice to its individuality as a thing of a definite type. Although this division has produced a seven-fold set of classes and thereby been governed by "natural" joints, the Stranger's preference for dichotomous division may have stultified producing the required number of classes if that number exceeded seven. The Stranger has, apparently, approximated "natural" division with his current effort but not fully realized it.

Slaves and Servants [289c–90e]

The Stranger notes that possession of tame animals—excluding slaves—is included in the art of herding, which has already been appropriately divided. Thus having tame animals belongs in the previous analysis of herding; as a result, this kind of possession is not part of the current division. The "class of slaves and servants in general" remains among the class of possessions and the Stranger "prophesies" that claimants to the title of king will be found here. All subsequent divisions are thus from this class. He concludes that "all the others, which we called contingent causes" have been separated from the activity of king and statesman.

This conclusion highlights the importance of recognizing the terminological shift between contingent causes and possessions. The Stranger reminds young Socrates that their analysis has been carried out under the rubric of contingent causes, reconfigured as possessions. The other contingent causes are represented by artisans and craftsmen producing possessions which play an essentially contingent but practical role in a functioning state. All these causes have been "separated from the activity of king and statesman." But at hand remains the class of slaves and servants, also possessions and, in their own way, contingent causes of the polis, since slaves and servants were viewed, unquestioningly, even by philosophers of the stature of a Plato and an Aristotle, as essential to a well-run polity. Furthermore, whereas possessions designated by the first seven classes are inanimate or result in comestibles necessary for maintaining human life, possessions in the final class are human beings, doing the bidding of their masters.[2] But both domains, inanimate and animate, collectively represent contingent causes as possessions.

When the Stranger prophesies that certain members of this class will claim to be king, the implication is that these individuals, drawn from the class of slaves and servants, are servants of the people. Thus the people have rulers as possessions just as they possess all the entities and services previously identified in the seven other classes. The ruler, the quintessential "public servant," rules only in service to the people being ruled.[3] The Stranger then contends that the "greatest" servants—

bought servants, or slaves—are "least likely" to claim to be king. Thus the class as originally described, "slaves and servants," is now effectively reduced to servants, with slaves incorporated as the "greatest" type of servant. The subtle shift elevating slaves to servants implies that with respect to discovering those who would claim to be king, *all* species of this class are servants. The shift also suggests that if slaves are the "greatest" servants, then all succeeding sub-classes will be ranked according to degrees of servitude, the highest being slavery. Finally, note the presence of value in this division—aligning slaves at the top of the class of servants—and the fact, again, that the Stranger has yet to specify any standard for uttering such claims in a dialectical division.

The members of the next identified class—brokers, merchants, ship masters, peddlers—have all freely chosen this type of activity and are explicitly recognized by the Stranger as having done so (289e), in contrast with the slave, classified as a servant but who acts in this capacity against his will. Thus the class collected and named "slaves and servants" discounts the difference between those who freely chose to function in occupations and those who have not freely chosen to do so—hardly an insignificant difference to the individuals falling under its compass nor to citizens, who will interact with traders far differently than with the slaves of those traders. The Stranger is surely familiar with this difference since he explicitly appealed to it earlier, at 276e, when distinguishing between those ruled freely, of their own accord, and those ruled under compulsion; indeed, he will appeal to this difference again shortly in dividing types of government.

Neither laborers, heralds, nor clerks are threats to kingship. But a more likely candidate for claiming kingship are diviners, who possess knowledge. Priests also, according to laws and customs, know how to sacrifice to gods and these functions are "part" of a servant's life. Both in Egypt and Greece, kings perform religious duties and so are akin to priests. Since priests and prophets share in a certain "menial" knowledge, they must be examined to determine whether they will aspire to the status of a ruler, especially since examples of priestly sorts are in the governments of Egypt and Athens. And finally crowding into the scene are individuals of mixed race, quickly exchanging "forms" [ἰδέας] and qualities with one another, many like lions and centaurs—these are sophists, the most practiced protagonists in semblances of the charlatan, pretenders in the expert matter of ruling.

At the outset of this final section, the Stranger, in announcing the rival claimants to kingly rule, says "I prophecy" [μαντεύομαι—289c], thus aligning his form of cognition with those dealing in divination [μαντικὴν—290c]. These individuals, possessing "a share of a certain menial science [τινος ἐπιστήμης διακόνου μόριον]," are "prophets" [μάντεων—290d]—decried by the Stranger as one of the false aspirants to the kingly art. If, however, the Stranger's characterization of divination is self-referential, then his identification and description of claimants to the kingly art is itself informed by only "a share" of a certain menial type of knowledge. Thus what he is saying about the origin of kings and claimants to kingship may be marginally accurate at best and should be accepted by his audience, and readers, in that vein. The Stranger's subtle reservation in assessing the truth value of his impending discussion reflects the fact that his account of statecraft will

be based on the paradigm of weaving, thus producing true opinion about statecraft, not knowledge.

Sophistry and Statecraft [291a–c]

After dividing the class of slaves and servants as indicated, the Stranger reaches the class of sophists—the "greatest charlatans"—who, "although it is very hard to do, must be separated from the band of really statesmanlike and kingly men, if we are to see clearly what we are seeking." Strictly speaking then, all types of ruler other than the true ruler are sophists. The justification of this strong claim begins here, at 291b–c, and does not conclude until 303c, when the Stranger asserts that "those who participate [κοινωνοὺς] in all these types of government [which, at that point, he has analyzed and evaluated] with the exception of the one based on knowledge" are not statesmen but rather "exponents of faction" [στασιαστικούς], "the greatest of all sophists." Young Socrates replies that the name "sophist" has "whirled around" quite correctly to the so-called statesmen. The Stranger reminds his companion that he had mentioned a band of "centaurs or satyrs" was looming, and that they must be separated from the true statesman, an analysis now completed although, he adds as an afterthought, "it has been very difficult" (303d).

The Stranger had indeed referred to centaurs and satyrs at 291b; the fact that he repeats this reference at 303d certifies that the account connecting statecraft and sophistry encompassed all twelve Stephanus pages. Furthermore, young Socrates' imagistic reaction to this account, that it "whirled around" [περιεστράφθαι—303c], recalls the Stranger's earlier warning, at 286e, that no objection should be made to "roundabout" accounts [τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ περιόδους] as long as they exhibit the truth about realities. This terminological subtlety reminds us that it may be necessary to venture explanations and reasoning which initially appear haphazard and wandering but which, after due consideration, are not. The Stranger will pass in review all currently available types of government and then, if taken at his word at the end of the discussion, show how all these types are inherently sophistical, with their respective rulers duly branded as imitators, charlatans and sophists.

Types of Statecraft—and Knowledge [291c–2d]

The Stranger now lists three traditionally sanctioned types of government: monarchy, rule by the few or oligarchy, democracy. However, since people will surely consider the factors of subjection and voluntary obedience, poverty and wealth, law and lawlessness as they occur in governments, two of these three forms will be subdivided—monarchy becomes either tyranny or royalty, rule by the few becomes aristocracy or oligarchy—producing five possibilities in all.

The Stranger asks whether any of these forms of government is the right one. Young Socrates says, "Why not?" Because, argues the Stranger, it had been affirmed at the beginning of discussion that royal power was a kind of knowledge. The Stranger reviews the section of dialectic beginning at 258b, restating that statecraft was a science of judgment and command which ruled living beings, and recalls how

they made a lengthy series of divisions until inquiry reached the present moment, when they remain unable to state "with sufficient accuracy" what kind of knowledge statecraft is. If they maintain this position, ensuring consistency with earlier inquiry, then true government must be derived solely from the class of knowledge, not by considerations such as whether few or many rule, whether those ruled are willing or unwilling, whether wealth or poverty determines the conditions of rule. Do any of the five forms of government at hand satisfy this requirement? The Stranger appeals to the fact that the divisions distinguishing the five types of government just enumerated are derived from popular belief. But if statecraft is knowledge, then, the Stranger insists, the factors popularly used to demarcate types of government would not seem relevant. The implication is that determining how statecraft is knowledge supercedes the division of government into the five types currently under analysis, in turn suggesting that the various allocations of power and responsibility inherent in any and all these types may not play crucial roles in statecraft properly understood. Determining what the ruler must know in order to make appropriate executive judgments and commands then becomes crucial. Merely asserting that the ruler judges and commands remains purely formal until substance is given to what the ruler must have in view as a foundation for the executive judgments and commands to be given. This is the knowledge which, says the Stranger, has yet to be determined with sufficient accuracy.

The Knowledge of Statecraft [292d–3e]

The problem is determining which, if any, of the available forms of government produces knowledge requisite to rule human beings, given that statecraft is the "greatest" type of knowledge, the "most difficult" to acquire and is encroached upon by the greatest number of individuals pretending, in the manner of a sophist, to have it.

The knowledge of government cannot arise from a multitude of people, for if it could so arise then statecraft would be the easiest of arts. Young Socrates notes that the individual possessing the kingly science must be called kingly whether or not this individual actually rules. The Stranger thanks his young friend for reminding him of that point, established much earlier in the discussion (259b). We must therefore look for the "right" kind of rule in one or two or very few, whenever we happen to locate it and, as just noted, whether or not that individual in fact functions as a ruler.

These rulers, whether they rule over willing or unwilling subjects, with or without written laws, whether rich or poor, must rule by an art [τέχνην—293a9]. The Stranger illustrates this point by shifting to physicians. If physicians cure by art, then it does not matter whether they do so with or without consent of their patients, causing their patients pain, or using written rules just as long as they preserve their patients "by making them better than they were." This is the only "right" definition of the rule of the physician—or any other type of rule. Therefore, following this analogy, the preeminently "right" form of government is that in which rulers "are discovered" [εὑρίσκοι] to be truly possessed of knowledge, whether or not they rule with law, with willing or unwilling subjects, whether rich or poor. As long as

rulers act "in accordance with knowledge and justice" and both preserve the state and make it "better" than it was as far as that is possible—this alone is the only "right" [ὀρθὴν] form of government. All other types must be considered "neither legitimate nor really existent" [οὐ γνησίας οὐδ' ὄντως οὔσας] but as "imitating" [μεμιμημένας] this type; those states well governed imitating it better, the others worse.

The Stranger's appeals to valuational considerations are significant, if not crucial. Statecraft is the "greatest" type of knowledge, but we are not told how this designation has been, or can be, determined. Furthermore, the type of government under scrutiny is the only "right" form of rule. Finally, that currently existing types of government are not "legitimate" presupposes that mere existence does not, by itself, bestow fundamental rightness. Again, the relevant senses of rightness and value allowing all such evaluative judgments are not specified by the Stranger.

For the Stranger, the only right account of true statecraft refers to the discovery of rulers, endowed with knowledge and justice, who preserve the state and make it better than it was, to the extent that such improvement is possible. However, he has also maintained that so far, they have not been able "to state with sufficient precision" [ἱκανῶς...διακριβώσασθαι] what kind of "knowledge" [ἐπιστήμης] statecraft consists in (292c) to accomplish this goal. But even if it is not yet possible to state what kind of knowledge the statesman must have in order to practice statecraft, it is possible to describe the results which must obtain if such statecraft were to exist—life will be better than it was prior to the advent of the only right type of government.

It is not clear at this point whether the desired form of government will be monarchical, oligarchic, or democratic—or, perhaps, another type not yet specified. But if only one such ruler or a small group of rulers exists (cf. 297c), then the government is either a monarchy or oligarchy. However, statecraft practiced by a single individual is not monarchical in the sense that sovereignty derives from only one person ruling. Rather, one ruler rules because that person is the sole individual commanding the knowledge requisite for this function. Knowledge confers sovereignty, and the argument shows that such knowledge appears in one person or a small group of individuals.

The right form of government makes things "better"—it does not guarantee that life will be "the best." Therefore life—imperfect before right rule took command—will remain imperfect, although presumably improve, gradually and continually. Thus if the quality of the best political life depends on knowledge and justice, then the ability of the true ruler continually to improve life implies that the true ruler constantly becomes more acquainted with knowledge and justice. This inference implies that the true ruler is not and never was divinely wise and knowledgeable, that is, in a sense not requiring extension of scope, study, and the necessity of revision. In addition, there is seemingly no ideal state in the sense that the state achieves a level of perfection which cannot be superceded by governmental administration. The true ruler practicing statecraft continually confronts situations defined by difference and conflict; as a result, the best statecraft can do is continue to resolve these conflicts so that the overall well-being of the polity is secured and improved, bit by bit.

To review: the only right type of government is the ruler acting according to knowledge and justice so that conditions for the citizens are "better" than they were. Therefore, the type of government actually in place—whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy—when the "best" government has been achieved is not as important as the fact that the ruler or ruling principals of this government will continually try to make life better for the citizens. But if, in the best form of government, citizens are continually becoming "better" than they were, then the ruler of that government acts on the basis of knowledge which, although only dimly seen by the Stranger, must be derived from some source. Therefore, if knowledge of statecraft depends on apprehending realities (for example, Forms), then the best ruler is the individual with some insight into these realities and the ability to translate this insight into practical decisions. Without this foundation, the ruler would have nothing to consider—no object of knowledge—in order to situate actions and decisions according to a standard providing the sustained vision required to produce a continually improving quality of life for citizens. The crucial point in the Stranger's formulation of the "best" type of government is the appeal to whatever conditions must be in place to ensure that citizens are becoming "better" than they were. We shall see that this severely truncated account of the best form of government has significant repercussions on subsequently stated features of statecraft.

Statecraft, Law and Wisdom [293e–7c]

Young Socrates finds everything said about statecraft reasonable with the exception of the claim that government, even and perhaps especially the only right form of government, should be managed without laws. This point merits discussion, replies the Stranger. The connection between law and statecraft will occupy their thoughts until 297c, when the Stranger will clarify another point for young Socrates, that the specified forms of government have less legitimacy and "less reality" than the one true form (297c–300e). The interpretation of law now advanced will become directly relevant to the Stranger's contention that all currently viable forms of government are "less real" than the one true type of government.

It is true, admits the Stranger, that lawmaking belongs to kingship. But it is best if laws are not in power but rather an individual both kingly and "wise" [φρονήσεως]. The reason: law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and most just for one and all, also enjoin upon them "that which is best" [βέλτιστον]. The manifest differences which characterize human beings and their actions, plus the obvious fact that nothing in human affairs remains at rest, bars any type of knowledge [τέχνην] from advancing a simple rule applicable for everything and all time. Young Socrates concurs with this sweeping assertion: The law is like a "stubborn and ignorant" person who allows no one to do anything contrary to command or even to ask a question, not even if something occurs which is "better" than the rule he himself proclaimed. Why then is law pursued, asks the Stranger? Just as physical trainers order what is best for the physiques of the majority rather than what is best for each individual, so the law-maker watching over "herds" [ἀγέλαις] can never make laws collectively which also respond to individual needs. Only rough approximations to

individual concerns will be produced, regardless whether the ruler institutes written laws or follows traditional customs. The Stranger adds that if someone who truly possessed kingly knowledge sat at a person's side and relayed what to do throughout that individual's life, he would hardly block this endeavor by inscribing what are called laws, since, as noted, laws as such remain inflexible and unyielding to circumstances—and, as emphasized earlier, circumstances in an individual's life are always in flux.

To illustrate, the Stranger sketches this scenario: if a physician or trainer went away and expected to be gone a long time, then it makes sense to write instructions for the benefit of those under care. But if either expert returned sooner than expected and saw a change in condition or circumstances, the expert would readily substitute new instructions to replace the old, outdated ones. The physician would never claim that no one should violate the old instructions (or "laws") since they were intended solely to produce health. If such a claim were asserted in the area of "knowledge and true art," such regulations would be greatly ridiculed. The Stranger extends this example to statecraft. If a ruler had instituted laws for "herds," whether written or unwritten, about the just and unjust, the honorable and disgraceful, the good and bad, it would be ridiculous if this ruler were not permitted to make laws contrary to these if a lawmaker "with art" should appear and so advise.

People's opinions on this subject appear compatible with this conclusion, since they say that if someone has an improvement on old laws then this suggestion should be proffered and they should persuade the state to accept it, otherwise not. The Stranger then asks whether it would be acceptable to use force rather than persuasion to institute such a legal change. Surely, the Stranger insists, if a physician cured someone by a regimen running against what law had required, this physician would not be accused of an unscientific error. In statecraft, a related error would produce decisions or commands derived from circumstances defined by baseness and evil and injustice. By parallel reasoning, even if force is used to compel people to obey what is "more just and nobler and better" than what they had done before, it would be ridiculous to blame this use of force. As long as a ruler does what is good for people, this is the truest criterion of "right" government in accordance with which the "wise and good" man will govern his subjects. Just as captain tends to crew by making "his knowledge his law," so right government can be similarly established, making "art" more powerful than laws. It is not a simple case of, baldly stated, the end justifying the means. Indeed, wise rulers can make no error as long as they maintain "one great" principle and always dispense what is "most just"with "good sense" [νοῦ] and "art" [τέχνης] and are able to preserve citizens and, as far as possible, make them better than they were.

Note the direction of the Stranger's critique of law. Laws are not made for individuals as individuals; they are made for individuals as indistinguishable members of a group. Thus law has an inherently leveling effect on its subjects—differences between, and among, individuals are typically and necessarily ignored. But the Stranger insists that what is noblest and "most just" for all individuals as determined by law will not be what is "best" for each individual. Therefore, the Stranger assumes that each and every individual has a unique value *as an individual* rather than simply as one constituent of a polity. The insistence on the importance of

individual differences with respect to the purpose and function of law attests to this assumption. Laws will not necessarily help perfect each individual under that law's jurisdiction. But each individual is worth being treated to realize what is best for that individual. Recall the status of individuals during the era of Cronos, when each and every member of the cosmos was cared for by continuous ministrations of the demiurge, presupposing that every individual was worthy of such divine attention.

More generally stated, the Stranger's position on law presupposes the intrinsic value of particularity as such. Therefore, law is an inherently inadequate means for administering to this value and providing for each individual's self-realization. The art of true kingly knowledge would, it seems, directly assist governance of all actions of everyone all the time. The manifest impracticality of this kind of assistance does not, however, invalidate the point that true statecraft will be based on knowledge rather than law, since knowledge can be much more readily adapted to varying circumstances than the "simplicity" of laws "set in stone" merely by being codified. The Stranger is not covertly advocating rule without law; rather, the ruler oversees the interests of the polity by combining available knowledge and justice in concert with the laws, modifying the latter whenever necessary by virtue of insight and direction attained from possession of the former.

If the lawgiver compels the citizen to follow a change from a given law, said change verbalized by the lawgiver, is the citizen's freedom infringed? If the citizen has agreed to follow the laws of the state and those laws represent what has been deemed "right" by whatever type of statecraft produced those laws, then being compelled to follow a change from the stated law will be, in effect, redirecting the citizen toward a renewed vision of his or her best interests. As Rousseau might have put it, the citizen is "forced to be good," that is, forced to act in such a way that his interests are better realized than if he had continued to act according to the guidance of prior existing laws.

Consider in this regard how the Stranger posed the problem of law—what had been decreed as "most just" for everyone might not also be "best" for everyone. This statement introduces an implied conflict between what is most just and what is best. Such a conflict is possible on the supposition that what is best, if based on the Good, is privileged and distinguishable from justice applied to individuals taken as members of classes and realized through laws applying to classes *as* classes. The art by which the practitioner of statecraft rectifies the distorting effects of law must have access to realities, or to a dimension of wisdom, which allows the ruler to implement what is for the best both for individuals as such as well as for groups of individuals. Without such access, the ruler would be strictly beholden to law as the only standard for making decisions and issuing commands.

According to the Stranger, the ruler must act by means of "*nou*," (297b1), rendered above as "good sense" but etymologically connoting the level of intellection which, from the standpoint of the *Republic*, is requisite for seeing Forms and determining connections between Forms and particulars. Just as the physician must have insight into the formal structure of the body—and into the distinctive characteristics of the particular body to be treated—in order to abrogate written laws or customary practices for purposes of ensuring health, so also the ruler must be capable of seeing differences and complexities in political situations in terms

of fundamental realities—or, using modern terminology, values—before deciding on a course of action which will resolve these factors and thereby preserve and enhance the well-being of the citizenry. Indeed, the Stranger makes the remarkably strong claim that any ruler making decisions on the basis of these realities will not be subject to error (297b). So potent and perceptive is the knowledge provided by the ruler's appropriate use of "mind" that the wisdom required to handle the most difficult circumstances, and to do so successfully and for the well-being of citizens, will be available for practical use.

Law and the "Right" Type of Statecraft [297c–300c]

The Stranger repeats that few could administer a state with the requisite level of "mind" [νοῦ] and that the one "right" [ὀρθήν] form of government must be sought in one or a few individuals; he also repeats that other forms of government are "more or less successful imitations" [μιμήματα]. Young Socrates immediately presses this point; the meaning of this unusual claim about imitation was, and continues to be, unclear (293e). The discussion of the nature and scope of this imitation will continue until 303d. This inquiry will proceed into areas not easy "to see" [ἰδεῖν]. First, if there is only one right form of government, then all other forms of government establish and preserve their existence based on a mistake. If the form of government described is in fact the only right form of government, then the Stranger claims that all other forms of government must employ its written laws if they wish to survive as governments and survive by doing what is presently approved of but which, the Stranger insists, is "not perfectly right." The error arises from the policy of not allowing any citizen to do anything contrary to the laws and to punish anyone who does act in this way by death and the most dire penalties (297e). This policy, although draconian in the extreme, "is perfectly right and good as a second choice" as soon as the first choice, the best form of government, has been left behind. In other words, the error derives from the fact that the second choice is necessitated because the first choice in governments is unavailable. The Stranger then relates how the second choice eventuates.

We begin by introducing "images" which "always" [ἀεὶ] must be used in portraying kingly rulers—ship captains and physicians. Assume that both types of leaders treat their subjects abominably, forcing them to pay bribes, cutting and slashing them if they don't, then killing them after being bribed by their enemies. Now assume further that these subjects decided no longer to follow their rule and substituted instead the views of the rich, or of all people residing in the polity, and allowed them to offer opinions about, for example, medicine and navigation. Then let whatever the majority had decided, regardless who took part in deliberations, be inscribed on tablets or adopted as unwritten ancestral customs and that from this time on, navigation and medicine should be practiced based on these provisions. Young Socrates reacts: "an absurd situation." Now suppose that rulers of the people are elected annually based on a random lottery, and these rulers exercise authority over navigation and medicine in accordance with written rules. "Still harder to imagine," says young Socrates. But there is more. After their year in office, the rulers pass

before judges, also chosen by lot either from the rich or the entire populace. Anyone who wishes can charge the captains for failing to command the ships during the year according to the laws or customs; if found guilty, the court can decide suitable punishment. Young Socrates: whoever consents voluntarily to hold office under such circumstances would deserve whatever punishment is meted out.

And there is still more. Anyone found investigating the arts of navigation or medicine contrary to the written rules shall be called a "star-gazer" [μετεωρολόγον], a "kind of verbose sophist." Thus anyone properly qualified can haul him into court, accuse him of "corrupting the young," attempting the arts of navigation and medicine in opposition to the laws, and governing the ships and the sick according to their own will. If found guilty, he shall be punished with the most extreme penalties. In short, one of the laws in place in this society prohibits investigation into all the laws affecting the arts of navigation and medicine.

The Stranger now generalizes: if these restrictions were applied to hunting, painting, carpentry, utensil-making, husbandry, horse-breeding, herdsmanship, prophecy, draught-playing, or any of the mathematical sciences, the consequences—noted, importantly, by young Socrates (299e)—are that all arts would be ruined and never rise again, assuming a law prohibiting investigation of these arts. This extensive list of arts, including the science of number, emphasizes the need for continuous investigation of the principles underlying these arts.

The Stranger continues. But what if the one in charge of laws were to disregard them to do a favor for someone and this individual did so lacking knowledge, wouldn't this be a greater evil than the former? Young Socrates agrees. In fact, insists the Stranger, since the laws have been made "after long experience" and after those instituting the laws had "carefully considered each detail with delicate skill" and then duly persuaded "the many" [τὸ πλῆθος] to ratify them, then anyone violating these laws would produce greater error and disruption of the social fabric than would eventuate if the laws were never investigated. Again young Socrates agrees. Therefore, the best second course of action for a government, once the ideal form of government is clearly unavailable, has been established—forbidding any violation of law, whether by a single individual or a group.

At 293c, the only right form of government is asserted to be one in which the rulers are truly possessed of science, "whether they rule by law or without law." Then, at 294a, the Stranger adds that "it is clear that we have to discuss the question of the propriety of government without laws." Although it is evident that "lawmaking belongs to kingship," the best situation is not that laws rule but rather the individual who is wise and of kingly power (294a). According to this account, the right form of government does not necessarily require laws on condition that its ruler is wise. Nonetheless, the point of the present scenario is to explain how "the second choice comes about" (297e), that is, to preserve the state by punishing severely anyone who breaks the law. The Stranger begins this "schema" by asserting, in the manner of an axiom, that its images must "always" be those of the "noble captain" and the physician worth more than any other. Earlier, and for a considerable stretch of dialectic, the Stranger had approached the nature of a ruler imaged as shepherd. Why the shift, with the rigid proviso that these new images must *always* be used in this kind of inquiry?

Shepherds rule sheep, captains and physicians direct and heal human beings. The shift may be justified because only at this point has the Stranger endowed the "herds" (cf. 295a; 295e) of humans overseen by a ruler with distinctively human characteristics, that is, the ability to form things from raw materials and the capacity to make their own choices. Also, later during the account of the ruler weaving elements of a state, the Stranger analyzes the soul of those ruled and describes their ability to possess true opinion. Thus the shift in imagery presupposes that citizens under such a ruler now approach fully fledged human beings, not animals functioning as simulacra of humans as implied during the early phases of dialectic. The Stranger has not only progressed in defining statecraft and ruler, he has also—perhaps for the first time explicitly—situated human beings in something approaching full complexity as part of the proper object of this inquiry.

According to the Stranger's hypothetical scenario, the original rulers are clearly tyrants. They are replaced by a system of laws produced by those chosen by lot, regardless whether or not these individuals possessed any knowledge about making laws. In short, the original rulers are degenerate, and there is little reason to believe, at least initially, that laws replacing them will be much better. Then, the courts deciding the fate of each set of rulers can reject any ruler for violating these laws based on the accusation of anyone, for whatever reason. Finally, one law condemns any investigation concerning any art, whether central or incidental to the well-being of government. Young Socrates remarks that life, given such a set of circumstances, would border on the unbearable and, without the possibility of improving the arts, become "absolutely unendurable."[4]

The political and legal environment hypothesized by the Stranger includes a law banning the investigation of all laws and arts, a law which young Socrates senses immediately will render life insufferable. Such a law is inimical to life, perhaps the very possibility of life, not to mention denying even wistful hopes for progress improving the quality of life for those living it under this form of rule. Note the universal scope of this law. The range of arts covers "every kind of imitation" (299d), and imitation refers to all aspects of practical life, from humble—making utensils—to essential—hunting, also to abstract arts necessary for computing figures or numbers—arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, and questions pertaining to motion. The law banning inquiry into these arts would freeze them all at their current state of discovery, and human existence in all phases, intellectual and practical, would be paralyzed in a static present. If, by consistency, this severe stricture includes the art of statecraft as well as the art of dialectic, then these two arts, however defined or characterized by the Stranger and young Socrates, cannot also be further scrutinized. If, however, this law is struck down precisely because of its inherently stultifying character, then all arts—including statecraft and dialectic—become open to study, exploration, revision and improvement.

The structure and purpose of law, established earlier by the Stranger, produces principles explaining why it is not perfectly right for a government to maintain as policy that "no citizen shall dare to do anything contrary to the laws, and that he who does shall be punished by death and the most extreme penalties." The first consideration is that not all laws are equal in their affect on human interaction; therefore, serious penalties proscribed for laws covering non-serious consequences

would make the punishment fail to fit the infraction, with commensurate effects, it may be assumed, on the status of justice in that society. But a second, more fundamental reason may also be offered. Law, in its capacity for perfecting all individuals under its jurisdiction, is imperfect. Therefore if a citizen obeys the law unthinkingly, without due attention to improving the law, then obedience to the law presupposes that the law is the absolutely final determination of what is right and best for that individual. But law as such does not function at the level of absolute certainty and fidelity to what is for the best. So the practice of severely punishing any citizen who contravenes the law is "perfectly right and good" but only as a "second choice, as soon as you depart from the first form of which we were just now speaking." The knowledge possessed by the true ruler supercedes specific injunctions of any codified law, and the possibility that such knowledge may in fact move beyond the scope of any one law is why blind obedience to the law on the part of citizens under its jurisdiction is, as such, "not perfectly right."

In that portion of his account emphasizing the law banning inquiry into the current status of the arts, the Stranger evokes a hypothetical personage who indeed makes such inquiry—and suffers severely for it in the society under scrutiny. The allusion is surely to the historical Socrates, a connection noted by commentators.[5] The unnamed Socrates is depicted here as a "star-gazer" [μετεωρολόγον] or speculator on things heavenly, a denigrating description recalling the more neutrally worded accusation recorded in the *Apology* (19b–c), that Socrates "is guilty of criminal meddling, in that he inquires into things below the earth and in the sky...." Recall that the Stranger has also pursued such speculation by considering the structure of the cosmos, albeit in myth. Furthermore, the *Phaedrus* contains the same description, where Socrates asserts that all "great arts" [τεχνῶν] demand speculation [μετεωρολογίας] about "nature" [φύσεως—269e]. The sense here is speculating on reality as it may be found, or understood, "beyond the heavens," in the great myth Socrates invokes to account for the proper structure of *eros*. This myth contains references to Forms, the "things that are" (*ta onta*—247e). If the speculation referred to in the *Statesman* encompasses a metaphysical dimension, the implication is that Socrates, taken in his Platonic guise as a student of reality, suffered "the most extreme penalties" because he attempted to secure definitions by sustained reflection on the nature of reality as ultimately grounding such definitions.

The Stranger has mentioned these realities in his own myth, calling them "most divine" (269d). But the Stranger has not incorporated them in an ordered or systematic way into his analyses of the "great art" of statecraft. Alluding to a hypothetical student of the arts of medicine or navigation and dismissed by the many as a "loquacious sophist" may evoke the need for precisely such speculation if these arts are to progress. But if arts pertaining to the body and a mode of travel require such speculation, then all the more will the art of statecraft, the "most important" art of all (292d). Socrates, as philosopher, practices the one intellectual activity which throws into question the principles of all other arts—including statecraft and dialectic itself. The Platonic Socrates then becomes an exemplar of the true statesman in recognizing the essential link between just governance of a state and what we now call metaphysics,[6] and the resultant need for inquiry into the nature of statecraft—thereby

rescinding any law against such inquiry and embracing metaphysics as necessary to establish the principles of knowledge ultimately funding the art of statecraft.

Derivative Types of Statecraft[7]—and Sophistry [300c–3d]

After stating the second best course for rulers regarding law, the Stranger asserts that these laws are nonetheless written by those producing "imitations" [μιμήματα] of "truth" [ἀληθείας]. Laws from the right type of state have been produced by a wise and kingly ruler, who may function as a lawmaker (cf. 293c–d). Since these laws have such a profound pedigree, they are the best laws possible. And yet this ruler would unhesitatingly change them since, by virtue of his art, a better course might become apparent, thus rendering the laws idle. In fact, anyone changing a written law would surely do so only to improve these laws. If, however, these individuals attempted imitation of "the truth" [ἀληθές] without knowledge, the results would fail badly; but if the emendations were done with knowledge, the results would no longer imitate—they would be "the most true thing itself" [αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθεστατον].

Neither a group of rulers nor people collectively can access the truth. Therefore if imitation of the true form of government—a single ruler governing with art [τέχνης]—were done well, then such a state must never contravene existing laws or traditional customs. Young Socrates gives full consent. At this point, the Stranger reviews the forms of government introduced earlier (291d–92a); a state where the rich imitate this government is an aristocracy, an oligarchy when the rich disregard the laws. In both cases rule is by the rich, but aristocrats heed the law whereas oligarchs follow their own devices in ignoring the law. Now the Stranger presents a careful description of monarchy. When one person rules by imitating "according to laws, imitating the one who knows [the scientific ruler—ἐπιστήμονα]," he is called a king. We do not distinguish by name between ruler ruling by knowledge and ruler ruling by opinion if both rulers govern in accordance with laws. Thus "king" will be predicated of both types of ruler. For the Stranger, the true ruler need not govern by law at all (cf. 293c); therefore, a special term—king—may be assigned to a true ruler when that individual does rule in accordance with law. The Stranger then summarizes: the true ruler, with knowledge, will be called "king" and by no other name. And so, "because of this" relation, names of the other five types of government have become only "one."

This step is important in pointing to the latent metaphysical interests underlying the Stranger's current thinking. The Stranger wants one name—"king"—to cover five distinct types of government. Why? Because imposing a single name forces the user of language and the student of statecraft to appreciate that singularity of name reflects singularity of structure, that is only *one* true Form of statecraft exists. As a result, the various types of government which have evolved over time and for various reasons must all be understood as deriving from, or imitating, that one true Form. Thus, subsequent evaluations of the five "not correct governments" [οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν—302b], a theme occupying the Stranger from 302c to 303b, are based on each of these types imitating the one true type of government. Some types of government will imitate the one true type better than others, and will

consequently receive higher ranking. But the crucial point to appreciate is that each ranking results from a vision of government defined by unity, with all other types of government derived by imitation from the one true type—the Form of statecraft. The Stranger's excursus into political philosophy is, at this juncture, driven by directly stated metaphysical concerns.

These concerns may be given additional detail. If laws of the derivative types of government must employ written laws of the right form of government, then that government must exist in some sense in order that these laws can be codified. As a result, laws written by those who are not the true ruler are "imitations in each instance of some part of truth" (300c). By claiming that existing laws are "imitations" of truth, the Stranger commits to a relation between (a) something written pertaining to human conduct and, typically, of serious concern and (b) "truth." The Stranger does not discuss truth in this sense, nor does young Socrates interrogate him about it. But claiming that laws "imitate" truth says that something is "in" laws as currently written which can be related to something else, presumably realities existing in a more fundamental sense, in a way justifying the conclusion that current laws are somehow deficient in that they only "imitate" those realities.[8] It may be inferred then that deficient imitations presuppose that truth refers to entities possessing more reality than that embedded in laws imitating these realities.

A reminder about the *Statesman*'s structure: At 281d, the Stranger posited two arts involved in all production: contingent causes and the cause itself. Then, at 287b, immediately after announcing that they are about to describe statecraft based on the paradigm of weaving, the Stranger distinguished between arts of the king and arts concerning the state, the "polis itself" [πόλιν αὐτὴν], that is, arts also divided into "causes and contingent causes." At 305e, the Stranger asserts his intention to describe statecraft according to the paradigm of weaving now that "all classes [πάντα τὰ γένη] in the state have been made plain to us." But if the existence of the state depends, in different ways, on causes and contingent causes, then if the Stranger has indeed identified all classes in the state, it follows that between 287b and 305e, the Stranger and young Socrates disclosed the state's causes and contingent causes. For if any of these causes has been omitted, then the Stranger has incorrectly concluded that *all* classes in the state have been made plain.

I suggest therefore that the analysis of law and the true ruler, culminating in the appeal to "truth," represents the Stranger's explanation of the cause of statecraft. The cause of statecraft is that element of "truth" which the true statesman must know to make executive decisions producing the best quality of life for those under his authority. But since the Stranger can only indicate this causal link without providing any details concerning the knowledge required for the ruler to rule in this way, the best he can do is merely imply that this is the cause of statecraft by situating all existing types of government as "imitations" of the one true type. This is the vision of government the Stranger declared at the outset of this phase of the analysis to be difficult "to see" [ἰδεῖν—297d4].

The Stranger now describes the tyrant, the most dramatic contrast to the highest available type of ruler. If a single ruler acts neither by laws nor customs, but claims—imitating the ruler who knows—that what is "best" [βέλτιστον] must be done even if contrary to the laws, thereby imitating the true ruler "through desire

and ignorance," then this ruler is a tyrant. The tyrant acts for what he deems best, although this construal of the best inflects desire with ignorance. Thus the tyrant, although at the apex of executive authority, has achieved that status without requisite knowledge, implying that rulers are tyrants because they do not know what they should know. However, the *desire* to secure the best also drives the tyrant to do what the tyrant believes must be done, suggesting that the tyrant's soul is inherently attracted to what is best—just as the (unavailable) ruler who knows also desires what is best. But the tyrant, rendered internally discordant by ignorance, cannot accurately direct that desire to make wise and beneficial decisions for the well-being of the citizenry.

At this point, all five types of government identified earlier have been described in terms fitting the context of inquiry. And, asserts the Stranger, these derivative types have arisen because people refuse to believe any one individual could rule with the proper degree of knowledge "to dispense justice and equity to all" (301d). If such an individual could appear, this person would be hailed and welcomed, and would dwell among the populace, directing them to "happiness" [εὐδαιμόνους] as the one and only ruler of the "precisely correct government." Since, however, no king is gifted at birth with body and mind to be such a ruler, it is essential to follow the track of the perfect and true type of government by making written laws. That governments survive when based on such an unstable foundation is remarkable, says the Stranger, yet survive some of them do. But many states have been, are and will continue to be destroyed by rulers who have the "greatest ignorance of the greatest things" [τὰ μέγιστα—302b], also "no knowledge of statecraft" although they believe they have a most perfect grasp of this highest form of knowledge. The Stranger distinguishes between the greatest degree of ignorance of the "greatest things" and lack of knowledge of "statecraft," clearly implying not only that statecraft is just *one* of the greatest things but also that the ruler must necessarily, as ruler, know about the *other* "greatest things." Although the Stranger does not identify these greatest things, recall the earlier references to things of similarly "great" magnitude (for example, 286a) and that dialectical method is in service to all such things (286a–b; cf.269d). The Stranger now asks whether their "duty" is to determine those "not right" types which are the least difficult and most oppressive to live with; he adds parenthetically that this inquiry "is somewhat aside from the subject we had proposed for ourselves." Then, as an additional afterthought, the Stranger says that "perhaps all of us have some such motive in mind in all that we are doing." Young Socrates agrees that they are duty-bound to pursue this matter.

This exchange sets in relief the practical results of their dialectical labors. All types of government about to be evaluated are difficult and oppressive, although some are more or less so than others. This kind of evaluation is off the point, notes the Stranger, because they set out to describe statecraft as such—not derivative or sham imitations of statecraft. And yet, discriminating among these imitations is what they find themselves doing, in fact, as both discussants agree, what they must be doing. The Stranger's closing comment, that perhaps such inquiry was in their minds all along almost wistfully brings out a subliminal awareness, present throughout their investigation, that statecraft in its essence was inaccessible to their inquiry. If so, then analyzing derivative types of statecraft, although an evaluative exercise

seemingly counter to their original intent, may not be entirely sterile—indeed, it may be necessary in order to render government feasible to human beings lacking mental and philosophical acumen for grasping and implementing true statecraft.[9] Recall that the Stranger seriously erred in his initial foray into dialectic, and that he had to recount an extensive cosmological myth to establish a new *archē* a revitalized origin, to be in position to redirect inquiry toward a more philosophically appropriate conclusion. Finally, his account of statecraft depends for its legitimacy on paradigms. But a paradigm produces only true opinion, not knowledge. Given these explicit and implied philosophical limitations, the final evaluation of derivative types of government may be the Stranger's way of admitting that this kind of inquiry, although not aimed at the best—the Form of statecraft—is the best he can produce and also the best his audience can comprehend.

When the Stranger clarifies the meaning of imitative types of government, law provides the locus of comparison. Thus the evaluation of existing types of government is based on a series of oppositions: with and without law, easiest and hardest to live with. Monarchy with good laws is the best of the six, without law it is the most oppressive. A monarchy is closest to the one true Form of government because it has a single ruler; furthermore, if this monarch has produced good laws, then this written version of knowledge comes closest to knowledge possessed by the true ruler and therefore is the best type of government. However, a monarchy lacking law is reduced to tyranny, the most oppressive type of government. The ruler of such a state, unsupported by law, will sink into the personal and willful excess so commonly found among tyrants. By contrast, government of the few falls midway between government by one and government by multitude and, asserts the Stranger, is also midway with respect to good and evil. If rulers are in the mean between extremes from the standpoint of law, then they enact laws not as good as laws produced by a monarchy but better than lawless life under tyranny. Why? If laws are produced by rulers, the Stranger assumes that a plurality of rulers will not be as percipient in discerning good laws as will a single ruler.

Finally, a democracy has the greatest number of rulers but it produces the least contrast between good and evil. Therefore if a democracy is lawful, this is the worst form of government endowed with laws because the laws produced are most distant from those which would be produced by a single ruler possessing knowledge. But if the democracy is without law, then this is the best—or least deficient—of all types of government lacking law since the many do not possess the resources to harm anyone living under such a regime. As Socrates says in the *Crito* (44d), "Would that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would be fine, but now they cannot do either." The Stranger concludes that life in the first type of state, under a monarchy with good written laws, is "by far first and best." The seventh life, that under a ruler with knowledge of statecraft and the other greatest things, must be kept separate from all the others, as, asserts the Stranger, "God is separate from mortals." The implication is that at this exalted level, should it ever exist, both ruler of citizens as well as citizens themselves would be divine, like unto God, compared to the level of humanity existing here and now, in a world riddled with sophistry among its rulers and by a humanity which can, only with the greatest difficulty, transcend its herd-like awareness of reality and

narrowly truncated ability to see things and make morally justified decisions. Young Socrates again agrees, saying that what he has heard "appears to be true" and that what the Stranger has asserted must be used as a basis for action.

The Stranger draws this phase of his argument to a close. At 302d–303c, the Stranger refers to the rulers of the five derivative types of government as "participating in" [κοινωνοὺς] the true form of statecraft and as exponents of "faction" [στασιαστικούς], as if they had seized some part of true statecraft and then transformed that part into a substantive and ruling whole. Furthermore, all those in charge of these governments, since "they are the greatest of imitators and cheats," are condemned by the Stranger as "the greatest of all sophists."

If (a) statecraft is one of the "greatest" types of knowledge (302b), and (b) there is only true Form of statecraft (293e1; cf. 302c) and (c) all existing types of statecraft are derived from this one true Form and therefore are imitations of that Form (293e2–3), then the Stranger infers that rulers of these governments are the "greatest" imitators and therefore the greatest "sophists." Calling a ruler of a monarchy with good laws a "sophist" might seem severe and unwarranted, but the Stranger's summary negative evaluation is justified if the premisses underlying this conclusion are accepted. The sophist is, in essence, someone imitating the possession of knowledge. Imitators of knowledge of lesser realities than statecraft will be lesser sophists, but the case at hand refers to one of the greatest types of knowledge and therefore produces, in *de facto* governments, the greatest sophists. Degrees of livability were introduced in evaluating the various types of government but here, as the Stranger concludes his explication of the degrees of reality of statecraft, no such differences appear—rather, all types of government other than that based on the Form are equally sophistical. Even though these laws, and governments promulgating them, imitate some part of truth, they all remain instances of sophistry. Since the laws only imitate truth, any ruler who insists on preserving these laws simply because they are codified does not understand the relation between legal codes and realities on which laws are based. Such rulers assert, in effect, that laws *are* reality precisely because they are laws. But a ruler who proclaims that identity confuses appearance as reality, and then compounds this confusion by making allegiance to this distinction essential to public policy and the resultant conduct of the citizens in light of that policy.

The Stranger's contrasting position: types of government should be evaluated strictly on the extent to which they possess knowledge. He interprets the differences between and among the five types of government as based, initially, on number of rulers involved—one in a monarchy, a group in an aristocracy, a multitude in a democracy. The Stranger does not consider the possibility that, for example, monarchy and aristocracy might fundamentally differ in a way (or ways) other than that the former has one person in charge while the sovereignty of the latter comes from the many. But that possible rejoinder fades in significance against the brunt of the argument evaluating the various types of government, depending as it does, again, on possessing knowledge and varying degrees of this possession. Thus such possession grounds the assertion that the five types of government are "less real" than the one true Form of government. In sum, the cogency of the Stranger's strong criticism of monarchs, aristocrats, and the majority depends on (a) the metaphysical difference between degrees of reality displayed by a set of imitations and the reality

imitated, and, as a result, (b) such differences justify commensurate value judgments concerning each member of this set.

Comment. Various descriptions from this phase of the Stranger's account, gathered as concerted narrative, present strong but perhaps not conclusive evidence that the true statesman must be, if not a philosopher as the *Republic* famously maintains, nonetheless gifted with intellect and character disposing the ruler to pursue a philosophical regimen in order to function as the true ruler.[10]

Consider: Statecraft is a type of knowledge and knowledge is of "truth" (cf. 300c). Statecraft is one of the "greatest things" (302b; cf. 292d); in addition, a plurality of such things exists implying that other realities are as great as statecraft. The Stranger has been at pains to show that types of statecraft constitute a "unity" (301b–c), and that these types are "imitations" which, in varying degree, approximate the highest level of this unity. Finally, the human exponents of these types, those ruling in their name, "participate" (303c) in the true reality of statecraft. And the Stranger prefaced this approach to statecraft by warning young Socrates that it is difficult to apprehend.

This strain of terminology, condensed and outlined as above, suggests that the Stranger has touched, elliptically but in a way difficult to miss, the presence of realities which, if not themselves Forms, are sufficiently similar to Forms to justify approaching statecraft as such as occupying this privileged mode of existence. The myth refers to "most divine" realities explicitly displaying some characteristics of Forms. If Forms they are, then the *Statesman* as a unified philosophical drama depicts the Stranger consistently seeking knowledge of the Form for statecraft—and, just as consistently, failing to secure that knowledge despite his best efforts. The lack of access to Forms, whether of statecraft or any other Form, is, perhaps, the most fundamental and telling reason why specifying the knowledge which constitutes statecraft eludes the Stranger.

Allied Arts of Statecraft [303d–5e]

The less crucial classes within a functioning state have been separated from the king but an additional group of classes remains, difficult to distinguish from the king precisely because they are most akin to kingly art. The arts of the general, the judge and that rhetoric partaking of the kingly art because it persuades the populace to justice all differ from the king's art, and are properly given special names corresponding to their distinctive domains. Just as the decision whether or not to learn music and handicrafts is a separate kind of knowledge from that required to practice those arts, so the king should decide whether or not any one of the arts allied with statecraft should be learned and, if they are, when they should be practiced or applied, thereby rendering all three arts dependent on statecraft. Thus judges will apply laws given by the king, doing so honestly and rigorously. In sum, the true kingly art should not act itself but have control over arts which have the power of action. The kingly art should decide the "right and wrong time" all these arts should be practiced in order to implement the most important matters in the state.

Now that allied arts have been identified and distinguished, the Stranger epitomizes statecraft: the art which "weaves" [συνυφαίνουσαν—305e] these arts and laws and everything else together "most rightly." This art may, with greatest justice, be called statecraft. The appeal to weaving recalls the point, noted by the Stranger at the start of this phase of dialectic, that the account of statecraft will follow the paradigm of weaving laid down earlier in the discussion. The allied arts of statecraft replicate the subsidiary deities dispensing services and realities of value to citizens of the cosmos. The ruler controls the existence and activity of practitioners of the allied arts, just as the demiurge initiates and directs divine deputies to make temperate the lives of humans beset by the whirl of cosmic opposition and the gradual erosion of natures. Of course, the ruler the Stranger describes is not the true ruler, who is unavailable and has been set aside, as a god is set aside from all mortals (303b). The ruler described is the best available ruler based on specifications given of statecraft and modeled after the paradigm of weaving. This paradigm has been derived from demiurgic agency described in the myth—reconciling opposite cosmic motions by the institution of a mean between extremes. In parallel fashion, the ruler's decision concerning the "right and wrong time" [ἐγκαιριάς τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαιρίας] to learn the allied arts implements due measure in terms of the *kairos* moment (cf. 284e).[11] This implementation forcefully demonstrates that such ability is essential for practical actions dictated by the art of statecraft, and at the same time evokes the demiurge's hailing of lesser divinities to institute due measure in reconfiguring and harmonizing the lives of human beings dwelling in a perpetually unstable cosmos.

The ruler must execute the required weaving of all constitutive elements of the polity in the superlative degree, "most rightly" [ὀρθότατα]. This designation implies not only that rightness of weaving admits degrees, but also that the ruler must control the highest degree—be the consummate weaver, as it were—to accomplish the end of statecraft and to realize fully all components of the polity. In this respect, the successful ruler supercedes the demiurge, since the latter responds to the need for rightness *retroactively* after witnessing—from a distance—the threatened dissolution of the cosmos, whereas the former, recognizing the need for correctness from the outset of the reign, establishes the required rightness *throughout* the duration of the polity.

Insofar as the ruler decides whether allied arts should be learned and when, if learned, they are to be applied, the ruler unifies the initial division of statecraft, made at 258e, into intellectual and practical. To the extent that the ruler decides concerning the existence and exercise of allied arts (and does not practice them as such), the ruler is intellectual; but to the extent that exercising these arts bears directly on the lives of the citizenry, the ruler's decisions are decidedly practical. Thus an intellectual decision is an act with direct and immediate practical consequences, rendering tenuous at best the initial dichotomous division directed at the nature of statecraft. The explanatory impetus inherent in the paradigm, derived from the myth and its cosmic dimensions, seems to have compelled the Stranger to redeploy, in a muted but significant way, the results of his earlier thinking.

Statecraft as Weaving [305e–11c]

The Stranger announces the final phase of inquiry: now that all classes [γένη] in the state have been made plain, they will discuss statecraft after the paradigm of weaving. The kingly process of weaving will be described: what it is, how it combines component threads of the state, the kind of web it produces. It has apparently become necessary after all, adds the Stranger, to exhibit a difficult matter.

At 277d, the Stranger asserted that it is difficult "to exhibit" [ἐνδέικνυσθαι] any of the "greater ones" except by paradigms. Now, at the end of the dialogue (306a), the Stranger says that it has become necessary "to exhibit" [ἐνδείξασθαι] a "difficult matter," the nature of statecraft. We are reminded of this methodological need and also, by implication, that statecraft is one of the "greater" things requiring such explanatory treatment. However, the exhibiting vehicle—paradigms—provide true opinion, not knowledge. As a result, when any greater thing is exhibited, it does not follow that such exhibition has produced knowledge of that thing's nature; rather, the paradigm has only approximated that nature, as true opinion approximates knowledge.

Virtue and Opposition [306a–8c]

For the Stranger, exhibiting the nature of statecraft is difficult because maintaining that one part [μέρος] of virtue [ἀρετῆς] is at variance with another part is easily attacked "by those who appeal to popular opinion in contentious arguments." But aside from this supposed difficulty, why does the Stranger begin to exhibit statecraft by discussing virtue?

At 301d, the Stranger had noted that no one believes a ruler could exist who, "ruling with virtue and knowledge," could dispense "justice and equity rightly to all." That the Stranger begins his final analysis of statecraft by developing a position on virtue suggests that even if the true ruler is unavailable, it remains crucial to connect virtue and statecraft. However, the development of virtue (a) reflects the derivative status of the available ruler and (b) is based on the formative agency and strategy of the demiurge coping with the consecutively opposed rotations of the cosmos.[12]

If people want to attack the position the Stranger is defending, it must be because they believe that the parts of virtue are not at variance with one another. But this is a canonic Platonic position on virtue, if the parts or elements of virtue are all co-implicatory. Therefore when people appeal to "popular opinion in contentious arguments" to attack the position the Stranger defends, they testify indirectly to the legitimacy of the Platonic position on virtue. However, this "popular" reaction is based on "contentious" arguments, suggesting that in the Stranger's mind such criticism is spurious. Now if refuting arguments are indeed bad, then the Stranger's position is, if not true, then not weakened by a confrontation with bad arguments (at least as far as the Stranger is concerned). This convoluted critical situation invites closely examining the Stranger's take on virtue in order to determine, if possible, the overall coherence of his development of that crucial moral reality.

The Stranger elicits from young Socrates the belief that courage is one part of virtue, and that self-restraint differs from courage but also is a part of virtue. Then the Stranger offers a "strange" [θαυμαστόν] doctrine about them, that "they are in a condition of great hostility and opposition to each other in many beings." This claim is unusual because all "parts" [μόρια] of virtue are usually said to be "friendly" [φίλια] with one another.[13]

The Stranger begins his exposition of this doctrine: there are qualities called excellent [καλὰ] but which we place in opposite classes [εἴδη]. Thus sometimes we praise quickness in mind or body and call it courage and sometimes we praise its opposite, slowness or deliberateness in actions or in speaking and call that decorum. But if something is too quick or too slow, then opposite or blameworthy terms are used—violent or mad instead of decorous, sluggish or cowardly instead of courageous. The Stranger summarizes: "the restraint of one class of qualities and the courage of the opposite class do not mix with each other in actions concerned with such qualities."

The Stranger now shifts from the opposed virtues to their effects. This opposition is normally without serious consequences but when it pertains to the "greatest things" [τὰ μέγιστα], as it probably will, it becomes a most detestable "disease"in the polis, capable of affecting all aspects of life.[14] An individual whose character is charged with courage will quickly find fault with another individual whose character is defined by decorum; in general, representatives of one virtue readily find themselves hostile toward representatives of the opposed virtue. For example, the naturally decorous want to lead quiet and sheltered lives; if they become dominant in a state, then according to this "desire" [ἐρωτα] they and all others under their purview will become unwarlike; then, over time, they, their children and the entire state will pass imperceptibly from freedom to slavery. By contrast, those inclined because of excessive "desire" [ἐπιθυμίαν] to display the opposite of decorousness, courage, consistently urge their country to wage war, and when they do so unwisely will involve their countries in conflicts leading to enslavement by more powerful enemies. Thus courage, first strong and flourishing, if uncontrolled eventually blossoms into utter madness; from the other direction, excessive modesty without any measure of courage produces sluggishness and, after many generations, utterly cripples those so affected. In sum, slavery is the unfortunate political consequence either way if the psychological and emotional characteristics underlying either the virtue of courage or the virtue of decorum are carried to extremes. The Stranger concludes: they have established what is intended—important parts of virtue are at greatest variance with one another, as are those possessing these characteristics when interacting with those displaying opposed qualities.

For the Stranger, courage and decorum "do not mix with each other in the actions that are concerned with such qualities." This claim concerns courage and self-restraint as such, not words of praise or blame about instances of courage and self-restraint (if such qualities are overextended). To buttress the point, the Stranger insists that self-restraint and courage can never be found together in any relevant activity (307c). In other words, the opposition in question is primarily rooted in the realities themselves and only secondarily does it derive from the way people speak of these virtues.

Why does the Stranger contend that parts of virtues are inherently at odds with one another? According to the myth, the cosmos is a living entity and, as such, can suffer disease. Thus at 273e, during the Zeus cycle when the cosmos had been left to itself and was on the verge of sinking into chaos, the Stranger describes how the demiurge reasserts control and reverses what had become "diseased" [νοσήσαντα], given excessive motion proper to one of the pair of opposed rotary motions defining the career of the cosmos. Much later, at 307d, the Stranger says that when the opposition characterizing the nature of virtue affects the most important elements in the state, it becomes a "disease" [νόσος]. The parallel is striking. Too much of either opposite condition produces disease, whether in the cosmos or in matters pertaining to virtue in human affairs. Recall also, however, that in the myth, things moving in opposite directions within the cosmos were in both cases called beautiful or noble [καλὰ—273b]. Therefore, beauty can, at this level, be predicated of things existing in opposed rotary cosmic motions, even and especially when these motions result in extremely divergent—even destructive—consequences for these things. At least according to the myth then, one quality, beauty, encompasses opposed or "inimical" elements.

Deploying thus the elements of virtue at this late stage in the dialogue mirrors structurally the unity of motion of the cosmos described in the myth. Indeed, the Stranger has just used the same term, *kala*—noble—to describe opposite types of virtue (306c). Therefore, attempting to think the unity of virtue, which includes (if the Stranger is correct) an inherently inimical opposition, replicates thinking the unity of the cosmos portrayed in the myth. In fact, unity of opposition obtains both in the cosmos, with respect to *kalos*, and, according to the Stranger, in virtue as well.[15]

The Stranger's account pitches distinct types of virtue as opposed to, or inimical to, one another—for example, decorum and courage. But these types still belong to virtue. Arranging the components of virtue in this way requires the student to think virtue as a unity. How then could these two virtues be compatible within the unity of virtue? They are hostile to one another because the pair involves a type of opposition. But does opposition *per se* produce hostility?

The slowness producing decorum results in the opposite of virtue when slowness applies to actions requiring courage. In this sense, courage and decorum are inimical to one another because the same characteristic (slowness) producing one virtue (decorum) will, if applied to another virtue (courage), negate that virtue. However, what produces this internal antagonism is not the characteristic as such, but excessive or deficient degrees of that characteristic. Slowness is essential to decorum but excessive slowness becomes sluggishness; speed is essential to courage but excessive speed becomes rashness. The right measure of slowness and the right measure of speed will produce the virtues of decorum and courage and, to that extent, eliminate the inimical quality posited in virtue. Quickness does not produce courage; rather, it is quickness *within certain limits*. Quickness beyond those limits begets violence and rashness, a condition blamed rather than praised.

The so-called "unfriendly" opposition within virtue depends on ignoring limits which, if in place, preserve an opposition essential to related virtues but not accurately described as "unfriendly." Courage, embodying a certain measure of speed, is

opposed to decorum, also embodying a certain measure of speed. These measures are, as such, opposed to one another but essential to the virtues in question. Thus the Stranger develops a theory of virtue which, as now is evident, presupposes *due measure* through the mean. The mean becomes the necessary fulcrum for determining how types of opposition inherent in virtue should be resolved to meet circumstances where virtues are "opposed" to one another. When these types of virtue are "out of place," then they are blamed. This inappropriateness is ἄκαιρα (307b), privative of *kairon*, one of the modes exemplifying due measure; this description evokes the fact that virtues must be practiced in measured ways at certain times—if not, then what was measured and virtuous devolves into its opposite.

The Stranger's joint appeals to desire in his description of courage and self-restraint are worthy of note, given that the Stranger never analyzes the nature of soul as a reality which can, or should, become subject to dialectical inquiry. These appeals imply that soul includes the element of desire, and that here desire becomes a dominant feature of soul, since it drives the courageous and decorous to seek a certain end, with energy difficult to deny or even to restrain.

Character and Education [308c–9b]

The Stranger generalizes this account of virtue, emphasizing that virtue is based on implementing good rather than its opposite. Thus no "constructive knowledge" ever willingly produces its works from good and bad materials; such knowledge invariably rejects the bad, so far as possible, taking only what is fitting and worthy, regardless whether this material is like or unlike, and, gathering all these elements together, fashions [δημιουργεῖ] "one power and form [ἰδέαν]." As a result, the true art of statecraft "according to nature" [κατὰ φύσιν] will never voluntarily combine bad and good human beings, but will first test them in play and only then entrust them to teachers. Statecraft will give orders and exercise supervision, just as the art of weaving commands and supervises all requisite subsidiary arts. The ruler then instructs teachers to educate prospective citizens in terms of character in a manner suitable to the constitution to be formed. Those lacking capacity for courage and self-restraint, virtues of preeminent importance for a well-ordered state, will be punished by death, exile or deprivation of the most important civil rights. The ignorant or cowardly will be made into slaves.

Although the Stranger has consistently denied that inquiry has elucidated statecraft as a type of knowledge, he confidently advances descriptions of knowledge in general. Any type of knowledge, as constructive, will, if possible, produce its results from strictly good material and eschew anything inherently deficient. Congenital cowards, for example, are not eligible for membership in the polity under scrutiny. This type of knowledge is constructive or "synthetic" in results by combining things or characteristics which may in relevant respects be unlike one another, a condition clearly encompassing the just-concluded analysis of the elements of virtue. Nonetheless, this radical difference must be incorporated within statecraft construed as a "woven" reality.

The account of knowledge developed here, with the emphasis on productive activity working with good rather than with evil, parallels the demiurge depicted in the myth. The practitioner of such knowledge "fashions" the result based solely on a synthesis [συνθετικῶν] of good materials, just as the demiurge, the composer [συνθέντος] of the cosmos, produced "only good things" within the cosmos (273c). Statecraft as knowledge generates its results by handling the good in certain ways, just as the demiurge produced good things. When the degree of goodness in the cosmos decreases to the point where order becomes threatened, the demiurge steps in and restores harmony to the various natures in the cosmos, thereby increasing—then leveling off—the degree of good found in both the cosmos as a whole and within each of its inhabitants. Again, as the previous section showed, the ruler blends inherent excesses of human temperament and, weaving these opposites together, engenders a unified and stable conjunction of opposites.

The ruler establishes a "type" [ἰδέαν], a reality grounding statecraft just as artisans contributed secondary causes of the polity (cf. 287d ff). This type replicates in seriousness of purpose and duration canonic Forms, although as derived from human activity, it cannot enjoy the stability of such inherently immutable realities. Nonetheless, that the Stranger uses this quasi-technical language suggests he is thinking of what this approach to statecraft produces as approximating the canonically proper object of knowledge—if, of course, the Form of statecraft were accessible to the Stranger's inquiry. In this regard, the Stranger insists that the type so fashioned is not merely a static reality existing solely as a model or standard but that it is also endowed with "power" [δύναμιν] to accomplish its ends. Just as a Form causes a particular (cf. *Phaedo*, 100b–c), so the type produced by the ruler allows statecraft to transform individual humans into citizens of a unified polity.

To depict the material functioning as the source for this form as potentially both good and evil presupposes that human beings are subject to conditions rendering them evil, at least in part. This condition parallels that phase of the myth identifying matter as the inherent source of disorder and chaos (273b). If humans are necessarily embodied, then all humans have some inherent evil in this sense. The myth is explicit on this point: although the composer of the cosmos instills the measure of good which the cosmos displays, the demiurge initially confronts disorder which, from its previous condition, "retains in itself and *creates in the animals* all the elements of harshness and injustice which have their origin in the heavens" (273c—italics mine). This primordial matter causes all harshness and injustice found throughout the cosmos, as well as within each of the animals fashioned as instances of natural types by the demiurge's formative power. The demiurge never deals with inherently good material; in the same way, statecraft selects the best material from available humanity but must constantly guard against the tendency of human beings to revert in their attitudes and actions to the harshness and injustice natural to their embodied selves.

Divine and Human Bonds [309b–11b]

The Stranger continues: Those capable, with education, of being made into fine and noble individuals and then blended together "with art" [μετὰ τέχνης] will, if their character is sturdier and inclined toward courage, the stronger part, be combined with those inclined toward decorum, the more pliant sort. This blending will be woven together as follows: the eternal part of their souls will be fixed with a divine bond, to which that part of their souls is related, and after this has been done the animal part will be bound to the human part. Young Socrates is unclear on the meaning of the first phase of this bonding and the Stranger explains that "true opinion with certain assuredness" [ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως] about honor, justice, goodness and their opposites is divine, and when such opinion arises in human souls, it arises in a "godlike race." Only the ruler is sufficiently inspired to implant this true opinion in those rightly educated. A courageous soul, hearing such opinions, will be made gentle and ready to partake of justice; without such opinions, the soul defined by nothing but untrammeled courage will incline towards brutality. Similarly, the decorous nature will become truly self-restrained and wise; without it, such a soul becomes excessively decorous, at risk of reducing itself to a simpleton. In general, blending of good with bad or bad with bad never produces anything enduring. But for those of noble birth, properly nurtured and in whom the laws have been implanted, such "medicine" is prescribed by art and this bond, uniting like and unlike parts of virtue, is more divine.

The first thematic mention of soul in the *Statesman* occurs at this crucial juncture in the account of statecraft. To designate elements of soul as eternal, human and animal suggests that soul is tripartite, although this is a division not subjected to sustained scrutiny by the participants. This trisection also differs considerably from the *Republic*'s tripartite soul. Consider:

Divine bonds

The "divine bond" connecting woven souls recalls the immaterial realities in the myth described as "most divine" (269d), suggesting that what links the souls of citizens will be derived from these realities. Alluding to the "godlike" character of citizens having such opinions reinforces this possibility; we envision groups of human beings, distinct from and in some cases opposed to one another in temperament, united by opinions about certain uniquely fundamental realities. If only the ruler produces such opinions, then the ruler also becomes godlike—and perhaps philosophical—in having this capacity to educate, order and coordinate.

But citizens as quasi-divine also reflect the fact that citizens have true opinion rather than knowledge. The true ruler has been set aside as if a "god" (303b), thus distancing the true ruler from the derivative level of statecraft described at this point in the dialogue, with correlative affects on the level of knowledge this account of statecraft can convey and on which that art is based. The Stranger emphasizes that the populace possesses true opinions, not knowledge. Although the Stranger qualifies the true opinion under scrutiny as "assured," true opinion remains subject to dislodgement from souls in which it resides, with consequent harm to the polity

taken collectively. This degree of knowledge remains, nonetheless, at a level of cognition like the gods in that such opinion is true and therefore approaches the knowledge enjoyed by deity. In this sense, citizens are justifiably god-like; their existence resembles the way the ruler is god-like in approximating the nature of the true ruler.[16]

The Stranger concludes his account by appealing to this bond as a "medicine" [φάρμακον], a metaphor which, in its consistency, again recalls the myth and its description of excessive cosmic opposition as a "sickness" (273e). When opposite temperaments are most fittingly blended with one another, the resulting union "heals" the tendency of each opposite to overextend its natural character, thereby producing a level of excess damaging if not destructive to the individual and the social and political union of which that individual is a member. Just as cosmic cycles are naturally prone to the kind of sickness where the unchecked motion of each cycle will disrupt an ordered cosmos, so also individual human temperaments, without blending with appropriate opposites, will become unrestrained and excessive, with commensurately harmful effects on the unity of the state. Blending such divergent and potentially destructive opposites is appropriate medicinal procedure for ensuring the existence and harmony of characters within the polity.

Human bonds

Once divine bonds have been produced, the generation of human bonds is relatively straightforward. As these unions are currently secured, the decorous and courageous seek their own type and shun their opposites. But just the reverse should happen if the chief function of both parties is "care" of the family. Thus if the courageous propagate only among themselves, then although initial generations are strong, eventually utter "madness" [μανίαις] takes over; by contrast, those souls too full of modesty will become, after many generations, sluggish and crippled. If, however, the members of both classes to be blended have one and the same opinion about "the good and the beautiful" [τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ], then these bounds will not be difficult to fashion. For, concludes the Stranger, the primary business of statecraft is weaving the self-restrained character with the courageous through common beliefs, honors, dishonors, opinions and exchanges of pledges, thus making a smooth and well-woven polity, and entrusting to them in common "forever" the offices of the state. When one official is needed, this individual possesses both sets of opposed qualities; when a board of officials is required, then individuals collectively combine both opposed classes. For in order to prosper in public and private matters, a state must have both self-restrained and courageous officials duly interwoven with one another or within one supreme executive.

If types of character seek their own kind—opposites intensifying difference with respect to their opposites—the results not only produce tension by virtue of this opposition but are, in fact, fatal to the well-being of the polity: madness at one extreme, crippling sluggishness at the other. In this regard, the human bonds integral to the polity suffer the same kind of dissolution as the cosmos itself when, according to the myth, its cycles of rotation are not brought under due measure. In order to prevent this disruption, statecraft must ensure that the populace shares the same

opinion about the same things—stipulated as the good and the beautiful. Recall yet another parallel with the myth. According to the Stranger, it is precisely and only the good and beautiful which remain throughout the widely divergent extremes the cosmos undergoes as it whirls through opposing cycles of rotation (273c–d). Again in parallel, all human beings having true opinion about the good and beautiful will realize that it is in their best interests, both as individual citizens and as collective members of one polity, to blend their opposition in marital unions. The good and beautiful thus embody special favor in that their apprehension produces a level of insight such that individuals so endowed transcend limits imposed by the opposition ingrained in their character and, as noted, actively desire to nullify these concerted differences in order to play an essential part in securing a larger good. The "care" [ἐπιμέλειαν—310c] stipulated by the Stranger as the responsibility of prospective parents mirrors, in a more limited social and familial setting, the care [ἐπιμέλειαν—cf. 273a, 274b, 274d] which the demiurge directs toward the needs of the cosmos and its inhabitants.

At 293e, the Stranger announced that viable types of statecraft exhibited diminished levels of reality when considered in relation to the nature of the true state; he then evaluated these types in terms of their greater or lesser approximation of the true state. But now the Stranger says that the state just described, based on the paradigm of weaving, should last forever. That the Stranger invokes earthly immortality for this polity reflects a relation of total participation between particular state and Form of statecraft. Although this type of government is not the best, it is the best type currently available given the Stranger's insight into reality and the dialectical procedures required to know it—essential, and limiting, qualifications. Nevertheless, the Stranger feels sufficiently confident in the results of inquiry to proclaim that this state should display "perpetual" [ἀεὶ] existence—as if it were the best type of government derived immediately and accurately from the Form of statecraft.

The Nature of Statecraft [311b–c]

The purpose [τέλος] of statecraft's "web" is producing this unity of opposites within a living society. The ruler must draw all these opposites together by the "kingly art" through friendship and common spirit into a common life and perfect the "most fitting" and best of all textures, clothe it with all inhabitants of the state, both slaves and freemen, hold all of them together and omit nothing which belongs to a "happy" [εὐδαίμονι; cf. 301d] state, ruling and watching over everything. Young Socrates ends the day's discussion by observing that the Stranger has provided a "most complete" and "most admirable" treatment of king and statesman.

The inquiry into the statesman has concluded. The Stranger and young Socrates have sketched an "art" [τέχνη—311c][17] which, although they are unable to describe it as a type of knowledge, is nonetheless sufficient as presently characterized, the Stranger insists, to produce happiness for everyone under its jurisdiction. When the exponent (or exponents) of statecraft practice this art and weave a political web, it includes what is "most fully fitting" [πάντωνμεγαλοπρεπέστατον], the all-

encompassing and superlative degree of one of the ways—*prepon*— indicated at 284e to describe due measure. Why the comprehensive and intensified sense of "what is fitting"? Because the range and complexity of what must be woven—including the evolution of unstated customs as well as explicitly formulated laws—in order to establish a harmonious state is extensive and profound. In addition, fittingness is a dimension of due measure realized in the mean between extremes, implying that a ruler practicing this art must continually reevaluate situations to determine, as circumstances vary, that which deputies and staff must do to preserve what has been woven so that the most fitting structure results from their administrative activity.

The question is, however, by virtue of what expertise does the practitioner of statecraft, so defined, know how to approximate this mean? Will the mere juxtaposition of opposites, as the Stranger has depicted the primary function of the art of statecraft, inevitably and necessarily result in generating the most fitting political decisions?[18] How is the friendship and common spirit to be produced to guarantee that all members of the polity enjoy and thrive upon this common life? And, even more fundamentally, how does the ruler instill in the citizenry the "true opinions" concerning the good and the beautiful which, it has been asserted, are necessarily heard and internalized by the citizens of a polity in order to realize a successful, happiness-producing, type of government?[19]

These concerns put pressure on the results the Stranger and young Socrates have secured by their considerable and highly diverse dialectical—and mythic—efforts. If statecraft is indeed a type of knowledge, as asserted throughout the day's discussion, but remains inadequately analyzed, then more philosophical effort must be exerted in order to be as clear as possible concerning the sort of things, or realities, statecraft should be related to in order to justify statecraft *as* a type of knowledge. The rule described by the Stranger is based on a true opinion of what, it may be assumed, is the uniquely real Form of statecraft. Since the Stranger does not know the nature of statecraft as a type of knowledge, the best he can do is describe that nature based on a true opinion of it, derived from the paradigm of weaving. However, if distinctions obtain between true opinion of the nature of statecraft (or, of course, the nature of anything) and knowledge of statecraft, then it is possible that the true ruler—who is, for the Stranger, separated from humans to the same degree that God is separated from humanity and who also may be gifted with requisite knowledge of statecraft—will function differently from the type of rule evoked in the account of statecraft based on weaving.

This difference may be small or it may be significant. The extent to which difference obtains in this context depends on the extent to which true opinion differs from knowledge. To deny even the possibility of such a difference between the two approaches to statecraft is in effect to deny any epistemological difference between true opinion and knowledge. But if there were no difference between these two degrees of cognition, then there would be no reason for the Stranger to fashion the remarkable complexity of the myth of the reversed cosmos. For it is precisely in virtue of this myth, and paradigms derived from it, that the Stranger crafts the account of statecraft based on the paradigm of weaving—an account which, the Stranger repeatedly maintains, is only a true opinion.[20]

In an epistemology lacking a distinction between knowledge and true opinion, the Stranger could have simply asserted, as a claim displaying intuitive correctness, that governing a state is analogous to weaving a cloak and then developed this analogy as in fact he does in the latter stages of the dialogue. This approach obviates the introduction of myth and would avoid interrupting dialectic leading to this conclusion. But as argued, it is precisely the mythic account, especially its cosmic import, which justifies selecting weaving as the source of this analogy. Thus the *Statesman*'s complex narrative structure reinforces the importance of distinguishing between true opinion and knowledge, thereby exhibiting that the best the Stranger can do, with paradigmatic assistance of myth, is an account of statecraft modeled after the care given to the cosmos by the demiurge.

Young Socrates pronounces this concluding account "most complete" [ἀπετέλεσας], thus vindicating it, at least in his eyes, in terms of the degree of theoretical adequacy which the Stranger had on several earlier occasions maintained was lacking.[21] The youthful interlocutor also describes their results as "most admirable" [κάλλιστα], appealing to the very quality, *kalos*, instrumental in (a) grounding the order of the cosmos throughout its mythic perturbations, (b) unifying the "unfriendly" opposition within virtue, as well as (c) establishing the source of opinions essential to weaving together a happy populace. Now, however, *kalos* has become a quality which young Socrates readily predicates of a lengthy and convoluted account combining a soaring cosmological myth and extended stretches of finely-grained dialectic.

But how reliable is this account? Ending the inquiry on the optimistic note voiced by young Socrates nonetheless invites wonder concerning whether this position should be taken as the best that sustained philosophical inquiry can establish. At the outset of the *Statesman*, shortly after the Stranger and young Socrates begin to converse, the elder Socrates announced (258a) his intention to take his turn when their colloquy had concluded. This intention is not fulfilled in the *Statesman*. Listening to Socrates in another dialogue may provide additional insight into the range of questions broached, and seemingly answered, in the *Statesman.* This dialogue is the *Philebus*.

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Chapter 6

The Good: *Statesman* and *Philebus*

The lengthy and intricate conversation between the Stranger and young Socrates concludes with an account of statecraft which appears to satisfy both parties. But how reliable is that account as an exemplar of Platonic teaching?

The *Statesman*: Structure and the Aporetic

The nominalism apparently playing some part in the first attempt at dialectical definition renders results uncertain—is inquiry concerned with clarifying names or analyzing natures? Then, when dialectic does pursue definitions, should it proceed by dichotomy or according to natural articulation? And what does dialectic analyze—classes, schemas, natures? If schemas, then how can knowledge be attained on Platonic grounds if schemas represent derivative degrees of reality? The Stranger frequently appeals to knowledge; however, the highest level of cognition analyzed and illustrated—and requiring a paradigm in order to secure—is not knowledge but true opinion. Also, if the object of dialectic lacks clear specification, what guarantees the existence of an entity encompassing both classes and parts—a crucial metaphysical difference explicitly left undetermined by the Stranger? If natures lack definite structure, how can natural division succeed in revealing the structure of a nature? Furthermore, if elements of a nature vary in metaphysical significance, how are such differences to be determined? Is the introduction of due measure, by the Stranger's own admission a forced or wrested response to the question of the origin of the art of statecraft (one art among many), adequate for this end or only a stopgap? And, underlying all these difficulties is the grand cosmic myth—why should the Stranger introduce and then roam freely throughout such an extended and complex imaginative domain, replete with various metaphysical elements and themes? Why inflect the seemingly mechanical or purely descriptive matter of eliciting divisions of natures with an account which starkly and dramatically reverses, on a cosmic scale, the natural order of growth and aging? Given this concerted pattern of difficulties and intentionally posed aporiae, to what extent should the final account of statecraft be taken as a seriously intended description of this most important feature of civilized life?[1]

Myth and the Aporetic

The myth, the pivotal narrative within the *Statesman*'s aporetic dimension, describes two spheres of influence: internal—positions stated in the myth proper; external—

implications for philosophical concerns in segments of the dialogue occurring outside the narrative bounds of the myth.

Internal

The myth refers to happiness and its importance for human beings; explicitly mentions realities with characteristics of canonic Forms; depicts natures with instances oscillating between fundamental opposites; describes particulars throughout the cosmos exhibiting degrees of goodness and beauty; and represents a divine demiurge with formative powers but who is absent during "half" the cosmic drama.

External

The myth as a whole functions as an element in a paradigm in order to exhibit the nature of statecraft, a project occupying the Stranger and young Socrates throughout the rest of the dialogue. In general, paradigms as cognitive devices to convey true opinions concerning important realities are essential to the Stranger's positions, both for the specific inquiry at hand and as a theoretically necessary factor in determining the nature of any such reality.

The pivotal aporetic positions developed in the dialogue either originate or are affected by the myth's content. Furthermore, as the Introduction argues, all this material revolves around the Good. Establishing a measure of clarity concerning the purpose of the multi-textured mythic narrative in the *Statesman* thus becomes a prerequisite for understanding the dialogue as a whole.

Myth and the Good

According to the myth in the *Statesman*, everything in the cosmos is both "good" and "beautiful." These metaphysically fundamental characteristics are retained throughout the antipodal oscillation undergone by the cosmos. When the cosmos traverses its cyclical course, its internal order becomes seriously compromised. However, even at the point during the epoch of Zeus where chaotic difference threatens to destroy any semblance of unity among existing inhabitants, the cosmos and its inhabitants preserve a measure of the good and the beautiful.

The myth makes clear that order within the cosmos—as well as the cosmos itself—depends on the demiurge. But if the Good, as the *Phaedo* states, holds all things together (99c), then the fact that the myth portrays the demiurge standing apart from the cosmos so that the cosmos inevitably verges on dissolving into chaos suggests that the relation between the demiurge and the Good is fundamentally fragmented—and that this discontinuity should be investigated. Furthermore, if, as the *Republic* maintains, the Good metaphysically grounds the Forms and if all particular things ultimately depend on Forms, then the topsy-turvy behavior of particulars in the *Statesman*'s mythic cosmos should also be investigated in order to determine whether, at the level of concrete particularity, this disruptive consequence reflects the lack of the foundational presence of the Good.

The Introduction analyzed a series of fundamental contexts—art, psychology, education—in which the Good plays a dominant role in the argumentation of the *Statesman.* In fact, from a variety of perspectives, both methodological and substantive, the aporetic dimensions of the *Statesman* converge on and coalesce in the Good. The primary reason for the reticulated omissions and false steps is lack of a comprehensive approach to the Good, as evidenced by the Stranger's concerted struggles and indecision with basic and integrally related philosophical problems.

Systematic Incompleteness: Myth, Paradigm and the Good

The myth reveals that the demiurge was presented with cosmic conditions which, appropriately contoured, would constitute a finite but continuous manifestation of the Good in a material context. However, the demiurge's activity attests to only a vestigial presence of the Good introduced throughout the cosmos. Since the demiurge intentionally withdraws at a certain juncture during the formation of the cosmos, it may be inferred that the demiurge did not sufficiently apprehend the Good and, as a result, was unable to finalize forming a fully balanced and harmonious cosmos. It should come as no surprise then that when the Stranger concludes the dialectical analysis of statecraft, he produces an account of statecraft imitating the extent to which the Good was seen by the demiurge.

The account of statecraft at the end of the dialogue parallels the description of the cosmos in the myth in that both are derived from fragmented or partial visions of the Good. This account maintains that the best the statesman can do is unify opposites characterizing citizenry, with the epistemic reason for such substantive incompleteness resting on the fact that this statesman possesses true opinion but lacks knowledge. In this respect, (a) the Stranger as philosopher securing true opinion about statecraft and (b) the statesman ruling the state are mirror images, in a strictly human context, of (c) the divine activity of the demiurge described in the myth. The symmetry of structure animating the *Statesman* as a whole is precise and profound in its implications.

By definition, a paradigm proceeds from "dissimilar" things and produces only true opinion (278c). Nonetheless, the Stranger contends that paradigms are often essential in order to exhibit the "greatest" and "most noble" realities (286a). And an especially fundamental paradigm coordinates the narrative structure of the *Statesman* itself. If the Stranger is a philosopher only in that he has seen enough reality to produce accounts exhibiting true opinion, then he is a "stranger" to the nature of reality as such—that is, the Forms, fully present, and the Good. The Stranger and his companion have produced a paradigmatic sameness in their philosophical ventures. This sameness would be recognized as such if results of their discussions were juxtaposed with related discussions involving a true philosopher—Socrates, for example. What is this sameness? When the Stranger and young Socrates indulge in analyses involving (a) dialectic in conjunction with (b) Forms but (c) lacking a comprehensive account of both elements and without either element explicitly grounded in the Good.

The two elements of a paradigm exhibit a degree of sameness with respect to each other but, of course, not absolute identity; thus a paradigm includes dissimilarity as part of its structure. How dissimilar in approach are the Stranger and young Socrates from pursuing true philosophy envisioned according to the customary Platonic model? The Stranger does not inquire in the classic Socratic manner, he wants to lecture (*Sophist* 217d1–3); also, the respondent—"young" Socrates—is in manner and passivity antithetical to the pursuit of wisdom typically exhibited in Socratic dialogues. Hence, again, the gambit of calling the main protagonist "Stranger" becomes suggestive. Both his thought and method are "strange" compared to the proper scope of philosophy as such. Restricting his identity to "Stranger" through two complex dialogues, the *Sophist* as well as the *Statesman*, continually reinforces the subtle strangeness of the methods and doctrines he advocates.

The dramatic structure of the *Statesman*, especially the placement and length of the myth, suggests that a complete account of the subject matter of the dialogue depends on an accurate and fully articulated apprehension of metaphysical totality—therefore, a vision of the Good. An adequate account of statecraft must break out of the epistemic circle circumscribed by true opinion—a circle from which the Stranger and young Socrates never leave—in order to see reality as it truly is and, as a result of this vision, to be in position to develop discursively the structure of statecraft. To move beyond true opinion and attain knowledge, it is essential to see the Good as well as (a) to articulate the nature of those realities which, properly assimilated, confer knowledge, and (b) to recognize as a result the ways in which what contemporary philosophy refers to as "value" applies to everything. The *Philebus* provides this fundamental metaphysical vision.[2]

The *Philebus* and the Good

This discussion follows the primary direction of thought developed in the *Philebus* but it is undertaken here to illuminate retrospectively the structure and import of the *Statesman.* Evidence strengthening that the *Statesman* is an aporetic venture may be derived by connecting key elements in that dialogue to their conceptual and thematic counterparts in the *Philebus*. A survey of the *Philebus* shows that answering questions posed in this dialogue requires inquiry into moral psychology, ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology—fundamental areas within the gamut of philosophy pursued in the Platonic canon. In addition, the *Philebus* is completely discursive—no mythic narrative breaks the continuous flow of discussion by Socrates and associates. Thus whatever caused the *Statesman* to introduce a massive myth into the fabric of discussion is lacking in the philosophical interplay represented by the *Philebus*.

This review of the *Philebus* concentrates on the seminal importance of the Good [*to agathon*].[3] The account establishes a context showing that important but inchoate elements in the *Statesman* myth, in conjunction with problematic positions advanced throughout the *Statesman*, provide topics of concern which are considered and, within due limits, resolved in the *Philebus*. Furthermore, these resolutions are all derived from the articulated structure of the Good which Socrates and company establish in that dialogue. The next and final chapter in this study demonstrates the

connection between these resolutions and the *Statesman*. It then becomes evident that the *Statesman* analyzes a fundamental question—determining the nature of statecraft—but does so in such a way that resolving this question requires additional inquiry concerning even more fundamental questions: identifying elements of reality and determining whether a method can be sufficiently codified to understand and articulate what is real.

The Question of Happiness: *Statesman* and *Philebus*

It is asserted, as one element in the mythic cosmos defined by the *Statesman*, that human beings are to be happy. In what does striving for happiness consist? The myth forthrightly answers—happiness is produced by philosophy (272c1). This is why it is so vital to be clear on what earthly inhabitants during the era of Cronos do to pass their time. Although these humans had all basic wants satisfied, the myth raised the question whether these individuals were happy (272d), for if they limited their attention and energies to strictly corporeal or ephemeral concerns, it is hinted darkly that they will not be happy. This question was not, however, directly answered in the myth due to lack of converse with the inhabitants of that cosmic era, given that we, the current investigators, exist in the era of Zeus, the opposed cycle. Whether we are happy during this era—the present era—is never posed in the *Statesman*. However, the final account of statecraft asserts that the ruler omits nothing which ought to belong "to a happy [εὐδαίμονι] state" (311c; also 301d), from which it seems to follow that if this kind of statecraft were fully implemented, then the citizens living under such a polity would indeed be happy.

Consider then that the initial problem of the *Philebus*, stated at 11d, is to decide whether the life of pleasure or the life of wisdom makes human beings happy. Happiness thus represents the most immediately obvious link between the *Statesman* and the *Philebus.* The *Statesman* advances a theory of statecraft which, we are to believe at the conclusion of the dialogue, provides citizens living under such a rule with happiness. But what *is* happiness for these citizens? Is it how they feel about interaction with other people and the world in general, or is it more of a thoughtful understanding of our place in the grand scheme of things? Or is it defined solely in terms of personal and private experiences, needs and wants? The *Philebus* is silent on the political dimension of human existence; if therefore the account of statecraft produced in the *Statesman* remains operative in the *Philebus*, then specification of the personal dimension of happiness becomes an obvious if not unavoidable line of philosophical investigation—which is, in fact, the immediate concern driving that dialogue.

After the initial statement of the issue—whether the life of pleasure of the life of wisdom is more desirable for humans—Socrates raises an objection: what if a life superior to these two can be specified? If so, then if its nature is closer to pleasure Protarchus, the advocate of pleasure, wins the philosophical palm but if this nature is closer to wisdom, then Socrates wins (11e–12a). The third life hinted at by Socrates does in fact exist. And its determination as superior to either of the first two lives is based on considerations derived from the doctrine of the Good elaborated variously

throughout the dialogue. This is the area of philosophical concern in the *Philebus* which, appropriately developed and applied, demonstrates the extent to which the *Statesman* is aporetic.

Philebus: the Revised Structure of the Good

The strategy of the *Philebus* is to show that the third life is superior to the two types of life initially proposed by indicating points of tangency between that life and the Good. In other words, if the hypothetical third type of life is closer in structure to the Good, then that life is better than either the life of pleasure or the life of wisdom, and therefore is the most reliable way to live in order to achieve happiness. As a prelude to this inquiry, it is essential to describe the scope and nature of the Good. The Good is analyzed and articulated from various perspectives in the *Philebus*, and the properties and character of the Good so specified must be kept in view. Unlike the treatment of the Good in the *Republic*, sharply condensed and restricted to the end of Book VI and the beginning of Book VII, the development of the Good in the *Philebus* is deployed gradually, with progressively broadened dimensions added as the dialogue considers topics relevant to deciding the basic ethical question posed at the outset of inquiry.

Unity

The characteristic of the Good receiving initial emphasis is unity: thus, "when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good [ἀγαθὸν] is one, the intense interest in these and similar unities becomes disagreement and controversy" (15a). The context of this assertion, juxtaposing the Good with humanity, ox, and beauty, suggests that the Good does not occupy a special place in a metaphysical hierarchy but does share with other realities a dimension of unity which can become controversial when its structure is analyzed and employed. The controversies emerging from the nature of the Good depend on the specification of that nature.

Perfection, Sufficiency, Desirability

Shortly thereafter, the Good is described as "the most perfect [τελεώτατον] of all things" and "sufficient" [ἱκανὸν], surpassing all other things (20d). These properties pertain to the Good as such, with the distinction between perfection and sufficiency not elaborated here. Socrates immediately adds that nothing is more certain about the Good "than that every intelligent creature recognizes it, goes in pursuit of it, and makes quest of it, desiring to capture it and secure it for its very own, and caring for nothing save such things as involve this or that good [ἀγαθοῖς] in the course of their realization" (20d).[4] This claim concerns the relation between the Good and types of things other than the Good. The plural, "goods," suggests that the good for one thing may not be the same in all respects as the good for another thing. Also,

Socrates identifies the Good as the proper object of each thing as an individual. Thus the subsequent analysis of the Good will not represent merely a generic sense of Good proper to the individual as an instance of a type or class. The appeal to "every intelligent creature" pursuing and desiring to capture the Good entails, taken distributively, not only that the generic Good of each individual must be specified but also the particular good for that individual *qua* individual—this account duly generalized to cover all instances of individual particulars. As we shall see, Socrates' analysis of the Good displays precisely this concern for the relation between the Good and particularity.

Threshold and Form

The lengthy description and analysis of types of pleasure follows these characterizations of the Good (31b–55a). Once this account is complete, Socrates and company answer the question posed at the outset of the dialogue. But to do so, they must enunciate the nature of the Good in addition to stating properties accruing to the Good as such, since the Good provides the standard for determining which proposed form of life is the highest and most morally desirable. At this juncture, Socrates personifies wisdom [φρόνησιν] and mind [νοῦν], who speak and clarify how to determine whether practice of reason or pursuit of pleasure represents the higher life. They assert that

> to mix with wisdom the pleasures that always go with folly and all other manner of evil would surely be the most senseless act for one who desired to see a mixture and fusion as beautiful and undisturbed by faction as might be, so that he might try to learn from it what the good [ἀγαθὸν] is, in man and in the cosmos, and what Form he should divine [μαντευτέον] it to possess (63e–64a).

Socrates investigates such a mixture in order, he says, to learn the nature of the Good. After noting these preliminary considerations, Socrates proclaims: "...we now stand upon the threshold of the good [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] and of that habitation where all that is like thereto resides" (64c).

Socrates asks whether they can determine the most valuable thing in a given "mixture" [συμμείξει] Much earlier, at 23c–30c, Socrates had introduced four "new tools" which, he said, may be required to resolve the question before them, that is, whether reason or pleasure is the best life. One of these tools, mixture [μικτὴν—27b], now becomes an integral element in the analysis. At the point in the dialogue when mixture was introduced, Socrates indicated that mixture combines limit and unlimited, formed into a unity by mind as the cause of mixture (27c). Socrates is therefore articulating the Good by considering a particular mixture of wisdom and pleasure already embodying the Good—the problem is to determine, from a given mixture, what the Good is not only for that instance but also for the cosmos as a whole. The full scope of this context is vital as the locus of inquiry for the subsequent ranking of human possessions and the resultant nature of happiness. Personified wisdom and mind present a strategy for determining the Good—to concentrate on a given mixture in order to discern its nature. The Good must be

present in this mixture since otherwise determining the Good by using a mixture as the source of specification becomes otiose. Also, the Good is a Form [ἰδέαν] but without any indicated special privilege with respect to other Forms. Finally, at this point the Good is only *one* Form. The appeal to what is similar to the Good, "where all that is like thereto resides," apparently refers to all entities "like" the Good in exhibiting features derived from characteristics defining the Good. These features are now identified.

The Form of the Good

Scope

The cosmos The specification of the Good in the *Philebus* is not directed at that which is good solely for human beings, the context apparently circumscribing the Good when the question was first introduced at 13e. Rather, the Good as such applies to all that is, the cosmos as a whole, a unity in which human beings exist as only one species. This all-inclusive metaphysical context for the Good is made clear at 64a and echoed at 64c, when Socrates indicates that the Good is to be sought both for human beings as well as for the cosmos [τῷ παντὶ]. The concern for totality with respect to the Good is emphasized yet again at 64b, when Socrates says that their reflections on the mixture of reason and pleasure have developed "an incorporeal ordered system" [κόσμος τις ἀσώματος—64b] appropriate for housing a "the rightful control of a corporeal subject in which dwells a soul." If the cosmos is a body in which dwells a soul—the World-Soul of the *Timaeus*— then the incorporeal ordered system referred to applies not only to each individual living thing within the cosmos but also to the cosmos as such, itself a living thing. Furthermore, if all living things have souls, then the cosmos has a soul insofar as this soul animates the body, the physical structure of the cosmos as a living unity enveloping other, more formally circumscribed types of being, with each type engendering a limitless number of instances of that type.[5]

Does τῷ παντὶ—referring to the Good "in the cosmos"—do so collectively or individually? If individually, then the good of any one thing might be limited by the nature of that thing in such a way that two distinct things, both guided by the Good, have no relation to one another insofar as both are good. If collectively, then the Good will presumably affect not only things as distinct individuals but also all individual things in relation to one another. Thus, for example, the element of proportion, which the *Philebus* will claim is essential to the Good, pertains not only to the harmony of parts within any one being but also connects in proper proportion all beings to one another within the cosmos as a whole. If the cosmos is a single living being, although one of indeterminately extensive internal complexity, then the Good must be sufficiently all-embracing to account for the structure of that one living being, both in its unity as one—indeed, *the*—cosmos and also in its diversity of constituent elements or natures, all parts of one whole. What is discovered to be the Good for human beings will also, properly formulated, constitute the Good for the cosmos as a living unity as well as for each living individual within the cosmos.

In this respect, considerations pertaining to the structure of the cosmos underlie the metaphysical positions developed in both *Statesman* and *Philebus.* But whereas the *Statesman*'s concern for the cosmos was explicitly tendered only in myth, the *Philebus* aims at elucidating a direct connection, established discursively, between the Good and the cosmos.

The Gods At 65b, Socrates asserts that "any one would be able to judge about pleasure and wisdom, and to decide which of them is more akin to the highest good [τοῦ ἀρίστου] and of greater value among men and gods." The highest Good not only encompasses the cosmos and everything in the cosmos, but also stands as the primary value of the gods. Thus gods as well as humans are directed by the Good. The myth in the *Phaedrus* states that gods are nourished by their connection to Forms (247d–e). In the *Philebus*, the gods are not directly connected to Forms; however, the *Philebus* does maintain that the Good is that reality the gods value over all others. If the Forms depend on the Good, as the *Republic* asserts, then Socrates' claim about gods and the Good in the *Philebus* only makes explicit what is implied in the *Phaedrus* myth concerning the ultimate source of reality for the existence and personalities of divinity.

Particulars After Socrates has stated the three-fold character of the Good (see below), he contends that this triune unity "may most properly be held to determine the qualities of the mixture, and that because *that* is good the mixture itself has become so" (65a). Although Socrates' present interest concerns a particular mixture of wisdom and pleasure, the context is general and its point about the Good holds for *any* mixture.[6] Any given mixture "becomes" as good as its assemblage of elements allows precisely in virtue of the fact that the Good is what it is and that the Good actively—and necessarily—characterizes and permeates that mixture. To repeat the point made earlier, the appeal to mixture in this context necessarily entails the active presence of the other members of the four new tools Socrates introduced earlier. Thus the Good, when it makes a mixture to be a particular of a certain type, does so by contouring the intersection of limited, unlimited and cause.

The Good functions as "the cause which makes any mixture whatsoever either of the highest value [ἀξία] or of none at all" (64d). If the cause can make a given mixture vary from having the highest value to having no value whatsoever, then it seems possible for a mixture to lack all value. This lack would occur if a batch of different elements combined without requisite internal order. Socrates is not saying that this aspect of the Good actively causes disorder and therefore the lack of value. Rather, to the extent that combinations of diverse elements cohere with one another in an ordered way, to that extent such mixtures exhibit value; but as internal harmony withers and fades, the defining unity of this mixture is dissolved, reducing to a concatenation of elements and thereby displaying either diminished value or the lack of value altogether. A mixture of no value whatsoever would therefore become a mere assemblage of elements, perhaps loosely related in space, with no binding connection or relation between or among any of these elements.

Unity, Difference and Interdependency

Socrates claimed (64a) that the Form of the Good must be "intuited" [μαντευτέον], as if the Good is not open to standard or describable avenues of cognition, thus recalling axiomatic reservations about knowing the Good asserted in the *Republic* (509b–c). However, the necessity to intuit the Good may originate not because of inherent limitations in cognition but in the Good itself; if so, even with the most rarified and highly refined epistemic sensibilities, the nature of the Good remains to some degree hidden from human inspection. In fact, from the attained threshold perspective, Socrates asserts that the Good appears as a combination of apparently discrete elements and he attempts to cope with this plurality as follows: "...if we cannot hunt down the Good under one Form [μιᾷ...ἰδέᾳ], let us secure it by the conjunction of three, beauty [κάλλει], proportion [συμμετρίᾳ], and truth" [ἀληθείᾳ—65a].

This complex passage is important for both *Philebus* and *Statesman*. The Good is articulated; it has a determinate structure but as a unity of a certain sort. This unity is tripartite in that three distinct elements constitute collectively the approximation of the Good as a single metaphysical element, one Form. Thus the Good as such remains to some degree ineffable, for if the Good were apprehended in its true unity, the suggestion is that some element (or elements) of the Good would become visible in some way (or ways) not indicated by the interlaced triumvirate of beauty, proportion and truth. Even so, however, Socrates of the *Philebus* remains more metaphysically perspicuous than Socrates of the *Republic*; now Socrates envisions a structure to the Good even if this structure functions only as a threshold reality with respect to the nature of the Good as such.[7]

The logic embedded in this characterization of the Good is also significant for interpreting the *Statesman.* Each of the three components is linked by conjunction to both of the other two components. It follows then that a correct analysis of the Good entails showing how any one of the three conjuncts is related to both of the other two, since this approximation of the Good exists if and only if all three components are simultaneously present. For example, the structure of truth (as defined in the *Philebus*) must be connected to the structure of proportion (again as defined in that dialogue) in order to determine how the Good—an ensemble including truth, proportion and beauty—pertains to anything existing and evaluated in terms of the Good as such. Finally, recall that the Good, as Socrates has noted, encompasses the cosmos as a whole. It follows then that the component elements constituting the approximation of the Good also pertain to the cosmos. Thus the Good—an interplay of beauty, proportion and truth—permeates the cosmos as a unity, one living being constituted by an indeterminately large number of distinct types of things as well as by a much vaster number of particulars exemplifying these types. This cosmic context must be kept in view throughout the following discussion of the three elements in Socrates' approximation of the Good.

Beauty

The tripartite structure of the Good is explicitly designated as a Form. Therefore, as a Form the nature of the Good contains nothing material or subject to change. However, the fact that the Good includes beauty[8] and proportion as constituent elements is significant. Beauty and proportion as Forms—or, more accurately, as elements of the one Form which is the Good—are especially relevant to the existence of natures and to particular instances of natures. And, as argued in Chapter 2, the structure of natures emerges as problematic in the myth of the *Statesman*.

According to the *Phaedrus*, beauty is the most palpable Form (250d), which may mean that instances of beauty are more readily experienced as emblematic of the Form beauty than, say, instances of just actions are of the Form justice. Additional clarification of the structure of this Form appears at *Philebus* 61b, where Socrates says that we must not only seek the good in the mixed life, but also in that kind of mixed life which is mixed "well" [καλῶς]. Beauty becomes embodied when an ensemble of parts displays harmony and internal balance thus allowing that whole to achieve a particular end or function. However, such balance presupposes an underlying structure or principle of organization, since a balanced or harmonious organization of parts, if not produced randomly, can achieve general ends or functions only by being arranged to do so. If this arrangement is established according to some kind of unifying nature, this approach to the metaphysical character of the mixture suggests that beauty as an element in the Good points to the parallel notion of nature. Proportion, also an integral element of the Good, strengthens this suggestion.

Proportion

Since each of the three elements of the Good is essentially related to the other two elements, it follows that proportion must function in relation to beauty and truth. Proportion can be a unique element within the Good only by presupposing the *need* for proportion, that a certain kind of relation between elements within one whole is establishable. First, proportion presupposes plurality since only if more than one thing exists can proportion function as the source of an ordered relation between two given things. Second, the elements of this plurality must differ fundamentally from one another since proportion establishes order between (or among) these elements, not merely a neutral conjunctive link between two identical entities (properties, and so on). Proportion thus, third, presupposes a more complex sense of difference than mere numerical plurality. Finally, proportion presupposes parts, since only if parts are related in a certain way to one another can there be proportion connecting parts as ordered elements in a given whole.

But now to draw an inference of considerable significance. For if Forms as such lack parts, then proportion as a Form must, in the context of essential membership in the Good, refer to things other than Forms, things constituted in certain ways as interplays of parts differing from the wholes to which these parts belong. Even if proportion refers to only the relation between parts of a whole, rather than to the parts as such, such a relation links parts as determinable features which, when they exist as elements in a given nature, will do so *in a material setting* for those

natures with instances occupying space and time. If this inference is sound, then proportion as a component of the Good refers to characteristics inhering only in particulars. Thus the Good with respect to proportion refers necessarily to realities—particulars—constituted as beings of a certain type by participation in specific Forms and produced as particulars in part by the intersection of that Form and proportion as an element in the Good. Socrates has so differentiated the Good to relocate its metaphysical center of gravity. Since proportion and beauty are of equal stature with truth, coordinate elements in the triune nature of the Good, the implication is that Socrates wants to understand how *particulars* exist in relation to the highest degree of reality available in the Platonic metaphysics.

Socrates had beauty and proportion in mind when he said (64a) that a particular mixture could be "as beautiful and undisturbed by faction as might be [καλλίστην... ἀστασιαστοτάτην]." A mixture which is "most beautiful" and displays the greatest "lack of faction" not only illustrates through this combined set of properties the first two elements in the tripartite structure of the Good, but does so pitched at the highest level. The superlative degree indicates that such a mixture shows beauty to the greatest extent possible, allowing that mixture to display beauty at a level indicative of a Form. Furthermore, the greatest lack of faction expresses, although couched negatively, the most cohesive and harmonious relationship of the parts of this mixture, again underlining proportion as a constituent element in the mixture's nature. Thus the sample mixture already exhibits the interplay of two of the three elements of the Good. Socrates has anticipated the structure of the Good in describing the mixture which serves as the locus for determining that structure.

Truth

The third stipulated element of the Good is truth. Truth is defined by, or includes, the Forms (58a; cf. 64b). Furthermore, truth represents Forms as causal agents in the production of particulars. For if participation is assumed, which Socrates seems to do in the *Philebus* (15d), then particulars are determined as such by their relation to the appropriate Form. Forms will remain what they are—the locus of truth—while grounding the existence of particulars by virtue of their participation in the Forms and garnering their name from this participation. As a result, truth as an element in the Good is in no way diminished if it refers not only to Forms as such but also to causal and naming relations Forms generate with respect to particulars as participatory instances of Forms.

In sum: Truth refers to Forms; Proportion refers to the relation between and among parts within a unified whole at the level of particularity—and therefore, by implication, to particulars determined as unities by participation in Forms, Beauty refers to that which provides a sense of propriety in terms of "measure and proportion" (64e). The *Philebus* implicitly connects the Good to Forms, explicitly connects beauty to truth and measure, and correlates measure to the Forms. The triune character of the Good shows the living presence, so to speak, of the Good not only in the realm of the Forms but also in the welter of particulars existing within and throughout the cosmos.

The Metaphysics of Happiness

Happiness serves as the immediate context circumscribing the inquiry of the *Philebus*. Socrates' purpose is to determine as accurately as possible how human beings should become happy. But what principle guides Socrates' ranking of the "possessions" of humans to achieve this end? To determine and rank possessions [κτημάτων] of citizens in the state was a pivotal division in the *Statesman* (287e–9d). The same reality is now analyzed, but the context encompasses possessions instrumental to human behavior and the quest to secure happiness. The reasons justifying *measure* as the highest human possession reflect the structure of the Good as that structure is developed in the *Philebus* (and outlined above). Furthermore, the exposition of this justification establishes a schematic for determining the extent to which the *Statesman* is an aporetic investigation. This schematic demonstrates how the Good, articulated in the *Philebus* as an approximation of one Form, represents precisely the metaphysical omission compelling the *Statesman*'s argumentation to complete its philosophical journey only in the most tentative sense, only by reaching a series of interlocking aporetic conclusions.

At 20c–d, early in the dialogue, Socrates asserts that the Good as such has properties of sufficiency, perfection, and the desirability of possession by every living being. These properties are repeated twice more, at 60b–61a and also at 67a. When these characteristics were first enunciated at 20c–d, it was assumed that they were intended to explain why human beings, in particular, were attracted to the Good. In other words, the Good—which, at that point in the dialogue, lacked specific content—was being analyzed only insofar as it existed in relation to and was fundamental for human beings. But now, at the end of the dialogue, these three characteristics belong to the Good as it functions with respect to *all* living beings within the cosmos—itself a living being, not merely with respect to human beings as one component of the cosmos. Therefore Socrates can maintain that measure is the highest human possession because it is most like the Good (66a; cf. 67a) only by juxtaposing measure with the structurally complex Good emerging from the concerted reflections on this reality occupying Socrates and company throughout the dialogue.

Socrates claims that measure [μέτρον], moderation [μέτριον], fitness [κάιρον] and all that are similar to them are more like the Good than any other possible possession. Therefore, if measure is the highest human possession because of this resemblance, then (a) this deployment of measure presupposes and develops the three distinct elements of the Good—beauty, proportion [μετριότητος—65b], truth—and (b) measure is more like the Good in terms of those properties pertaining to the Good as a unity—sufficiency, perfection and desirability—than any other human possession. The following discussion details these inferences.

The justification for ranking measure as the "highest" human possession includes demonstrating why measure is higher than mind and truth. At 65d, Protarchus asserts that "mind is either identical with truth or of all things most like it and truest." Therefore when Socrates says (66a) that "eternal nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these" as the highest possession and "mind and wisdom" as the third highest (after proportion, beauty,

perfection, sufficiency and all that belongs to that class—66b), the implication is that measure, moderation and fitness are closer to the Good than mind and wisdom. But if, as Protarchus has just claimed, mind and truth are or are virtually synonymous, then the Good assumes this privileged metaphysical status for reasons other than the extent to which Good includes truth as one of its three elements. For if the Good and truth were identical, then Socrates would have to rank life of mind as the highest life (since, as stated, mind is either identical with truth or "most like" it). It follows that measure, moderation and fitness more closely approximate the sufficiency, perfection and desirability characterizing Good than, for example, mind and wisdom do, since this approximation enables Socrates to rank the life of measure higher than the life of mind and wisdom.

The following analysis justifies, against any other possibility considered in the *Philebus*, measure as the highest human possession. This justification is based on ways in which measure most closely approximates the Good in terms of the three characteristics attributed to the Good as such—sufficiency, perfection, desirability. The development of the three characteristics connects each characteristic to the appropriate element or elements in the tripartite structure of the Form of the Good. The explanation justifying the selection of measure establishes in turn a system of principles not only apposite to the purposes of the *Statesman* but revelatory in directing attention toward the ways in which that dialogue is aporetic. This system of principles—deployed under the aegis of truth, proportion, beauty as ordering elements—will be employed in the final chapter of this study to demonstrate the range of aporetic elements permeating the complex structure of the *Statesman*.

Sufficiency

The fact that mind is ranked third presupposes that a realm of reality essentially other than mind exists and that this realm enjoys a degree of value such that only if the Good incorporates this realm and its attendant value can the Good be sufficient. This realm can be identified and its relevance to sufficiency can be demonstrated. The strategy: to show that measure will be ranked higher than mind and truth if degrees of reality exist in such a way that they are encompassed by the former, measure, but left untouched by the latter, mind and truth.

Consider measure, moderation, fitness as essential exemplars of the same basic reality: The possession of measure refers to the capacity to react to what can become subject to measure, that is, what is quantitatively determined as "more" or "less" or qualitatively determined as "better" or "worse." These characterizations presuppose the existence of parts (taken in a broad sense) which can relate to one another in a variety of ways. But parts must cohere within some sort of unity, something capable of being divided and then measured in terms of these evaluative designations. Measure as the highest human possession thus presupposes the existence of something other than humans and also that this something, as subject to being measured, assumes a certain unity.

Socrates has explicitly identified the "mixed" life [μικτῷ—61b] as the particular mixture which will provide the locus for determining the highest human possession.

Thus the unity in question is a mixture. But this sense of mixture is, as noted, an example of one of the four new tools Socrates proposed earlier in the dialogue as necessary to deal with the demands of reality. Now as a matter of principle, the four new tools represent an essentially integrated set—in other words, any one of the four implies the presence of all four taken as a unity (27b–c). Therefore a given mixture also presupposes the unlimited—or, broadly interpreted, matter—and requires that the unlimited manifests itself as a wide variety of continuous parts subject to being arranged and divided in certain ways according to the determinations of measure.

The kind of unity underlying this continuity of parts results from the presence of order, and the order is provided by Form. The element of Form pertaining to the parts so measured is conferred by that dimension of the Good identified as truth. But the Good is an essential interplay of three Forms—truth, proportion and beauty. Thus, truth, the formal element, although it confers a nature or type on a particular segment of the unlimited, does so in necessary conjunction with proportion and beauty. And as has been demonstrated in the previous section, the two other constituent Forms of the Good, beauty and proportion, refer directly to characteristics occurring in particular things: proportion includes the relation between parts of a living whole insofar as these parts constitute elements of that whole as a unity, as a particular of a certain type established by truth; beauty secures the factor of harmony within the interrelation of component elements of a given particular.

Therefore, sufficiency as it applies to the Good pertains not just to the Forms of truth, beauty and proportion, but also to the relations between elements of entities produced and affected by these Forms—particular things. This crucial inference follows: The Good encompasses not only Forms as such, but also particular things insofar as the Forms of truth, beauty and proportion are present in these things. The claim is not that the Good *exists as* particulars—the Good is, as Socrates stipulates, a Form; therefore the Good as such cannot be characterized by any property which belongs to particulars. But the specification of the Good-as-Form as the necessary intersection of three elements represents a reality embracing, by relationships established through the presence of Forms in particulars, *the totality of particulars* as formed individuals of certain specific or limited natures.

Consider particulars in their status as mixtures, formed or limited instances of the unlimited. Either matter, the unlimited, is eternal or it is not. If matter is eternal then matter has just as much claim to be a component of reality as the Forms, since matter and Forms both share the property of being eternal. The Good must therefore encompass the eternality of matter just as it must encompass the eternality of Forms. Even if matter originated somehow posterior to Forms, the duration of matter throughout untold reaches of time commands respect and inclusion in the realm of the real. Succinctly stated, a cosmos including matter as a kind of unlimited as well as mind and the Forms is more sufficient, that is, more complete, than a cosmos consisting only of mind and Forms.

What holds for a given mixture, say a particular human life, can be generalized, since the Good constitutive of a given mixture and the Good animating the cosmos as a whole are identical in structure. Therefore if measure is better than competing alternatives because of its proximity to the Good as such, then measure found throughout the cosmos as such, as a unity, must be better than any other element or

group of elements within the cosmos since human beings and the cosmos are both living beings and what makes each of these entities good is identical for both. The fact that the cosmos is the reality within which all other living beings reside does not militate against this conclusion because the cosmos is and remains only one single living being.

Since the *Philebus* establishes that the Good functions for the cosmos as living, beauty and proportion permeate the cosmos as such as well as all inhabitants of the cosmos, both in themselves and in relation to one another. Socrates asserts that a considerable amount of the unlimited exists (30c). But the unlimited assumes a determinate mode of existence only when it has been formed into a mixture, some sort of whole. There are, in the cosmos, an indefinitely large number of such mixtures, all formed as wholes and exhibiting order through measure. And finally, beauty as an element of the Good establishes the comprehensive harmony existing between and among particulars exemplifying natures interacting and interrelating within that one unity which is the cosmos.

To review the argument: taking mind and its grasp of the Forms as a self-contained relational unity—for example, mind intending a thought about some determinate content—and then elevating this mind so that it becomes equivalent to the highest level of the Good omits everything existing as access to and potential object of this kind of cognition—the spatio-temporal world, rich in complexity and diversity, the cosmos in which appear the objects of mind's attention, many of which dwell in bodies. In sum, sufficiency ascribed to the Good points to the Good as the animating force *in all living particulars*. Sufficiency attests to how an embodied thing of a certain type—this thing formed by truth as an element in the Good—exists in position to achieve what is "good" for that thing insofar as it is an individual thing of a certain type, in a definite spatio-temporal environment within the cosmos. Sufficiency is the characteristic of the Good by virtue of which each particular can individualize itself by seeking its distinctive good as *this* particular and not *that* particular.

It may be concluded then that measure as a human possession is more sufficient than any other candidate since measure explicitly introduces relations between elements of particulars precisely insofar as particulars exist, thereby encompassing the entire domain of formed particulars and approximating the complete metaphysical scope of the Good. Otherwise put, the ability of human beings to recognize the presence of measure in themselves as well as in the world about them presupposes that things exist which display measure as integral to their reality. Thus measure, both its reality and the ability to discern this reality, is higher as a human possession than mind and wisdom because measure includes relations to realities *essential to the Good*, realities which, as such, are separate from mind and wisdom as media for appreciating and relating to these realities.

When Socrates identifies measure as the highest human possession, he appeals to "eternal nature" [ἀΐδιον...φύσιν—66a] as the source for this selection. This unspecified reference to eternity reinforces the interpretation that domains of eternality exist other than those occupied by the Forms. If such domains exist, this would account for Socrates using the general term *phusis* and attributing to it the property of eternity. Indeed, if matter, or the unlimited, were eternal, as suggested above, then it becomes metaphysically incumbent to employ this kind of locution

in order to indicate that all relevant regions of reality, including eternal matter, have a say in determining the highest human possession. Thus it is the eternal as exemplified by Forms as well as matter, and the resulting intersections of these two types of reality accounted for by the four new tools, which indicates that measure is the human possession most proximate to the nature of the Good.

Perfection

The interdependency of elements of the Good as Form is such that each of its three components establishes connections to both of the other two components. The sufficiency of the Good, it has been argued, establishes the formal presence of truth, beauty and proportion in the cosmos as a unique living entity as well as throughout the realm of particulars dwelling within the cosmos. Particulars, as mixtures, are formed by the intersection of the unlimited, limited, and mind. The element of mind, *nous*, provides entry for appreciating how the Good exhibits perfection.

According to the *Timaeus*, the mind of the Demiurge fashioned the natures of things, based on its apprehension of Forms (29a). Perfection as a property of the Good brings out therefore that these elements are formed by mind, one of the four new tools introduced in the *Philebus*. But if all existing particulars are instances of natures and natures derive from Forms, then the Good is present to Forms serving as standards for all natures instantiated throughout the cosmos. By inference then, mind is present in particulars since their existence is patterned after truth (Forms), that is, as mixtures through the intersection of limit and unlimited. Thus the Good includes a telic dimension, directing all things toward a certain end controlled by a thing's nature, an end which includes the place of a given thing within the harmony of the cosmos. This harmony is established by mind, the primary causal agent—at its highest manifestation, by the divine mind of the Demiurge. The extent to which mind exists at this level of cosmic control, in concert with Forms and particulars instantiating Forms, is the extent to which the Good exhibits perfection as one of its three defining characteristics.

Measure, the highest human possession, includes the mind's relations to material things, that is, mixtures, since it is mind at the cosmic level which originally formed the nature of which a given mixture is an instance. Mixtures are a blend of limited and unlimited. But if the unlimited, or matter, is eternal, then measure is more adequate than mind in isolation because measure, as a function of mind, encompasses this dimension of reality whereas mind by itself does not. Thus measure is closer to the Good because measure combines the mind doing the measuring in conjunction with mixtures as interplays of the four basic elements of reality.

Although mind by itself is insufficient to circumscribe the complexity and diversity of what exists—which, as argued above, is why mind as such cannot be the highest possession—mind does connect the human agent with Forms and, in an intuitive way, with the Good. In this sense, therefore, mind as instrument and determinator of what is measured is more perfect than mind taken in isolation. The purposes endowed in a given mixture by cosmic mind are then open to being measured by the individual

human mind. This mind interprets the results of such measurement and then orients these results according to that individual's own purposes and situations.

Measure includes the power of the human mind to measure realities with which it interacts, and to appreciate appropriate moments for actions (or refusals to act) in light of such measurement. The ability of mind, in its human setting, to measure what is other than itself puts the human being as a unity in intimate contact with the underlying purposiveness of given mixtures as well as with the internal harmony of material parts produced by the intersection of the other elements constituting the particular instance being measured. Measure [μέτριον] as human possession thus replicates proportion [μετριότητος] insofar as proportion is one of the three cardinal realities defining the Good. This replication must be understood in conjunction with the totality of what is measured, that is, all mixtures established by the four new tools. In this regard, the perfection of the Good connects mind, both in its cosmic and human dimension, with everything determinate and ordered (existing other than mind), thereby reflecting in these dimensions the sufficiency of the Good.[9]

Desirability

In the language of the *Phaedo*, the Good is that which holds all things together (98b), both individually as things of a certain type (by virtue of the Good as truth) and collectively as members of one cosmos (by virtue of the Good as proportion). All particulars enjoy existence as beings of a certain type only insofar as they are concurrently attracted to and defined by the Good. This feature, the desirability of the Good, attests to the concern for, minimally, maintaining a living thing as living and also for maximizing what is best for a particular living being's long-range interests as an individual of a given type—an individual, as such, situated necessarily in certain concrete circumstances within the complexity and endless reaches of the cosmos.

The initial dispute in the *Philebus* concerns what is the good for human beings. Socrates described the Good itself as what is most desirable; if so, then the object desiring the Good must be complex and constituted by fundamental differences. Thus if something desires X then it lacks X (*Symposium*, 200a–b). If every intelligent being pursues and desires the Good[10] then it apparently follows that every intelligent being lacks the Good. Furthermore, Socrates' use of the plural, goods [*agathois*—20d], in a pivotal account concerning the Good in the *Philebus* suggests that what is good for one kind of intelligent being may differ in some respects from what is good for another kind of intelligent being. A secondary inference: different intelligent beings of the same type might require different goods precisely in virtue of individual differences or differences in environments (or both).

Consider, for example, the answer asserted early in the *Philebus* as the Good for human beings—pleasure. Clearly if I seek pleasure, then I currently lack pleasure and it is precisely because I lack pleasure and desire to attain it (or to maintain its possession), that I claim that pleasure is the Good. But reflection indicates that I could maintain that pleasure is the Good for me only if (a) I were constituted in a certain way and (b) I could react to my environment so that it is possible to realize that I am more complete as a human being if, and only if, I seek and attain pleasure.

This belief about the goodness of pleasure may or may not be correct, but such a belief is not even possible unless the being holding this conviction is formed and organized in a certain way, as capable of envisioning something other than what is immediately at hand, with that particular something projected as valuable to the existence and continued well-being of that individual.

This line of thought suggests that the Good is not a reality aimed at as the donkey aims at the carrot. Rather, the Good is what, given our determinately formed nature, we must and should possess in order that this nature can be fully realized. But this possession directly results from our nature constituted as what it is and also our recognition of this fact. Such intimacy requires Socrates to formulate the Good at a much more fundamental level in the *Philebus*—the intersection of truth, proportion, beauty—once it becomes evident how pervasive the Good is, not only for human beings but for all living beings—including the cosmos itself, as a unique living being.[11]

In the *Republic*, the Good [*to agathon*] directly connects in a strict metaphysical sense only to Forms; in the *Philebus*, the Good is the desired object of all intelligent beings. Therefore the Good exists in a more complex and diversified metaphysical dimension in that an explicit relation is established between particular intelligent beings and that single fundamental reality which all intelligent beings desire. As a result, intelligent beings must, to be constituted as intelligent beings (of a certain type), desire the Good. Their failure to do so, or the inability to satisfy completely the inherent drive to secure the Good, results either in the gradual dissolution of their identity as beings (again, beings of a certain type) or weakens their hold on the formal nature which they, as particulars, exhibit by participating in a relation with the Good. An anticipation of this metaphysically-oriented sense of desire (in a passage cited earlier in a related context) appears in the *Phaedo*, when Socrates asserts that particular instances of equal things are "striving" [ὀρέγεται] to be like equality itself but fail to achieve this more elevated state (74e–5b); in this case, the striving or reaching is to approximate the reality of a Form whereas in the *Philebus*, desire is for the Good as the nexus of realities perfecting that individual as an instance of a given type of thing.

Since possessing the Good defines a particular living being as well as constitutes what is best for that being, measure becomes prominent as the human possession through which the desire for the Good connects the particular living being with everything material to the fulfillment of that being's nature. At the cosmic level, such desire establishes the continuous order and harmony displayed by the ways each living being desires to fulfill itself as well as to interact with all other living beings within their common environment, their "world." From a strictly human standpoint, measure shows the Good's desirability more than those living beings attracted to the Good with lesser degrees of awareness of what they are attracted to, since a human being has a mind capable of appreciating and, as it were, sensing what is the Good for that being as a whole.

The desirability of the Good is a direct function of its inherent—if fragmented—intelligibility, and this aspect of its nature depends on mind's ability to detect the presence of Forms, especially the interrelated trio of truth, beauty and proportion. When mind measures the significance of what is other than the individual human,

mind is connected with Forms grounding those realities, ultimately with the Good itself. But the mind never loses sight of the fact that when it measures those realities in terms of its own interests, this measuring includes the reality of what is measured in terms of particularity (its own) defined through the intersection of the four new tools introduced into the metaphysics of the *Philebus*. The desirability of the Good is felt throughout the cosmos insofar as mind measures the extent to which individual realities are connected to what is "best" for that mind and for the person generally. And what is best for that individual is determined by the Good.

The Good and the *Statesman*: Summary and Prospect

The fact that measure is the highest human possession because it most closely resembles the Good has important consequences for understanding the Good within the metaphysics of the *Philebus*. Furthermore, this complex association of metaphysical elements, seen as a whole, illuminates the structure of the *Statesman*.

The *Philebus* shows that Socrates no longer thinks of the Good as in the *Republic.* In that dialogue, the Good is emphasized in terms of its cardinal relation to the Forms; thus Forms exist and can be known because in some fundamental metaphysical sense the Good exists. Therefore, by extension, the Good exists in a metaphysical dimension even further removed from the shadowy reality of particular things. By contrast, the Good in the *Philebus* is represented as a Form resident with other Forms rather than as that reality by which the Forms exist as Forms. Nevertheless, the Good in the *Philebus* continues to stand alone in the hierarchy of reality depicted in that dialogue.

According to the *Philebus*, the Good as a triune interplay of truth, proportion, and beauty includes, necessarily, relations to non-formal elements—the unlimited. Thus the Good can be explicitly discerned wherever particular entities embody a unified and harmonious structure under the guidance and formative agency of mind, and whenever these entities desire to maximize the limits of that structure in terms of their individual circumstances within the cosmos. But if each living thing dwelling in the cosmos, as well as the cosmos itself as a unified whole, is produced by mind in concert with Forms standing as unchanging patterns, then the Good underlies everything that exists in the cosmos. As a result, if every living thing in the cosmos is good in this principled metaphysical sense, both individually and in its relations to every other living thing in the cosmos, then the Good itself, as a unity, affects the existence of and relations between everything in the cosmos. Under this interpretation, the Good as fundamental metaphysical reality underlying the existence of all things remains alive in the *Philebus.* But although the basic function of the Good is identical to *to agathon* in the *Republic*, the direction of emphasis has shifted, as it were, from the metaphysical apex of a single transcendent reality down to the "less real" levels of existence.[12]

The Good in the *Philebus* is an essentially contextual reality—the Platonic Socrates has recognized that the Good contributes necessary elements to everything which exists in a formed state within the cosmos, as well as the cosmos itself as a subsisting unity encompassing a broad spectrum of living entities. Socrates has

discerned that the purely formal elements of the Good—its three constituent Forms—do not exhaust the range of reality governed by the Good; rather, the Good must also be recognized within particular living beings determined as such by participating in Forms and the unlimited as the principle of materiality which contributes essentially to actualizing these beings as particular beings of a certain type. In the *Philebus*, the Good becomes a tripartite unity in order to render its presence in the spatio-temporal world more palpable, more accessible to cognition. Particulars are now expressly invested with their own measure of the Good insofar as they exist as formed particulars of a certain type or nature.

The penetration of the Good into the fabric of concrete particularity becomes a metaphysical pivot with considerable play and explanatory power. The *Statesman* asserts that philosophy, understood as comprehensive and ordered inquiry, will provide a foundation for the pursuit and attainment of human happiness. But the nature of happiness, left indeterminate in that dialogue, is given specific content in the *Philebus*. Furthermore, this content depends on developing the nature of the Good as an articulated metaphysical structure. The interpretative goal of this study has been to show that the *Statesman*, in its concern to blend metaphysics and myth, is an aporetic document principally due to its lack of development of the Good. By contrast, the *Philebus* establishes its conclusion concerning the nature of human happiness precisely in virtue of its explicit development of the Good. As a principle of interpretation therefore, the Good developed in the *Philebus* may be placed in apposition with the structure and content of the *Statesman.* If the articulated Good developed in the *Philebus* is employed as an interpretive grid, this grid—accompanied by detailed demonstration—not only reinforces that the *Statesman* is aporetic in structure but its employment in this capacity also develops a series of advances beyond the positions left inchoate in that dialogue, advances seriously and substantively pursued by Socrates and company in the *Philebus*.

The final chapter in this study demonstrates the extent to which the aporetic character of the *Statesman* depends on the Good, in particular the development of the Good which is fundamental to the argument of the *Philebus.* The structure of the Good—beauty, proportion, truth—in conjunction with the new tools Socrates introduces in the *Philebus* will, when applied to the intricate narrative movement of the *Statesman*, disclose the extent to which the latter dialogue is aporetic because the Good has not been thought out to the extent that it has in the *Philebus*. According to the Stranger's myth in the *Statesman*, everything in the cosmos preserves a measure of good and beauty. In the *Philebus*, the same position is maintained—without having recourse to "telling tales"—by virtue of sustained investigation into the structure of reality developed by Socrates and associates. The argument of the *Statesman* results in a series of aporetic accounts of fundamental questions. The doctrine of the Good in the *Philebus*, consonantly juxtaposed with the text of the *Statesman*, shows why this kind of account was the best the Stranger and young Socrates could have produced.

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Chapter 7

The Good and the Aporetic Structure of the *Statesman*

The following account demonstrates the extent to which the aporetic structure of the *Statesman* depends on the fact that the metaphysics of this dialogue, explicit or implied, lacks full recognition of the nature of the Good. Although the Good is only approximated in the *Philebus*, this approximation connects directly to the *Statesman*. The point is not that the *Statesman* serves only as prelude to the *Philebus*—the two works differ widely in organization and theme. It may be argued, however, that the Good developed in the *Philebus* derives its structure from the line of inquiry and problem areas left unresolved in the *Statesman.* Chapter 7 argues this thematic connection.

According to the Socrates of the *Philebus*, the threshold of the Good is attained by means of a Form which unifies three distinct realities—truth, proportion, beauty. Each of these realities may serve, in sequence, as a focal point for exhibiting the aporetic structure of the *Statesman.* The interdependence marking this hybrid sense of the Good, with commensurate implications connecting any one of its three elements with both of the other two elements, will be a feature in the following discussion. Sufficiency, completeness and desirability will be incorporated when these properties of the Good are relevant to present concerns. Additional passages from the *Philebus* will also be introduced in order to develop further the account of the Good analyzed in Chapter 6, thus clarifying the extent to which the treatment of the Good in the *Philebus* contributes to understanding the *Statesman*'s analysis of statecraft as an essentially aporetic exercise.

Statecraft and the Good

The initial display of aporetic structure in the *Statesman* involves the apparently substantive results attained by the Stranger and young Socrates during their dialectical deliberations in search of the truth concerning the nature of statecraft.

Truth

Forms At *Philebus* 58a, Socrates asserts: "I am confident that all men who have any intellect [νοῦ] whatsoever believe that the knowledge which has to do with being, reality, and eternal immutability is the truest [ἀληθεστάτην] kind of knowledge." Later (64b), Socrates adds: "a thing with which we don't mean to mix truth [ἀλήθειαν] will never really come into being, and if it ever did it wouldn't continue

in being." Truth provides both metaphysical and epistemological foundations for the cosmos depicted in the *Philebus* since truth apprehends realities which have "being, reality, and eternal immutability." However, in a celebrated passage occurring much earlier (15b), Socrates' approach to the metaphysical dimension of truth was more hypothetical:

> The first question is whether we should believe that such unities [μονάδας] exist; the second, how these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can nevertheless be permanently this one unity; and the third, how in the infinite number of things which come into being this unity, whether we are to assume that it is dispersed and has become many, or that it is entirely separated from itself—which would seem to be the most impossible notion of all—being the same and one, is to be at the same time in one and in many.

If the later passages in the dialogue remove the careful hesitancy of the earlier discussion regarding the existence of these realities, then the monads of 15b and truth cited at 64b refer, in different ways, to Forms. When both passages are combined, the realities referred to display the following properties—they are one, self-identical, undifferentiated, unchanging and eternal. As such, the Forms are fully articulated and functional in all relevant metaphysical respects in relation to and within the cosmos described by the *Philebus*. Compare in this regard the *Statesman*. As the dialogue approaches its final position on the nature of statecraft, the Stranger and young Socrates describe and evaluate different types of government (301a–3c), an analysis characterized in terms of different degrees of reality. However, all these types are kept separate from the one "really real" [ὄντως οὔσας—293e] type of statecraft. Thus reality admits of degrees, and if one true type of statecraft exists, its reality must be in some sense privileged. But the Stranger insists that this reality is not available for consideration. And the implied reason rests on the fact that the Form of statecraft, as all Forms, remains distant from the discussants' metaphysical and cognitive awareness.

The diminished stature of the Forms in the *Statesman* is a cardinal reason why the dialectical exercises in that dialogue went astray. Since neither the Stranger nor young Socrates philosophize while in the presence of reality fully defined, they cannot be expected to produce dialectical results which are true and complete in the way truth and completeness are governed by Forms and the recognition of such governance by the concerned and sufficiently informed philosopher.

In the *Republic*, the Forms explicitly depend on the Good; although the myth in the *Statesman* makes clear that goodness (as well as beauty) permeates the cosmos, the Good as such remains in metaphysical shadows, as it were, with the result that Forms reflect this indeterminacy by occupying only a vestigial place in that dialogue's hierarchy of reality. Forms are mentioned in the myth, but guardedly and without metaphysical or epistemological elaboration; it may be argued, nonetheless, that the perspective of totality underlying the structure and scope of the myth is precisely what initially allowed the Stranger to apprehend the existence—and relevance—of the Forms.

When Forms are introduced in the *Philebus*, Socrates contends that without this kind of truth, particulars would never come into existence and, even if somehow

they were to emerge into reality, they would not continue in existence for any length of time. This appeal to the lack of duration besetting particulars without the continuously informing presence of Forms is, I suggest, an oblique reference to the career of particulars depicted in the *Statesman* myth. In that narrative, particulars maintained their existence as long as the demiurge watched over them during the cycle of Cronos; but once the demiurge departed in the cycle of Zeus, particulars were threatened with total dissolution. This drastic oscillation of existence at the level of individuals would not transpire, as the *Philebus* makes clear (26d), if particulars derived their reality from participation in Forms. But if Forms are only hinted at and, given this reduced degree of reality, subsist without any connection to the Good, little stability can be expected from the derivative realities analyzed in the *Statesman*. The perspective on totality embraced by the Stranger throughout the myth served only as a prelude for discerning Forms. It took the Socrates of the *Philebus*, seeking the Good as a prerequisite in order to determine the content of human happiness, to reveal the full structure of the Forms.

Participation Forms, or realities displaying characteristics of Forms, are mentioned in the *Statesman*'s myth but remain unconnected with anything, even with each other. No reason is given or even hinted at in the myth, or elsewhere in the *Statesman*, that particular things may depend on something in order to exist. However, in *Philebus* (15b), Socrates explicitly connects particulars with Forms—in a word, Socrates assumes participation. The problem with this assumption, also indicated at15b, revolves around how a Form can engender an infinite multiplicity of particulars and still preserve its unity. The relevant point: Socrates recognizes, as the Stranger did not, an essential connection between particularity and the world of Forms.

The absence of a direct metaphysical link between Forms and particulars opens up the possibility, vividly developed in the *Statesman* myth, that particulars may exist only in a partially determinate sense. Particulars are thus subject to variations in fundamental characteristics—such as reversing the growth process—indicating that the parent particulars' hold on reality is not as secure as it might have been, given a more fully articulated metaphysical source. The dimensions of the Good encompassing proportion and beauty also become crucial in this context, since they, working in conjunction with truth, preserve the natural harmony and ordering of parts of existing particulars, characteristics of particulars suffering severe disruption in the cosmos of the *Statesman*.

Knowledge The connection between Forms and particulars has vital implications for the relation between truth and knowledge. Knowledge is appealed to often in the early stages of dialectic in the *Statesman* (for example, 258c, 258e, 259a) and also at its conclusion (308c), apparently with the assumption that the Stranger and young Socrates are in complete command of the meaning and structure of knowledge. At no point in the dialogue, however, is knowledge ever defined, much less subjected to scrutiny—as it had been, say, throughout the *Theaetetus*.

At *Philebus* 59c, Socrates elaborates on the claim made at 58a (and discussed above) by saying that "we find fixity, purity, truth and what we have called perfect clarity, either in those things that are always, unchanged, unaltered and free of all

admixture, or in what is most akin to them; everything else must be called inferior and of secondary importance." Here Socrates asserts that truth is found either in entities unchanged and free of any mixture or in what is "akin" to such entities. If therefore the only entities which in principle remain unchanged are Forms, then knowledge as truth consists in apprehending the Forms. This is a standard Platonic position. However, the disjunct which immediately follows significantly modifies that position.

Hackforth identifies the beings "akin" to the Forms as the planetary bodies,[1] but a more relevant and compelling interpretation may be developed. First, the context of Socrates' claim at 59c is general, concerning truth wherever it may be secured. But if the beings "akin" to Forms were only the heavenly bodies, then it would seemingly follow that the only truths Socrates intended were those about heavenly bodies, an arbitrary restriction without foundation in the dialogue. Second, the fact that Socrates locates a diminished degree of truth resident in particulars—things that come into being and perish—suggests that what is "akin" to the Forms is a type of reality subject to difference by degree, not a sector or region of reality located in a particular place. I suggest then that the intended reality "akin" to the Forms are Forms insofar as they are instantiated in particulars. The disjunctive character of the passage at 59c does not contrast Forms with a completely different kind of reality (that is, heavenly bodies, as in Hackforth's reading); rather, the contrast is between Forms as such and Forms insofar as they reside in particulars. According to this interpretation, truth as developed in the *Philebus* refers to (a) particulars in relation to Forms as well as (b) Forms as such.[2]

This interpretation is reinforced by Socrates' distinction between two types of knowledge (61e): "one having regard to the things that come into being and perish, the other to those that do not come into being nor perish, but are always, unchanged and unaltered. Reviewing them with respect to truth [ἀληθὲς], we concluded that the latter was truer than the former." This passage establishes that knowledge arises from things "that come into being and perish," that is, particulars. Thus no longer is knowledge reserved just for apprehension of the Forms as such. Knowledge now encompasses the entire realm of particulars. At 61b, Socrates recognized that when Forms embody particulars, human apprehension of instantiated Forms constitutes knowledge, albeit of a secondary degree since the Forms are not dwelling alone but rather in things. The metaphysical groundwork for this epistemic claim was established shortly before, at 59c, when Socrates pointed to realities "akin" to Forms by virtue of their function in determining the nature of particular things. If soul exists by itself, then soul could apprehend Forms as they are in themselves; this is knowledge in the highest sense and is described mythically at *Phaedrus*, 247d–e.[3] When soul exists in a human body, the living person perceives something existing in the cosmos yet knowledge is still possible, only at a diminished level from the pure knowledge soul would enjoy when existing by itself and in touch with Forms.

This position has important consequences with respect to the *Statesman*:

Schemas The Stranger pronounced that dialectic showed the "*schema*" of the king and appeals to schemata were frequent throughout the dialogue. However, the Stranger never addressed what exactly a schema was, nor did he consider whether any

connection existed between the schema of statecraft and the apparently privileged realities—one of which is, presumably, that of statecraft—mentioned in the myth. But the *Philebus* obviates the need for the schema as a separate, or potentially separable, metaphysical vehicle by positing a degree of knowledge derivable from instances of Forms. In the *Statesman*, awareness of schemas produces only true opinion, not knowledge, and it may be suggested that the reasons why the Stranger doggedly pursues this derivative degree of cognition throughout the entire dialogue are that (a) the Forms are not fully articulated and (b) the relation between schemas and Forms is never directly addressed. Now if true opinion is true because it is based on the true object of knowledge, then it may be inferred from the account of types of knowledge in the *Philebus* that the schemas so prominent in the *Statesman* are derived from Forms. As a result, the Stranger can assert that apprehending schemas generates true opinion—although, as noted, the truncated metaphysics of the *Statesman* does not allow the possibility of attaining a higher level of cognition. Therefore, this dependency on derivative reality results, necessarily, in a commensurately deficient account of the nature of statecraft.

Particulars The *Philebus* grants to particulars a legitimate degree of reality rather than, as the *Republic* put it, a status wavering between being and non-being (V478d–e; cf VI508d). Recall that the *Statesman* also presupposed a legitimate degree of reality for particulars during the critique of law. At 294b–c, the Stranger claimed that the inherent weakness of law is that it does not touch the uniqueness of particular beings as particular, thereby skimming over particularity as such. This critique of law is now metaphysically justified since according to the *Philebus*, particulars display sufficient reality to ground a derivative but essential kind of truth (62b–d). If law touches only some aspects of particulars and omits all other aspects, then the particular is on its own, as it were, and its completion as an instance of a type must be sought for, and attained, elsewhere than from the universality of law. Thus particularity is elevated to a level where it exerts pressure on theoretical and philosophical concerns. Particular things exist so that their character as particulars must not only be respected but also protected and enhanced; as a result, each particular has a claim to whatever sanction or control the law intends to convey.

When the Stranger asserted that the ultimate rationale for the ruler's actions was making all individuals "better" than they were (297b), the subtle presence of the Good as the ultimate ground for such improvement is evident—as is, again, the implication that individuals are worth such fulfillment. Making a thing "better" as such is improving it with respect to the type of thing it is. But if particulars are what they are in relation to natures and if natures derive from Forms (on which more below), then the improvement of a particular, its becoming "better" than it was, ultimately depends on the Form establishing a nature controlling the end of that particular. This control is determined by the interlocking concatenation of elements of the Good in the *Philebus*—truth, beauty, proportion. This fundamental unity substantiates and ultimately defines the individual character of particulars, providing direction for the betterment of a particular in whatever sense of betterment is required for that particular given (a) its parent nature as well as (b) its unique circumstances within the cosmos.

If knowledge about statecraft is possible but unrealized during the dialectical analysis of statecraft, then any apparently final specifications pertaining to the nature of statecraft may be incomplete or flawed. Such is the case in the *Statesman* given that the Stranger explicitly asserts that the methodological approach to the final account of statecraft has produced only true opinion concerning that nature and if it is granted, as canonic Platonic principle, that true opinion is less cognitively secure than knowledge. Furthermore, if the structure of knowledge itself is unanalyzed and undefined, then claiming that statecraft is a type of knowledge also remains indeterminate until such an analysis has been provided—an indeterminacy regarding statecraft which, the Stranger admits, describes his current grasp of that reality (292c). Without this substantive analysis, what the practitioner of statecraft must know to be fully competent as well as what this practitioner must do to secure such knowledge and thus act on it cannot be made a matter of public awareness, thereby becoming accessible to philosophical review and critical evaluation.[4]

The failure to pursue a purely theoretical approach to knowledge emerges from another, more psychological perspective. Early in the *Statesman* (258c), the Stranger distinguishes between the class in which statecraft resides and all other classes, and maintains that soul will conceive of knowledge as admitting these two types. Furthermore, the myth asks what the "desires" of the people in the age of Cronos were with respect to knowledge and the usage of speech (272d), a point followed almost immediately by the claim that the cosmos and its "innate desire" [σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία] naturally reversed the direction of its rotation (272e). However, if knowledge presupposes some fundamental sense of desire but the Stranger feels no need to analyze the soul as the seat of desire—an analysis Socrates actively pursues in both *Republic* and *Philebus*—then there is additional reason to suspect the conjunctive appeals to soul and knowledge in the *Statesman* given that virtually nothing is said in this dialogue about the nature of soul as such. This concern is reinforced by the fact that, as is clear in the *Philebus*, the Good exhibits inherent desirability which plays into the determination and natural fulfillment of particulars. It would be just as crucial to understand and situate soul in its capacity to follow the dictates of desire in order to fulfill its own nature by the acquisition of knowledge.

The need to pursue such psychological inquiry is hinted at by Socrates—not, be it noted, the Stranger—during his prefatory remarks at the beginning of the *Statesman*, when he asserts that everyone present should be "eager" [προθύμως—258a] to discuss how classes or types being analyzed are related to one another, a decidedly abstract debate presupposing that desire can be stimulated by purely dialectical concerns. But if the desire underlying such eagerness is not studied as—or, indeed, even recognized as—a factor in the nature of soul, then it would be premature to expect such eagerness to be forthcoming on the part of those involved in such discussions.

Paradigms At *Statesman* 277d, the Stranger insisted that it is "difficult" to exhibit the "greater" ones—presumably the more important Forms—except by using paradigms. The *Statesman*'s lengthy excursus into weaving and the even longer and more involuted cosmic myth reflect the urgency to establish such an epistemological gambit. The carefully detailed description of weaving is required because paradigms

are essential as a surrogate path toward approximating the nature of statecraft. The diligence with which these accounts are pursued by the Stranger and young Socrates reflects the seriousness of their intended methodological purpose—showing the way to approximate the nature of statecraft through paradigmatic models. Furthermore, the myth, with its concerted and sharply detailed paradigms based on cosmic phenomena, not only illustrates the divine formative rule of the demiurge, but also brings cosmic considerations into focus and the consequent recognition of the Good as a fundamental principle required to establish the order and stability essential to both being and becoming as metaphysical ultimates. In fact, the cosmic dimension of the myth allowed the Stranger to detect the need for, and the structure of, the paradigm as a gambit for approaching knowledge. The isomorphism between the actions of the demiurge with respect to cosmic organization and the subsequent definition of statecraft can be seen (as argued in Chapter 3) as a mythically evoked foundation for the theoretical derivation and definition of a paradigm.

But the Stranger insists that paradigms produce true opinion, not knowledge (278c). The central element of a paradigm is the sameness connecting its two relata. But if knowledge is higher than true opinion and if a paradigm contributes only a sameness between its two elements, then sameness, as one of the greatest kinds in the *Sophist*, is shown indirectly to be insufficient as a conceptual rubric for establishing truth and for determining the origins of things.

This implication serves as an implied metaphysical critique of paradigms from the standpoint of establishing truth about the "greater" ones: (a) How does the Stranger know that weaving can stand as the "lesser" reality for exhibiting the nature of statecraft? Only if he were already in command of a reality providing the rightness of this selection would weaving, rather than some other reality, be justifiably chosen. (b) What principle or metaphysical ground allows the Stranger to determine that weaving is a "lesser" reality in relation to the "greater" reality of statecraft? His approach to the method of dialectic (266d) seems to obviate the need for value discriminations, but surely value must be discerned, and at a level grounding the very possibility of a paradigm since paradigms reveal the structure of greater realities and thus depend for their initial formulation on relating something lesser to something greater. (c) Presumably the Stranger would reply that in the case of the paradigm in question, exhibiting the nature of statecraft, blending is the relevant feature and such blending must be done "well," just as weaving warp and woof of material must be done well in order to produce a cloak. But how is this functional sense of value determined, since the paradigm simply pinpoints a sameness between two relata without specifying criteria or standards so that the practitioner of either art knows how to combine the various materials in order to generate the desired end of both activities? To reveal to a prospective statesman that he or she must (a) "blend" disparate personalities as they interact during affairs of state just as (b) the weaver blends warp and woof is informative, but it does not tell the ruler how to execute such blending, nor what the blending should be trying to accomplish.

The Stranger asserts that it is difficult, not impossible, to exhibit Forms except by using paradigms because he is not in full control of the Forms. Since the best the Stranger can do is apprehend schemas, interpreted here as derivative replicas of

Forms, then the Stranger must avail himself of paradigms to approximate accounts of Forms. However, the Stranger's frequent appeals to knowledge and truth expressing knowledge invite a continued quest for what knowledge as such is, given that the Stranger's practice of dialectic provides, at best, only a series of true opinions. And for the Stranger, this quest to see reality includes fabricating an epic myth as the principle requisite for embarking on any further dialectical adventures in search of the "greatest things."

The account of statecraft reached at the conclusion of the *Statesman*, based on paradigms engendered in the myth, merely approximates the true nature of statecraft. The myth serving as the centerpiece of this dialogue is required only because of the Stranger's lack of metaphysical perspicuity. As a result, the final statement of the nature of statecraft, mirroring paradigmatically the depiction of the fragmented demiurgic treatment of the cosmos, should be approached as equivalently deficient even though the analysis of that nature consumes a considerable amount of dialectical energy on the part of the Stranger and young Socrates. According to the conclusion reached by the Stranger, statecraft is essentially the mediated resolution of opposed differences. While as a practical matter such resolution is doubtless often integral to statecraft, without a theoretical specification of particular realities—or values, to use a more modern term—this resolution lacks direction and guidance. The question becomes: what kind of realities and also, which ones?[5]

In developing two levels of knowledge, the *Philebus* effectively nullifies any need for paradigms since knowledge, whether of Forms as such or of collected instances of Forms, supercedes true opinion and the Stranger's dependency on paradigms as an essential dialectical device—given the truncated metaphysics of the *Statesman*—for moving as cognitively close to reality as possible. The *Statesman* emphasizes paradigms, both in theory as integral to methodology and in practice through the myth and account of weaving reflecting the myth's cosmic direction, because the Stranger's metaphysical awareness has edged only to presentiments of the Good rather than, as Socrates achieves in *Philebus*, a more articulated awareness of the complete structure of the Good.

Proportion

The *Philebus* specifies proportion [συμμετρία—65a] as one of the three essential characteristics of the Good. Implications derivable from the *Statesman*'s correlate notion of measure [μετρητικὴ—283d] demonstrate the extent to which this crucial notion contributes, in a pair of metaphysically related areas, to the aporetic formulation of statecraft.

Particulars In the *Statesman*, the art of measurement is divided into two parts: "one part is concerned with relative greatness or smallness, the other with that which is necessary for production" (283d). The first type "includes all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, and thickness in relation to their opposites; the other [type] encompasses those which measure them in relation to the moderate, the fitting, the opportune, the needful, and all the other standards that are situated in the mean between the extremes" (284e). Furthermore, the quantitative art of measurement

must be measured against, or interrelated with, the other, "the establishment of the standard of the mean" (284c); otherwise, no one would exist with knowledge of practical affairs. The two types of measurement are thus essentially linked with one another. When quantitative measure determines that something material can be expressed according to greater and smaller (or their multiples), this kind of measure also exists in relation to that same characteristic of a thing determined by the measure of the mean, that is, according to what is fitting, and so on. But the Stranger has also made clear that the moderate, fitting, and so on, represent measurement by which that something is produced. However, this entity must be a thing *of a certain sort*, not merely a thing undifferentiated by properties. Therefore the interplay of the two types of measure, in producing a determinate something, depends on a formal reality for this determinacy. As a result, "due" measure introduces, although perhaps only implicitly, specification and formal order into the indeterminacy of what is measured by a strictly quantitative "greater and less." Combining the two types of measure produces a particular, existing by definition in a material or quantitative setting, and determined as a particular of a certain definite type.

As described in the myth, particulars are subject to drastic alternations of formal opposition, that is, in reversing the order of aging. It may be assumed, as indicated, that particular things suffer such radical variation because of incomplete determination in some respect, presumably a rectifiable deficiency. The metaphysics developed in the *Philebus* accomplishes exactly this rectification.

The second type of measurement distinguished in the *Statesman*, production [γένεσιν], refers to the genesis or coming to be of a particular thing. As such, this type of measurement generates the same end as the set of elements stipulated in the *Philebus* as the source of coming to be of mixtures. Consider the parallel account of a particular—the mixture—presented in the *Philebus*. Recall also the connection stated by Socrates between the mixture and the Good, that the mixture exists *as* a mixture, as a unity of a sort, by virtue of the Good determining this unity as a unity (65a). Once the mixture has been so established, Socrates articulates the mode of existence of particular entities, this or that mixture, as an intersection of four distinct determinants.

This phase of the *Philebus*—on particularity as a mixture—glosses the status of particulars presented implicitly through blending the two types of measure as stipulated in the *Statesman*.

Socrates' interest in particulars issues from a more basic concern, given the main question posed by the *Philebus*. He asserts that "it really looks as though I need fresh tactics: if my objective is to secure the second prize for reason [νοῦ] I must have weapons different from those of my previous arguments; though possibly some may be the same" (23b). These "fresh tactics" encompass "all that now exists in the universe" (23c); thus they account for a "coming into being [γένεσιν], resulting from those measures [μέτρων] that are achieved with the aid of the limit" (26d).

These new tactics are embodied in four sectors, detailed thus: "The first, then, I call the Unlimited, the second the Limit, and the third the being that has come to be by the mixture of these two; as to the fourth, I hope I shall not be at fault in calling it the cause of the mixture and of the coming to be..." (27c). Socrates summarizes: "these four kinds, Limit, Unlimited, Combined and Cause, which is present in all

things as a fourth kind" constitute the four new tools, adding a bit later that "we cannot suppose that this last-named [Cause]...failed, I say, there to contrive that which is most beautiful [καλλίστων] and most valuable [τιμιωτάτων]" (30b). Furthermore, "there is in the universe a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in addition a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind" (30c). Thus, "mind belongs to the family of what we called the cause of all things" (30e).

These four new tactics address, and more adequately account for, the modes of reality displayed by particular things as that reality has been sketched through the interplay of the two types of measure in the *Statesman.* The following discussion connects relevant sections in the *Philebus*' account of particulars with their aporetically counterpart positions in the *Statesman*.

Mixture Mixture is the third of the four "tools" but it may be considered first because of its designated metaphysical function. Socrates identifies mixture as a fundamental type of reality because he realizes the need to categorize the particular as an independently existing entity. The mixture is a principle of being in its own right, apart from limit and unlimited which, in concert, constitute that being *as* a particular being of a certain type. Thus when Socrates announced that the fourfold classification represents "all that now exists in the universe," the universe in question encompasses all that exists "now," in the spatio-temporal setting in which Socrates and company dwell. But this means that Socrates is analyzing the structure of particular things as particular, since particularity defines one dimension of the cosmos. Furthermore, it has been shown (in Chapter 6) that the mixture exists as a unity because of the Good as an intersection of truth, proportion and beauty, thereby conferring on the mixture as a particular a degree of reality commensurate with the privileged status of the Good as a foundational principle. In these respects then, particulars establish themselves metaphysically in a new and more penetrating way. Finally, Socrates' inquiry concerns "all" that now exists; the present analysis encompasses the complete range of entities inhabiting the cosmos.

The *Statesman* never establishes the reality of particulars as a separate metaphysical category because the only entry the Stranger has at his disposal in this regard is the intersection of two types of measure. One type, due measure, is essential for the production of things. But how? According to what principle of order? For what purpose? These questions are not answered; indeed, they are never directly raised. The Stranger fails to apprehend the reality of particulars from the appropriate theoretical perspective, one requiring him to address the full reality of Forms and their grounding in the Good which, as the *Philebus* makes clear, may be approximated as a tripartite foundational reality.

During the account of weaving, the Stranger appeals to a pair of principles which structure the cosmos with respect to generation of particulars—composition and separation, processes funding the cosmos with its store of realities (282b). Since, according to the Stranger, these processes account for everything real in the cosmos, it may be inferred that the demiurge employs them in forming the cosmos (cf. 273c). Introducing such processes, especially at this high level of generality, focuses attention on *what* is combined and *how* it is combined, according to what principles

and for what ends—although the specificity required for developing answers to such questions is not part of the Stranger's mythic strategy. However, the myth emphasizes the continuous presence of the good and the beautiful, implying that value derived from these realities constantly permeates the cosmos.

This dimension of fundamental value pervades the cosmos, particularly in the realm of human action. When the topic of measure is then introduced by the Stranger, he mentions—without developing the point—that measure is the reality which will account for the primary difference between good and bad human beings (283e). Those particulars which are human beings must act according to measure in order to determine their existence as morally praiseworthy (or its opposite) human beings. And, more generalized, the contrast between the two types of measure is characterized at a level so fundamental that the "due" in due measure implies an incipient value dimension. Thus the Stranger asserts that "due" measure grounds the existence of a thing (and, implicitly, a thing *of a certain type*) because this type of measure derives its formative power—although this derivation is unstated—from the underlying presence of the Good. The interplay of the two types of measure in the *Statesman* in generating particulars must await the much more detailed development in the *Philebus*.

Unlimited Mixture establishes the value of particulars as particulars, thereby setting the scene for a more articulated analysis of their metaphysical character. In the *Philebus*, the unlimited with aspect to particulars is defined as that which has "more and less actually resident in them" (24b). Thus hotter and colder have, within them as a pair, "more hot" and "less hot," and so on. Opposites remain in the *Philebus*, but now all pairs of opposites are located under a broader class—the unlimited. Furthermore, realities exist limiting and thereby transforming the unlimited into what is "well proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of number" (25e). Socrates is thinking of "more" and "less" as a pair, a dyad, logically and metaphysically linked. But this dyad exists necessarily in conjunction with a kind of reality introducing degrees of order into the inherent fluidity and indeterminacy of that reality differentiated solely by the more and the less.

In the *Statesman*, the Stranger distinguishes one of the two types of measure into "relative greatness and smallness" (283d)—quantitative measure—measurements applying to any material thing in the cosmos. The unlimited in the *Philebus* becomes therefore the Socratic counterpart to quantitative measure in the *Statesman*. The unlimited of the *Philebus* replicates the "stuff" of the cosmos of the *Statesman*, that dimension of reality which as such is not ordered by any kind of limit and, as a result, is subject to a continually surging back-and-forth motion along the continuum of opposition evoked so vividly and dramatically in the myth. The harsh and potentially destructive structural variations affecting the destiny of particulars in the *Statesman*'s myth provide dramatic impetus to the need to reconcile the interaction of (a) formal specification of a distinctive nature with (b) the material as a principle continually realizing its inherent tendencies to disrupt formal structure and thus to threaten cosmic chaos. Despite this imminent threat, the fact that the myth specifies counter-motion of the cosmos as essential establishes matter as a principle of fundamental metaphysical importance, thus anticipating the unlimited—matter

(again, broadly defined)—in the *Philebus*. Furthermore, the myth suggests a relation of consanguinity between matter and formal determination; however chaotic matter may be in itself, when matter becomes associated with a formal element, matter becomes receptive to assuming a set of ordering and limiting characteristics.

When a given nature has been impressed on the unlimited, this nature, through its power of determination, guarantees the continued and stable existence of all particulars instantiating that nature. The *Philebus* provides this element for establishing the stability of particulars; the *Statesman* lacks such provision except for the partial and temporary determination provided by "due" measure. When the *Philebus* stipulates that the cosmos contains a "fair amount of unlimited" (30c), this amount is presumably circumscribable, although it enjoys status as a primordial cosmic element and therefore is, in itself, indestructible if not immortal as a type of reality. Finally, the unlimited also implicitly accounts for the plurality of particulars since the unlimited, if continuous, can be divided and subdivided an indefinitely large number of times and still have each unit of the unlimited become a particular of a certain specified nature. This implication explains the plurality of distinctly different entities as well as multiple instances of the same type of thing.

Limited In the *Philebus*, this element of a mixture is that which "puts an end to the conflict of opposites with one another, making them well-proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of number" (25e). This is the central property of "the family [γένναν] which shows the character of Limit" (25d). Thus limit produces such realities as beauty, strength, health and "a whole host of fair [πάγκαλα] things found in our souls" (26b). Limit generates what is harmonious by being introduced into, as the *Philebus* expressly states, the "conflict of opposites with one another." But this oppositional structure is precisely the type of conflict governing the cosmos depicted in the myth of the *Statesman*, a conflict originating because what is measured according to more and less—the unlimited—has *not* been formed into specific types marked by sufficient structure and uniformity to withstand the severity of cosmic oscillation ultimately threatening the dissolution of natures.

Wisdom, as the myth in the *Statesman* contends, is endemic to the cosmos. Therefore, the opposition exemplified in the divergent directions of living beings with respect to time and aging represents an element of wisdom on the part of cosmic motion. The wisdom of the cosmos in this regard underpins the Stranger's eventual formulations of the nature of the king and natures of particulars. By contrast, the limited represents a dimension of reality determining, in a fundamental interplay with the unlimited, the type of particular named in the *Philebus* as mixture.

The newly forged weapon of limit directly addresses the mode of production described in the *Statesman*. Due measure is necessary for the existence of anything; due measure is also characterized as the mean between extremes. In the *Philebus*, the family of the limit resolves the conflict of opposites with one another, in the process making them, as noted above, "well proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of number" (25e). Thus, for example, music comes into existence as an art when the high and low in pitch or the swift and slow in tempo are mixed—or limited—through the positioning of numerical values. However, a plurality of specific limits is required to produce all constituent elements of music. Again,

establishing this plurality requires a number of distinct formal elements and positing the existence of Forms, as the *Philebus* does, ensures such a plurality.

What the Stranger refers to in the *Statesman* as "the mean between extremes" finds its counterpart in the limit as developed in the *Philebus*. One instance of the mean between extremes is the moderate [πρέπον]. If health is an instance of the moderate, then health exists when the mean between extremes is established with respect to opposites which pertain to the body, controlling the body's temperature, for example, so that it occupies a mean between the extremes of excessive heat and cold. However, limit is not restricted just to that type defined by the mean between extremes. Since the limit can and in some cases must be imposed in different places along the continuum of the unlimited, the limit must be derived from some kind of formal reality, a reality evincing a certain structure. As argued above, due measure in the *Statesman* introduces the dimension of formality into what exists and is measured purely by quantitative measure. However, it does so without the finality and structure required to stabilize particulars, that is, to establish a unity of sufficient metaphysical heft to eliminate the destiny of particulars suffering the kind of fundamental oscillation besetting them in the cosmos mythically evoked in the *Statesman*.

To assert that the mean between extremes is essential to the production of something remains excessively abstract. For if, as is directly perceivable, *different types* of things are produced according to this rubric, then additional specification is necessary in order to distinguish between one type of thing (produced as the mean between extremes) and another type of thing (produced the same way). The *Philebus* account provides this additional specification, and does so by the express introduction of formal realities. The Stranger, appealing to the mean between extremes in order to explain production, not only recognizes the need to address this aspect but also evokes a dimension of reality enabling the possibility of production which, he would have us believe, occupies a different level of reality than that which grounds a system of purely empirical measurement in terms of more and less.

The Stranger emphasizes, at 284d, that "sometime we shall need the principle of the mean for the demonstration of absolute precision [αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν]." The seriousness of this need is reflected in the extended surrogate argument demonstrating the existence of this mean—an argument which, as interpreted in Chapter 4, reduces to a logical truism. But the point to notice here is the close connection the Stranger senses between the mean and truth. Truth is provided only by accessing the Forms. For the Stranger, the Forms exist only as shadowy beings, displaying minimal specification and lacking any link to the Good. Therefore, his avowed insistence on the need for the mean is an indirect insistence on having Forms fully in place, providing the locus of stability, the ground of natural unity and the resulting dimension of precision which he divines as essential but cannot properly and fully articulate. The two types of measure approximate, but only approximate, the Forms as the only reliable metaphysical standard for securing precision in the sense desired.

The partial metaphysical perspective on the mean available to the Stranger may be derived from the myth, which vividly depicts the career of particulars careening from one set of characteristics to the corresponding set of opposed characteristics.

Presumably the Stranger envisions the mean between such extremes as the locus of generating those things since the mean represents a range of stability between the termini defining the extent or limits of such (cosmic) oscillation. Note, on behalf of the Stranger's abilities as a metaphysician, that he envisioned the two types of measure essentially related to one another; in this regard, he anticipated the intimate and necessary connection established in the *Philebus* between limited and unlimited.

The appeal to limit as an essential element in constituting particular things, mixtures, raises the question, "Is limit as formative principle limit *of* something?" It is relevant then to examine the connection between limit and Forms, a classic issue in interpreting the *Philebus.* The following discussion develops the position that limit, although not equivalent in a one-to-one sense to Forms, essentially accounts for all that exists in the cosmos because it specifies *how* Forms are present in particulars. Limit names the cutting edge of Forms, as it were, when they inform the unlimited and, insofar as they function as the source of the limited, constitute mixtures, that is, particulars.[6]

Specifying how limit functions in this regard clarifies the extent to which the *Statesman*'s two types of measure, although essentially related to each other, remain an aporetic stopgap for a metaphysically complex state of affairs.

A. At 15c, Socrates says that the problems of the one and the many with respect to Forms and instances of Forms "cause all manner of dissatisfaction if they are not properly settled, and satisfaction if they are," to which Protarchus replies, "Then there, Socrates, is the first task for us to achieve here and now," a response to which Socrates concurs. This exchange suggests that Socrates assumes participation of particulars in Forms and that his purpose in the *Philebus* is to account for Forms "in" particulars so as to preserve the unity of the Forms and to explain the possibility, and reality, of a plurality of particulars. It is therefore plausible to investigate whether the *Philebus* answers a problem posed in the same dialogue.

B1. When he identifies the "fresh tactics" necessary to demonstrate the place of reason with respect to the Good, Socrates describes these tactics as "different" although some "may be the same." This qualification admits that the fresh tactics may, in part, duplicate dialectical tools previously analyzed, or reprise some aspect of those tools, or offer different perspectives on old tools. I suggest that this possibility is exploited by Socrates and that he has identified an aspect of Forms which will allow him to articulate their presence in particulars in order to respond to the problems of the One and the Many raised earlier in the dialogue.

B2. In a related vein, Socrates asserts that the new weapons constitute an analysis of all things now existing in the cosmos. If "all things" encompasses particulars and if particulars exist because they participate in—or in some way are related to—Forms, then the new weapons must refer to the Forms in some sense; if the new weapons do not so refer, then they will account for the existence of all things in the cosmos but without the active agency of Forms. Presumably then at some point in the account of the new weapons, Socrates will refer to Forms or to some element derived from Forms.

C. When Socrates describes the effect of the limit on the unlimited, he cites the production of what is well-proportioned and harmonious (25e). These characteristics inhere in a particular entity. Now if a particular is well-proportioned and harmonious then it is complex in that it contains a variety of parts or elements. Furthermore, if these parts are related to one another so as to be "well" proportioned, then the set of parts must exhibit some kind of underlying unity. As a result, the properties of being well-proportioned and harmonious presuppose a unifying principle inherent in that entity. Therefore, limit names a principle which shapes the unlimited but does so in a certain way. The thing produced—the mixture—is a particular, but not a "bare" particular. Rather, the particular is always and necessarily something *of a certain sort*. Thus limit names a formal reality which determines a particular material segment of the unlimited so that this particular displays the requisite dimensions of proportionality and harmony. These properties are exhibited by the particular through the presence of *any* Form "in" *any* spatio-temporal particular—hence the generality of the terms Socrates introduces—limited and unlimited—to name his newly forged metaphysical tools.

D. At *Philebus* 66a, Socrates says that "eternal nature" has chosen *metron* and *to metrion* and *kairion* and all similar things to be the first possession of human beings, that possession most like the Good. In the *Statesman*, *kairon* referred to a characteristic, due measure, accounting for the existence of an entity which, in conjunction with the correlative sense of measurement, then became measurable according to quantitative factors. Now if *kairion* means fitness in the *Philebus* in the same sense as that displayed by *kairon* in the *Statesman*, then fitness no longer rests in an indeterminate region somewhere between extremes, an indeterminacy reflecting the incompletely defined metaphysics of the *Statesman*. For if *aidion... phusin* refers to realities characterized by eternal nature, then Socrates is identifying "what is fitting" to be derived from Forms, since Forms exist eternally, as does matter itself (as argued in Chapter 6). Whereas in the *Statesman* what is fitting in accounting for existence was derived from the only metaphysical framework available, that is, the intermediate between extremes, in the *Philebus* what is fitting is indicated in conjunction with "eternal nature," since in the latter dialogue the Forms have been fully invested with requisite metaphysical specification.

E. At 26d, Socrates refers to "measures achieved with the aid of the Limit...." Measure as proportion is one part of the Good and another part of the Good is truth, with (again as argued in Chapter 6) all three parts logically interrelated within a single unity. Therefore, if the existence of a particular is defined metaphysically by the Good, then all three elements of the Good will intersect within that particular. Truth and proportion are logically interdependent as they contribute to the constitution of particulars. But truth, an element in the Good, is defined in the *Philebus* explicitly in terms of the Forms (59b). Thus limit names that dimension of particulars situated according to (a) truth, Forms determining a particular to be of a certain type and (b) measure, referring to the ordered relation of parts within the particular as a unified whole.

In summary: The *Statesman* contains an inchoate theory of measure which invites, but only by subtle implication, the presence of Forms in order that the Stranger's approach to measure in relation to what is measured becomes operational in producing particular things. This invitation is tendered insofar as "due" measure establishes types in conjunction with what, in a particular thing of a given type, is subject to the second type of measure, quantitative measure, thereby presupposing the material to be essential to the particular. The *Philebus*, however, connects measure with Forms through the essential connection between proportion and truth as elements of the Good. Existing particulars as individual entities receive metaphysical legitimacy from the mixture, one of the newly forged tools. Furthermore, particulars as mixtures are constituted by the interplay between Forms and unlimited. The defining and determinative Form "limits" a stretch of the unlimited, transforming it into an instance or particular of a certain type. Limit thus names, at as high level of generality, the presence of Forms determining a particular as an instance of a given nature.[7]

In the *Statesman*, the mean-between-extremes aspect of due measure approximates a kind of limit, thereby establishing a formal dimension within existing particulars. The *Statesman* account uses the notions of rightness or propriety through the appeal to "due" measure to intimate the presence of the formal. However, this intimation lacks the requisite sense of unity. The best that the Stranger could do in the *Statesman*, given his restricted metaphysical vision, is to install a mean-between-extremes device—the fitting, the proper, and so on—as a dispositional surrogate for limit, a tool determining particulars ultimately, as we have just seen, from their participation in Forms.

In general then, the two types of measure so central to the metaphysics of the *Statesman* have now been subsumed under proportion and truth, where truth encompasses the Forms and proportion represents the relation between (a) the measured harmony of parts within a whole and (b) the Form from which that whole, or mixture, derives its origin and sustained existence. In the *Statesman*, measure was defined as the mean between extremes and the cosmological myth depicted this range of opposition literally, with living things endlessly cycling from death to birth and from birth to death. Indeed, the conjunction of limited and unlimited as constituent elements in a mixture may be derived from the distinctively disjointed career of particulars depicted in the myth, since the oscillation between extremes rests on unlimited "stuff" in conjunction with the limiting function provided by divine supervision. The *Philebus* appeals to measure but specifies that the source and goal of what is measured is determined by an immutable Form through the imposition of limits.[8]

As noted, Socrates assumes participation—the problem is not to account for the distinctive character of particulars by arguing to Forms as their informing principle; rather, the problem is to explain, to the extent explanation is possible, how individual things participate in Forms in such a way that the unity of the Form is preserved given that multiple instances of that Form exist in the spatio-temporal world. At a level of high generality, the interplay of unlimited and limited addresses that problem. If the unlimited evokes a principle of matter and if there is a large, presumably infinite, supply of matter, then limit names what is common to all Forms

when intersecting with the unlimited and producing a multiplicity of particulars. As a result, designating limit as the operative function of a Form in the participation relation preserves the unity of that Form while concurrently evoking its presence in every instance of individual particulars.

By appealing to limit as a structural feature of Forms, Socrates achieves the requisite degree of generality such that this "new weapon" clarifies the relevant problems of the One and the Many raised earlier in the *Philebus*.

Cause The previous section has shown that the element of the Good identified as proportion, *ksummetria*, condenses into a single component the intersection of the two types of measure developed in the *Statesman*. Thus limit in effect de-limits, that is, imposes order, what in the *Statesman* is called "due measure," and unlimited refers to that dimension of reality measurable quantitatively, what the *Statesman* measures according to "relative greatness and smallness." The two types of measurement coalesce in the mixture, the actual particular entity. But the metaphysical structure of the mixture is not yet complete; Socrates adds a fourth component, cause, and he stipulates mind as an exemplar of this kind of causality. In the *Statesman* myth, particular things are subject to extreme forms of oppositional variation. At the point when particulars are threatened with dissolution due to the absent demiurge, this deity returns and restores the internal harmony and formal stability of each thing. Without the continually guiding agency of the demiurge, things in the *Statesman* myth would lose their stability and eventually fall apart, vanishing into the inherently chaotic flux of matter.

However, the demiurge's function depicted in the *Statesman* myth shifts in the *Philebus* to a more abstract level and becomes more complex. Since all four new tools are interdependent, the particular thing as mixture includes the cause of its existence. And since mind belongs to the family of cause, then mind—presumably the demiurgic mind (as well as minds of subordinate deities insofar as they have been charged with secondary creation and supervision)—establishes itself as a constituent element in the coming to be of any existing thing. Thus the account of the origin of particular things in the *Philebus* reduces the demiurge of the *Statesman* to an impersonal mind, perhaps in part to deflect attention from possible, and irrelevant, comparisons with the pantheon of deities animating the cosmos of the *Statesman* (and, of course, Greek religion generally).

The *Statesman* variously prefigures this deployment of mind as essential causal agent:

(a) The preamble to the myth appeals to the "cause" (269c) which will explain all events described in that account, thereby alerting young Socrates to attend to whatever would accomplish such a fundamental end. Therefore, the subsequent career of the demiurge as depicted in the myth must be especially noted, in particular all the implied limitations on the demiurge in the description of cosmic movement and the initial formation of natures, limitations suggesting that the demiurge lacked the requisite metaphysical vision to complete what was divinely begun. That the demiurge saw fit to withdraw from the cosmos testifies to and reinforces this lack. The

necessary return of the demiurge to restore and maintain natural order thus prefigures the introduction of cause, and mind, as one of the four tools in the *Philebus*.

(b) It was argued in Chapter 4 that measurement, introduced at *Statesman* 284e, presupposes something doing the measuring. But if only a mind can measure, then the very concept of measurement presupposes a mind present and measuring as well as instituting the order inherent in measuring what is being measured. In the *Philebus*, this implication becomes explicitly designated as mind—a structural necessity to account for both the origin and continued existence of particulars.

(c) Later, at the onset of the account of weaving, the Stranger appeals to a distinction, applying to all production, between contingent cause and "cause itself" (281d). This appeal to an apparently privileged dimension of causality focuses attention on the two types of cause in order to emphasize the difference between them, that is, what would be required in order to produce something on the order of magnitude of a state, or indeed of any magnitude, but especially those entities or realities which enjoy a sustained and serious command on human or natural attention. The subsequent account of statecraft instances a paradigm, an account exhibiting a derivative degree of knowledge—as a result, since paradigms are based on only true opinion, it is not evident that the Stranger has accounted for statecraft so as to reveal the "cause itself" of that art. The *Philebus*, appealing to mind actively collaborating with the three other new tools, directly addresses this level of causality.

Is mind constantly present to a nature and its instances or only at the origin of establishing the nature as a unity of a certain kind? The myth implies that mind (that is, of the demiurge) must be continually present to a nature, otherwise the inherently chaotic forces of the unlimited (matter) gradually disrupt and dissolve that unity. In other words, mind as cause fashions a nature, then continually preserves the unity of that nature as well as its instances. The *Philebus* glosses this necessity (64b) when Socrates says that "a thing with which we don't mean to mix truth [ἀλήθειαν] will never really come into being, and if it ever did it wouldn't continue in being." Since truth, an element in the Good, is essential in the actuality of things and since the four newly forged weapons account for the coming into being of things, then if all four weapons coexist as this metaphysical ground it follows that mind as cause is continually present throughout the career of a particular thing. Things require mind to continue to exist just as they need mind in order to exist in the first place.[9]

The myth is a dramatic narrative grounding the need for specification of the four tools: particulars of a certain type exist during both cosmic epochs, but their hold on formal stability oscillates between extremes when the divine source of this stability retreats from the cosmic scene to such an extent that their formal character is threatened with dissolution. This situation is confronted in the *Philebus* by introducing (a) mixture, preserving each particular as a fundamental unity, (b) unlimited, materiality which, as essential to particulars, coexists with (c) limited, a fixed identity formed on the indeterminacy of the unlimited, all three conjoining with (d) mind, the living and intelligent correlate which, it may be assumed, originated and continues to provide the controlling design for unitary natures underlying the diversity of particulars.

The Stranger engenders an evocative and highly imaginative myth interlocking a set of metaphysical problems concerning the destiny of particulars; Socrates in the *Philebus* addresses these problems and, assisted by a "retooled" and diversified approach to the origin and sustenance of particulars, resolves them.

Natures Since the oscillation depicted in the *Statesman* myth pertains to all particulars of the same type, the root source of this variation must, strictly speaking, derive from a deficiency in the respective natures underlying all particulars rather than from anything characterizing the particulars as such. Thus living beings oscillate with respect to aging and becoming younger because the nature of these particulars has only been partially determined. Despite such oscillation, however, the myth is careful to note that natures, as the cosmos itself, always maintain a measure of good and beauty. Determining the structure of the Good is not a matter of theoretical concern in the *Statesman*, yet the good and the beautiful remain throughout the severe dislocation suffered by particulars. The good/beautiful is a constant, and therefore is in some sense fundamental as an underlying principle providing order to the cosmos and its inhabitants, although the degree of that order varies throughout the continual run of cycles defining the career of the cosmos.

The myth in the *Statesman* is instrumental in illustrating the important metaphysical point that natures do not merely appear as unities—rather, they must be formed. In the Cronos era, living beings of a determinate type emerge directly from the earth but do so apparently at random, without control or guidance. Then, after the cataclysmic change of cosmic direction, the cosmos and its inhabitants continue to exist in an orderly fashion, "remembering and practicing the teachings of the demiurge...at first more accurately and at last more carelessly" (273b). However, as time went on, all living things "grew forgetful" (273c) of the demiurge's teachings and the order taught to particulars and cosmos begins to disappear—until the demiurge returns, restoring order and the prior condition of formal immortality. This passage makes clear that the order originally characterizing the cosmos and all its resident particulars was bestowed by the demiurge. The reference to "remembering" teachings of the demiurge evokes the doctrine of anamnesis so crucial to middle period dialogues (and suggests that all instances of natures are basically "living"); now, however, all living things must remember since all living things have been determined to the extent that they have been informed by a nature. The myth pointedly situates divine presence with regard to the establishment of natures—all natures, not just human nature—and shows that without this presence the ordering function of natures gradually but inevitably disappeared, potentially destroying all particulars instantiating those natures.

The widespread destruction of living things during the shifts in cosmic cycles testifies to the harshness of such organization, at the same time intimating the need, on a cosmic level, to balance the effects of this dual rotation so that these dire results may be circumvented. The reverse motion of the cosmos is carefully described as uniform in order to enhance the sense that the formation of natures by somehow combining both opposed cycles is rational and, in fact, should be considered as part of the orderly process of nature. In this regard, the "wisdom" of the cosmos displayed during its reversed cycle also focuses attention on the need to establish harmony in

natures and also, as a corollary to this requirement, to the fact that matter, a requisite element of this harmony, must be incorporated as essential to the formation and existence of natures. In sum, the account in the *Statesman* of particulars undergoing cosmic oscillation between extremes underlines a need for some additional essential factor in the constitution of a nature. But what factor?

According to the *Statesman* myth, the good and the beautiful permeate all aspects of the cosmos. This appeal to good/beauty evokes the parallel reality—the Good—analyzed in the *Philebus*. But what is conjoint in the *Statesman*, good and beauty, is distinguished in the *Philebus*; thus beauty, in company with proportion and truth, becomes an element in the Good rather than, as the *Statesman* maintains, coextensive with it. The factor of proportion presupposes plurality and also a qualitative kind of difference encompassing the elements of a plurality. It is not sufficient simply for an entity to have plurality of parts; rather, these parts must coexist with one another in a measured way, thereby guaranteeing that the plurality of parts will form an entity *of a certain sort*. Thus proportion, once realized, exhibits an implied nature insofar as the arrangement of elements, their proportionality as it were, is established by virtue of a purely formal function. Also, truth as an integral element of the Good refers to Forms, proportion to the relation between and among parts of a nature as formal unity and, in parallel fashion, in those parts insofar as they constitute mixtures, particular instances of that nature, and beauty refers to the harmony defining the unified elements within a given nature, paralleled again by beauty in the unified elements of particulars.

Recall, again, the myth in the *Statesman.* The deity functioning as demiurge is unnamed, denoted only by reference to its function. This feature of the narrative evokes the demiurge as a "mind" in charge of forming the cosmos and everything in it and also, in company with lesser deities, acting as the divine bestower of gifts to mortals. It is now evident that the source of a complete determination of natures beyond the transitory and variable status natures display in the *Statesman* is—mind. The crucial difference is that the mind required for appropriately determined natures belongs to a demiurge endowed with complete apprehension of the requisite models—Forms, fully and manifestly defined—who therefore does not leave the formation of natures only half complete. Mind, at the divine level described in the *Timaeus*, fashions natures by patterning their structure upon ideal standards which divine mind beholds in, it may be supposed, their purest and most complete sense. The *Philebus* also shows, in more detail, that mind does not act alone in establishing natures; it works in concert with limit and unlimited in order to produce exemplifications of the fourth new tool, mixture, the tool representing a particular entity produced as one instance of a nature. Underlying the four tools as a unified set is the Good articulated in the *Philebus*—the same Good which, according to the *Statesman* myth, permeates the cosmos and all that is in it. But this Good, only partially beheld by the demiurge in the *Statesman*, awaits a more complete articulation by Socrates in the *Philebus*.

Beauty

In the *Statesman* myth, beauty and good remain throughout all cosmic perturbations. This juxtaposition of beauty with good indicates the cosmic dimension beauty

maintains within parameters laid down in the myth; thus beauty as well as good is fundamental to the cosmos and all its inhabitants. Furthermore, the fact that beauty is identified in conjunction with the good strongly suggests that (a) beauty and the good are not identical to one another and (b) beauty exists on the same level as the good, implying that neither is more metaphysically fundamental than the other.

By contrast, in the *Philebus* this relation is part to whole, that is, beauty is one of three elements of the Good, coordinate in structure with proportion and truth. But this coordinate structure testifies to the incompleteness of the account of the cosmos rendered in the myth. If beauty is part of the Good, in necessary conjunction with proportion and truth, then residues of beauty will define all things existing within the cosmos—but only on condition that particular beautiful things are also intersections of proportion and truth. The *Timaeus* specifies the "most noble" [κάλλιστα] natures, that is, the four cosmogonic elements (53e ff). The *Timaeus* also insists that the Demiurge employed the idea "of the best" [τοῦ ἀρίστου—46a9] as the most fundamental cause for all production. In the *Philebus*, these components are essentially linked with the Good since beauty, *kalos*, is part of the Good. Another characteristic of beauty at this level must also be noted. At *Philebus* 26b1–3, "the source of fair weather and all other beautiful things" [καλὰ] occurs "in a mixture of the unlimited with that which has limit." The ratio between unlimited and limited must therefore display a degree of rightness so that the result, in terms of weather, produces congenial conditions. Beauty in this cosmological sense thus admits degrees, so that the greatest degree of beauty with respect to weather, presumably fair weather, is defined in terms of harmony of the physical elements constituting weather, whereas the least degree of beauty may be represented by storms which, as discrete events, display their own measure but are volatile, unstable and, typically, of brief duration. Finally, the universality attributed to this rightness means that any particular beautiful thing will incorporate a certain ratio of limit in conjunction with unlimited.

The ratio between limited and unlimited producing this rightness derives from proportion in conjunction with truth, both equiprimordial elements of the Good. Without the coordinating and ordering power of proportion, the exponents of beauty referred to in the *Statesman* myth become subject to the severe distortions in structure which characterize all living beings inhabiting the myth. These beings exhibit beauty by displaying a degree of harmony as instances of a given nature, but such beauty remains fragmentary in the *Statesman* precisely because this natural harmony lacks a fully established metaphysical foundation. Due measure, specified by the Stranger (after narrating the myth) as essential to generating a thing, remains only a gesture, given the incomplete character of such measure in relation to truth and the limited introduced and developed in the *Philebus.*

From the standpoint of particularity, beauty as a coordinating element of the Good refers to the harmony exhibited by elements of a particular once these elements have been duly combined into a natural whole. This harmony characterizes the relation between and among parts of a whole not merely in a formal sense, as elements in the definition of a nature, but also in the existent parts of a particular as, in the technical terminology of the *Philebus*, a mixture determined by the intersection of limit and unlimited. At *Philebus* 64e, Socrates asserts that "measure and proportion

are everywhere identified with beauty [καλλός] and virtue [ἀρετὴ].” In fact, juxtaposing beauty and virtue in this way becomes relevant to resolving one of the most vexed positions in the *Statesman*.

From 306a to 308c, the Stranger produced an account of virtue in which the elements were necessarily opposed to one another, thus displaying, once again, the influence of the myth and its divergent cosmic motions although doing so here in an important ethical context. However, the *Philebus* maintains that proportion and measure are essential for both beauty and virtue. Recall again that regardless how chaotic the cosmos became, throughout the entire process it still preserved a portion of beauty. The implication then is that all types of things within the cosmos, and the cosmos itself as living, maintained some degree of measure and proportion both within themselves and in their relations to each other in order to establish the conditions essential to beauty—conditions explicitly detailed in the *Philebus*, and with the *Statesman*'s position on virtue in view.

At *Philebus* 12c, Socrates asserts as a matter of principle that “the mere word ‘pleasure’ suggests a unity, but surely the forms it assumes are of all sorts and, in a sense, unlike each other.” This “unlikeness” within the unity of something as fundamental as pleasure is directed at the “unfriendly” relation between and among elements of virtue as argued in the *Statesman*. Furthermore, this “unfriendly” relation of parts within a whole originates from the Stranger's lack of appreciation of the unity (including measure and proportion) of a whole when that unity is determined by truth.

With the *Philebus* in hand, it may be argued that since beauty entails measure, then the elements of pleasure measured within the unity of pleasure could be unlike one another without being unfriendly to one another. For example, coordination between physical and intellectual pleasures allows these two types of pleasure to coexist in harmony even though they are unlike each other in physiological and psychological origins and effects (prescinding from their status as “false” or “true” pleasures asserted by the moral psychology of the *Philebus*). The same consideration holds for elements of virtue when subsumed under proportion and truth, once the Form of virtue is understood so that individual virtues are unlike one another in some respects but remain, in the terminology of the *Statesman*, “friendly.” Proportion, an element of the Good, produces the requisite degree of harmony between and among various components of virtue. Thus virtue in the *Statesman* lacks beauty if beauty confers inherent harmony on diverse parts. Also, beauty in the *Statesman*, especially when it appears in the myth, bears only vestigial connections to the Good when the Good is defined as it is in the *Philebus.* But the main point is that the tension in classifying types of virtue in the *Statesman* may be resolved, given the components of the Good articulated in the *Philebus*.[10]

The uneasy equilibrium defining the opposed elements of virtue reflects the instability in the opposing cycles of the cosmos, a moral consequence with increasingly significant metaphysical overtones given that according to *Laws* (XII 963a), virtue [ἀρετὴ] is the reality circumscribing the scope and letter of each and every law. The seemingly close connection between law and statecraft suggests, by way of the apparent doctrinal status of the *Statesman*'s final position on statecraft, that this connection merely provides a temporary glimpse of the true nature of statecraft,

now with the context of law more dominant. The *Statesman*'s development and application of dialectical method only reinforces this studied and tentative approach toward the subject matter at hand.

Dialectic and the Good

It has been argued that proportion as an essential characteristic of the Good presupposes parts within a unity determined as a nature of a certain sort. This characteristic offers the most immediate entry into the status of method—dialectic—in the *Statesman*, since the dialogue pays explicit and frequent attention to methodology and also to the problematic determination of parts or elements of things produced through division. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that proportion, again essential to the Good, connects relations between and among parts which it oversees to both truth and beauty. This interrelation, duly amplified, provides additional evidence of the extent to which the *Statesman*'s approach to and application of dialectic is also consistently aporetic.

The *Philebus* may again be used as guide. The *locus classicus* for method in the *Philebus* is 16c–d. This passage establishes conditions which connect to the metaphysics established later in the dialogue and which, in turn, provide a framework for specifying the aporetic character of method in the *Statesman*:

> The men of old, who were better than ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods, passed on this gift in the form of a saying: all things (so it ran) that are ever said to be consist of a one and a many, and have in their nature a conjunction of limit and unlimitedness. This then being the ordering of things we ought, they said, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single Form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then, if we have laid hold of that, we must go on from one Form to look for two, if the case admits of there being two...the one that we started with is a one and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is.

The historical qualification at the beginning of this passage is neatly congruent with the *Statesman* myth in that gifts given by gods are bestowed prior to the current stabilization of natures. Those human beings initially receiving these gifts were, according to the myth, indeed "men of old" who "dwelt nearer the gods" (cf. 274c), and therefore closer to that point in the cosmic rotation when the demiurge had addressed the necessity of restoring natures to their prior state of unity. This thematic connection between the two dialogues is reinforced by Socrates, who adds (*Philebus* 16b–c): no "more noble" [καλλίων] road to knowledge is available than the method he will describe, a road the nobility and beauty of which he has always been a "lover."

This road is "easy to point out, but very difficult to follow, for through it all the inventions of art [τέχνης] have been brought to light." It was given by "Prometheus together with a gleaming fire," recalling *Statesman* 274c—"...the gifts of the gods that are told of in the old traditions were given us with the needful information and instruction—fire by Prometheus...." According to the *Philebus*, Prometheus was twice beneficent to mortals—bestowing fire, an archetypical contribution to human

civilization, as well as the method of dialectic which Socrates will detail; in the *Statesman*, Prometheus provides fire alone. The suggestion is that dialectic should nonetheless be taken in conjunction with fire, from both of which has "arisen all that constitutes human life." The method of dialectic established in the *Philebus* is thus no less essential than fire to the demands of human life. Although the myth is silent on whether any deity offered humans the gift of dialectic, the fact that "men of old" presented this gift to us moderns suggests, but only suggests, that they in turn received this gift from a divine source. If so, then Socrates is extending the import of a mythical narrative which originated from the Stranger's thinking in the *Statesman.* Be that as it may, it is precisely by virtue of the gift of method, properly defined, that human beings can determine the structure of the cosmos and its elements—including the nature of happiness as the ultimate goal of human endeavor.

The appeal to beauty as a predicate proper to method and also Socrates' confession that he is a lover of this method bring out (a) the presence of beauty in method reflecting the beauty in what that method is directed at—discerning the structure of reality defined by the Good as a unity of truth, proportion and beauty and (b) the desirability of the Good discussed later in the dialogue, again derived from the fact that the Good is the source of desire, especially so for minds structured and suffused with ability to appreciate its presence. Socrates loves the method of dialectic because its application, if successful, will place his mind in intimate contact with Forms and the Good as an amalgam of truth, beauty, proportion. Such contact is the natural desire of a mind which has seen reality and wishes to recoup that vision. It is worth emphasizing again that the *Statesman* lacks any appreciation for *eros* in this metaphysical arena,[11] as the medium through which soul seeks those kinds of realities which will fulfill its desire for epistemic and natural completion.

Socrates asserts that "all the inventions of art" have been discerned by this method. If therefore statecraft is an art, then the method laid out in the *Philebus* must have been employed to establish this art. But if this method differs in essential respects from the method used in the *Statesman*, then it should be possible to determine why the *Statesman* did not fully succeed in describing statecraft as an art. Also, the Stranger twice contended that it was difficult to explain integral features of this method (262c; 263a–b), but he did not hesitate to apply the method over and over again, and in various ways. In the *Philebus*, Socrates says that the method is easily described but difficult to apply. This sharply opposed difference toward describing and applying method is an additional reason to examine the method in the *Statesman* to determine whether both its formulation and application contributed to the aporetic conclusions already identified and discussed.

The *Statesman* exhibits a grand myth as prerequisite for sustaining dialectical inquiry into the nature of statecraft; the *Philebus* says nothing about myth and proceeds entirely according to dialectical procedures. Although the Good is only approximated in the *Philebus*, this approximation, indeed recognizing the need to pursue this reality in a concentrated way, is sufficiently illuminating to preclude resorting to such imaginative narratives. Socrates has seen the Good, perhaps as fully as such vision is vouchsafed to a philosophical mind, and with that vision in hand he develops both method and metaphysics for analyzing the fundamental questions of philosophy.

As a prelude to this pivotal discussion of method, Socrates described the effects of "someone intoxicated with the one and the many"; such an individual would spare "neither father nor mother nor any other human being who can hear, and hardly even the lower animals, for he would certainly not spare a foreigner, if he could get an interpreter anywhere" (16a) and shower these audiences with discourses based on this venerable metaphysical poser. This passage echoes life during the mythic era of Cronos, when philosophical discussion—assuming it occurred—could have involved animals as well as human beings. The one and the many is such a fundamental relation that anyone recognizing its status will feel inspired to "spread the word" to all possibly affected parties—including lower animals and non-Greeks. The irony here appears palpable, since one so metaphysically intoxicated would doubtless fail to make much of an impression discoursing to deer and duck concerning the subtleties of the one and the many. Recall, however, that life during the era of Cronos explicitly sanctions the possibility that philosophical discussion—again, if realized—could involve animals as well as human beings (272c). Furthermore, at 262d–e the Stranger criticizes a division of humanity into Greek and foreigners as unscientific; if this division were sound, relegating foreigners to sub-human status, it would be idle to attempt impressing them with the deep-seated significance of the one and the many. But in the *Philebus*, Socrates insists that foreigners are fully equipped to appreciate these abstract subtleties, implying that all human beings regardless of geographical location receptively embrace, at least in intellectual capacity, such fundamental concerns. An examination of collection and division, essential components of dialectic, indicates from a purely methodological perspective additional aporetic dimensions emerging from the *Statesman*.

Collection

At 16c, Socrates asserts that we ought, "whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single Form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained...." This procedure is consonant with collection in the *Statesman*, since for the Stranger, "when all sorts of dissimilarities are seen in a large number of objects," it is essential to "gather into one circle of similarity all the things which are related to each other" so that they are included in "some sort of class" [γένους τινὸς] by their essential nature [οὐσία]. There are, however, substantive differences in the *Philebus* account which indicate deficiencies in collection as stated and applied in the *Statesman*.

The *Philebus* is sensitive to the fact that appropriately dealing with particulars is not readily accomplished due to the welter of particularity confronting us. Socrates contends that "...the unlimited variety that belongs to and is inherent in the particulars leaves one, in each particular case, an unlimited ignoramus, a person of no account, a veritable back number because he hasn't addressed himself to finding number in anything" (17e). The heterogeneity of particulars and the potential uncertainty produced in the mind of one intending to know their nature is perhaps an outgrowth of the Stranger's rather cavalier approach toward collecting particulars. In fact, the Stranger's appeal to "some sort of class" is an extension into methodology commensurate in lack of rigor with the Stranger's diminished insight into matters metaphysical. Collection in the *Statesman* rests on recognizing strands of similarities

in a set of particulars, with the resulting consolidation producing a group displaying only a marginally determinate unity. The reference to "some sort of class," with its studied vagueness with respect to both content and structure of the class in question, runs in tandem with the *Statesman*'s lack of specification of essential characteristics of Forms.

The account in the *Philebus* encompasses collection as a phase of dialectic by referring to "whatever it be that we are dealing with" and then, once this step has been accomplished, by asserting the need "to assume" the presence of a "single" Form. Since we are assuming this Form, then whatever is being dealt with prior to that assumption is not itself a Form. Therefore we are cognitively approaching something or, more accurately, a set or grouping of things, from which this kind of reality may be educed. By implication then, these things are particulars which, upon investigation, will yield a common reality once these particulars are properly collected, since such a reality indeed informs this group of particulars. No longer are we loosely tied to the methodological vagaries of the Stranger's "some sort of class"; now the true formal unity establishing the nature of the particulars in question is explicitly asserted to exist as *one* Form, the object of those who would know these particulars in terms of their formal nature. Furthermore, the structure of this single Form is laid out elsewhere in the dialogue as immutable and immaterial.

According to Hackforth (p. 26), the description of method in the *Philebus* "takes no account of particulars, but only of species; and for that reason alone it cannot be what Plato attempts to formulate here as the reverse of the 'descent' from ἓν [one] to ἄπειρα πλήθει [unlimited many]." Against this reading, however, consider the phenomenon of sound. At 18b, Socrates contends that "the unlimited variety of sound was once discerned by some god, or perhaps some godlike man...." Why does such discernment require divinity? Because the observer has recognized limit and unlimited, the formal element of reality within a welter of diversified and variegated particularity. What is collected is a set of realities grouped under a certain commonality—sound, in this case. But for Socrates it is an insight into reality, when apprehended as randomly rushing undifferentiated flux, to realize that all myriad disruptions of the air can be collected into a single unitary phenomenon—sound. Hence Socrates' assertion that this step is accomplished by deity, or by a human being endowed with metaphysical perception proper to the divine. But this collection, once established, remains an indeterminate infinite—although bearing the character of a *single* infinite—until appropriate divisions have been made. Socrates has transformed collection from a random gathering of particulars into "some sort of class" to a vision of individual realities characterized by the limited and unlimited. This approach to collection allows division according to Forms to transpire so that individually limited realities are preserved in their particularity—as instances of the unlimited—while also determined as instances of types by appropriate Forms.

In one of Socrates' examples, three types of sound are indicated—vowels, noises, mutes (18b–c). Each of these types is then exhaustively enumerated; in other words, only a certain definite number of vowels, noises, and mutes exists and methodological necessity requires enumerating each and every one of these elements. Although Socrates emphasizes the numerical aspect of division, the specification of sounds enumerates *a determinate type* of sound. In other words, vowels and mutes are

types of sound, then each type contains a certain delimited number of components. Thus the number of components is dictated by the type from which this number is derived. Type grounds number of elements, not *vice versa*. Sound remains unlimited even after this tripartite division into vowels, noises, and mutes, however, in that an unlimited number of particular instances of vowels, noises and mutes can and will occur during spoken discourse. Although each individual instance of speech will fall under one of the three types, an unlimited number of these instances will exist.

The appeal to a deity or to a godlike human manifests the level of recognition of reality exhibited by Forms which the intellect of such a being can apprehend. Socrates recognizes that the practitioner of collection must already have in mind, so to speak, a unity according to which a given cluster of particulars may be subsumed. This is why Socrates says "none of us could ever get to know one of the collection all by itself, in isolation from all the rest"; as a result, it became necessary to conceive a "bond of unity" (18d) which unites, in this case, all different sounds into one. Recognizing such a unity underlies the movement of mind while traversing unlimited particulars. The unity limits, thereby allowing mind to enumerate all constituent classes comprising that unity.

The *Statesman*'s announcement of collection resulting indeterminately in "some sort of class" is reflected by the Stranger's commensurately indeterminate application of this phase of dialectic. When the Stranger and young Socrates are formulating the material for determining the nature of statecraft, the Stranger asks whether, with respect to government, there is "any difference between the grandeur of a large house and the majesty of a small state" (259b), to which young Socrates says no. But if a small state has thousands of people and a large house has dozens of inhabitants, may this quantitative difference not translate into a qualitative difference between a master ruling dozens and a ruler governing thousands? And if the large house has a certain reputation (for whatever reason) and the small state is known for military prowess or economic influence (or, perhaps, cowardice and licence), can these value predications be ignored in determining how each unit should be ruled? In general, this collection discounts value as well as quantitative dimensions proper to a large house and a small state, with potentially disruptive effects on the putative class formed by such a collection. This pattern of ignoring potentially relevant differences continues, producing more serious consequences. The collection the Stranger introduces (261e) to generate the herdsman includes driver of one ox, groom tending a horse or man tending a herd of cattle or drove of horses. Viewing this collection, the Stranger says that "we call the art of caring for many living creatures the art of tending a herd or something like community management." The Stranger then names a type of caretaker—herdsman—when, given that dialectic had reached the art which gave orders to living beings not singly but in common, the more appropriate name would have been the broader class, that is, caretaker.

Immediately after this dialectical move, the Stranger says to young Socrates that if he preserves an attitude of indifference to mere names, he will turn out wise when he becomes old (261e). But the present indifference to "mere" names misdirects dialectic and is one reason why the Stranger will shortly embark on a massive myth in order to redirect dialectic toward its proper goal. Furthermore, the locus of the error is the original collection since it does not specify human beings as the object

of rule. The Stranger construed the relation between ruler and ruled to be funded by the relation between human beings and animals rather than by a relation strictly between or among human beings. The Stranger did not recognize that if humans have more "value" than animals, then it would be anomalous to lump humans together with animals, as at 261e—with unfortunate if not ludicrous results for the dialectical efforts eventually produced by the Stranger and young Socrates at 266c–d. An obvious lack of proportion between humans and animals obtains with respect to their joint membership in a class intended to encompass ruling as caring. Apparently it took the pressure and scope of a myth to reorient the Stranger's dialectical vision toward a more appropriate starting point, since only after the myth did the Stranger become aware of this mistake in unanalyzed value assumptions. In order to discern the correct formal reality establishing the unity of a given class, the Stranger had to pursue an extensive mythologization of the generation of the cosmos—a narrative journey suggesting that only when reality is beheld from the standpoint of totality and constituted by principles of extreme generality is it possible to envision correctly a given Form, including its status with respect to value considerations, within that cosmos.[12]

This incomplete understanding of collection magnifies aporetic results in the dialogue once collection in this decentered sense flanks an even more uncertain application of division.

Division

A. Theoretical Structure

Dichotomy vs. nature

As noted, Socrates in the *Philebus* asserts that the method is simple to state but difficult to apply; the Stranger does not find dialectic simple to state but, apparently, very straightforward to apply. This difference in attitude may be explained by considering the relation between method and its object.

At 262c, young Socrates had asked about the Stranger's claim that it was "safer" to divide down the middle, dichotomously, to guarantee that the part divided is also a species. The Stranger attempts to clarify the point, but he aborts this attempt by saying that "just at present it is impossible to make the matter entirely plain." However, the Stranger's practice often belies his reticent grasp of theory. As early as 259d, long before he embarks on the cosmic myth, he divided intellectual knowledge [γνωστικὴν] according to "nature" at least if we take him at his word [διαφυὴν]. Furthermore, later in the inquiry, he suggests that division should be according to "natural joints," although he immediately qualifies this crucial methodological shift by adding that "we must always divide into a number of parts as near two as possible" (287c).

There are two very different types of dichotomy—dividing a class into A and non-A produces a purely formal, and logically necessary, complement class, lacking specific content other than the exclusion of everything other than A; dividing a class (for example, human beings) into A (males) and B (females), where A and

B are presumably exhaustive, produces classes with specific content. The Stranger seemingly advocates the latter type, although instances appear where the former seems to drive his dialectical energies (for example, horned and hornless, at 265b).[13] Consider then *Philebus* 16c–d, where Socrates asserts that the dialectician should begin with one Form, then search for two Forms if required and continue in this vein as long as necessary. The *Philebus* discussion of method directs division away from dichotomy and toward natures, since dichotomous division producing logical complementaries need be done only once. For Socrates, division will be concluded when the requisite number of Forms has been identified, however many that might be. Once this formal enumeration is complete, then the nature of the thing has been exhaustively divided. Now if natures depend on Forms and division must be according to "natural joints," then truth as an element of the Good implies that division must indicate natural joints as determined by Forms.

Why does the Stranger vacillate between the two types of division—by dichotomy and according to nature? The ambivalency between the two clearly distinct methods derives from the Stranger's fragmented awareness of the Forms and also from the fact that he has not appreciated the pervasive reality of the Good as ultimately determining the nature and structure of what is to be divided. From the Stranger's metaphysically foreshortened perspective, it is safer to divide a Form into, first, a class and its complement because this division is purely mechanical, depending only on negation and affixing a negative operator to a given class. Awareness of an underlying and determinative Form is completely unnecessary for such division. Furthermore, second, dichotomously substantive rather than logically complementary divisions still only approximate division by natural joints since the reliability of a division depends on whether or not the dichotomous cut corresponds to a natural joint. Early in the day's discussion, concerted emphasis was placed on the unity of a class (258c). But if dialectic functions either by dichotomy or specification of natural joints, then the unity underlying such divergent divisions has not yet been properly determined. Only apprehending a Form *qua* Form provides the requisite sense of unity grounding subsequent differentiation by division.

The Stranger's allegiance to dichotomy as a method is so steadfast that it may be asked why he even envisions the possibility of division according to natural joints. Recall when the Stranger initially enunciates division according to nature. This methodological change of mind occurs, as noted above, at 287c—*after* the narration of the myth. Involving himself in a complex and comprehensive myth has reoriented the mind of the Stranger so that it has moved closer to the Forms, although not so close as the mind of Socrates in the *Philebus.* The Stranger now divines that the method of division is beholden, at least to some degree, to the nature of what that method intends to divide. This recognition remains limited, however, given that he clings to the conviction that division should still aim to produce dichotomous results, even while claiming that the goal of division is realizing the natural joints of the reality to be divided. The Stranger has grasped an important truth about division—that its results, if reliable, will be determined by the nature of what is to be divided. The closer the Stranger's mind moves toward apprehending the Forms, the more he appreciates the structure of natures determined by Forms, with correlative insight into the need to divide a given nature according to this structure. In this regard, the

Stranger has anticipated the far more complete Socratic statement of method in the *Philebus*. But the Stranger's application of that truth remains deficient because he has not realized the importance of grasping Forms as such and their fundamental relation to the Good as a uniquely ordering and differentiating principle.

Part vs. class

Shortly after young Socrates' query concerning the procedure for distinguishing types of division, another crucial methodological point is raised. At 263a, young Socrates asks how they can "get a clearer knowledge of class and part and see that they are not the same thing, but different." The Stranger responds that they will pursue that point later, "if we have time." However, the issue is never reexamined. The difference in question is essential since, as the Stranger himself asserts, parts depend on classes but not *vice versa* (263b). Without a clear criterion for distinguishing between part and class, it is possible to divide something and mistake a part for a class or a class for a part. Such an error would establish something to be an independent entity when it was not (if a part were mistaken for a class) or demote something from the status of independence when it was indeed so (if a class were mistaken for a part).

Although the problematic distinction between part and class is not directly addressed in the *Philebus*, truth—the Forms—in conjunction with other components of the Good determine such dependency. Thus once the Forms determine particulars, it becomes possible to account for the ordering relations distinguished in the *Statesman*, the dependency of one part upon another, more essential component. Proportion, a basic component of the Good, points to the possibility of such ordering. The value dimension provided by the Good establishes, at the most basic metaphysical level, the possibility that one component of a nature is metaphysically "more essential" or, normatively, of greater value to the unity embodied in that nature than another component.

The appeal to natural joints, in conjunction with the stated distinction between part and class, compels attention to natures and also to determining value considerations with respect to their metaphysical underpinning. If, for example, part of a unity belongs to that unity only because it depends on something else within that unity (as a finger depends on a hand), or on the unity itself (as a finger depends on the human being whose hand includes that finger), then this dependency generates a dimension of value distinctive to the unity in question. Thus a finger is less important to a human than, say, the hand of which that finger is part. Such value derives from the Form of the nature coordinating all elements of that unity, a Form channeled through the intelligent agency of mind in order to be structured and imprinted on a material setting—in the terminology of the *Philebus*, for limit to be situated on the unlimited to cause a mixture.

The possibility for distinguishing between class and part emerges from the intersection of the four tools. If natures include elements dependent upon other elements within that nature, then the demiurge, or mind as one of the four tools, has fashioned a nature displaying such dependency. But the demiurgic mind, correlating elements according to dependency relations to constitute a nature, renders it theoretically possible for a human mind, through dialectic, to reproduce

the thinking of divine mind in determining the structure of that nature, in particular distinguishing its independent and dependent elements. This correlation between human and divine mind enables human mind to indicate these differences in structure and value. Distinguishing between or among elements of a nature in terms of whether a given element is a part—therefore dependent on something other than itself, or a class—therefore autonomous, will often be, in practice, difficult. But the point with respect to dialectic is that the Good in the *Philebus* establishes a fully articulated metaphysical framework for drawing such distinctions, a framework existing at best only in skeletal form in the *Statesman*.

Division

B. Applications—Dialectic Applied to Statecraft

To illustrate this pair of related methodological deficiencies, consider the following examples of division in the *Statesman*, with accompanying analysis of their aporetic character:

Theory and practice

The Stranger's initial split of knowledge into theory and practice controls all subsequent dialectical moves. Theory produces knowledge for the sake of knowledge with no practical consequences, practice produces "objects which did not previously exist" (258e). In form, this division appears to be strictly by dichotomy since nothing said by the Stranger indicates that the division is coordinated by attention to natural unity. Now if the division is truly exhaustive in all respects, than nothing theoretical can belong to the practical and *vice versa*. But the following consequences result from such a sharp split—if knowledge depends on Forms, then any object produced for the sake of practice, such as a set of laws, cannot be based on Forms; if it were, then theory and practice would share Forms as the ground for producing those objects and in this respect the division between theory and practice fails to divide. In the other direction, if knowledge produces results without any practical consequence becoming objectified (for example, a decision to wage war), then a ruler's decision based on knowledge could never be put into action since this result again inextricably merges theory and practice, now as tangible results rather than with respect to the metaphysical origin for the two elements of the division.

This initial division appears to run counter to discovering the relevant classes from which statecraft, an art producing decisions for running a polity, is defined. But if the above argument shows that such dichotomous division of knowledge fails, then the question becomes how to divide knowledge so that statecraft can be distinguished from other types of knowledge. This distinction could be established if independent inquiry had demonstrated the nature of knowledge in general, from which one could describe how the ruler as knower differs from, for example, the mathematician and the potter as knowers. But if knowledge depends on Forms and Forms are not fully present to the Stranger, then the best the Stranger can do is confront the possibility of acquiring knowledge according to a plausible division,

that is, appealing to the difference between knowing (a) for its own sake and (b) for the sake of producing something based on that knowledge.

In fact, true statecraft might involve both classes produced by this distinction—knowing something because it is inherently worth knowing and, precisely because of the value of that knowledge, then producing something—a government and its laws—as the best possible structure to organize human beings to secure their collective and individual happiness. The sharp split the Stranger introduces between the two types of knowledge engenders this plausible, perhaps fertile, line of thought. This procedural sharpness also calls into question the possibility, asserted by young Socrates, that knowledge is "one" class from which apparently justifiable divisions can be established. Furthermore, the Stranger's hedging on this division by asserting that the king is "more like" the theoretical than the practical suggests that he is aware of its methodological artificiality and, by implication, that a ruler who would do nothing but theorize is, in truth, a ruler in name only.

The Stranger's conclusion, that the best the statesman can do is seek a kind of unification of opposites, reflects the lack of cognitive awareness the statesman has of Forms which, if such cognition were possessed, would permit a more direct course of actions because of more complete theoretical awareness of realities from which practical decisions could—and should—be derived.[14] A statesman combining opposites and hoping for an effective and just result is like a weaver blending warp and woof without knowing the Form of the cloak that, as the end of all practical activity in this kind of endeavor, will necessarily determine the dimension and direction of weaving.[15]

Statecraft and the swineherd

The errant course of dialectic practiced from the outset of discussion until 266d—a mélange of dichotomous division according to strict complements of classes mingled with substantive divisions (as outlined above)—results in a joke, identified as such (266c), equating statecraft with the art of tending pigs. At this juncture, the Stranger proclaims that the method employed in the *Sophist* and so far in the *Statesman* is value neutral, paying "no more heed to the noble than to the ignoble" en route to attaining "the most perfect truth" (266d). However, as a result of the indeterminate outcome of dialectic practiced so far, the Stranger senses the need for a radically different discourse to reorient inquiry in more philosophically accurate directions. This discourse is the myth, replete with complex and pervasive metaphysical narratives and concerns.

The conjoint application of the "two ways" which the Stranger and young Socrates have followed in their initial practice of dialectic suggests a flaw in the implementation of method, especially if the two approaches produce divergent results culminating in a dialectical dig. The "famous joke" cited by the Stranger surely gives away that something is seriously askew in a method producing such a result, especially given the manifest importance of securing a reliable definition of statecraft. The examples produced during the original dialectical exercise effectively show that division by dichotomy, although seemingly safer, is in fact prone to error because of so rigidly using opposition and producing formally complementary classes.

And another problem emerges, equally relevant and fundamental. The value-neutral status of method advanced by the Stranger can be justified if everything capable of dialectical analysis eventually yields some degree of truth since everything must, by virtue of existing, have some measure of Good in it. This conclusion follows from the composition of the mixture developed in the metaphysics of the *Philebus*. However, the dimension of value must be capable of articulation, that is, expressing how value is present to a particular entity as instance of a type. The problem of determining value becomes paramount given that the method practiced in the *Statesman* lacks any sense of value reflected in its dialectical results.

Furthermore, how is it possible to measure *degrees* of value, that is, determining that something is more or less valuable than something else? The question of degrees of value is relevant in two contexts: (a) determining whether one whole is more or less valuable than another whole. Indeed, the first question arising in the *Statesman* concerned the relative value of sophist, statesman, philosopher (257a–b)—this initial exchange points to the need to establish a principle of value in order to address and resolve such issues involving wholes; (b) lack of clarity concerning the distinction between part and class, a lack which, for example, may affect the force of the Stranger's argument, developed in the longer way, comparing cranes to human beings. In this case, the question concerns value in the relation between same or similar parts and different wholes. The concern of the *Philebus* to emphasize proportion with respect to truth as related elements of the Good becomes crucial here. For if proportion applied to the natures of human being and crane indicates that the relation between being a biped and being a crane is more valuable for a crane than this relation is for a human, any argument including both cranes and humans which included this characteristic but ignored its valuational aspect could fall prey to unjustified conclusions.

Types of possessions

The division of causality into (a) actual, the cause of the thing itself, and (b) contingent, dependent for its function on the actual cause, precedes an application of this division undertaken by the Stranger to clarify the arts, great or small, required for producing a state.

a. Completeness The division of classes deployed by the Stranger (288ff) may not be complete. For example, when identifying coins, seals and stamps in dividing possessions, the Stranger says all these artefacts could be located within a class, ornaments, on the ground that these things are "unimportant." But he can make this dialectical move only by ignoring the possibility that these entities are not in fact parts of one class, which is his assumption, but rather constitute a distinct class (or classes) in their own right. Furthermore, ascribing unimportance to a set of entities borders on inconsistency, since it introduces a value consideration into a methodological move when the Stranger had maintained, as a matter of principle, that value played no part in applying this method. The general recalcitrance of particulars to be ordered according to precise classification must be noted. Even so, specifying seven and only seven classes of possessions allows that some things may

be "forced" into these classes, suggesting from a strict methodological perspective that the classes have not been adequately divided. By contrast, the method in the *Philebus* promises that if properly applied, the number of Forms discernable will be both exact and exhaustive. But if the Stranger had not properly apprehended the Form of possessions because he has not yet seen the Forms as such, it should not surprise us that his division of that reality may suffer from incompleteness and inaccuracy.

b. The question of value When the same seven-fold division is completely enumerated, the Stranger says that one of the seven classes, the "manufacture of composite classes of things from kinds that are not composite" is the "primary and simple possession" (288e) and should "in justice" have been "placed first" (289b). But relocating the class of manufacturing composite classes from its original niche to a position at the head of the list implies that the specification of classes in division is not value-neutral, that is, that the classes are, or should be, ranked in value; as a result, the reality of classes encompasses ways in which each class displays value. Again, the Stranger's practice belies his theoretical statement of method where value as such was discounted. However, the fact that only after he traversed the entire set of constituent classes did he realize that one class was of primary importance suggests that running through and enumerating a given division was informative—indeed, he did not indicate that this division was characterized by value until he completed the process. Plato shows the Stranger—and us—the need to learn the relevance and importance of value as a component in the division, and resulting description and ordering, of types of possessions.

The larger question is whether value emerging in this division can be generalized to become an essential element in *any* division. Furthermore, specifying the source of value in division is vital, even if value is inherent to some but not all instances of division. Thus if some, perhaps all, the classes generated by an instance of division include value, then by what principle does division determine degrees of value? For if specifying value is indeed essential to division, then the seemingly mechanical aspect of dividing classes into sub-classes may require a certain vision and reality underlying that vision which the Stranger's account of dialectic has not attained.

Another dimension of value also emerges from this exercise in division. The Stranger's inclusion of slaves as a class of possessions fails to consider the difference between human and non-human possessions. Thus it might be contended that non-human or inanimate possessions are less in value than human possessions (that is, slaves); in fact, instances governed by this sense of value may differ so much that these two types of possessions are not coordinate with one another and therefore should not be included within the same division. But assume, as a Greek might, that possessions are possessions, regardless whether one set contains humans (that is, slaves) and the rest are inanimate. The question remains whether, in the class of possessions which are human, slaves, *as* possessions, have sufficient value to belong to the class of human beings fit for statecraft. This assumption, central to the Stranger's procedure here, directly affects the subsequent analysis of types of statecraft.

Statecraft and degrees of reality

At 291b, the Stranger points to "that which of all the sophists is the greatest charlatan and most practiced in charlatanry" and asserts that although it is dialectically difficult, this individual "must be separated from the band of really statesmanlike and kingly men, if we are to get a clear view of the object of our search." Then, at 293e, the Stranger claims that only one right type of government exists and that "all other types must be considered not as legitimate or really existent, but as imitating this" type, some doing so better than others. The identification and evaluation of all available types of government follows (302b–3b). At 303c, the Stranger concludes: "those who participate in all these governments—with the exception of the scientific one—are to be eliminated as ...the greatest of imitators and cheats, they are the greatest of all sophists," a position causing young Socrates' comment: "the term 'sophist' seems to have come round quite rightly to the so-called statesman" (303c). The division and description of forms of government assumes as axiomatic that the highest type of state is the seventh, which "must be set apart from all the others, as God is set apart from men" (303b). Earlier, the Stranger contended that all available forms of government "imitate" (301a) its one true Form; as a result, "the five names of what are now called the forms of government have become only one" (301b).

The Stranger contends that those who participate in all these governments are the "greatest" of all sophists. But if the sophist is an imitator and cheat, then the governments in which they participate represent the source of this concerted charlatanry. But these governments are, as the Stranger stipulates, oligarchy, monarchy and democracy. Therefore, if this evaluative assessment is correct, then an apparently paradoxical conclusion may be drawn. Either (a) even the best ruled instances of these three types of government are and remain sophistic and false—this by comparison with the one true type of government—since these three types of government are, according to the Stranger, inherently sophistic or (b) if these three types of government are the best that human beings can secure, then the definition of the sophist produced by the dialogue of the same name is at least overstated and perhaps patently false; after all, democracy would appear a viable and realistic option as a type of government, especially so if realizing in an earthly setting the one true Form of government is, as the Stranger maintains, available only to a deity. How did the Stranger box himself into this cramped political and methodological quarter?

The division of types of statecraft is premised on the inability to apprehend the Form of statecraft—or, to use the Stranger's language, the most real type of statecraft. The Stranger's divisions of types of government are then evaluated by determining which are "least" and "most" oppressive to live with. But determining degrees of oppressiveness in types of government are value judgments. Therefore, although the Stranger is dividing a single unity, these divisions encompass explicitly stated normative positions. But on what basis are such evaluations executed?

For the Stranger, each type of government divided from the "one" set of governments "imitates" the best—and unattainable—type of government. Therefore a difference in degree of livability produced by a given type of government reflects a difference in degree of reality, that is, a difference in the extent to which a given

type of government has more or less successfully imitated the one true type of government. If the evaluation is based on relative degrees of reality, then each type of government, as a type of reality, exhibits its own degree of value. Now to determine that any one degree of reality is "more" or "less" than any other degree of reality, it may be argued that a standard must exist according to which all such derivative types are situated and assessed; only an awareness of this standard justifies the Stranger's evaluation of the diminished reality and sophistic nature of all other types of government. But according to the Stranger, this standard exists—it is precisely the most real government, a type, claims the Stranger, available only to a god. According to the *Phaedrus*, all gods see all Forms (247b–c). Therefore, the Stranger, described as "divine" in the *Sophist*, has, like a god, detected such a reality without discerning any of its properties, either as such or in terms of constituent characteristics of statecraft exemplifying the highest degree of reality. The Stranger's veil of ignorance is befitting if this reality is a Form, since, as we have seen, the Forms display only a shadowy, incomplete existence in the metaphysical world of the *Statesman*.

The Stranger demonstrates that division is not value-neutral, at least not in this case—that if cuts made by division of types of statecraft must take into account the value of what is so divided, then by extension it should be possible to determine the value of any division made—assuming that the investigator approaches the nature to be divided with cognitive access of all relevant constitutive Forms as well as the Good. How does the *Philebus* articulation of Good pertain to this inference? If proportion extends not only to the relation of parts within a whole but also to the respective value of each part in relation to all other parts and to the whole, then division according to natural joints should determine (a) the value of each unity divided from a larger unity (for example, ranking types of statecraft in terms of degrees of oppressiveness) as well as (b) the internal value of each part divided from a whole (the *Statesman*'s example, barbarian divided as a part from the class of human beings). These implications are essential to value applied to method; the *Philebus* specifies principles funding such implications, the *Statesman* asserts conclusions based on value considerations but from a metaphysical backdrop where the requisite realities are, at best, dimly apprehended.

Statecraft: method, law and truth

At 309e, the Stranger asserts that only "the statesman and good law-giver" [ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην] can inspire certain individuals to possess true opinions about "the beautiful, the just and the good" and thereby populate a polity with appropriately educated citizens endowed with full expectations of happiness. However, at no point from here to the conclusion of the dialogue does the Stranger indicate how such a statesman formulates "good laws" so that those ruled enjoy their citizenship. The Stranger says only that such a statesman will interweave those of opposite character, all possessing true opinions, so that the result "unites unlike and divergent parts of virtue" (310a); statecraft will be a "kingly weaving" (310e) of opposites until "the most glorious and best of all textures" results (311c) thus ensuring a "happy state" for all its inhabitants, freeman or slave. The final formulation of statecraft emphasizes blending opposites to produce the best state, just as the demiurge and divine associates

had mythically generated the human condition by weaving together elements from opposite directions of cosmic motion. However, the student of the *Statesman* who wonders how rulers establish laws ordering this state and what principles ground these laws finds no help from the concluding texts of this dialogue.

The Stranger did assert earlier that laws underlying the evaluative summaries of possible states offered between 302b–3b are written by those "who know in so far as knowledge is possible" and that these laws "are imitations in each instance of some part of truth" [ἀληθείας—300c]. To the extent that statecraft depends on law, to that extent the *Statesman* advocates constitutionalism, as a number of commentators have observed.[16] But the connection between law and truth, which presumably is fundamental for law as the grounding element according to even this derivative sense of constitution, remains unanalyzed. Furthermore, the fact that this type of government is, by the Stranger's own admission, an imitation of the currently concealed truth about statecraft suggests that the asserted relation between truth and law must be reconsidered and, if possible, developed so that the procedures for proper lawmaking become apparent. Indeed, the Stranger's appeal to law itself becomes an aporetic component of the dialogue given that truth remains undefined and unspecified, and that the formulation of statecraft leading to the need for law results from a method and a degree of metaphysical awareness which have not ascended to a philosophical level appropriate to warrant taking the position reached on statecraft as canonic and sufficient.[17] This conclusion, if sound, suggests that concentrated inquiry must be directed at the activity of making laws suitable for begetting and ensuring a just and happy polity. Plato faced this challenge in his final dialogue.

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It is an index of the systematic care marking the structure of the *Statesman* that its aporetic character is equally balanced between the various descriptions of method employed and the results achieved through this method. The Stranger indicates deficiencies in method, but perhaps not as immediately obvious are commensurately deficient results produced by the application of this method. This chapter has outlined and discussed a series of pivotal instances underlining the aporetic material presented by the dialogue. Some concluding thoughts follow which offer, in summary fashion, a rationale for this finely harmonized exercise in indirect thinking.

Myth and the Good in the *Statesman*

The Stranger, an Eleatic philosopher described as "divine" at the beginning of the *Sophist* and the principal protagonist in the *Statesman*, is surely well versed in regions of realities defined by a sense of unity duly inflected with sameness and difference. In fact, Plato may use a Stranger as the personalized philosophical pivot in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* because it allows him to develop problematic positions inherent in earlier dialogues but to do so through adherence to metaphysical characteristics which an Eleatic thinker would find congenial and relevant to a Platonic context and which, at appropriate levels of abstraction, are also fundamental to strictly

Platonic concerns. Thus "father Parmenides" provides a firm theoretical foundation for an Eleatic representative to engage in reflection of the highest seriousness and difficulty.

The Stranger indicates this sensitivity to the metaphysical dimension in the initial stages of dialectical discussion. Then, at a critical juncture in the quest for a definition of statecraft, the Stranger interrupts this concern for abstraction by recounting a highly imaginative yet philosophically fragmented myth depicting the origin and destiny of the cosmos and the place of human nature within that cosmos. The dominant figure in this myth, a demiurge of sorts, sees the Good but, again, only in a partial sense or through a philosophical glass darkly—Forms are incompletely described, no connection is established between Forms and the Good, no mention is made of particulars' dependency on Forms (and, ultimately, on the Good). As a result, although the demiurge induces a kind of cosmic order from primordial chaos, the natures so generated, human and otherwise, reside along a spectrum of opposition with their constant oscillation providing dramatic testimony to the incomplete demiurgic vision of reality. Indeed, at a certain fixed point the demiurge must retreat from the cosmic drama and observe the gradual dissolution of natures, stepping in to preserve their fragmented unity only when the threat of their complete destruction becomes imminent.

The dialogue makes clear that the Stranger is the voice, the sole voice, of this myth. In a sense then, the demiurge in the myth is destined to have incomplete knowledge of Forms and the Good because the Stranger has incomplete knowledge of Forms and the Good, the fundamental reality within this complex metaphysical environment. The fact that the Stranger is the singular source of this myth becomes an even more prominent feature of its import. The Stranger possesses rudimentary vision of the Good, detecting the Good throughout the cosmos and identifying measure as a simulacrum of the formal character of the Good. But he does not connect this awareness to the need to analyze or evoke the nature of the Good as such. The Stranger displays a presentiment of the importance of the Good, especially in the myth; however, he lacks the requisite philosophical vision to see the Good as systematically animating everything in the cosmos.

This incompleteness is replicated by the Stranger's dialectical efforts in non-mythical contexts, just as he lacked metaphysical vision to appreciate the need for his mythic demiurge to behold the Good and to implement this awareness in the cosmic productions of divine art. If the Good encompasses Forms as well as anything fashioned by its informing presence, then this fundamental connection was also hidden from the Stranger. It should not then be surprising that although the Stranger discerns traces of the Good throughout the cosmos, he cannot discursively describe the structure of a Form, nor can he discriminate theoretically between classes and parts of Forms, nor can he decide whether to use division by dichotomy or by natural joints. It should also not occasion surprise that he relies on the methodological expediency of paradigms in order to get as close to the Forms as he can—an epistemic proximity expressible in terms of true opinion, not knowledge.

But the Stranger was not called "divine" without reason. In this regard, both the placement and scope of the myth are philosophically significant. After completing what appeared to be a reliable account of the nature of statecraft, the Stranger

hesitates because he has discerned a flaw in the dialectical reasoning. This flaw is remedied—but not by additional reasoning. It is remedied by a myth of cosmic content and extended length, punctuated by commentary and discussion. The Stranger's philosophical instincts informed him that the only way to proceed in the present matter is shifting from discursive analysis to "telling tales," a type of account demanding different responses from its audience than would controlled dialectic. Furthermore, the Stranger also divines that this tale must display a certain content—hence the myth's concern to articulate the origin and structure of the cosmos. All things considered, the Stranger's philosophical vision is limited by foreshortened awareness of the Good. Yet he is sufficiently aware of the Good to realize that the most appropriate investigative venue for seeing the comprehensive structure of reality is cosmic in dimension.

The myth in the *Statesman* provides the impetus for re-examining the Good as an essential component in a fully comprehensive metaphysics. The myth refers to Forms, but incompletely and without a perspicuous sense of their complexity and importance; it introduces a new appreciation for the reality of particulars but fails to integrate particulars with Forms except indirectly, through a subsequently stated connection embodying two types of measure. The myth does explicitly connect mind, in the guise of a demiurge, and production of particulars, and does so in a context of cosmic totality defined throughout in terms of beauty and goodness. But it remains true, dramatically and starkly so, that lack of comprehension of the Good underlies the myth's cosmic context and accounts for its systematic incompleteness—in sum, the need to see the Good inspires the Stranger to introduce a myth of this intricately fragmented sort at this juncture in dialectical inquiry.

The articulated Good established by the dense analysis and argumentation of the *Philebus* provides a setting for discerning the range of aporetic elements animating the complex dramatic and philosophical design of the *Statesman.* The connections established in this chapter have displayed this consonance of themes in the two neighboring dialogues. Furthermore, the extent to which the array of positions taken in the *Philebus* resolves so many of the aporiae structuring the *Statesman* not only reinforces that the *Statesman* is essentially an aporetic dialogue, it also suggests why the *Statesman* was so organized. The aporetic dimension in metaphysics and method in the *Statesman* provides a framework for reflection on the function and nature of the Good and also how the Good is present to all dimensions of reality—to Forms in relation to the Good and to particulars in relation to Forms. In this respect, the rationale for the *Statesman*'s convoluted structure is derived from within the *Statesman* itself—when young Socrates asserts that all arts must be continually studied or else they will atrophy, rendering human life even more difficult than it already is. As a result, the art of philosophizing practiced in the *Statesman* engendered the need to reorient the Good so that its presence was recognized throughout the cosmos—not merely, following the *Republic*, as foundational reality for the existence and intelligibility of Forms.

Every element sketched in the extended review of the *Statesman* developed in this chapter falls under the scope of the Good as one reality which can be approached, according to the Socrates of the *Philebus*, as a union of three distinct but integrally and essentially related realities. When viewed from this interpretive perspective,

the *Statesman* becomes an inquiry concerned to evoke aporetic conditions and conclusions allowing the fundamental importance of the Good to become evident once these conditions and conclusions are appropriately thought through. This consequence suggests that the *Statesman*, in conjunction with its predecessor, the *Sophist*, serves as a transitional dialogue, a discussion of an especially fundamental subject—the nature of statecraft—but structured to direct the student of philosophy toward avenues of further inquiry rather than to stand as an independent statement of finalized thought. The *Statesman* is a work of discovery in the additional sense that Plato is exploring material reality from a truncated perspective on what is truly real—formal reality. In this respect, the protracted colloquy between Stranger and young Socrates continues the quest to see the Forms but by concentrated reflection on the presence of Forms within the visible world around them, a world defined by individual things dwelling in particularized circumstances.

From this perspective, the *Statesman* becomes a strikingly fertile dialogue, a convergence of reflection on fundamental aspects of metaphysics and methodology, marking a new direction in thinking about the Good, Forms, and participation of particulars in Forms. This quest originated in the *Parmenides* with the splendidly detailed architecture of paradox revolving around the meaning of unity, worked its way through the *Theaetetus* and the implicitly demonstrated need to have the Forms in view and properly grounded in order to secure knowledge, then emerged in the indirect quest for value initiated in the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* and *Statesman* both formulate positions evoking the need to establish dialectical inquiry concerning a fundamental metaphysical postulate. Indeed, this study emphasized consistently throughout its argument that the Stranger's lack of full awareness of the Good affected his subsequent claims about reality at the level of Forms and, by implication, of methodology as providing a discursive account of reality through apprehending the Forms.

Concerted references to "good and beautiful" appear in the *Statesman* but no explicit mention is made of the Good, the *to agathon* of the *Republic*. The emphasis on goodness and beauty predicated of all things in the mythic cosmos of the *Statesman* comes to fruition in the *Philebus*' concern to identify particularity within the circumambience of the Good. Thus the Good formulated in the *Philebus* includes, and includes necessarily, particular things since truth as one of the three components of the Good expressly encompasses the Forms in relation to particular things. In sum, again, the structure of the Good in the *Philebus* follows directly from the aporiae of the *Statesman*.

The *Statesman* blends imaginative insight in the construction of the myth with a consistently finely-tuned aporetic approach to the question of method and the inherent intimacy between abstract method and concrete metaphysics, insight serving as an anticipatory beacon shining toward the positions developed in the few dialogues which remained to be written. Plato teaches readers of the *Statesman* by fashioning a literary and philosophical universe which, through its intriguingly baroque and, at times, almost quixotic charm, compels them to pay close attention to dramatic detail throughout the dialogue and to blend that attention with a serious and sustained interest in pursuing the classic issues of philosophy—What is reality?

How is reality known? How should our life be led? What form of government best serves our collective concern for happiness?

An examination of the *Statesman* as argued in this study renders these questions all the more urgent. Furthermore, the *Statesman* helps us realize where to look and what to think about in order to answer these questions. In this regard, the narrative, dramatic and philosophical importance of myth cannot be overemphasized. The myth in the *Statesman* parallels in import the myths of the great middle period dialogues in providing philosophical substance to questions of the highest generality and greatest significance to human affairs. But the narrative expansiveness of myth remains in service to what can be known and analyzed discursively, through dialectical method directed at a range of realities existing according to canonic specifications. Plato remains a rationalist to the end. But the later dialogues exhibit a heightened respect for the reality of particulars, entities described in the *Republic* as a species inflected with non-being. For the later Plato, particulars inhabiting the visible world assumed a level of importance competitive with Forms for demanding the philosopher's thoughtful attention—albeit in presenting this approach, a philosopher who throughout protracted and exquisitely complex inquiry, never receives the minimal courtesy of a proper name. The starkly paradoxical myth and provisional metaphysics informing one another throughout the narrative limits of the *Statesman* animate a unique philosophical drama, distinctive in the scope of its questions and range of potential answers poised for further development.

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Epilogue

Statecraft, Metaphysics and the *Laws*

This Epilogue illustrates various ways in which the position on statecraft in the *Laws* either modifies or refines related positions developed in the *Statesman*. If, as argued above, the final account of statecraft in the *Statesman* derives directly from the metaphysics and methodology advanced in that dialogue, then this account is no less provisional than the methodology and metaphysics employed as prerequisites to achieve it. However, the *Laws* embraces and develops a number of approaches toward statecraft initiated in the *Statesman*.[1] The differences between the accounts of statecraft in *Statesman* and *Laws* remain such that comparing these accounts will, despite these developments, reinforce the interpretation of the *Statesman* argued here—the dialogue is an aporetic exercise with respect to method and metaphysics, with commensurate implications for the substantive position reached on the nature of statecraft. As a result, its positions require sustained scrutiny illustrated by lines of argument pursued in the *Philebus* in order to establish a more complete theoretical foundation for determining statecraft, law, and ancillary philosophical concerns—a foundation which, as we shall see, animates the variegated complexity of the *Laws*.

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In "The Rule of Philosophy," the final chapter in *Plato's Cretan City*, Glenn Morrow observed that few readers

> have failed to recognize in the Nocturnal Councillors of the *Laws* the philosopher-kings of the *Republic*. The programs of higher education in the two works are strikingly similar in content and purpose. As in the *Republic* the goal of these higher studies is unified insight based on knowledge of the Good, so in the *Laws* their purpose is synthesis....[2]

I believe that Morrow's general point is true but, strictly speaking, the dependency of the Nocturnal Councillors' studies on "the Good" is an interpretation, since the discussion of the Nocturnal Council in *Laws* XII never identifies "the Good" in the unique metaphysical sense it enjoys in the *Republic.*

The Good is, however, alluded to in conjunction with beauty—as in the *Statesman*. In fact, the Good is indeed present in the *Laws* and its presence is indicated in the description of the Nocturnal Council, as Morrow correctly saw—but it is a Good remaining partially in shadows, as did the penumbra of the Good appearing in the *Statesman* myth and the more articulated although threshold Good Socrates beheld in the *Philebus*. Thus to demonstrate an elliptic Good in the *Laws* establishes a consonance of structure with the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*, since these dialogues also depend, each in its own way, on their participants working with a diminished sense of the Good.

The *Laws* is a vast panorama combining grand philosophical vistas and minutely detailed legislative proposals; this Epilogue indicates the approximated Good developed in the *Philebus* as it appears throughout the *Laws*, a presence at times pronounced and other times muted. This account is nonetheless sufficiently expansive to show that the *Laws*, taken in conjunction with the *Philebus* and then reviewed from a standpoint of high generality, connects structurally with trains of thought pursued in the *Statesman*, thereby reinforcing that the *Statesman* is aporetic rather than substantive. Although the *Laws* does not concentrate on either method or metaphysics, what it asserts in these areas of fundamental philosophical concern provides additional evidence that the methods and metaphysical positions in the *Statesman*, both explicit and implied, are predominantly provisional.

The Nocturnal Council: Method and the Good

In Book XII, the Athenian pronounces that the code of laws he and his colleagues have so painstakingly laid out during their lengthy conversation "is substantially completed." However, he insists that "the end of an enterprise is never reached by the mere performance of the act....; we must never take ourselves to have done all there was to do until we have provided a complete and permanent guarantee for the preservation of our work. Until then we should regard our whole achievement as unfinished" (960b–c). The requisite labor guaranteeing and preserving the codification of law is accomplished by the "Nocturnal Council." The organization of this Council as well as the preparation and course of studies it must follow to do its work illustrate the pivotal importance of metaphysical considerations, in particular the application of a distinctive type of dialectic applied in conjunction with beauty and the good, realities serving as necessary objects of the Council's investigative and jurisprudential endeavors.

The Council's function is, in fact, essential for the success and continued existence of the state. Thus, "if the censors who are to approve our magistrates are better men than themselves, and do their work with flawless and irreproachable justice, then there will be prosperity and true happiness for the whole of nation and society, but if aught is amiss...the state will no longer be one but many" (945d–e). The Athenian phrases this threat of dissolution in a way recalling the classic problem of the one and the many, a metaphysical difficulty raised in the *Phaedo* and also, importantly for present purposes, in the *Philebus.* The Athenian posits that the unity of the state will be preserved only if the Council does its work; without appropriate review and, if necessary, revision by the Council, the laws of the state are threatened with dissolution, with correlatively detrimental affects on the well-being and happiness of citizens dwelling under the jurisdiction of these laws.[3] The Nocturnal Council is so named because it meets just before dawn, the rising of the sun. The reason for such an unusual meeting time, especially given the serious nature of the Council's business, is that this is "the time, above all others when a man is always freest from all other business, private or public" (961b–c). This reason, as stated, is justified by pragmatic immediacy; however, details provided by the Athenian concerning the organization of the council suggest more significance to this logistical stipulation

than merely getting a head start on the day's administrative labors prior to council members pursuing other occupations. In fact, the pattern of imagery employed in describing the circumstances surrounding the organization and pedigree of the Nocturnal Council has long-range significance for interpreting the *Statesman*.

As a preamble to determining the Nocturnal Council's significance in this regard, consider that in Book X, the Athenian, discussing how to discern soul's function in guiding the cosmos, asserts that in attempting to give the answer, "...let us beware of creating a darkness at noonday for ourselves by gazing, so to say, direct at the sun... as though we could hope to attain adequate vision and perception of wisdom with moral eyes. It will be the safer course to turn our gaze on an image of the object of our quest" (897d–e). For the Athenian, staring directly at the sun is equivalent to staring directly at the source of "adequate vision and perception of wisdom" but to do so with "mortal eyes," thereby causing the distinctive blindness which results from overwhelming vision with excess light. A being endowed with intellectual access more congenial to the demands of wisdom, if such a being existed, could perhaps absorb the sun full force, thereby becoming capable of instilling wisdom into the cognition of whoever required its possession. However, the Athenian, and by extension anyone accompanying him, is not so equipped, implying that their control of wisdom is necessarily derivative—although the Athenian claims to dwell in the presence of an "image" of that reality. For present purposes, the key point is the more abstract metaphysical consideration, the alignment of the sun with wisdom, in particular wisdom requisite to decide soul's function pertaining to the motion of the cosmos, and the suggested relation between a unique foundational reality and an image of that reality accessible to human cognition.

The same phenomenon, blindness caused by excess light, is described in *Republic* VII 518a–b, where this cause contrasts with blindness produced by the transition from light into darkness. In the *Republic*, the sun symbolizes the Good. Earlier in Book VII (508e), Socrates asserted that the reality "that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of Good [τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν], and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known." The idea of Good stands as the ultimate foundation for the metaphysics and epistemology advanced here and throughout the dialogue; "the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power" (509b). The objects of knowledge are Forms, and Socrates expressly grounds the existence and knowability of Forms on the idea of the Good.

The thematic connection between sun and Good is identified at the conclusion of the Allegory of the Cave, with the "light of the fire" in the cave linked to "the power of the sun." Socrates' allegorical "dream" is that

> the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of Good, and that when seen it must point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this (517b).

Finally, as we enter the arena of knowledge, the organs by which we know "must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul...until soul can endure the contemplation of essence [τὸ ὄν] and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the Good...." (518c).

The allegorical correlation between sun and truth in tandem with wisdom bestowed by the Good is a paramount metaphysical component of the *Republic*. But precisely the same correlation between wisdom and the sun is established in Laws X. The question becomes whether a counterpart Good—qualified in the *Philebus* by soul's ability to discern degrees of reality in particulars—functions in an equivalently fundamental way in the *Laws*. The answer is yes, with the most immediate evidence of this Good emerging from the description of and justification for the Nocturnal Council. Consider the procedures involved in establishing the Nocturnal Council detailed in *Laws* XII.[4] Selecting the Council begins as follows: "the whole body of citizens shall annually, after the day of the summer solstice, assemble in a precinct jointly dedicate to the sun and to Apollo, where each citizen is to pick the best three men (excluding himself)" (945e–946a). The members of the Council are chosen annually by all citizens, each selecting three individuals who are "best." This phase of the process is quintessentially democratic since "best" is determined by judgment of each citizen. Note also that this assembly transpires at a designated time—the day after summer solstice, the day of the year with the greatest amount of sunlight. The fact that the Athenian specifies that the assembly occurs *the day after* the solstice suggests that citizens will meet when the sun has begun its cosmic descent, when the amount of sunlight available is slightly less than optimum.

In the first year, three auditors are chosen, presenting "its three most worthy citizens to the sun" and dedicating them, "in accord with its ancient usage, as a choice offering of first fruits, to Apollo and the sun in common for so long as they shall give themselves to their work as judges" (946b–c). Why, as in the initial step, does the Athenian mention Apollo and the sun? The Athenian adds that "for their term of office they shall have their residence in the same precinct of Apollo and the sun in which their election was held" (946c). Again, the insistence on residence in the locale where they were elected as well as the reference to Apollo and the sun evokes a question concerning the point of this specification. In addition, individuals elected to the Council are worthy of the community's "supreme distinction"—only they are "permitted to decorate themselves with the laurel wreath" (947a). Finally, they shall "all hold priesthoods of Apollo and the sun..." and will be honored with elaborate burial rituals after they are deceased. This is the third reference to "Apollo and the sun." The Athenian concludes (950d) that due to the Council's efforts, "ours will be one of the few well-governed states and countries that enjoy the beams of the sun and his fellow gods." The pattern of imagery connecting the Nocturnal Council to the sun and Apollo is undeniable; but is this mere imagistic adornment or does it contribute to understanding the *Laws*?

I propose the following interpretive principle: the fact that this pattern is *concerted* suggests that the *Laws* be read as if the Good is present—but defined derivatively or in a secondary way—in shadows, as it were. If so, then the Good does not animate the *Laws* the way it grounds the method and metaphysics of the *Republic.* Nevertheless, the sun imagery, especially its placement in describing the

Nocturnal Council, alerts us to the connection between the Council's work and the animating presence of the Good—in some sense of Good. It would be anomalous for the Good as metaphysically axiomatic to be entirely absent from the argument of the *Laws*, given (a) the essential function of the Good in the *Republic* and (b) the equally essential, if somewhat muted, function of the Good in the *Philebus*. As shown in Chapter 6, the Good of the latter dialogue is a foreshortened but more articulated expression of the Good developed in the former dialogue, but the fact that the Good performs dual functions in both dialogues suggests that it will actively animate the *Laws*, Plato's final and extended statement on philosophical requirements for governing a state and maximizing wisdom embodied in laws essential for such governance.

The Athenian thrice asserts that the council is dedicated to "Apollo and the sun." This identification of Apollo, the god associated with the sun, connects the divine with the source of light and heat for the cosmos. Furthermore, this allegiance guides all members of the Council for as long as they serve in this capacity. Finally, the members of the Council are required to reside in the same area where their election occurred, attesting to the continued importance of the sun and, by mythic extension, to ongoing Apollonian supervision for whatever reflection and resolutions the members of the Council may deem worthy. The point of this imagery is, as suggested, to link the Nocturnal Council and the sun—the Good as depicted through imagery of the sun and its light in the *Republic*.

The Nocturnal Council is symbolically juxtaposed to the Good spatially and temporally—temporally, because the Council exercises itself before dawn, when sun begets day. The suggestion is that their deliberations and decisions transpire in pre-dawn darkness, gradually dissolving into day, that is, without guidance of direct sunlight and, symbolically, without wisdom such light provides. The image is starkly dramatic—a determinate number of select individuals entrusted with the pivotal task of reviewing and revising laws, doing so literally in slowly diminishing darkness, at least from illumination provided by the cosmic source of physical light. But the Nocturnal Council is also spatially juxtaposed to the Good because selecting its members occurs in a place dedicated to the sun, and to Apollo as divine emissary of the sun's light. Establishing the Council is thus directly governed by solar considerations; only individuals guided by the sun's divine aegis—and wisdom vouchsafed by what the sun represents—will assume membership in the body guaranteeing continued well-being of the state. However, the fact that the Nocturnal Council works "in the dark," as its name denotes, suggests that the Good is hidden, just as the sun as symbolic equivalent of the Good remains shining in the cosmos during their deliberations but not making this presence immediately experienced by those naturally and by training sensitive to its light.

Law and the Threshold of the Good

The *Law*'s symbolic apposition of the sun with wisdom, and with the Good as ultimate source of wisdom, should be compared with the approach to the Good taken in the *Philebus*. In that dialogue, Socrates also advances an approximation of the Good, that

is, components of truth, beauty, proportion. Since the Athenian and Clinias specify that members of the Council must have working knowledge of, among other realities, beauty (καλοῦ) and the good (ἀγαθοῦ—966a), it may be contended that the Good detailed through dialectical means in the *Philebus* is replicated in the *Laws* in terms of the concerted imagery of the sun as cosmic ground for the establishment and practice of the Nocturnal Council. This is a Good which, again, remains in shadows, just as the Good in the *Philebus* only approximates the Good vividly evoked in the powerful light imagery of *Republic* VII. However, once the *Laws* as a whole is examined from the standpoint of the Good's triune approximation in the *Philebus*, that approach to the Good becomes relevant for both the method and content of the *Laws*. The Epilogue demonstrates the ongoing presence of the Good throughout Plato's final dialogue and also, since the Good was not of thematic concern in the *Statesman*, reinforces the conclusion that positions advanced in that dialogue are provisional, especially with respect to fundamental metaphysical considerations.

The most explicit dimension of metaphysics and method developed in the *Laws* concerns the Nocturnal Council. Although, as will become evident, the theory of statecraft in the *Laws* derives in part from the *Statesman*, the function of the Nocturnal Council reveals both the implied presence of the Good developed in the *Philebus* as well as the importance of an articulated method and metaphysics.[5] However, the Athenian's concern for this dimension—especially in terms of the Good—informs his inquiry throughout the dialogue. The following review and analysis of the *Laws* is divided according to the three characteristics of the Good apprehended in the *Philebus*—an intersection of proportion, beauty and truth. This sequence is so ordered to indicate various senses in which the Good animates the argument of the *Laws*, as well as to clarify how this adaptation of the Good contributes to interpreting the *Statesman* as a primarily aporetic document.[6]

Proportion

Psychology and truth

In Book I, the Athenian asserts as a principle that "pain and pleasure are, as it were, nature's twin fountainheads; whoso draws from the right fount, at due times, and in due measure, be it city, or person, or any living creature, is happy [εὐδαιμονεῖ], but he that draws without knowledge [ἀνεπιστημόνως], and not at the right moment, has the completely contrary lot" (636e). The importance of examining the nature of pleasure in the *Philebus* becomes obvious here, as does appealing to the need for knowledge to determine the propitious moment for seeking pleasure. Notice the universality of the claim—any living creature, any individual human being, indeed an entire city can be happy if they know how to negotiate properly between the inherent opposition of pain and pleasure and to reconcile this opposition in terms of proper proportion. Juxtaposing this pair of opposites becomes crucial later in Book I, when the Athenian demonstrates that a thoughtful analysis of drinking reveals how to test for two primary qualities of soul worth cultivating, supreme confidence and its contrary, supreme fearfulness (649c).

The primordial opposition between pain and pleasure is, from a psychological perspective, neatly summarized in Book II. The Athenian contends that the greatest folly for a human being is

> that of a man who hates, not loves, what his judgment pronounces to be noble or good, while he loves and enjoys what he judges vile and wicked. It is this dissonance between pleasure and pain and reasoned judgment that I call the worst folly, and also the greatest, since its seat is the commonalty of the soul, for pain and pleasure are in the soul what the populace or commonalty is in a community (689a).

The epitome of folly results from confused judgment concerning what we should desire as good and revile as wicked. The soul is the seat of this primordial dysfunctionality; were such a dire condition to obtain, its only realistic result is a soul, and a person, fundamentally at odds with self, and therefore, from a Platonic standpoint, gripped in the throes of extreme unhappiness. The need for right correlation and proportion between knowledge and desire within the interplay of these opposites is therefore especially crucial.

The Athenian takes advantage of the kinds of opposition which permeate the reasoning in the *Statesman* to direct inquiry toward a more fundamental approach to happiness and the conditions for producing happiness. Thus to illustrate the need to satisfy both ends of the pleasure/pain continuum, the Athenian contends (Book V) that "a life which contains numerous, extensive, and intense feelings of both kinds [that is, pleasure and pain] is desired, if there is an excess of pleasures, not desired if the excess is on the other side" (733c). Life without any pain whatsoever is, for the Athenian, not the best life; however, life with more pain than pleasure is also not desired. The optimum life contains, as indicated, more pleasures than pains. But experiencing pain is nonetheless essential to life. This seemingly counter-intuitive consequence holds on condition that each end of the pleasure/pain continuum is as essential as its opposite. If so, then the structural opposition characterizing this continuum must be appreciated and appropriately experienced by human agents.

Emergent here is the predominance of opposition grounding the Stranger's thinking in the *Statesman*. The difference between growing older and growing younger, a key element in the mythic treatment of the cosmos, underlines the need to resolve this difference by striking a mean between extremes—as the demiurge does to the cosmos toward the end of the myth, and as the Stranger replicates in designing statecraft at the conclusion of the dialogue. In addition, a parallel sense of proportion governs all hedonistic components in the specification of the best life in the *Philebus*.

Although both ends of the continuum must be recognized and experienced, the best course of action advanced in the *Laws* continues to be striking the middle course. Thus

> if we disregard due proportion [μέτριον] by giving anything what is too much for it, too much canvas to a boat, too much nutriment to a body, too much authority to a soul, the consequence is always shipwreck.... No soul of man, while young or accountable to no control, will ever be able to bear the burden of supreme social authority without taking the taint of the worst spiritual disease, folly and so becoming estranged from its

> dearest intimates. When this happens, that soul very soon suffers ruin and the loss of all its powers. Hence it calls for a great legislator to forestall this danger by insight into due proportion [μέτριον] (691c-d).

Both in individual endeavors as well as pursuing the affairs of state, folly emerges and soul suffers the loss of its powers whenever either extreme of everything which admits of such opposition becomes dominant. Hence the legislator providing laws for the state must have insight [γνόντας] into "due proportion." Although the Athenian does not develop this necessity, lawmaking must function by awareness of, if not knowledge of, whatever constitutes appropriate measure between extremes, just as on a psychological level it is necessary to choose the "right moment" [ἐκτὸς τῶν καιρῶν] to pursue a certain degree of pleasure. The Athenian thus adopts and develops the position on statecraft and measure maintained at the conclusion of the *Statesman*.

Earlier, in Book II, the Athenian also asserted the necessity for insight into proportion: "equal is never equal, nor symmetrical symmetrical [σύμμετρον], because someone believes it to be so, or because someone feels no pleasure; no, we should judge by the standard of truth [τῷ ἀληθεῖ], never, on any account, by any other" (668a). What holds for symmetry holds for proportion—symmetry does not depend on observation or hedonic response of an observer; symmetry and proportion are constituted by truth. Furthermore, the connection between proportion and truth is balanced by a connection between proportion and deity: the Athenian contends that

> the right road in life is neither pursuit of pleasure nor yet unqualified avoidance of pain, but that contentment with the intermediate condition [μέσον] to which I have just given the name of graciousness—a state which we all...plausibly assign to God himself. It is this habit of mind, I maintain, which must likewise be pursued by the man who would be like God....(792d).

The Athenian emphasizes that the present topic is an instance of "unwritten law," suggesting that its importance is inversely proportional to the fact that it cannot be codified in the registry of written laws. The individual agent must *intuit* that the intermediate condition between pleasure and pain is best and also, given such knowledge, become conversant in ways and methods for implementing this knowledge. The intimacy between this way of life and deity supports the premise that this position cannot be made into law since it requires an insight into, as it were, the living presence of divine character. Adopting this principle also presupposes that the nature of deity is governed by measure in the same or similar way as those mortal agents who would be godlike in this life by thoughtfully emulating the existence of deity.

The concern for opposition both in internal human experience and the external sources of that experience, in conjunction with measure or the mean as the optimum condition for dealing with these experiences, demonstrates that the *Laws* has, from the outset of its argument, been structured on opposition as an especially fundamental given. Unlike the *Statesman*, however, in which the metaphysics of opposition dominates (and in fact is not superceded by realities of any other type), the *Laws* only *inaugurates* its analysis of metaphysical matters with opposition and measure—then

shows connections between opposition as a point of departure and realities which, properly approached, give justified direction to the correct realization of the mean.

Opposition and the ends of law

The Athenian has argued that the middle way between extremes is the key to happiness, indeed to a way of life godlike in completeness and fulfillment. But the appeal to measure or symmetry between extremes also helps determine realities underlying the production of law. In Book III, the Athenian proclaims that

> there are two matrices, as we may call them, of constitutions from which all others may truly be said to be derived; the proper name of the one is monarchy, of the other democracy. The first is seen in its perfection among the Persians, the second among my own countrymen. These are the strands, as I have said, of which all other constitutions, generally speaking, are woven (693d).

The Athenian asserts this principle because "it is indispensably necessary that there should be both ingredients where there is to be the combination of liberty and amity with wisdom. This is what our argument meant to enjoin when it urges that no community which has not those characters can be rightly administered" (693e). At the end of Book III, Clinias says that the previous discussion, in which the Athenian demonstrated that the best form of government is a measured unity of opposed forms of government, will serve as a preliminary position from which to found the laws of Crete and, by extension, to establish a suitable philosophical foundation for any state.

The Athenian's image of "weaving" [διαπεποικιλμέναι] the strands of monarchy and democracy recalls the *Statesman*'s cardinal usage of that process. What is the difference between weaving practiced by the statesman and the treatment of opposite types of government in the *Laws*?

In essence, what is substantive in the *Statesman* becomes procedural in the *Laws*. In the *Statesman*, weaving opposed types of character constitutes the form of government (311c). But the Athenian is not content with such an abstract and incomplete process. Indeed, he develops *what is produced* from weaving together the two opposed types of government as follows:

> ...I said a legislator should have three aims in his enactments—the society for which he makes them must have freedom [ἐλευθέρα], must have amity with itself [φίλη ἑαυτῇ], must have understanding [νοῦν]. ... This was why we took the examples of the most autocratic of communities and the freest, and are now asking ourselves in which of the two public life is what it should be. We found that when we had a certain due proportionality [μετριότητά] in either case, in the one of authority, in the other of liberty, there was a maximum of well-being in both societies, whereas when things were pushed to an extreme in either case, an extreme of subjection in the one, and of its opposite in the other, the consequences were unsatisfactory in both societies alike (701d-e).

The enactment of laws in a state must establish, preserve and enhance the "freedom" of individual citizens, encourage amity or "friendship within itself," and be based on, as well as foster, "understanding." These values were produced by analyzing

the juxtaposition or weaving of opposed types of government, then noting elements emerging from their proportionate intersection which should be duly integrated into laws. Thus filtering opposite types of government through the correct measure of proportionality functions only heuristically for the argument of the *Laws*; substantive results of this juxtaposition are explicitly identified as values the implementation of which should guide legislators. Whereas the Stranger straightforwardly places two opposed types of reality adjacent to one another and lets their mere juxtaposition somehow do the work of resolving the resulting differences, the Athenian identifies what is produced by this juxtaposition and then, with these realities clearly in view, maintains that it is essential to develop a set of laws acknowledging and embodying these realities as fully as laws permit. Weaving opposites does not just continually blend opposed qualities, as in the *Statesman*; rather, the measure of opposed governments generates a trio of realities whose actualization becomes the focus of *all* legislative effort. In theory then, each law promulgated in the dialogue should reflect, in one way or another, these three values. This plethora of legislative proposals will directly instance values fundamental for a well-run polity as determined by the intersection of the Athenian's opposed types of government. Implications from this intersection thus become a necessary precursor of inquiry into the rationales for any given law.

Consider, for example, the following application of the mean and the need to combine opposites in service to freedom. The Athenian asserts, again as a matter of principle (773b–c), that "balance and due proportion are out of all comparison more excellent than an unqualified extreme." He then immediately concludes:

> ...he who knows himself overhot of temper and overhasty to act in all he does should connect himself by preference with a quiet family, while he of the contrary bent should look for connections of the contrary kind. ... A man should 'court the tie' that is for the city's good, not that which most takes his own fancy.

This policy should not be mandated by law, a legislative possibility which, the Athenian asserts, would be "ridiculous." Thus recognizing the need when marrying to counterbalance one's personal excesses with a spouse of contrary nature should be up to the individual citizen. If so, then each citizen, especially those whose character lies at one end of any type of emotional opposition, must have sufficient self-awareness and awareness of other citizens in the state. This awareness inspires individuals to act of their own accord for their own well-being, since their excesses will be proportionately modified by such personal unions; also, these unions will produce, each in its own way, unity and concord in the state as a whole.

At the conclusion of the *Statesman*, the Stranger says that the ruler is responsible for weaving together opposite types of personality "by common beliefs and honours and dishonours and opinions and interchanges of pledges" (310e). Although the ruler does not mandate such juxtapositions by law, the ruler is responsible for inducing these unions by the techniques and blandishments listed. But the *Laws* puts the burden for such choices squarely on citizens; even to think of requiring them to make these choices by law would be, as noted, "ridiculous" (773c). This shift is significant, reflecting the fact that in the *Laws*, citizens are treated as unique

individuals with sufficient powers of self-knowledge rather than, as in the *Statesman*, herd-like subjects of a dominating ruler.

What in the *Statesman* was constitutive for statecraft in terms of proportion becomes in the *Laws* merely heuristic, reinforcing that the former dialogue asserts as final and definitive what in the latter dialogue is only introductory and provisional. The reason for this substantial difference rests, as we shall see, on the fact that the *Laws* contains a developed metaphysics and method revolving around an enhanced appreciation for the Good while the *Statesman* lacks both components precisely because investigating the Good, even if only as an approximation of its reality, is never attempted except for the vestigial articulation of the good and the beautiful animating the cosmic myth.

Beauty

Juxtaposing opposed constitutions has produced a triumvirate of values—freedom, friendship, understanding—the realization of which, according to the Athenian, must control the state's legislative efforts. These values are generated from applying proportion or measure (weaving two opposed types of government)—the first of the three elements of the Good specified in the *Philebus*. In the *Laws*, two of these values—freedom and friendship—are integral to the Athenian's development of beauty, the second of the three marks of the Good specified in the *Philebus*. Thus the connections between beauty and both freedom and friendship will be examined in this section. The third value emphasized in the *Laws*, understanding, animates and is directly relevant to truth, the third mark of the *Philebus* conception of the Good; its function is analyzed below. By implication then, the connections between and among freedom, friendship and understanding further exhibit the Good in the *Laws*—a presence both tacit and explicit—as the Good is articulated in the *Philebus*. Seen from this perspective, the Good also positions statecraft as developed in the *Laws* in ways (discussed below) reinforcing the *Statesman* as a work of aporetic exploration rather than doctrinal substance.

Physical appearance

Beauty, *kalos*, functions in several ways within the complex world of the *Laws.* The most immediate sense is beauty in its customary context of physical attractiveness, although even here the perceptual aspect of beauty is indelibly fused with moral perspective. In Book IX, for example, the Athenian says that

> when we think of right in general, or of upright men, right deeds, right conduct, we are universally agreed in a way that they are one and all comely [καλά]. Thus, however strongly a man should insist on the point that even upright [δικαίους] men who may be physically ugly are perfectly comely [παγκάλους], in respect of their eminent uprightness of character, his language would never be thought out of place (859d).

In other words, a physically unattractive person acting in a morally upright manner displays "beauty" through the nobility proper to moral virtue. In this sense, *kalos* is

not skin deep. Acting morally is always attractive, regardless whether the agent shines as an Adonis or evinces the initially repugnant Silenian features of a Socrates. The Athenian does not address the converse possibility, whether a physically attractive person who fails to act uprightly loses the external, perceived sheen of beauty. Presumably not, although the beauty remaining rests only on the surface—in this context, *kalos is* only skin deep! In this passage, *kalos* displays a double connotation of physical attractiveness as well as the inherently appealing nobility of moral virtue, with such virtuous conduct possessing its own ambience, a characteristic with significant philosophical and moral overtones.

Kalos as physical beauty is also tempered by concern for mediation between extremes (the crucial importance of which has been demonstrated in the examples analyzed in the preceding section on proportion). Thus

> the body to be honored is not the comely [καλὸν], nor the strong, nor swift, no, nor the healthy, though so many might be of that mind—nor yet that of the contrary sort. The body which displays all these qualities in intermediate degree [ἐν τῷ μέσῳ] is by far the most sober, and soundest as well, for the one sort make men's souls vain and overbearing, the other tame and abject (728d).

Good looks, for the Greeks and for us, have always been deemed desirable in themselves; the Athenian expresses the reservation that those so endowed are prone to suffer from a vain and overbearing soul. At the opposite end of the spectrum, those burdened with an ungainly appearance tend to become tame and abject, meekly following the lead of others simply because they lack confidence to face the world given that the world typically shuns them because of their unattractive looks. The healthiest condition here, again, is possessing physical attractiveness in the intermediate degree, as with all other attributes of the same type.[7] Seeking the mean, or displaying a physical appearance falling into the mean, instances the *Law*'s concern for measure in the context of beauty, a concern which governs the attitudes all right-thinking people should have about the importance of physical attractiveness in relation to morally correct human conduct.

However, beauty as nobility displays a much more penetrating and significant reality in the *Laws* than as a place marker for the most desirable measure of physically attractive appearance.

The noble and the divine

According to the threshold Good developed in the *Philebus*, beauty provides harmony by combining different elements of a thing's nature into a unified structure. This harmony can occupy either a physical or a moral dimension, or, as in *Laws* V, both dimensions interacting with one another. Consider then this additional claim by the Athenian in Book V:

> Nothing is so native to men as pleasure, pain, and desire; they are, so to say, the very wires or strings from which any mortal nature [φύσει] is inevitably and absolutely dependent. We have therefore to commend the most noble life [τὸν κάλλιστον βίον], not only as superior in comeliness of repute, but further as superior, if a man will but taste it and not

> decline it in the days of his youth, in that on which we are all set, lifelong predominance of pleasures over pains (732e).

Here *kalos* functions in a predominantly moral setting; the attractiveness of the noble life is found not only in the high repute bestowed on those who live such a life but also, internally, in the agent who has mastered self so as to appreciate, for self-realization, the right blend of pleasures over pains.

Determining these pleasures requires proper alignment of experiences by striking the middle chord between extremes. This alignment also receives divine support:

> What line of conduct, then, is dear to God and a following of him? There is but one, and it is summed up in one ancient rule, the rule that "like"—when it is a thing of due measure [μετρίῳ]—"loves its like." For things that have no measure [ἄμετρα] can be loved neither by one another nor by those that have. Now it is God who is, for you and me, of a truth the "measure of all things," much more truly than, as they say, "man" (716c).

The divine element in conjunction with measure thus provides a necessary source for connecting (a) proportion, insofar as proportion engendered the values of freedom, friendship and understanding through the intersection of democracy and aristocracy, and (b) beauty—proportion and beauty standing as, again, two of the three cardinal components of the Good approximated in the *Philebus.* This connection between proportion and beauty emerges when beauty functions as nobility, the noble life resulting from adherence to the mean, a mode of existence inherently attracting divine love. As a result, humans ought to emulate this mode of existence for their own well-being, since striving for such practical nobility of character and action renders one "like unto God" and thus as complete and happy as circumstances of life in this world allow.

The inherent value of nobility to a way of life pertains to every human being, a distributive context which the *Laws* carefully and systematically integrates into its principles of jurisprudence.

The gods and particularity

The Athenian has proclaimed freedom as one of the values to be preserved and enhanced in making legislation. The most dramatic expression of beauty as nobility is, I suggest, found in considerations pertaining to freedom. Envisioning freedom as a paramount goal of legislation is based on embracing the theoretical and undeniably metaphysical position that an individual human being has unique value, which in turn implies that justifying what that person chooses to do will, within certain limits, be derived strictly and solely from that individual's decisions determined only by that individual. This consequence presupposes, from a perspective of high generality, the inherent value of the individual *qua* individual.

The connection between God and measure also supports this determination of value. Note that God in the *Laws*, inherently friendly to measure, differs radically from the counterpart deity in the *Statesman*: the Athenian asserts that "God, who, as the old saw has it, holds in his hands beginning, end, and middle of all that is, moves through the cycle of nature, straight to his end..." (716a). This "old saw" concerning

the range of divine providence is striking compared to the depiction of the *Statesman* demiurge as a "half-way" deity. The Athenian describes deity managing the entire sweep of cosmic drama, from beginning to end, through all cycles. In the *Statesman*, deity fashioned the cosmos, then withdrew for a full cycle, returning only when its handiwork threatened to decompose from within. The God of the *Laws* is much more reliable—displaying greater concern and truth—than the tentative demiurge only partially controlling cosmic affairs in the *Statesman*.

In fact, the divine contingent in the *Laws* not only attends to the complete cosmic cycle but also, importantly for present purposes, is fully responsive to its most minuscule elements: "...perhaps it would not be hard to establish as much as this, that the gods are more, not less, careful for small things than for great. ...the gods, who are good [ἀγαθοί] with perfect goodness [ἀρετὴν] have the universal care [ἐπιμέλειαν] of all things as their special and proper function" (900d). This divine concern for details is repeated twice shortly thereafter: "all living creatures, like the world as a whole, are possessions [κτήματά] of the gods [θεῶν—plural].... Tis all one, then, whether a man counts such things small or great in the eyes of heaven; in neither case can it become our owners, provident and all-good [ἀρίστοις] as they are, to neglect them" (902b–c) and "we must never suppose that God [θεόν—singular, 902e7], who is at once supremely wise and both willing able to provide, makes no provision for the small matters..." (902e–3a; cf. 901d).

The Athenian distinguishes, perhaps with intent, between God and gods, but he insists that both share concern for "small things" and "small matters" in the cosmos. This distinction recalls the Stranger's parallel move in the myth, when he allocated care and supervision of certain types of living thing to various minor deities acting in concert with more universal responsibilities of the demiurge. However, crucial in the *Laws* is its insistence that deities are concerned with everything in the cosmos, everything understood individually rather than collectively or defined in terms of types and natures. That the gods are "good" with perfect goodness (900e–d; cf.901e) should be viewed then not as a perfunctory honorific but as a description with definite metaphysical implications. With this claim, the Athenian supports the position on particulars in the *Philebus*. There a particular exists as an intersection of four fundamental types of reality—including cause. One of the family of causes is mind (*nous*). But mind animates the divine formation and sustenance of natures insofar as they underlie and structure particular things. Therefore, divine concern in the *Laws* toward the smallest things in the cosmos replicates, in less abstract terminology, the same active concern for defining the full reality of particulars realized in the *Philebus*.

Particularity and preambles

The *Laws* insists that particulars enjoy direct surveillance and solicitude of the divine. If so, then particular human beings have a commensurate value as citizens of a polity. The Athenian elicits a key conclusion from this implication:

> ...a real legislator should not confine himself to the composition of statutes; he should further entwine with the text of his laws an exposition of all he accounts laudable or the

> reverse, [καλὰ...μὴ καλὰ] and the citizen of eminent goodness must feel himself no less bound by such directions than by those enforced with a legal sanction (823a).

It follows that "any man who treats of law in the style we are now adopting, means to educate his fellow citizens rather than to lay down the law to them" (857e).

Consider the very different relation between lawmaker and citizen enunciated in the *Statesman*: the Stranger argued that it is legitimate to force people to do "what is more just and nobler and better than what they did before" and that anyone blaming this use of force would be "most utterly ridiculous" (296d). Using compulsion when considering what is best for citizens was prefaced with a similar position concerning what is best for citizens' physical well-being. The Stranger cites the physician who, with right knowledge of medicine, "forces" [ἀναγκάζῃ] the patient, whether man, woman, or child, to do the better thing in order to be healed. In this case, the patient could never rightly say treatment was administered "in a baneful or unscientific way by the physicians who used force on him" (296c). But in the *Laws*, the free practitioner of medicine conducts his art very differently: the patient's disease is treated "by going into things thoroughly from the beginning in a scientific way," taking "the patient and his family into his confidence." Thus, the physician "learns something from the sufferers, and at the same time instructs the invalid to the best of his powers." Finally, the physician "does not give his prescriptions until he has won the patient's support, and when he has done so, he steadily aims at producing complete restoration to health by persuading the sufferer into compliance" (720d–e).[8]

This dramatic difference in bedside manner, so to speak, is significant. The Stranger's approach to healing is justified on the assumption that patients are not fully defined human beings; indeed, in the cosmos circumscribed by the *Statesman*'s narrative, they are little more than literate sheep. Just as animals are cured of disease whether they want to be or not since such treatment obviously enhances their well-being, so human beings—if their nature is not fully described and appreciated—will be treated in similar fashion. In the *Laws*, by contrast, the physician talks to the patient as well as the patient's family, explaining to all the nature of the patient's ailment. Only when the patient has understood the condition does the physician prescribe. Furthermore, if the physician must use rhetoric to persuade the patient to follow a certain regimen, the physician does so in order to ensure the patient's willingness *to choose* to partake of a remedy restoring the patient's physical well-being. The example of medical practice makes clear that freedom is a prerequisite for citizens, thereby repudiating the position advanced in the *Statesman* that treatment in the name of medical best interests can be forced upon a citizen without his or her consent. Such freedom throws into question if not rejects the notion that the Good can just be forced upon a populace. For if citizens are *compelled* to do what is good, then values clash—freedom vs. the interest citizens have to realize, on their own and for themselves, what is best for their individual well-being.

The care directed by the physician toward a citizen's body is mirrored by the concern demonstrated by the legislator toward the citizen's soul. The stipulated institution of preludes to laws presupposes that citizens must not only obey laws, but also must know why they should obey them. This concern assumes citizens

are capable of such understanding and therefore that they should be treated with commensurate respect. As a result, citizens exhibit a unique value as individuals, since only individuals will experience integrating (a) preludes to laws with (b) the content of these laws. The *Laws* respects citizens as individuals, full-blooded unities embodying an inextricable blend of feelings and desires, all of which will be tempered, rightfully so, by rational acceptance of laws as necessary limitations—within a political setting—on individual freedom.

The appeal to *kalos* in constructing preambles to the laws (823a) extends this concern for proportion and harmony. An individual obeys a law in the truest sense, that is, as *one* human being acting in concert with the full range of human nature, if that individual not only does what the law mandates but (a) understands why the law is a law and (b) actively desires to obey it. The preamble addresses the citizen as a unity; furthermore, recognizing the need to respect each citizen as a unique, complex totality justifies the use of *kalos*. For if an individual obeys a law without understanding why, or without wanting to obey, then that individual is externally law-abiding but internally is, or at least may well be, at odds with self. The preamble, if successful, will harmonize reason and desire within the agent, establish proportion between what that individual desires to do and what is understood must be done, given that law stands incumbent upon everyone. Since different laws will affect prospective agents in different ways, a legal system serious about instructing its citizenry will employ different kinds of language to appeal to elements of the agent most directly affected by the diversified character of law. The greater the success of preambles shaped by rhetorically variegated styles, the more that individual citizens will be at peace with the law and, by extension, at peace with everything in the environment related to law in constituting the daily affairs of life.[9]

Law, as rule, must by nature be universal in jurisdiction. Therefore, regardless how specific and finely tuned its conditions and how effectively prefaced with preambles of suitable subtlety, scope and persuasiveness, law will inevitably and necessarily overlook the particularity of each citizen as a unique individual. However, implementing beauty as a kind of nobility in order to (a) harmonize elements in law as written and (b) regulate the psychological constitution of those acting according to its lights indicates heightened respect for individual citizens as such, that is, for structuring law so that its statement reaches as many diverse features of an individual human being as the written word can envelop, educate and secure. In this respect, the *Laws* reflects the concern for the importance of the individual developed in the metaphysics of the *Philebus* through the new tools as well as by the conjoint approximation of the Good, especially the juxtaposition of beauty and proportion. By contrast, the *Statesman* requires rulers to impress law rigidly and inexorably whether or not their subjects willingly accept its strictures (even if the law serves their best interests)—thereby dehumanizing all citizens by implying they lacked both understanding as well as emotional perspective on realizing their well-being through acceptance of and adherence to the laws.

The Athenian emphasizes the divine in establishing the source of proportion, the measure which, if adopted by the human agent, renders that individual like God. The ultimate justification—or cause, to use terminology of the *Philebus*—for proportion assuming the shape that it does for a given nature derives from divine

mind fashioning that nature according to divinity's apprehension of the appropriate Form. Therefore, when beauty as nobility governs the proportionality of elements within a given human being, the greater the degree to which this proportionality approximates the natural ideal in an individual's desires and actions, the closer that individual internalizes the causal agency of God with respect to that ideal. A legal code formed with the grounding values of the state in view and inflected with a broad range of preambles will produce both theoretical and practical harmony—theoretical in that laws will cohere with one another with as much consistency as possible, practical in that the citizenry will, both collectively and individually, understand the rational justification for these laws and do their best to follow the laws' prohibitions and dictates.[10] Furthermore, agents endowed with individual freedom guided by law with preambles of this sort will interact so that the unavoidable differences between and among individuals comprising the polis should be celebrated as a societal given on the basis of which the laws of the polis, governing and harmonizing this broad spectrum of individuals, will justify their enactment as legal mandates.

Beauty connects with proportion primarily through linking desires, attitudes and actions governed by pleasure and pain which—if the *Law*'s psychology is correct—encompass virtually all living things, including human beings, so that these basic experiences will interact and be unified in ways producing the best results. Since pleasure and pain play a pivotal function in human lives, the *Philebus* approach to the unlimited and limited becomes crucial, given that all such experiences are defined by greater and less with the consequent need for the individual to decide how to limit the continually varying flux of pleasures and pains in order to maximize their overall quality. For human beings, the best result of such maximization is happiness produced on condition that they strive for the middle ground between the extreme experiences pleasures and pains naturally provide.

Preambles to laws derive from the legislators' sense of *kalos*, beauty as nobility. But if this sense of *kalos* is metaphysically fundamental, then the legislator must have at least a working grasp of *kalos* at the level of the unities, one of which is explicitly identified as *kalos* (966a). Furthermore, the structure of a preamble to a given law depends, obviously, on the content of that law. Regardless how skillfully the legislators craft a preamble derived from perceptive understanding of nobility, a given preamble cannot effectively instill an attitude of engaged obedience unless the law so prefaced is structured to accomplish its intended purpose in human affairs. But all laws are written. And, as the *Phaedrus* famously maintains, writing "stays the same forever" (275d–e)—unless written law is revised as need arises. How to pursue such revision occupies significant portions of Book XII, the dialogue's final section. This account highlights truth, the third element of the triumvirate approximating the Good of the *Philebus*. The following discussion shows that truth incorporates factors of friendship and understanding, just as beauty wove freedom into its treatment of laws. In this way, the Good continues to fund the legal and political policies developed in the *Laws*.

Truth

According to the *Philebus*, the intersection of proportion, beauty and truth approximates the Good. In the *Laws*, proportion animates the Athenian's concern for determining the psychological contours of a happy life as well as elucidating, after reflectively juxtaposing opposed forms of government, fundamental values defining a well-run polity. Beauty as nobility justifies the introduction of preambles for laws since the citizens living under these laws are defined as unique individuals, each a blend of emotion—therefore subject to informed inducements and justifications of legal preambles—and intellect. Truth, the third element of the Good, integrates proportion and beauty as prerequisites for the relevance and pursuit of dialectic as essential to the revision of law.

Truth and happiness

The Athenian asserts that on principle, "of all things good, truth holds the first place among gods and men alike. For him who is to know felicity and happiness, my prayer is that he may be endowed with it from the first, that he may live all the longer a true man" (730c). Truth, the element of the Good which, according to the *Philebus*, directly connects to Forms as the object of knowledge and ultimate source of truth, is essential to happiness, but its importance must be situated carefully for law:

> No law or ordinance whatever has the right to sovereignty over true knowledge. 'Tis a sin that understanding [νοῦν] should be any creature's subject or servant; its place is to be ruler of all, if only it is indeed, as it ought to be according to nature [κατὰ φύσιν], true [ἀληθινὸς] and free [ἐλεύθερός]. But, as things are, such insight is nowhere to be met with, except in faint vestiges, and so we have to choose the second best, ordinance and law (875d).

Recall the connection between understanding, *nous*, the third value derived from the measured juxtaposition of opposed forms of government and identified by the Athenian as essential to law, and truth, the third element in the *Philebus* approximation of the Good. The passage just cited qualifies understanding's function as "ruler of all"—that is, *nous* serves in this capacity if and only if it is true. Thus the products of understanding are controlled by whether or not what is understood and then articulated, especially law, is indeed true. The question then becomes how understanding must be connected to Forms in order to produce truth. This question will be addressed below. For present purposes, the implication is that law in general and presumably the particular laws stated in the dialogue derive from something less than sustained apprehension of truth, since the Athenian is convinced that truth in its highest sense is available only briefly.

In fact, the "faint vestiges" of truth available to human inquiry echo the Socratic approximation of the Good in the *Philebus.* Thus, some degree of truth is displayed in the complex and detailed legislation advanced in the *Laws* and, it may be assumed, an equivalent degree of truth guides the Athenian and company when they describe more abstract factors underlying the possibility of producing and, when necessary, revising such legislation. Given that legislators work with a fragmented sense of

truth in generating laws, the Athenian wonders whether "as time goes on and he puts his scheme to the test of practice," any legislator will be thoughtless enough to forget that the laws must be (769d) "full of such lacunae which some successor will have to correct, to ensure that the constitution and system of the society he has founded may steadily improve, not deteriorate?" Any law, since it embodies only a perspective on truth, must be open to revision. At this point, the Nocturnal Council takes command.

The education of the nocturnal council

The opening discussion in this Epilogue outlined the symbolic and metaphysically fertile connection between the Nocturnal Council and the Good. The following analysis clarifies how the Council must practice, with consummate skill, a decidedly philosophical type of dialectic in order to satisfy their duties toward the polity which has selected them. The Good functions essentially in implementing and applying this dialectical inquiry.

The one and the many The Nocturnal Council must have "an education of a more exacting kind than we have so far contemplated" (965b). This education is in dialectic: thus either "a consummate craftsman [δημιουργόν] or guardian in any sphere will need the ability not merely to fix his regard on the many, but to advance to the recognition of the one and the organization of all other detail in the light of that recognition..." (965b–c). The same point repeated with an addition relevant for the *Statesman*: "now whose vision and view of his object can be more precise [ἀκριβεστέρα] than his who has learned to look from the dissimilar many to the one form?" [μίαν ἰδέαν—965c]. The Athenian continues that "there is no surer path for a man's steps...." Therefore, we must add "one more statute to all hitherto rehearsed, a law instituting the Nocturnal Council of magistrates, duly furnished with the whole education we have described, as the state's custodian and preserver" (968a). Then, once this "admirable Council" has been created, "we must deliver the state into its keeping, and there will be hardly one modern legislator to disagree with us" (969b).

The Athenian emphasizes that the Nocturnal Council not only considers the many, but moves from apprehending the many to recognizing "the one." Furthermore, this apprehension will then coordinate "all other detail" in its light, presumably applying the acquired sense of the one in terms of the concrete specifications of a given law insofar as this law derives from apprehension of "the one." The Athenian promises that this cognitive grasp will be greater in precision solely because the investigator has beheld the many in relation to "one Form." In the *Statesman*, being precise—*akribesteros*—was a desideratum approximated, but not fully realized, through due measure (284d ff). But here, in the *Laws*, precision is explicitly connected to apprehending *one* Form. Although the generation of specific laws is not explicitly derived from knowledge of Forms, the Athenian's account of the Nocturnal Council shows that their review of all existing laws is based on precisely this kind of metaphysical inquiry and its application to law, a review required for

the final formulation of law for purposes of ensuring the state's unity and overall well-being.

In the *Statesman*, the method for determining truth remains, by the Stranger's own admission, incomplete—hence the emphasis on paradigms as statements of true opinion—with commensurate effects on the nature of statecraft exhibited by continually practicing this inherently fragmented approach. By contrast, the *Laws* emphasizes the need to have appropriate methods fully defined. In the *Statesman*, the objects which the inchoate method intends to define are not fully described and their metaphysical status is left equivalently indeterminate; even more fundamental is the fact that it is never made clear that method must be directed at such realities. In the *Laws*, the members of the Nocturnal Council are explicitly required to direct attention to "one Form" so that they can review and evaluate existing laws, however these laws may have been originally derived. The Council members make all decisions on the basis of direct apprehension of the unity of a given Form, not, it should be emphasized, on whatever interpretations follow from commingling opposite characteristics, as the account of statecraft maintains at the conclusion of the *Statesman*.[11]

The good and the beautiful The education under scrutiny is based on dialectic but the Athenian emphasizes that certain Forms occupy a privileged position in overseeing the duties of the Council: The Athenian asks Clinias: "Then what say you to this? Do we take this same view when it comes to the fine [καλοὺ] or to the good [ἀγαθοῦ]? Will our guardians have merely to know that each of them is many, or must they know further how and in what way each is a unit?" Clinias replies, "Why, we seem fairly driven to hold that they will actually have to understand their unity" (966a). In fact, "men who are to be real guardians of the law will need a real knowledge of them all [virtue, beauty, good]; they must be able to expound this knowledge in their speech and to conform to it in their practice; to discern the true intrinsic demarcations of good and evil..."(966b).

In formulating the expertise an effective member of the Council must command, the Athenian identifies the beautiful and the good (as well as virtue, on which more below) as if they were fundamentally distinct from one another. In the *Philebus*, beauty, in conjunction with truth and proportion, is one of three essential components of the Good. As we have seen, this dimension of the Good functions in an equivalently fundamental way with respect to the overall project advanced in the *Laws*. The Athenian's distinction between beauty and the Good should therefore not be understood to supplant the foundational character of the Good as such.

In fact, however, caution concerning the precise nature of the Good should be exercised when the Athenian adds that the guardians must know "how and in what way each [that is , beauty and the good] is a unit," especially since, as we have seen, the *Philebus* emphasizes that the unity of the Good is only approximated through this metaphysical triumvirate. The Athenian further qualifies the good in terms of unity by indicating that the Council must appreciate, when they practice dialectic, exactly *how* the good is a unity. Such methodological caution may be explained by the fact that, according to the Athenian, knowledge of the good, beauty and virtue is

a prerequisite for an informed evaluative response to law—presumably *all* particular instances of law. Thus the specified realities occupy a preeminent position with regard to the possibility that the Nocturnal Council, in apprehending these realities, will integrate characteristics drawn from them to modify and improve currently standing laws. Given the complexity and breadth of these laws, it is both prudent and practical to insist that realities servicing this end must necessarily be of considerable generality.

The procedure—or method—of moving from the dissimilar many to the one Form presupposes that the unity in question exists "in" the many, otherwise such epistemic movement would not be possible. But since the many are dissimilar, available characteristics differentiate members of the many from one another—a truncated account of conditions prior to collection. If so, parallel structure suggests that collection as the initial stage of dialectic be connected methodologically with division. This anticipation is fulfilled, with virtue, an especially crucial reality, exemplifying the unity divided.

Virtue and law Early in Book I, it is asserted that the legislation of the Cretans "was framed in the interest of virtue [ἀρετῆς] as a whole, not of one fragment of it, and that the least considerable" (630e). And again, "after we have treated of all virtue, we will try, with God's permission, to show that all the regulations we were just enumerating have it for their object" (632e). This point reappears at the conclusion of the dialogue, in Book XII (963a): "We said there was one end to be kept in view in all our own laws, and we were agreed, I believe, that the right name for the thing is virtue" [ἀρετήν]. However, Book III maintains that although all components of virtue should be kept in view, certain elements must lead the way with regard to legislation: "...that virtue which brings all the rest in its train, that is, judgment [φρόνησις], intelligence [νοῦς], and opinion [δόξα] attended by appropriate passionate desire [ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας]" (688b). And at the conclusion of the *Laws*, the Athenian reinforces the importance of the unity of virtue regarding the duties of the Nocturnal Council:

> Then it looks as though the guardians of our god-given constitution too must be constrained, first and foremost, to see exactly what is the identity permeating all the four, the unity [ἓν ὄν] to be found, as we hold, alike in courage, in purity, in rectitude, in wisdom, and entitling them all to be called by one name, virtue. This, my friends, if you please, is what we must now close upon with a firm and unyielding grip, until we are content with our account of the real character of the mark on which our gaze shall be fixed, whether it prove to be a unit or a whole [ἓν εἴτε ὡς ὅλον], or both at once, or what you please. If we let this slip through our fingers, can we suppose we shall ever be fully equipped for a virtue of which we cannot tell whether it is many things, or four, or one? (965d–e).

It is essential therefore "to explain in what way the four things can be one thing [that is, virtue], and that when you have given your explanation you are once more to ask me in what way they are four" (964a).

In the *Statesman*, virtue is divided in ways pitting one component against another so that the relation between and among its parts is marked by "unfriendliness." This internal tension—reflecting, as argued in Chapter 5, the mythic characterization of

the cosmos with its cyclical opposition—requires statecraft to dissolve the tension creatively, as it were, by combining relevant sets of opposites so that they coexist, thereby producing a stable social and political order. But in the *Laws*, virtue is unified so that its elements are in harmony with, or "friendly" to, one another, with particular laws produced by legislators necessarily engendered to reflect and enhance this unity.

The Athenian emphasizes the importance of definition in conjunction with the metaphysical character of the Form as the object of definition. But does this sense of *idean* refer to a canonic Form, given the Athenian's subtle but significant description of its unity?

The unity in question is distinguished into two abstract possibilities—unit or whole. Thus (a) unit and whole are not the same in all respects and (b) the difference (or differences) between them cannot be incompatible, or the Athenian could not also assert that the character which holds our gaze could be (c) "both at once." Finally, the Athenian also intimates through the concluding qualification "what you please" that the correct sense could be something other than these three possibilities.

This unclarified sense of unity bears directly on the proper division of the unities in question, including virtue. For example, a unit may not be divisible whereas a whole might be; also, a unit might be divisible in one way whereas a whole might be divisible in a different way. The *Statesman* asserted, as a question which the Stranger was not capable of addressing, that the relation between part and class was problematic (263a), requiring additional reflection for its resolution. The diverse but potentially relevant senses of unity in the *Laws* testify to the metaphysical range and subtlety of that problem. Note also the correlations between the unity of virtue and beauty interpreted as that essential aspect of the Good providing harmony within a particular being and between beings when they interact with one another. Virtue thus becomes a primary instance of what the *Philebus* refers to as a "monad," and the problematic sense of unity characterizing virtue is, since its elements essentially harmonize with one another, established initially by the harmony of beauty, and, ultimately, by the Good as the fundamental reality within which beauty and truth cohere.[12]

The Athenian insists that an essential connection exists between passionate desire and opinion, intelligence and prudence. This desire is excited when virtue, properly and harmoniously defined, is realized within enacted laws. Although the Athenian does not develop this connection, its mere presence at this crucial juncture should be compared with the *Statesman*'s account of human nature, lacking as it does any mention of *eros*, or indeed any element linking the intellectual and emotive sides of soul. In particular, the Stranger omitted any reference to desire functioning in concert with paradigms, the vehicle of true opinion and the highest level of cognition attained by the Stranger's inquiries. Thus paradigms are deficient epistemologically not only because, as defined, they evoke schemas rather than Forms but also because they are not sufficiently developed to embrace the natural desire of soul to touch realities marking soul's participation in the world of Forms. The introduction of preambles to laws, as discussed above, indicates that the Athenian recognizes that citizens are more than receptacles of pure reasoning or merely the place holders for governmental mandates. His insertion of desire as essential to the attainment

of virtue extends that insight, especially with respect to the need for understanding (*nous*) to be inherently and necessarily attracted to realities providing substance for the requisite revision of laws.

The *Statesman* also maintains that paradigms are frequently necessary in order to grasp the "greater" realities, presumably Forms. But paradigms, by design, exhibit only true opinion, not knowledge. The Athenian has divined that the members of the Nocturnal Council must be sufficiently schooled in dialectic to address possible revision of all laws, implying that they must be conversant with truth about Forms whenever a law involving a given Form requires revision. Thus an additional dimension of harmony emerges, not only marking the relations between and among constituent elements of virtue but also arising from understanding's appreciation of written laws in relation to the ever-changing panorama of practical events which law will oversee. Since the Council is responsible for reviewing *all* laws, the extent to which these laws pertain to various types of entities or activities is the extent to which the Council must reflect on whatever Forms ground those entities or activities, all such reflection guided by their even more fundamental awareness of virtue, the good and beauty. The broader the scope of laws to be reviewed, the more philosophical the Council members must be in discerning the gamut of unities underlying all variegated multiplicities permeating, through the aegis of law, the day-to-day social and economic existence of citizens.

This specification fixes the range of investigation the Council must oversee. In theory, any established law requiring modification as a result of new information, regardless of its source (as long as the information is reliable), can become an object of additional study. Since these laws cover all aspects of civilized life in the polis, the relevant branches of study will, or at least may, also encompass all aspects of civilized life. To determine this relevance, the Council must access the kind of knowledge equivalent to the cognition secured when its members study virtue—knowledge based on apprehending those unified realities which are Forms. The point is not that Council members must all be polymaths; rather, the range of their knowledge must be sufficiently broad to direct those who do command knowledge of particular aspects of life to become involved in the redevelopment of current laws. Thus the Council must have expertise in much more than virtue, if narrowly defined, to make recommendations concerning branches of study required for revising existing laws in order to guarantee improving the overall quality of life of citizens under their jurisdiction.[13]

Given the breadth of jurisprudential concern incumbent on the Nocturnal Council, the studied intimacy between the abstract method and metaphysics characterizing the work of the Council and its practicality when applied to revising the details of laws should be noted. This intimacy underscores the fundamental misconception marking the initial division in the *Statesman* between practical and theoretical knowledge, and the Stranger's aligning of the statesman solely—or almost solely—in the former category.

Law and nous The Athenian asserts that "the chief part of virtue is understanding [*nous*]" (963a). Otherwise put, law is "the offspring of *nous* by right reason" (890d); it is the name given by the Athenian to the "regulation of *nous*" (714a). Therefore,

"it is the *nous* in the members of the Nocturnal Council that affords salvation to the state" (961d) since it is by dint of the degree of understanding resident in the Nocturnal Council that they collectively and individually grasp the structure of realities ultimately grounding whatever revisions the laws may require.

Understanding, or *nous*, refers to the highest degree of cognition available in the Platonic epistemology when canonically defined—for example, according to the Divided Line in *Republic* VI. Therefore, positing this characteristic as essential outgrowth of the interplay of the two opposite types of government and also as a prerequisite for a properly produced legal system invites questioning concerning understanding's proper object. The initial answer is that *nous* describes the level of cognition necessarily present in the minds of those producing laws, since such legislation is derived from *nous*. The second phase of the answer refers to the degree of comprehension in the minds of individuals who live under these laws and who must, to the best of their ability, obey them and understand by means of preambles why it is in their best interests to do so. The third phase becomes evident when the Athenian develops the makeup and purposes of the Nocturnal Council, since the Council must cultivate *nous*, the power of understanding, in order to evaluate current laws and to suggest modifications and revisions when needed. Method as dialectic and metaphysics, including the Good, then become crucial to the education of the members of the Nocturnal Council.

When the Athenian maintains that laws express *nous* and that *nous* is the chief part of virtue, the relevance of *nous* as one of the four new tools in the *Philebus* becomes prominent. However, this emphasis does not elevate *nous* to a level of independence apart from its proper object. Just as *nous* in the *Philebus* is coordinated with limit and unlimited to account for all entities dwelling in the cosmos and, from the standpoint of knowledge, our experience of these realities, so in the *Laws* understanding funds legislation in this relational sense. The extent to which realities, that is, Forms, are understood constitutes an essential—in fact, *the* essential—component in the formulation of laws. Under this interpretation, laws are not merely "read off" by means of pristine and privileged vision of truth immediately derivable from the relevant Forms; rather, the articulation and development of a law depend on understanding as a separate function interacting with whatever Forms underlie a law's content. Thus law expresses a degree of understanding as well as the content of a specific object of cognition. This explains why a given law is always theoretically subject to revision, since the understanding (*nous*) required to apprehend the relevant Forms—themselves immutable—may become aware of circumstances in the environment constituting the origin and scope of that law such that it requires revision to guarantee its continued relevance for the well-being of the polity. The invocation and application of *nous* does not as such establish law; rather, *nous* is the medium through which laws are formulated and which, in conjunction with Forms, the Nocturnal Council must continually reassess in order to establish the highest degree of relevance from its members' study and grasp of the relevant Forms. This medium, following the argument in the *Philebus*, includes particular human beings and their relations to and connections with other particulars populating their surroundings. The Nocturnal Council seeks to characterize laws in terms of proportion and beauty as guiding principles providing recommendations

derived from these elements of the Good and funding revisions engrafted on the specificity of a given law.

The emphasis on dialectic practiced by the Nocturnal Council in conjunction with the fully-fledged metaphysics underlying dialectic indicates that when the laws of the state are reviewed for final installation, only dialectic provides a sufficiently perceptive and comprehensive set of principles to establish any revisions existing laws may have to undergo. Therefore when the Stranger concludes that statecraft consists primarily if not exclusively in delicately balancing certain opposites permeating the complex circumstances enveloping the citizenry of the state, this position is clearly only a provisional step in producing a stable account of statecraft. In fact, with positions developed in the *Laws* in place, it becomes even more evident that the long-range purpose of the *Statesman* is to compel its student to pursue the various aporiae interspersed throughout the exchanges between the Stranger and young Socrates in order to achieve a theoretical position sufficiently articulated to establish statecraft and laws essential for a functioning state in the truest, most stable sense. As we shall now see, the *Laws* addresses one of the most significant of these aporiae.

The immutability of law At 311a, the Stranger underscores his account of statecraft by asserting that once the process of "kingly weaving" has been completed, it will entrust those empowered to fulfill the offices of the state to do so "forever." The certitude implied by this appeal to the unlimited duration of this government is replicated in the *Laws*. In a summary passage in Book XII, the Athenian asserts that once the Nocturnal Council has amended the currently existing legal proceedings "in the light of their personal experience until they judge them to be all sufficiently perfected," the Council will "take the last step, stamp them as wholly immutable, and put them into practice for all time to come" [τὸν ἅπαντα βίον—957b5].

The conditions leading to this bold conclusion display an important dimension of the *Statesman*'s aporetic character if the approach of the *Statesman* is compared to that of the *Laws*. At 292c, the Stranger admits that he and young Socrates have yet to determine with sufficient clarity the kind of knowledge proper to statecraft. However, at the conclusion of the dialogue, the Stranger asserts that "the art which holds sway over [generalship, judges, rhetoric] and watches over the laws and all things in the state, weaving them all most perfectly [ὀρθότατα] together, we may, I think, by giving to its function a designation which indicates its power over the community, with full propriety [δικαιότατ'] call statecraft" (305e). The Stranger and young Socrates then begin, necessarily according to the Stranger, to exhibit statecraft according to the paradigm of weaving. The first phase of this exhibition is the analysis of virtue, an extended account running from 306a to 308b. At that point, the Stranger maintains that any "constructive science" [συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν] will take only the best elements and reject the bad elements, as far as such separation is possible to secure, and from these "like and unlike elements produce [δημιουργεῖ] one power and form (308c)." Thus the true natural [κατὰ φύσιν] art of statecraft will test humans for goodness and then entrust the chosen to be taught, giving orders and exercising supervision just as the art of weaving does to carding and those who prepare the materials for weaving. Only "the statesman and

good lawgiver" is entitled to implant the true opinions concerning honor [καλῶν], justice and goodness [ἀγαθῶν] to the appropriately chosen citizens (309d). In sum, kingly science weaves together "the character of restrained and courageous men" and perfects "the most glorious and best of all textures" through "friendship and community of sentiment into a common life" (311c). The Stranger insists that this governmental structure and platform, with appropriate staff, will perdure.

Consider the critical function of law in this account. Laws, laid down by the statesman and watched over by the practitioner of statecraft, are all woven into the fabric of the state along with other enumerated elements comprising the state's essential features. But such weaving does not result from knowledge required by the statesman, since according to the Stranger that knowledge has not been made available by his and young Socrates' sustained methodical scrutiny. Nonetheless, the statesman must still sufficiently control *kalos*, justice and *agathos* in order to impart, somehow, "true opinions" concerning these realities to those individuals deemed worthy of citizenship. It seems fair to conclude then that even this diminished sense of statecraft must to some extent apprehend these realities, especially since the ruler so guided is, according to the Stranger, a "good lawgiver" [ἀγαθον νομοθέτην]. Therefore, statecraft forms laws it imposes on citizens, at least in part, by its awareness of *kalos*, justice and *agathos* as defining values for the specific content of all laws.

Strictly speaking, however, this conclusion is an inference drawn from juxtaposing texts—the Stranger never explicitly connects law and values nor, more generally, does he indicate how statecraft formulates laws in the first place. All the Stranger provides in terms of the nature of government is the necessity to weave together opposite characters. This necessity is derived from (a) the account of virtue, an avowedly fundamental moral reality, defined by juxtaposing opposites, a position which derives even more fundamentally from (b) the demiurge's forming the cosmos and its inhabitants. This account, we recall, emphasizes the continual oscillation of opposites and the need for divinity to institute a *kairon* moment of harmony and balance between the two cycles.

The Stranger insists that this political structure is sufficiently developed to remain in place for all time. He is in a sense justified in appealing to the unlimited duration of such statecraft, but only if a series of anticipations based on his positions be granted concerted metaphysical weight.

Although the Stranger forthrightly asserts that he does not know with precision the type of knowledge which defines statecraft, he nonetheless remains confident in describing at least some conditions by which any constructive knowledge produces "one power and form." The use of "constructive" knowledge recalls the fundamental processes involved in any type of production (282b) and also the name given to the demiurge, the synthesizer [συνθέντος—273b], when producing the inhabitants of the cosmos. Now according to the Stranger, knowledge in this qualified sense produces "one power and form" [μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν ἰδέαν—308c6–7]. So although Forms cannot be produced, the appeal to unity predicated of both this form and its potential effects mirrors how such a reality would function if it were a Form canonically defined. Clearly the Stranger has at least partially envisioned what Forms are and what they can accomplish.

After the extreme generality of the Stranger's thinking on constructive knowledge, he spends even more time analyzing virtue. As we have seen, this analysis concentrates on contrasting particular virtues seemingly opposed to one another—all mutually coexisting within a single nature. This approach to virtue replicates the mythic account of the demiurge fashioning the partially defined, and cyclically opposed, natural types inhabiting the cosmos. If one were then to speak of a Form of virtue limited to the moral sphere, it would mirror the cosmos as a unified whole yet still undergo continual internal opposition. And, looking ahead in the Stranger's argument, the account of virtue neatly anticipates statecraft as a subtle balancing of opposite personality types.

In addition, statecraft in its final formulation represents the "most perfect" weaving and therefore can "most rightly" be called statecraft because it embodies the "most glorious and best" of all textures. Note the concerted appeals to value. But value grounded on what standard? The criteria for determining how this weaving occurs and to what extent such weaving may be accurately described as "glorious and best," remain unanalyzed in the *Statesman*. By contrast, the Good, characterized in the *Philebus* in terms of proportion and beauty, provides access for determining these criteria. The elements so woven—laws, honors, and so on—must be proportionate to one another so that their harmony within the complete set of elements exhibits beauty or nobility. But these characteristics are also, and necessarily, related to truth. And truth, as a component of the Good, encompasses the Forms. If therefore weaving which, the Stranger concludes, represents the essence of statecraft bears the evaluative qualifications he explicitly ascribes to it, then the nature of statecraft remains incomplete until the explicit institution of realities and methodological procedures for apprehending these realities are so painstakingly produced by Socrates in the *Philebus*.

At *Statesman* 311a, the Stranger concluded that "the whole business of the kingly weaving" entrusts "to them in common forever [ἀεὶ] the offices of the state," weaving which includes watching over laws of the state. But since the Stranger is silent on how laws are produced, the "constitutionalism" commonly attributed to the *Statesman* remains purely formal, a matrix connecting law with the noble, just and good, but not extending this matrix theoretically to the point where the practitioner of statecraft knows how to establish laws requisite for preserving "for all time," as the Stranger so confidently asserts, a state formed according to these principles.

The Athenian proposes that law can be established for all time (957b) but only because current laws have been reviewed and, if necessary, revised by the Nocturnal Council—its members thoroughly trained in dialectic aimed at apprehending and articulating virtue, good and beauty. The Council must review, revise and ratify existing laws according to a metaphysical and methodological rubric which parallels or at least approximates its counterpart in the *Republic.* The account of lawmaking in the *Laws* concludes by establishing a group of legislators comprising, in effect, a committee of philosopher-kings collectively embodying the highest degree of knowledge available to human inquiry.[14] Versed in the intricacies and profundities of the most fundamental realities, the Council adapts existing laws to the theoretical and practical demands revealed by sustained study of those realities so that resulting legislation is as close as humanly possible to a system of laws laid down by a

demiurge for the benefit of a human population. In this respect, such laws reflect divinity insofar as human beings can participate in a degree of understanding commensurate with that of deity. The Athenian proclaims this status "for all time," a pronouncement which is, if Platonic principles are accepted, significantly more warranted than its counterpart claim in the *Statesman*.

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In his introductory comments on the dialogue, A. E. Taylor observes that the *Laws* is "severely practical" and that "it was composed and is meant to satisfy a pressing felt need."[15] However, the coda to this lengthy enumeration and justification of laws contains an important, if relatively brief, excursus into the abstract realms of method and metaphysics. This analysis, in conjunction with the *Law*'s interwoven and sustained use of opposition, proportion and beauty, demonstrates that Plato still saw fit to introduce and emphasize metaphysical considerations for dealing satisfactorily with a political world undergoing drastic and dire changes. The need to take abstract features of reality seriously in the midst of practical and pressing concerns was no less essential to Plato at that point than during earlier dialogues fashioned with parallel concern for the well-being of Athens and its people. To establish a state on firm theoretical foundations requires hard thinking on difficult subjects, even when the investigator's immediate interest is crafting a wealth of precise statutes overseeing as many facets of life as is feasible in a written work of philosophy.

The thinking of the Athenian retains a number of familiar Platonic themes; in this regard, the Athenian, his identity named only by his urban residence, is much closer to the Platonic Socrates than was the *Statesman*'s Eleatic Stranger. Nevertheless, the Stranger functioned as an intermediary mouthpiece for determining statecraft through types of measure and adumbrations of the Good developed in ways which, although preliminary, were fertile for the Socrates of the *Philebus* and the Athenian of the *Laws*. In fact, the Good developed in the *Philebus*—a metaphysical prism grounding the radiating streams of analysis in that dialogue—engenders a connected and concerted vision. This vision, deployed in terms of proportion, beauty, and truth, culminates in the *Laws* with the Nocturnal Council evaluating and revising the totality of individual laws guiding and controlling the lives of individual citizens. Although the Nocturnal Council functions literally in the dark, figuratively its members determine the final statement of the laws because they have seen enough of the Good to appreciate the Forms, the need to understand Forms in their essential unity, and to apply that understanding through dialectical method in measured and proportionate ways. These applications encompass matters of jurisprudence pertaining to all aspects of the political well-being of citizens—individuals fully defined in their humanity and uniqueness—insofar as this well-being can be controlled by the protective injunctions of law prefaced with appropriate preambles.

From this perspective, philosophy deals with particularity as much as it does with the universal, a lesson demonstrated with pervasive and incisive effect in the *Philebus* and put to extensive use in the *Laws*. However, to what extent can the lives of individual human beings be affected by such sustained and complex material? In *Laws* VII, with the context the place of play in education, the Athenian comments, in seemingly an offhand way (803b): "To be sure, man's life is a business which does

not deserve to be taken too seriously; yet we cannot help being in earnest with it, and there's the pity." This sentiment—haunting, wistful and tinged with a touch of resigned bitterness[16]—is, perhaps, the personal view of a thinker who devoted his life and virtually limitless energies and vision to reflecting on the complexities of reality and the ways in which such reflection can establish principles which guarantee, or at least increase the chances of, human beings leading lives which matter to themselves and others. The blend of thoughtful seriousness and balanced perspective toward the practical efficacy of the philosophical enterprise evoked in this splendid passage strikes a note of cautionary wisdom, even as that enterprise ascends towards its culmination in the pointed reflections on method and metaphysics in Book XII of the *Laws*.

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Notes

Introduction

1. Stanley Rosen observes (Rosen, 1995, p. 100):

   > The fundamental question raised by the *Statesman* is then not at all that of the nature of the royal art, but rather the nature of dialectic. But this amounts to the assertion that the fundamental theme of the *Statesman* is the question of the nature of philosophy and so, by extension, of the philosopher.

2. Whether canonic Forms appear in the Statesman is disputed (Chapter 1, Note 4). See also Note 8 below, on the relation between Forms and dialectic in the Statesman. The extent to which Forms appear in the complex argumentation of this dialogue will be a major topic in Chapter 7.
3. An approach to the *Statesman* not shared by all commentators. Cf. Julia Annas' observation (p. ix) in the introduction to Robin Waterfield's translation of the *Statesman*: "...we find that, in the *Statesman*, the *Republic*'s metaphysical backing...has dropped away...."
4. This structural repetition is noted by Kenneth Dorter, although he does not draw the interpretive inferences argued here in the Introduction (Dorter, 1994, p. 223).
5. Seeing the centrality of the myth in this way differs from the approaches of several commentators. For example, Seth Benardete asserts in his translation and commentary (p. 85) that the myth could have been avoided; also, Mitchell Miller (Miller, 1980, pp. 35 ff) labels the myth, given the structure of the dialogue, as a "digression." Benardete and Miller discuss various details of the myth (and additional references to their accounts will be made when appropriate), but both apparently believe that the point of the *Statesman* can be established without myth.
6. This approach to the dialogue is not original. For Rowe (p. xii, fn14; cf. p. 175), the Stranger explores rather than asserts philosophical positions. See also Plochmann, 1954, pp. 223–31.
7. And an insight suggesting that Mccabe's description of young Socrates as an "ignoramus" is unsympathetic and inaccurate (McCabe, 1997, p. 116). See also the observations favorable to young Socrates' abilities suggested by John Cooper (Cooper, 1999, p. 189).
8. The *Republic* maintains that Forms ground knowledge. Whether dialectic in the *Statesman* apprehends Forms in the same sense is disputed. McCabe (1997, p. 115) and Rosen (1995, p. 15) both deny, in different ways, that the Forms are functional. Rosen's reading is followed by Charles Griswold (Griswold, 1989, p. 165, fn. 20).
9. For development of this approach, see Taylor, 1961, p. 192.
10. Mitchell Miller (Miller, 1980) bases much of his reading of the entire dialogue on young Socrates' philosophical inexperience. See, for example, the discussions on p. 33 and, esp., p. 111.
11. Although something very close to this approach exists in the literature (Scodel, 1987, pp. 166–7). Rosen has similar negative views on the reliability of dialectic (Rosen, 1995, p. 116).

12. Several commentators appeal to the *Philosopher* at junctures where conclusions reached in the *Statesman* appear either inconclusive or incomplete. See, for example, J. B. Skemp (pp. 51, 80) and Lewis Campbell (p. 18—re 262c8).
13. Commentators noting thematic affinities between *Statesman* and *Philebus* include; Skemp (p. 80); Campbell (p. 105; pp. 107–8); Paul Friedländer (Friedländer, 1969, pp. 292, 293); Kenneth Sayre (Sayre, 1983, p. 159); Cornelius Castoriades (Castoriades, 2002, p. 90). See also Mohr (1977, pp. 232–4).

Chapter 1

1. Annas asks (p. 2, fn. 3): "Why is Socrates, of all people, criticizing a leading mathematician?" Because, one might reply, mathematics is not a discipline for determining value or even for broaching the question of value. This Socratic exchange underlines, although indirectly, the importance of value in subsequent discussion and, by extension, in the dialogue as a whole. One need not be a practicing mathematician to understand and articulate the limits of mathematics.
2. See Dorter (1994, pp. 190–91) on the relevance of value considerations at the beginning of the dialogue. But cf. Skemp (p. 119, fn. 1), who contends that the three times more valuable remark is "after all, only a pleasantry."
3. For other conjectures on Socrates' lack of participation, see Miller (p. 15) and Scodel's response to Miller (p. 16). Friedländer has, I suggest, correctly approached the continually hovering Socrates (p. 304): "Should we instead interpret Socrates' silence at the end, as throughout the dialogue, as a silence that both speaks and questions?" The questioning Friedländer intuits becomes relevant to the aporetic character of the *Statesman* once Socrates of the *Philebus* is brought onto the dialectical scene (Chapters 6 and 7 below). See also the related controversy concerning whether young Socrates or Socrates speaks the dialogue's final lines, discussed in Chapter 5, Note 21.
4. Rowe (p. 3, fn 8) describes the various terms used for class, type, and so on, in the *Statesman* and comments on their technical and quasi-technical senses. See Guthrie's summary observation (Guthrie, 1978, p. 175): "...the question whether, in using these or analogous terms in the later dialogues, [Plato] has at the back of his mind the exalted, other-worldly beings of the earlier, is and will probably remain a matter of controversy." (For Guthrie, the Forms are present—p. 170.) Other supporters of Forms in the *Statesman* include: Campbell (p. lviii); Skemp (p. 73); and, more cautiously, Deborah de Chiara-Quenzer (de Chiara-Quenzer, 1998, p. 119, fn. 38); Trevor Saunders is more confident (Saunders, 1992, pp. 466–7). On the other side, Stanley Rosen denies (p. 28) that the terms in question refer to "the so-called doctrine of Platonic Ideas." Additional denials in this regard occur on pp.18, 49, 79, 96, 99–100. Also asserting this denial is Scodel (pp. 25–6; pp. 85–6).
5. Cf. *Republic* 525a: "...the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being."
6. The difficulties resulting from the division between theoretical and practical have been noted: Rosen (pp. 20–1); Scodel (pp. 33, 40); Benardete (pp. 74–83; 126); Griswold (pp. 146–7).
7. Ernest Barker (Barker, 1959, p. 166) on the Stranger's pivotal collection: "This view furnishes the starting point of the *Politics*; for Aristotle begins by traversing its truth, and by emphasizing the distinction between State and household, politics and economics." For discussion of this instance of collection, see Annas (p. 5, fn. 8), who cites Aristotle's criticism of it in *Politics* 1252^{a} 7–23; see also Benardete (p. 77).

8. The relevance of "nobler" [γενναιότερον] as a property essential to this division and, more generally, with respect to value considerations is noted by Scodel (p. 47; also p. 70) and Rosen (p. 51). Aristotle takes the value of subjects ruled very seriously in this regard at *Politics* I1254 ^{a}24–28. See also Note 14 below.
9. On the possibility of names misrepresenting reality, see Scodel (p. 156) and Campbell (p. 16). Stefano Minardi elaborates (Minardi, 1983, p. 420): "To Plato's mind the method of division is directed to the investigation of reality (as distinct from the names we can apply to it); he wants to recall it to mind as it is, despite the linguistic bewitchment that we and others—sophists, above all—are wont to cause."
10. The Stranger's concern for the relation between different levels of division tells against Rosen's interpretation of dialectic (that is, as "concept-construction") since precisely determining the structure of a class will elicit distinctions and components based on degrees of reality rather than the interplay of conceptual components. See Rosen (pp. 15–16); cf. Annas (p. 12, fn. 16) who asserts that in matters dialectical, there is "[n]o substitute for rational investigation," although Annas does not indicate what such investigation might entail. Cf. also De Chiara-Quenzer (p. 97, fn. 10) on distinguishing between proper and improper division.
11. A possibility also noted by Scodel (p. 63).
12. Noted by Scodel (p. 65).
13. Taylor appreciates (p. 202) the "cream of the jest," that the "closest competitor of that dignified being a monarch [is] the breeder of pigs (266c)"; cf. Campbell (p. xix), who conjectures that Jonathan Swift would have applauded "the close relationship between mankind and the pig." See also V. Tejara's comments (Tejara, 1978, p. 90).
14. As Scodel maintains (p. 24, fn. 11): "'intrinsic' value is either denied entirely or is irrelevant to the dialectician. Value, from this point of view (viz. the Stranger's), cannot be subjected to the logico-technical analysis of dialectical diaeresis."
15. Asserted at *Sophist* 253d1–e6.
16. An allusion noted by Scodel (p. 67).
17. For discussion of this implication, see Dorter (pp. 189–90); Scodel (p. 49); Skemp (p. 133, fn. 1); and Miller (p. 31).
18. The appeal to accuracy should be noted, since determining the nature of accuracy with respect to dialectic becomes crucial later in the discussion (See Chapter 4).

Chapter 2

1. Campbell (p. 41—re 268d10) cites a thematic parallel between the goal intended by telling the myth and *Republic* VII 515e, that is, the difficulty of keeping to a mountain-path in the quest for the Good. Cf. J. A. Stewart's summary impression of the myth (Stewart, 1905, p. 174): "To enforce a 'naturalistic' estimate of kingship is the ostensible object of the Myth; but it soars high, as we shall see, above the argument which it is ostensibly introduced to serve." But cf. Annas (p. xv): it is "strikingly surreal" how "seriously he [Plato] is taking the idea even as a myth." "Surreal" is intended pejoratively, but the etymology of this word nonetheless points to the metaphysical dimensions of the myth, as Chapter 2 will demonstrate.
2. See Guthrie (pp. 193–6) on sources from Greek literature for the myth. See also the discussion by Diès (1935, pp. xxx–xli).
3. Sources interpreting the function of the myth in the dialogue as a whole include Dorter (pp. 191–5) and Andrea Wilson Nightingale (Nightingale , 1996, pp. 80–81, fn. 29—with additional sources cited). Sources focusing on the myth in terms of its potential political

implications include Diès (pp. l–lxv) and Griswold (pp. 151–3); for another treatment of the myth which attempts, in part, to connect it with political matters, see Gabriela Roxana Carone (Carone, 1993). For sources on whether the myth functions as seriously intended cosmology, see Skemp (pp. 25–6) who says it does; a position seconded (but with qualifications) by Andrea Wilson Nightingale (p. 66); Rowe (p. 160, fn. 17) says it does not. For additional discussion denying that the myth has serious cosmological aims, see Taylor (p. 208) and G. R. F. Ferrari (Ferrari, 1995, p. 392, fn. 12). For additional discussions, see (Vidal-Naquet, 1978) and John Tomasi (Tomasi, 1990).

The interpretation of the myth in this chapter is guided by predominantly metaphysical concerns, an approach which, as far as I know, has not been systematically explored in the literature.

4. The non-pantheonic identity of the deity in question has been noted by other commentators: Skemp (p. 24); Miller (p. 36); Rosen (pp. 42, 43); Dorter (p. 194).
5. For an account (based primarily on the *Timaeus*) showing how the Demiurge exercises creative energy by interacting with Forms to produce the cosmos and its inhabitants, see Richard D. Mohr (Mohr, 1989; see also Mohr, 1978).
6. This uniform counter-motion running opposite to the other stipulated motion, a manifestation of wisdom on the part of something alive, tells against considering such motion as purely mechanical. For sources discussing whether the rotary motion of the cosmos is mechanical, see Campbell (p. 49); Taylor (p. 214); and Guthrie (p. 181, fn. 3). For Plato, art axiomatically involves knowledge of opposites—for example, *Republic* 332d ff; *Hippias Minor* 367c–8a; *Phaedrus* 261c–2c, 273d–4a. Since cosmic counter-motion produces severe consequences when paired cyclically with its opposite, the suggestion is that the demiurge, lacking control of the sequence of opposition resulting in such destruction, is essentially lacking in the art of structuring the cosmos.
7. See, for example, *Phaedo* 80b1, *Phaedrus* 269d6.
8. Scodel contends (pp. 85–6; cf. p. 89) that the myth (at 269d5–7) denies "that such being can exist in the cosmos." See also Rosen (p. 43), for whom the Forms play "no role, either in the myth itself or in the dialogue as a whole...." But cf. Dorter (p. 195), who insists that "it is a myth that represents a two-world conception of reality." And Friedländer (p. 285), on how the myth functions "...with the Forms and with God...." For Rowe (p. xx), the myth "strikingly forms an organic part of the philosophical process itself"; but if in a Platonic context the philosophical process includes Forms, then the myth must also in some way encompass or relate to Forms. That the Forms are represented in this elliptic, even cryptic, manner is a pivotal element in the aporetic structure of the dialogue (see more detailed discussion of the Forms in this regard in Chapter 7).
9. For a reconstruction of and detailed commentary on the argument from 269c4 to 270a8, see Mohr, 1981, p. 215. What Plato wants to achieve philosophically by so mythically constituting the cosmos must be determined. For discussion, and sources cited, see Mohr (1980).
10. Benardete (p. 96) infers from the account of life under Cronos that "...myth thereby debunks myth, for it disenchants us from the enchantment of the golden past and from the longing to see once more gods' rule on earth." However, this strong conclusion on the function of the myth (a) overemphasizes the first of the two cosmic cycles, that under Cronos, and (b) does not situate this narrative—each of the two cycles as parts of one whole—within the complex structure of the dialogue.
11. For Scodel (p. 83), the innate desire of the cosmos is "its desire to actualize the potential for life it has been given by its maker." See also Rosen (p. 58). However, a more apposite sense of desire is glossed from the *Phaedo*, when Socrates says of perceiving equal objects (75b) that "...before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must have

possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it, and realized that all of them were eager to be like it, but were inferior." The desire in question is not for life, as Scodel maintains, but for remaining alive by exclusively retaining the specific formal nature which had been firmly in place during the Cronos cycle, just as, according to the *Phaedo*, instances of equal things are "eager" to be as like the Form equality as is possible for such embodied entities.

12. For a conjecture on the origin of counter rotation based on conflating ideas in the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* (rather than, as argued here, on the myth itself), see T. M. Robinson (1967).
13. See Ferrari's critique (p. 394, fn. 17—with sources cited) of Luc Brisson, who argues that the complete cosmic cycle contains three, not two periods; for additional critical analysis which includes Rowe's similar reading of the myth, see McCabe (pp. 102–8); cf. Rowe (pp. xx–xxi) summarizing his divergent translation of the myth. These critiques in the secondary literature successfully support the standard reading that the myth describes only two cosmic cycles. Additional support for the standard reading is provided by the remaining commentary in Chapter 2.
14. Frutiger notes (Frutiger, 1930, p. 242) that nowhere else in Greek literature is there an analogous conception of life gradually "vanishing into nothing," except in a fragment of Theopompus (who lived approximately a century after Plato). The originality of this conception accentuates this section of the myth and the myth proper, both as a narrative whole and as integral to the *Statesman*'s overall philosophical position.
15. Scodel (p. 68) notes the omission of *anemnesis* in the Stranger's use of dialectic. That the myth stresses recollection in preserving natures should be taken into account in determining a properly philosophical dialectic, especially given the shadowy status of the Forms in the *Statesman*.
16. Scodel comments (p. 80) that Zeus' name is "conspicuously absent from the list of man's divine benefactors"; thus we "are justified in concluding that Kronos and Zeus are not gods according to the Stranger." A more cautious reading is simply that the Stranger does not assign Zeus a function in bestowing specific goods on human beings during the cycle which he oversees, rather than, as Scodel wants, a blunt denial that Zeus enjoys divine status.
17. Scodel observes (p. 85): "In truth, the myth is profoundly pessimistic." But, just as Benardete did (see Note 10 above), Scodel's conclusion overemphasizes the import of the cosmic cycle opposed to the one we currently inhabit and fails to take the entire myth as integral to the philosophical purpose of the dialogue as a whole.
18. Cf. Rosen (p. 60): "...the demiurge, *qua* co-rotator—if we take him as a paradigm of the royal art of the statesman—is like a benevolent despot who rules directly by guiding every motion in the human herd, just as the co-rotator guides, either personally or by daimonic surrogates, every motion in the cosmos." But the demiurge, according to the argument in Chapter 2, does not guide "every motion in the cosmos"; rather, the demiurge sets the cosmos in motion, then withdraws and is absent during one of the two cosmic rotations. If the entire set of cycles is taken as a unity, then the "daimonic surrogates" introduce just enough goods to make the demiurge not Rosen's "benevolent despot" but, as argued, a deity who functions more benignly by establishing—although indirectly to be sure—the lived contours of human life as a mean between extremes.
19. Annas asserts (p. 35, fn. 35): "There is no warning here...of weaving as what the statesman must do...." But as argued in Chapter 2, the myth does indeed provide the relevant "warning," that is, the demiurge establishing a cosmic structure as foundation for the subsequent implementation of weaving as a paradigm for statecraft. According to Benardete (p. 107), the "model of weaving [is] taken from the age of Zeus, when men can

no longer go naked....” However, this claim receives scant argumentation and also ignores the import of the myth. Cf. Eve Browning Cole (Cole, 1991, p. 207, fn. 18), for comment on the myth and weaving as integral to the Stranger's approach to statecraft. The structural connection between the myth and the *Statesman*'s dialectical conclusions has not always been recognized: after noting that the first half of the dialogue concentrates on developing “diaeresis, mythopoeism, and *paradeigma*,” Morris Davis concludes (Davis, 1967, p. 320) that its second half “ignores these methods almost entirely...and concentrates instead on a rather informal analysis of political occupations, tasks, and responsibilities in a postulated city.” But, again, the myth produces the paradigm of weaving, which in turn will serve as the model for the final account of statecraft. Furthermore, Morris' “informal analysis” is, in fact, systematically developed in terms of the methodology advanced in the earlier phases of the dialogue.

20. For Benardete (p. 85), the myth was “avoidable.” In the same vein, after asserting that the initial exercise of dialectic “fails to do its job,” Rosen (p. 86) says that the Stranger “turns to myth (as it happens, unsuccessfully) to repair the damage.” The reason for this failure, according to Rosen—“the construction of the wrong myth.” And in summary comments on the *Statesman*, Guthrie (p. 183) maintains that “though in the circumstances” looking “for hidden meanings is pardonable,” it is “more cautious and truer to content ourselves with the welcome fact that Plato still takes pleasure in telling stories.” Guthrie again, more concisely (p. 192): Plato “happens to like myths.” But surely the *Statesman*'s interpreter should explain (a) why Plato included a myth, even if a myth was “avoidable,” especially if we agree (Guthrie, p. 192) that this “strange and fascinating dialogue is as much a work of art, or philosophical tapestry, as any other work of Plato's”; (b) why Plato included *this* myth rather than another myth; and (c) whether determining the point of the myth within the dialogue as a whole—Guthrie's “philosophical tapestry”—might require close analysis of the dialogue's structure in order to discern the myth's long-range implications.

    In this context, Luc Brisson's translation of 277b7 (Brisson, 1998, p. 50) as “we did not give the myth an ending” [*telos*], is both literal and perceptive, since the *telos* essential to complete the myth—which the Stranger does not provide—will be a discursive exploration of the Good (see Chapters 6 and 7 below).

Chapter 3

1. Scodel (p. 31) refers to schema as a “quasi-technical term,” adding that “its denotation in the Stranger's hand is not easy to determine.” For a general discussion of the term, see Robert J. Rabel (1996).
2. The “letters” analogy also appears in other dialogues—see S. Kato (1995); Kato cites *Theatetus* 201c8–6b12, 207d8–8b10; *Sophist* 252e9–3a12; *Philebus* 18b6–d2. The general strategy for employing this use of letters is announced at *Republic* 368d.
3. Cf. Campbell's slightly expanded translation (p. 83): “When that which is the same in another separate thing, and which is rightly conceived, is brought into comparison, so effects one true opinion about each of the two things which are thus regarded in one view.” The sameness in question produces true opinion about each element connected through the paradigmatic relation.

    That true opinion pertains to *both* elements of a paradigm has not always been clearly understood. Stephen Menn claims (Menn, 1998, p. 301):

> ...what distinguishes knowledge of the simples from true opinion about the simples is that it involves *consistently* [italics in text] recognizing them as complexes. Thus the children in the *Statesman* who

can correctly identify the letters in a short and familiar syllable, but misidentify the same letter when they occur in an unfamiliar syllable, are carefully credited only with right opinion (278a9, 278c5)....

However, Menn has misconstrued the structure of a paradigm given at *Statesman* 278c: the consistent recognition of what is the same in two separate things produces true opinion, not knowledge. Thus children who identify the same letter in two different syllables, one familiar, the other strange, do not have knowledge of this letter but only true opinion about it; they can recognize its presence in diverse settings but do not, by reason of such recognition alone, have knowledge of what that letter truly is. This consequence is vital to keep in mind when the context shifts from letters to weaving and how weaving paradigmatically "defines" statecraft.

Also, on a more abstract level, Friedländer notes (p. 288) that in the definition of a paradigm, "we encounter a twofold connection with the basic categories of "the same" and "the different" that are known to us from the *Sophist*." By contrast, Rosen insists (p. 43) that "sameness...plays no role, either in the myth itself or in the dialogue as a whole...." However, (a) sameness is essential to the structure of a paradigm (as Friedländer clearly and helpfully recognizes) and (b) according to the Stranger, a paradigm is necessary in order to construct a reliable account of statecraft. Rosen is incorrect in bluntly denying the relevance of sameness in the *Statesman*.

4. McCabe wonders (p. 96, fn. 11) whether a paradigm *is* a Form. But Scodel insists (p. 106), correctly, that the dominant note is that of "true opinion." The more relevant question is whether the relation of sameness characterizing a paradigm can, or must, include a Form as one of its relata.
5. Skemp (pp. 80–81) comments on paradigm in *Republic* and also, briefly, in *Parmenides.* For additional instances of *paradeigma* in metaphysical contexts in *Timaeus*, see 28a, 28b, 28c, 29a, 38b, 48e; for commentary on this usage of paradigm, see Eugenio E. Benitez (1995).
6. Scodel (pp. 109–10) asserts that Forms are absent in paradigms. But cf. Campbell (p. 84), who identifies "the alphabet of things" as "the ideas"; Stephen Menn agrees (p. 300). The status of Forms with respect to paradigms will be discussed later in this chapter.
7. Scodel (p. 111): "...one must know the whole truth, in a way, if one is to form a correct opinion about any part of reality." But to be led by truth does not necessarily mean to be lead by all elements of truth—that is, by all the Forms. The *Phaedrus* myth makes clear that the only necessary condition for soul's animating a human being is whether soul beheld *something* of the Forms—249c. Thus, being aware of any one Form does not necessarily presuppose being aware of all Forms.
8. Tejera (p. 99) refers to the divisions produced in the account of weaving as "trivial"; for Owen, the divisions in this section "are of a tedium little relieved by the suspicion that Plato is playing some lexicographical jokes": G. E. L. Owen (1973, p. 351); finally, John Cooper comments (p. 173) that the detail in the account is "for most of us nowadays, excruciating and bewildering...." We will recall the Stranger warning young Socrates (283b, also 286d–e—discussed in Chapter 4 below) not to fall prey to the "illness" of disparaging an account simply because of its length. The essential point in evaluating an account is whether (or not) the account does what it intends to do; in this case, the Stranger is illustrating the nature of a paradigm, an explanatory vehicle which, he has maintained, is essential for showing the nature of statecraft—the sole stated reason for the dialogue's existence. The obvious importance of this account serving as such an exemplar surely warrants a measure of patience, and critical restraint, from Plato's interpreters.
9. Dorter (p. 199) comments on the reversed order of divisions in the account of weaving.

10. This distinction between types of cause also appears at a crucial juncture at *Phaedo*, 99b: for discussion emphasizing the connections between causality and the Good, see David A. White, *Myth and Metaphysics in Plato*'s *Phaedo* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 189–204. See also *Philebus* 53e on the two types of cause.
11. Friedländer (p. 210) cites the earlier—and cosmic—use of combination and separation in Anaxagoras, and also usages in other Platonic dialogues.
12. A conclusion which runs counter to Rosen's contention (p. 157): "When the divine demiurge makes the cosmos or when the co-rotator seizes control of the tiller, neither god employs a *technē*." But the combination and separation described are surely representative of art, even if this art is practiced by a deity in a context of cosmic dimension.
13. Scodel denies that paradigms are related in any way to Forms (see Note 6 above). But both Skemp (p. 162, fn. 1) and Guthrie (p. 177) understand paradigms to involve Forms. The analysis following in Chapter 3 reinforces the latter position.
14. Cf. also the interplay between dreaming and waking discussed at *Meno*, 85c.
15. See Skemp (p. 44, fn. 1—a note also quoted in Cole, p. 206, fn. 5) on the feasibility of using this highly detailed account to construct an actual loom.
16. Skemp (p. 76) sees in these likenesses "the late form of the earlier doctrine of recollection"; for Kato (p. 171), the likenesses are "determined in advance," which admits recollection as a factor in such determination; Dorter's comparison is apt (p. 197): "...as with the doctrine of recollection, paradigms make possible the transition from merely implicit knowledge to explicit knowledge." But whether this transition can be accomplished is questionable since paradigms produce nothing more reliable than true opinion.

    For a very different approach to the paradigmatic, see Rosen (p. 116):

    > Once again [cf. 106] we may conclude that there is and can be no single satisfactory paradigm of statesmanship. Such paradigms are either too general or too particular. This is not at all to say that the Stranger's various examples have been useless. One valuable lesson they teach is the inadequacy of analytical methods like diaeresis....

    Although Rosen is certainly free to criticize the adequacy of a paradigm of statesmanship based on weaving, it is not clear how he can categorically deny the very possibility of asserting such a paradigm, since the Stranger has explicitly maintained that he is establishing a paradigm to satisfy precisely this end. Rosen's denial of the possibility of describing a satisfactory paradigm appears to distort, seriously so, the text of the dialogue.
17. Cf. Menn, interpreting the results of a paradigm (p. 298): "I bring two or more objects together for comparison, and by doing so I notice some aspect in which they are alike, so that I am brought to awareness of a *nature* identically present in the different objects...." [Italics mine.] More accurately, I suggest, the awareness identified by Menn is of a *property* which may belong to a nature, as blending may belong to the nature of statecraft. Moreover, even if statecraft possesses blending as exhibited by the sameness of a paradigm linking statecraft with weaving, it does not follow that the nature of statecraft reduces to just that one property.
18. See Kato (p. 162) quoting Goldschmidt (with citation) on paradigms as Plato's most characteristic thinking. But cf. *Meno*, 98a on the instability of true opinions. See also *Epinomis*, 978b as well as the passages from *Republic* and *Timaeus* on the fragility of true opinion (cited in the Introduction). Finally, the extended criticisms developed in the *Theaetetus* of true opinion and true opinion with an account, both claimants to knowledge, should be kept in mind, in addition to the fact that Forms are never introduced in this dialogue's extended quest to define knowledge.

Chapter 4

1. That rejecting accounts (for example, the analysis of weaving just concluded) simply because of length is a "sickness" reminds contemporary students of the dismissive observations by Tejira, Owen and Cooper (Note 8 in the previous chapter) concerning this section of the dialogue.
2. Cf. *Charmides*, 156e: "For all good and evil, whether in the body or in the whole man, originates...in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul—that is the first and essential thing." See also *Republic* 403d.
3. For Michael Kochin (Kochin, 1998, p. 84):

   > The discussion of the mean, and the discussion of weaving that preceded it, are appropriate in length because they are themselves appropriately excessive in length, appropriately boring. These discussions are boring enough to teach us that politics is ultimately not a very interesting topic for philosophic investigation. To teach his young interlocutor that politics is, in the end, uninteresting for the philosopher, the Eleatic Stranger delivers an uninteresting account of the political art.

   But connecting the discussions of the mean (and the extended account of weaving) with politics requires more expansive argument to justify Kochin's strongly adverse conclusion, since these discussions concern methodology pertaining to philosophical questions (that is, defining statecraft), not to politics *per se*.

   The importance of the mean was recognized in earlier dialogues, especially the *Republic*: 402c, 423c, 619a–b; see also *Protagoras* 338b. Additional references to the mean appear in: *Seventh Letter* 334e; *Eighth Letter* 354e. The mean is also crucial to statecraft as developed in the *Laws*; the Epilogue to this study discusses this importance.
4. Manasse (1937, p. 95, fn. 1) says that the "necessity" at 283d is not "taken strictly in an absolute way, but is only hypothetical." This modal distinction is perhaps justified if whatever due measure is based on remains indeterminate, but the Stranger is not hypothetical about due measure as necessary for production. Friedländer (p. 292) asks rhetorically whether 283d8–9, which he translates "according to the necessary being of becoming," anticipates *Philebus* 26d8, the "coming-into-being as a result of limit and measure." Kenneth Sayre has the same thought (p. 159). This incisive metaphysical suggestion and its ramifications are explored in Chapters 6 and 7.
5. Rosen (p. 119) denies that distinguishing between the two types of measure is technical division by Forms—it is, rather "the exercise of *phronēsis*, good sense or judgment"; but Guthrie (p. 166) contends that the "dichotomy of measurement into comparative and evaluative is *an example of* [italics mine], and encouragement to, correct *diairesis* according to real kinds (285a–b, 286d), but the principle of division is axiological, a reminder that the Forms discovered by *diairesis* itself are not merely genera and species but patterns or norms." However, the axiological dimension Guthrie imputes to this division runs counter to the Stranger's earlier disavowal to be dialectically concerned with value considerations. For discussion of the relation between the two types of measure, see Maurice Vanhoutte (1956, pp. 128–37); see also pp. 144–50 for a series of "striking" (p. 144) comparisons between the methods advanced in the *Statesman* and the *Philebus.* Vanhoutte has here anticipated the argument connecting the two dialogues developed in Chapters 6 and 7 below.
6. This comment of Skemp (p. 78) reinforces the relevance of Forms in this context: the "second form of the art of measurement is vital in two ways": it helps the dialectician "in his map-reading of the world of Forms as well as in his estimation of the correct

length of discourses." Harold Cherniss makes the same point: of the two types of measure, the former is "only relative measurement and the latter measurement against a norm," with the norm in question constituting a Form—see Harold F. Cherniss (1965, p. 10); de Chiara-Quenzer (p. 119, fn. 38) asserts that "the objects of division [as practiced in the *Statesman*] would seem to suggest that they are forms." She also mentions the "greatest and most honored beings" (285e4 and 286a5–6), citing as additional support for this reading C. H. Kahn (1995).

Rosen denies that the Forms function in dialectic, or indeed anywhere in the dialogue. Yet consider the following (Rosen, p. 121):

> It is crucial to emphasize that whereas measurement in the sense just indicated is relative, it does not follow that the standards are relative in the same way. What counts as a just act will vary from one circumstance to another, whereas the difference between justice and injustice could be fixed, and in fact it must be fixed in some intelligible or perceptible manner, or else we would be unable to distinguish between acts that are suitable or fitting and those that are unsuitable or unfitting in attempts to be just.

However, two pages later (p. 123), Rosen adds that when "judging that an action is excessive or defective, we see only one act, namely, the act judged to be excessive or defective. And we measure this act, not by a fixed ruler or standard metric, but by an unquantifiable act of judgment." The first passage appeals to a fixed and intelligible standard of justice which does not vary; but the second passage seems to deny that this standard is used in measuring or judging a given act if, for example, this act pertained to justice. However, what purpose would the fixed standard fulfill if not for a rational agent employing it when morally evaluating a particular act related to this standard? Rosen appears to have introduced a reality very close to, if not identical with, the Form justice—and then denied its relevance in contexts where, if such a Form existed, it would be suitable to if not decisive for determining the moral status of a given action.

7. Interpretations of "precision itself" [αὐτό τἀκριβὲς] in the secondary literature range over a broad spectrum. Griswold (p. 155; also p. 165, fn. 20) says that this concept is "mysterious." Miller (p. 67) refers to precision itself as "obscurely noted," although he does offer additional comments on the relation between precision and the good (pp. 133–4, fn. 57). A number of scholars detect a close connection between the mean and the Good: Taylor (1961, p. 299, fn*; cf. also p. 222) says that precision itself "presumably means the final and complete solution of the great problem of metaphysics as conceived by Plato, 'what is the good?'" Benardete (p. 116) asserts that the "precise itself looks like another name for the idea of the good or the good itself" which gives both being and intelligibility to everything (cf. p. 146); also in this regard, Scodel (p. 138). Guthrie (p. 171, fn. 1; cf. p.170), refers to Skemp's expansion of the "untranslatable" [πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν] as "to give a full exposition of true accuracy in dialectical method," or, more literally (according to Guthrie), "to seek to demonstrate the accurate (or true) itself." Guthrie has no doubt concerning the metaphysical foundation of due measure and the subsequent connection with true accuracy (pp. 170–71):

> For Plato the standard [that is, for *metrion*] is obviously provided by the changeless and definable Forms, culminating in the Form of the Good. After explaining the twofold division of measure, he immediately links it with *diairesis*, which, he repeats, is the method that enables one 'to divide according to Forms' (286d), and he warns that what has been said here will be needed when the time comes to demonstrate the very nature of truth.

Crosson notes (1963, p. 31) that "the Stranger suggests that the mean may some day be susceptible of an absolute demonstration, such, we may infer, as the vision of the Good would provide. This is not necessary, he says, for the present inquiry...."; Campbell (p. 105) contends that precision itself "is that absolute principle which is essential to and identical with perfection of method," adding that it "appears from the *Philebus* that the absolute standard [μέτρον] was closely allied in Plato's mind with Reason and the Idea of Good." Klein (p. 175) does not hesitate to make an explicit identification, saying that "finally, in its self-sufficiency, it [precision itself] appears as the '*Good itself*', beckoning to the cognizing soul" [italics in text].

Note Dorter's more cautious approach with respect to the possible connection between the mean and the Good (p. 204; cf. p. 191): "The mean cannot therefore be equated with the *Republic*'s idea of the good, whose existence has absolute priority and is unhypothetical. The mean is not goodness absolutely, but the *measure* of goodness in words and actions, hence inseparable from them." But this inseparability between mean as measure and concrete human actions must, I submit, be connected to a Form. For example, in fashioning a cloak, the agent must know the formal nature of what is being aimed at and also how to produce a "good" instance of that nature. A similar point can be made regarding Benardete's observation (p. 115) that "insofar as the nature of the mean measures excess and defect in becoming, it gives becoming its being (283e5, cf. e8)." But becoming, insofar as it *only* oscillates between excess and defect, is unduly abstract without identifying what excess and defect pertain to, that is, excess and defect with respect to a specific sort of thing, action, and so on. The mean does not give becoming its being—something else must accomplish this phase of the process; rather, the mean directs the process *once begun* so that it successfully achieves what is intermediate between the limits of excessive and defective—for example, a well-made cloak rather than one too loose or tight, and so on. In short, the mean is, as will be argued in Chapter 7: (a) a surrogate notion for a Form, with the appropriateness—the "due" in due measure—provided by the mean in concrete circumstances resting ultimately on (b) the relation between Forms and the Good. In this regard, cf. the prescient comment of Friedländer (p. 293) who wonders whether 284d, which he translates as "for an exposition of what is truly exact and essentially accurate," anticipates *Philebus* 64d et seq., where "goodness" and "perfection" have the "characteristics of measure and symmetry."

8. For Richard Mohr (1977), this argument is substantive and supports the existence of Forms (his analysis also draws connections to the *Philebus*). The very different interpretation developed in Chapter 4 situates the argument within the *Statesman* as an aporetic whole.
9. Annas (pp. 43–4, fn. 39) comments:

> ...it is odd for Plato to compare this point [that is, the existence of the mean] with the point about being and non-being in the *Sophist*, which is established differently, as the conclusion of an argument (see *Sophist* 258b–259c). Further, he goes on to claim that the existence of expertise [that is, art] and the existence of due measure are mutually entailing, making it unclear why the point about due measure is supposed to give independent support to the point about expertise.

Rosen (p. 133) notes the importance of logical considerations when he claims that this argument "is obviously circular reasoning, since it assumes what remains to be proven about the nature of *technē*." However, the Stranger's reasoning is more logically sophisticated than merely falling prey to a *petitio.* Furthermore, the present reading, based on understanding the dialogue as aporetic, accounts for the "oddity" and "unclarity" which disturb Annas.

10. An approach too abstract for McCabe (p. 114), who finds such an interpretation "reading this material through neo-Platonising spectacles...." But cf. Dorter (p. 209) referring to

> ...the ability to discern the inner necessity of the existence of such essences, the fact that, as Socrates puts it in the *Republic*, they all spring from the nature of the good. Thus what is required is that the mathematicians learn to think qualitatively rather than only quantitatively, and eventually learn the teleological mode of thought implied by the myth and presupposed by the concept of the mean.

This comment more fully appreciates the subtle metaphysics embedded in the text at these junctures.

11. Several commentators have seen the relevance of the material dimension in the present context but then fail to recognize any connection between the material aspect of measure and the formal impetus provided by due measure: see Scodel (p. 66); Rosen (p. 130).
12. See Guthrie (p. 166, fn. 1) regarding the referents of 285a–b (and his appeal to a parallel passage in the *Philebus*). What Guthrie in his discussion refers to as "particulars" are called "things" in the present interpretation, that is, elements constituting materials of a collection.
13. After noting that *Statesman*, 285d maintains that the purpose of the present inquiry is to become better dialecticians, Skemp nonetheless claims (pp. 66–7) that "the political interest of the dialogue is predominant." If, with Skemp, this insistence controls interpretation of the dialogue, then its final position on statecraft will more likely be considered canonic or close to it (a position adopted by commentators who discuss that position as official Platonic dogma); if, however, emphasis is on the inquiry into statecraft as a single exemplar of a much broader methodological concern, then the final account of statecraft will be taken with considerable judiciousness in terms of its reliability, given that the method explicitly developed by the Strange and young Socrates to secure the nature of statecraft is manifestly incomplete. See also the following Note.
14. G. E. L. Owen, in a frequently-discussed article (see citation in Chapter 3, Note 8), has contended that the appeal to "greatest and most valuable things" (286a5–6) need not "show that in this late work Plato still assumed without argument that the participant in any Form was related to that Form as a likeness (or, more strongly, a copy) to its original" (349/138). If so, then the Forms are not necessarily an element in the Stranger's position at this point. The crux of Owen's interpretation rests on a specification of context, for when this context is in view, "...it can hardly be doubted that when Plato speaks...of perceptible likenesses and images fashioned in a clear way for men he means to be understood literally, not in theory-laden metaphors" (353/141).

    Owen identifies the *terminus a quo* of the relevant context as 277d, when the Stranger "begins to explain the nature and importance of philosophical examples such as weaving" (351/140). But why limit the context in this way? Why not extend the context just a bit further, that is, to the myth (269d) where the Stranger refers to the "most divine things of all," entities which "lack bodies"? If this extended context is permitted, then the greatest and most valuable things can become, as the myth puts it, identical to the most divine things. And if the most divine things lack body, then the greatest and most valuable things can be construed as Forms. Thus if statecraft is great and valuable, then statecraft cannot be taught—or, with Owen, be "depictable"—through perceptible likenesses, since statecraft as such is a Form and Forms do not have perceptible likenesses. Hence the need for "clarity" stated at 285, since students of statecraft cannot clearly "see" a well-run polity the way a student of weaving clearly sees a well-woven cloak; reasons and descriptions in language, a *logos*, must be provided to comprehend this kind of reality—not pictures, diagrams or demonstrations. This argument gives reason to question (if not reject) Owen's dismissal of Forms at *Statesman* 286a.
15. As, for example, Scodel maintains (p. 24, fn. 11); see also Chapter 1, Note 14 above.

Chapter 5

1. For Dorter's reading of the "silent" bisection, see pp. 210–11.
2. Skemp says (p. 184, fn. 2): "It is noteworthy that Plato does not regard the slave as a living tool as Aristotle does in the *Politics* (I, 3, 1253^{b}, 28). He is therefore classed not as an 'instrument' but in the rather vague residual class of live possessions, as a kind of 'tame living creature'."
3. Taylor (p. 225) cites *Republic* 420a, adding that the master in the community really ought to be "the servant of all." With respect to the question of classification, Dorter notes (p. 221): "The statesman, it seems, is ultimately found within the form of 'servant,' although this is never stated precisely." De Chiara-Quenzer (pp. 109–15) agrees.
4. Miller (p. 99) suggests that young Socrates here shows an analytic awareness allowing him to follow a Socratic path, citing in support the famous passage in the *Apology* proclaiming that the unexamined life is not worth living. By contrast, recall McCabe's apparent dismissal (p. 116) of young Socrates as an "ignoramus"—see Introduction, Note 7.
5. See, for example, Fowler (pp. 150–51, fn. 1); Annas asserts (p. 66, fn. 64):

   > This speech [299be] obviously refers bitterly to the trial and execution of Socrates. Cf. *Republic* VI488–489a. It is not very germane to the present point (and what follows in effect ignores it) since Socrates standardly does not claim to be any kind of expert in political matters, although he is represented, at least by Plato, as holding that there is such a thing as this expertise (at *Gorgias* 521d he claims to be among the few attempting to find it in the right way).

   But, against Annas, consider *Gorgias*, 515c, where Socrates asserts:

   > ...when you embark upon a public career, pray will you concern yourself with anything less than how we citizens can be made as good as possible? Have we not many times already agreed that this should be the task of a statesman? Have we acknowledged it or not? Answer me. We have; I shall answer on your behalf.

   To establish a state producing goodness in its citizens, the appropriate reality must be kept in view. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates stresses that the Good holds everything together (99c). The Stranger's allusion to this phase of Socrates' philosophical agenda does indeed become germane by suggesting a metaphysical backdrop relevant to anyone inquiring into the nature of statecraft. (The ensuing commentary in Chapter 5 develops this point by appealing to a parallel position in the *Phaedrus*.)
6. Socrates comments relevantly at *Gorgias* 521d (cited by Annas in the previous note): "I think that I am one of very few Athenians, not to say the only one, engaged in the true political art, and that of the men of today I alone practice statesmanship." The statement immediately following this passage is also pertinent: "Since therefore when I speak on any occasion it is not with a view to winning favor, but I aim at what is best [*to beltiston*], not what is most pleasant...." If "best" is taken at its most general—then the Socrates of the *Gorgias* has in view the same ultimate reality as the Socrates of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*—and, as we shall see, the *Philebus*. In addition, the *Phaedo* asserts (61a) that philosophy is "the greatest of the arts"; therefore, if love of wisdom supercedes in importance even the greatness of statecraft, then the committed student of the art of philosophy becomes most eminently qualified to practice the art of statecraft.
7. The approach taken to the account of the derivative types of statecraft concentrates on its metaphysical dimension. For discussion emphasizing political implications, see Griswold (pp. 156–60); Benardete (pp. 124–5, 132); Miller (pp. 96–104); Barker (p.

172). And for additional commentary, see Rowe (pp. xiv–vi); also De Chiara-Quenzer (pp. 109–10, fn. 23).

8. For discussion of the origin of laws produced by the perfectly right form of statecraft, see Campbell (p. xlv); and Rowe (p. xv).
9. Cf. Annas (p. xx): "...the passage at the end [of the dialogue] about weaving the fabric of the state, though technically it is not part of the dialogue's official task of defining the statesman, is another original and seminal passage in Plato's political thought." This description is accurate if we take the point or "official task" of the dialogue to be, as stated at its outset, establishing the definition of the statesman in the truest sense. However, extensive analysis by the Stranger and young Socrates has indicated that this sense of statecraft is unavailable. Therefore, understanding statecraft according to the paradigm of weaving is the best that can be done. From this perspective, the concluding description of statecraft becomes, against Annas, an essential part of what the Stranger and young Socrates are philosophically in a position to accomplish. The Stranger underlines the need to deal with our lack of knowledge now, at 302b, when he observes, prior to evaluating the currently available types of governance, that "perhaps all of us have some such motive in mind in all that we are doing." This is delicate Platonic irony, rich with aporetic consequences for understanding the entire dialogue.
10. Several commentators identify the true ruler as the philosopher: Skemp (p. 54); Friedländer (p. 281); Rowe (p. xiii). But this ruler, whether or not equivalent to the philosopher, is *not* available for duty insofar as the ruler in question is godlike in stature (303b).
11. Melissa Lane emphasizes *kairon* over *metrion*, especially in practical matters of politics. Thus Lane claims it is a misreading of the dialogue to argue "...that the μέτριον rather than the καιρός bears the philosophical weight." See Melissa Lane (1995): 276–91. Lane is followed in this approach by McCabe (pp. 110–11). More on this interpretation in Note 18 below.
12. Christopher Bobonich (Bobonich, 1995, pp. 313–29) argues carefully and in detail for a non-aporetic, substantive reading of the position on virtue developed toward the conclusion of the *Statesman.* Bobonich raises various problems regarding the internal consistency of the argument, concluding (p. 329): "The ambiguity we are left with at the end of the *Statesman* may well reflect a genuine tension in Plato's views about the nature and capacities of non-philosophers." John Cooper also infers substantive results from this account of virtue (p. 183): "Each comes to possess both *genuine* courage and *genuine* moderation—neither remains at the level of merely 'natural' versions of these virtues—but in a different way in each case" [italics in text]. In support, Cooper cites, in fn. 28, 309e5–6 and 309d10–e3, emphasizing the phrase ὄντως σῶφρον, which he renders "genuinely moderate." The genuineness in question refers to courage and moderation relative to blending opposed characteristics. However, such genuineness is not necessarily identical to virtue produced if an individual participated in the Form of courage or moderation. Cooper has not distinguished between genuine as based on canonic metaphysical considerations (Forms) and genuine as based on derivative and provisional metaphysical considerations (blending opposites). In addition, the logical tension Bobonich detects in the final account of virtue derives from the aporetic structure of the dialogue, as the commentary will demonstrate (Chapter 7 and Epilogue).
13. See Skemp's comment on the Stranger's approach to virtue (p. 223, fn.): "We now make what seems a frontal attack on this position [that is, that the several parts of virtue are all in mutual accord]—and though it leads to a new 'synthesis' in the sense of the interweaving of the opposing characters, the new statement must necessarily destroy the *Republic* psychological scheme." Annas is more circumspect (p. 77, fn. 75):

> The question [that is, at 306a] whether the different virtues imply one another (the reciprocity of virtue) or are taken to be just one and the same state (unity of virtue) is left unresolved. What we find here seems to be a rejection of any version of this view, but the issue is in fact somewhat complex. For detailed analysis of the passage see Bobonich [the source cited in Note 12 above].

For additional discussion, see Crosson (pp. 37–8) and Mishima (Mishima, 1995, p. 311). See *Meno* 72c on the need to seek unity when understanding virtue (also *Fourth Letter*, 344b). The connection in the *Laws* between the necessity for sustained reflection on virtue and unity, in tandem with the importance of virtue in producing law, will be examined in the Epilogue.

14. Cf. Scodel (pp. 165–6): "When the Stranger continues by saying that, when the opposition concerns τὰ μέγιστα [the greatest things], the most hateful disease befalls cities (307d7–8), the suspicion that the play of the myth has very serious implications is confirmed, since it is very difficult to think that the myth does not concern τὰ μέγιστα." This connection has significant metaphysical import (see also the following Note), although Scodel does not pursue the point.
15. Scodel (p. 164, cf. p. 166): "The opposition between κοσμιότης [decorum] and ἀνδρεῖα [courage] recapitulates the opposition between the two cosmic cycles, although the connection between these two opposing pairs is nowhere explicitly made." See also Friedländer (p. 303). The point worth emphasizing is the need to seek the harmonious alignment of individual virtues, in some essential sense opposed to one another, within the unity of virtue as such.
16. Cf. Skemp (p. 230, fn.1 [re309c]):

> The divine bond is 'right opinion based on absolute truth which has become settled conviction'—we might say 'sound standards and a sense of values'. The ordinary citizen could not understand fully the metaphysical ground of such opinion, and yet in accepting it through the laws and education prescribed by the statesman he could achieve a....'faith to live by'. This Plato now claims to be an element of the divine in man. He has up to now only said this openly about the highest, god-like, reasoning faculty of the philosopher....

For similar comments, see Miller (p. 110); Annas (p. xxi, p. 83, fn. 83); and Scodel (p. 159). See also Christopher Bobonich (Bobonich, 2002, pp. 117–18, 414–15). Relevant as well is Bobonich's comment on the relation between psychology and knowledge (p. 575, fn. 90):

> Although we should not read into the *Statesman* the *Republic*'s theory of parts of the soul, according to the *Timaeus* (69C5–D6) and Book 10 of the *Republic* (611Aff.), the immortal part of the soul is the rational part. And if the divine bond of true opinion is akin to the rational part, these true opinions should be supported by reasons and not just trained emotions and habits. Note also that the bond of true opinion binds or works on the rational part of the soul alone and not on the mortal part (*Statesman* 309C1–3).

This selected commentary shares the conviction that true belief in the *Statesman* has been elevated above its status in the *Republic* and other dialogues where its lack of permanence is emphasized as an epistemic deficiency; now true belief suffices as a level of cognition fit for the citizenry of a polis. Cooper's reading epitomizes this approach to true opinion (p. 183):

> As I interpret it, the 'true' and 'firmly settled' opinion about 'what is fine, just, and good' that the expert educators introduce into the minds of the citizens of the expert statesman's city involves the

> citizens' coming to see and accept good reasons for so regarding certain actions and dispositions—it involves a significant development of their own moral understanding.

However, if true beliefs are grounded ultimately on proclamations of the ruler, then the question becomes to what extent the ruler's knowledge can secure such a newly privileged level of cognition securing the well-being of the citizenry when, following the Stranger's explicit admission, indicating or delimiting this knowledge is impossible. What would the "good reasons" appealed to by Cooper consist in or be based on? For if the Stranger cannot specify the type of knowledge requisite for the statesman, then other than merely identifying the "fine, just and good" as subjects of due educational concern, how can educators instruct the populace by providing "good reasons" if educators themselves cannot be informed how to proceed by the statesman because, again as the Stranger clearly indicates, he cannot specify what type of knowledge belongs to the statesman? Cooper has recognized (p. 181, fn. 25) that "...in the *Statesman* the Visitor does not speak about the education needed to produce a fully expert statesman...." This is true, because the Stranger explicitly asserts that he cannot state what kind of knowledge the "fully expert statesman" must possess to achieve that status. But, again, without establishing the content of this knowledge, how can Cooper's "good reasons" be produced for the benefit of the populace? See the related discussion in Note 19 below.

17. The Stranger has consistently referred to statecraft as an art, and he does so here as well, when the dialogue is about to conclude. Stanley Rosen says (p. 161) that throughout "the dialogue, the Stranger refers to statesmanship as a *technē*, but he is now in the process of showing the inadequacy of that appellation. *Phronēsis* and *technē* are entirely distinct from one another; hence too *phronēsis* is distinct from *nomos*, which is a product of *technē*." Rosen concludes (p. 170): "At best, then, the expression 'political *technē*' is ambiguous and rests on an equivocation of the term *technē*. At worst, it is a self-contradiction." For a more balanced (and textually accurate) assessment, cf. Hoffmann (Hoffmann, 1993, p. 94): "So we need the long debate about the necessary expert knowledge of the true statesman (292b–301a) because we can understand in this way the distinguishing of those who rule with a more precisely defined 'political' *technē*, from those who only imitate this knowledge." Recall that Hoffmann's "expert knowledge" is, in context, based on a paradigm producing only true opinion and also, more fundamentally, that the Stranger denies that he knows what kind of knowledge, expert or otherwise, the ruler possesses. However, Hoffmann has correctly seen (as, apparently, Rosen has not) the extent to which the ruler's activity is indeed an art.
18. Cf. McCabe (pp. 110–11):

> [The *Statesman*] sees the conflict of different virtues (belligerence and pacifism, for example) as a necessary and dynamic feature of the state, whose smooth working (by means of the education of the citizen) is the product of the statesman's art. The true statesman, on this view, is no autocrat: instead he is someone who enables the citizens to integrate and govern themselves: [quoting Melissa Lane] 'to do real politics is to do it yourself.'

Lane's interpretation, the source of McCabe's citation, warrants review and evaluation. Lane contends (p. 276) that the *Statesman* presents "...as rigorously theoretical a political ideal as that of the *Republic*, but one shaped by a crucial innovation: the perspective of time as the dynamic medium within which political conflict occurs." This interpretation is justified primarily by Lane's reading of *kairos* (p. 281):

I have argued above that in light of their rival judgments about the kairos, such combination must mean that at some moments, one group perceives the kairos accurately and advocates an appropriate policy; at others, the other does; the state has need of both of them at different times. The weaving together of the two factions, if it is to recognise the kairos, must therefore take the form of a dynamic alternation between them in time. No static hierarchy can capture both insights.

Lane's interpretation introduces time within executive policy-making, that is, instantiating the *kairos*—the opportune moment for deciding what to do—differently at different times. These decisions may, at different times—and correctly so—represent diametrically opposed views, and Lane insists that weaving in the relevant paradigmatic sense encompasses such temporal and procedural opposition.

There are, however, serious difficulties with this interpretation from the standpoint of the dialogue's internal consistency. Consider a cloak. The warp and weft in weaving a cloak must exist simultaneously in order for the cloak to be a cloak. If warp exists first without weft (or *vice versa*) or warp is separated from weft (or *vice versa*), then weaving vanishes and so does the cloak as a unified artefact. Temporality is clearly relevant to the *process* of weaving; temporality is irrelevant to the *product* of weaving once that product exists. The temporality Lane introduces would, by implication, destroy weaving insofar as this process, duly practiced, has produced something woven. To illustrate the simultaneously interlacing feature essential to weaving in a political context, consider the following example: In the 16 November 1992 issue of *TIME*, (former) President Bill Clinton described himself as being "quite taken" with Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. F.D.R's governing style has been captured best by biographer Kenneth Davis: "Whitmanesque in his zestful openness to a variety that...included contradictions, and in his 'yea-saying' to all and sundry, he was absolutely confident of his ability to 'weave together' antagonistic counsels and personalities...."

This kind of weaving is, I suggest, what the Stranger intends. The antagonistic positions, even if contradictory with respect to one another, are woven together in such a way that the best course of action eventually results. But, and this is crucial, *the statesman decides* the best course of action. Thus, despite her rejection, Lane's "static hierarchy" is indeed required, although the static element is represented by the continuous decision-making authority invested in and practiced by the statesman. There is indeed a dynamic element in the interplay of various positions during the process of deliberation (just as a dynamic element pervades the process of weaving). However, Lane's overemphasis of temporal process as such becomes problematic for two reasons: (a) If one end of the political gamut provides the impetus for a decision at one point in time, the other end at a different point in time, in what sense has anything like weaving been accomplished? Even if the decisions, viewed as a sequence, were in fact correct, the process leading to these decisions reduces to a periodic alternation of opposite viewpoints, with no manifest sense of "weaving" together two opposed sides dealing with temporally separated decisions. The point of the paradigm for statecraft, its dependency on weaving itself, is thereby lost. (b) Furthermore, if the decision is made by one of the two (or more) opposed groups, then the statesman becomes effectively otiose. The interpretation of McCabe and Lane eliminates the need for a statesman except as organizer and "educational supervisor" of opposite positions. Such elimination seemingly undercuts the purpose of the dialogue.

The following contrasting position may be directed against McCabe and Lane: the continuing oscillations of opinion produced by such weaving are precisely what organizes and solidifies the statesman's awareness of the ramifications of the given situation and indicates the range of possibilities relevant to its resolution. With all phases of this oscillation fully present in hand, the statesman then decides what is best to do. Here is one

way to "weave" together the opposite groups: the statesman could (a) elicit opinions from both sides, each opinion supported by reasons and then (b) select one of the two opinions (with his or her own thoughts added to the sum of these reasoned reflections) but justify this choice with additional reasons in such a way that both sides appreciate the wisdom of the choice so made. An example: the courageous side advises going to war, giving reasons to justify this course of action; the decorous side recommends restraint, arguing with opposed reasons that due cause for waging war is lacking. The statesman weaves together both positions in deriving relevant input from each side and integrating that input into the final decision.

The decision as to what is best depends therefore on what the statesman recognizes and understands given what has been woven together from the two sides. The statesman decides which side, given the blended positions, will be "for the best." In this way, the statesman would effectively rule, but include in the process of decision the range of opinions of the opposed groups, persuading each group that the decision rested on taking to heart what was best from each side. As a result, the ruler would not alienate either group; indeed, this procedure reinforces their relevance as the source of essential input toward his or her decision. On this interpretation, however, and against the approach of McCabe and Lane, the statesman remains the pivotal executive figure, with the two groups articulating relevant features of the situation at hand, a crucial function with respect to the statesman's being in position to secure the most informed, and wisest, final decision. I suggest that Lane's interpretation (followed by McCabe) of the intended sense of statecraft based on their reading of the *kairon* moment is unworkable and runs counter to the point of weaving as the paradigm for statecraft. (For a development of this position which remains subject to the same criticism, see Melissa S. Lane (1998, esp. pp. 139–45 and 193–202).

If the above hypothetical process of weaving accurately represents the Stranger's thinking, the central inadequacy of the Stranger's formulation of statecraft emerges. If the statesman merely ratifies the argument of the more persuasive group, thereby instituting whatever has emerged as practical policy at the *kairos* moment, then, as argued above, the statesman becomes effectively redundant; but if the statesman selects a decision based on the weaving of opposites and justifies that decision by virtue of authority of his or her office, then presumably the statesman—in order not to be redundant—must have a reason (or reasons) for a given decision over and above the fact that the opposing members of the group had argued for this or that position. In this case then, the statesman combines what has been woven by the relevant groups with what he or she knows to be what is best. As a result, the statesman must be sufficiently wise to recognize what is best for the polity given a certain set of circumstances crystallizing at the *kairos* moment, including in these circumstances the input and arguments of the opposed advisory groups. It is precisely this wisdom, and the knowledge of what is best funding it, which the Stranger says he cannot render to young Socrates—and to the readers of the *Statesman.* (See also the related discussion in Note 19 below.)

19. Paradigms produce true opinion and the statesman weaves together citizenry based on their possessing true opinions about certain fundamental realities. But what knowledge does the statesman *qua* statesman possess in order to impart such true opinions?

Consider Guthrie (p.189, fn. 1; cf. p. 190):

> Here we have an intermediate class of those who, without possessing philosophical knowledge themselves, act under the instructions of the one who does and in the light of the 'true belief concerning what is just and good and their opposites' which he imparts to them (309e-d) as the philosopher king imparts it to the subordinate guardians in the *Republic*.

Although Guthrie may be certain that the statesman possesses "philosophical knowledge" with ability to impart it to others, thereby acting as a counterpart to the philosopher king of the *Republic*, the Stranger explicitly asserts that he lacks certainty about the content of such knowledge. Crosson poses the relevant question (p.39):

> The Stranger stipulates that the opinion about the good and the just is to be really true (ὄντως οὔσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν—309c6). How is this to be assured? More concretely, how is a *true* opinion to be implanted in the soul of the citizen? For the statesman cannot form opinions as he could in the *Republic*, and so cannot proffer doctrines, which he certifies as true, to be accepted by the citizens [italics in text].

Christopher Bobonich has similar reservations (1995, pp. 322, 323). See also Morris (p. 323).

Two problems emerge from Crosson and Bobonich: (a) what precisely are the opinions held to be true by those ruled and (b), more fundamentally, how is the statesman to be educated in order to have requisite knowledge to impart these opinions? The latter question raises a subsidiary point concerning the relation between educators and statesman. Most commentators assume that the two functions are distinct and therefore will be practiced by different individuals—cf. Skemp (p. 43); McCabe (p. 97, fn. 17); Cooper (p. 181). Cf. also Friedländer (p. 302): "If, in the *Republic*, philosopher, statesman, and educator are practically one and the same person, in the *Statesman* educators appointed by law are subject to the royal art of the true statesman (308e)." If the statesman and educators implementing true beliefs for the citizenry are indeed different individuals, then the problem seems compounded, since in this case the statesman would have to educate the educators, as it were, so that those performing the latter function would indeed control true opinions with sufficient understanding to be able to impart these beliefs to others.

There are related difficulties. For John Cooper (pp. 185–6), the function of the "political orators" suggests that they be seen as an antecedent to the preludes of laws which the Athenian argues for in the *Laws* (see Epilogue for discussion). In Note 34, Cooper says that the orators will tell citizens "stories." Thus the orators do not "bring the people to understand and accept complete, decisive explanations of what needs to be done or why some change in the law is required.... That would be beyond their capacities (see 292e, 300e4–5)." However, the orators will nonetheless "give the people sound reasons, ones that they can understand and approve of as a basis for the statesman's enacting or deciding whatever may be in question." But where do these political orators receive their education? Furthermore, how secure or fixed are true opinions as reasons if couched in stories delivered by professional orators? A rival orator, acting as an agent of demagoguery, could tell a divergent, even contradictory story which, if delivered with properly compelling language, would threaten to instill precisely the opposite opinion in the minds of the populace. So much for the reliability of "firmly settled" opinions. Furthermore, the history of the 20th century offers a series of "stories," promulgated by orators educated by and working at the behest of "statesmen," which were horrific in implication but duly acted on by the populations of citizens who heard and internalized them. Again, the more pressing problem logically (indicated in Note 16 above) is the knowledge which the true statesman will possess—knowledge the precise content of which the Stranger cannot describe—in order to deliver true opinions to the educators, who then relay them to orators and, ultimately, to the populace in "stories" which, presumably, integrate successfully the more dialectically engendered wisdom possessed and understood by the duly educated statesman.

20. Commentators differ on the theoretical adequacy of the final account of statecraft: Miller (p. 111) asserts that by "...focusing on the citizen's character instead of the statesman's the stranger therefore leaves the inquiry profoundly incomplete." For Campbell (p. xlix): "The description of the 'Royal web' in the concluding passage of this dialogue is a mere outline; yet if the sketch is anywhere finished this is not done in the *Republic*, but in the *Laws*." Crosson also comments on what, for him, is the manifest incompleteness of the final definition of the statesman (p. 43). But for Guthrie (p.189), the "...form or essence of statesmanship is found in the art of 'kingly weaving', understood as combining disparate characters into the firm fabric of a stable community." DeChiara-Quenzer agrees (pp. 118–19) that the dialogue provides "the complete definition of the statesman."

    The interpretation developed in this study is coordinate with Campbell's reading—the dialogue's final account is only a "sketch" (although based on true opinion and sanctioned by the introduction of a paradigm) and this sketch is indeed completed in the *Laws.* Such completion is, however, complex and requires a review of the *Philebus* before it is possible to recognize fully how the *Laws* is relevant in this regard. See also Chapter 7, Note 13 for additional discussion.

21. The identity of the speaker of the dialogue's final speech is disputed; some commentators think young Socrates (hereafter YS), others the elder Socrates. For Skemp (p. 235, fn. 1), YS is "hardly likely to be the one to say the final word of thanks"; Miller (p. 135, fn. 52): "Most editors...are agreed that the elder Socrates makes the final speech..."; and Annas (p. 86, fn. 85): "The present rather lame ending [giving the last speech to Socrates, not YS] is one sign that Plato has not yet successfully integrated these two concerns. He does not do so until he gives up the *Statesman*'s focus on the ideal ruler." On the other side, Friedländer (p. 525, fn. 2) believes that the final speech is by YS, but he cites older scholarship claiming that Socrates, not YS, is the speaker. Also, Skemp (p. 235, fn. 1), Miller (p. 135, fn. 52) and Scodel (p. 161, fn. 5) list additional commentators who agree or disagree with assigning the last speech to the elder Socrates.

    Commentators who argue for YS rather than the elder Socrates include Campbell (p. 191): "The present expression is merely an expanded and more courteous form of assent, marking the conclusion of the argument." Campbell also offers additional reasons against the last line being said by the elder Socrates. Crosson (p. 43, fn. 39) agrees that YS has the final say, and cites with approval those who argue that the speech would be inappropriate for Socrates. Monique Dixsaut also assigns the final speech to YS (Dixsaut, 1993, p. 256, fn.14).

    I suggest the following three-phase defense of young Socrates as the author of the final speech: (a) Socrates appears for the first time at 258a, one Stephanus page after the dialogue begins; if he were the speaker of the final line (at311c), then although Socrates' utterances structurally frame the dialogue, they would do so only in the thinnest narrative sense, since 53 Greek pages pass during which elder Socrates says absolutely nothing—surely a glaring anomaly as far as balanced narrative structure is concerned. (b) Socrates insists at 258a that he will take his turn in this discussion "by and by." Now if Socrates did speak the final line of the *Statesman*, then assuming he means what he says at 258a, his sustained silence throughout the conversation becomes a tacit endorsement of *everything* maintained during the entire dialogue as preamble to the final definition of statecraft. But if so, there would be no need for him to resume the discussion and to take his turn, as he explicitly says at 258a. For if Socrates wanted to direct questions at what the Stranger and young Socrates had maintained, he would surely have raised any such inquiries at the appropriate moment—not waited with estimable patience until the entire discussion was concluded, then be required to rehash the account in order to resurrect the points which in his mind were worth pursuing beyond the positions finally articulated by the Stranger

and young Socrates. (c) *Pace* Campbell, young Socrates is not merely being "courteous" to the Stranger; in speaking the final line, he in fact testifies to the "completeness" and "nobility" of the concluding definition of statecraft as rounding off the day's inquiry, thereby establishing that discussion as finely and accurately finished. But when elder Socrates would enter the conversation, as he promised, it is within range of the Platonic Socrates' interests to review and engage the entire account—including what is implied in the myth—in the course of his critical evaluation of what had been discussed and asserted. This final reason is suppositional, but Chapter 6 culminating in Chapter 7—as, we shall see, a natural progression of interpretation—provides an extended supplemental analysis to support the cogency of reason (c).

Chapter 6

1. Cf. Guthrie (pp. 192–3): in "...the *Politicus* combines the ideal and the practical in a unique and puzzling way which probably reflects a transitional stage of indecision in Plato's own thought. Is it the ideal or the possible statesman that he has in mind in the final section on royal weaving? ...One cannot be sure...." Guthrie's puzzlement concerning Plato's "transitional stage of indecision" is indirect testimony to the aporetic quality of the *Statesman*—including the final section on royal weaving, the paradigmatic approximation of true statecraft. This study argues that Plato is not at all indecisive in structuring the dialogue, which is carefully organized to direct the reader toward a set of interlocking philosophical questions (see Chapter 7). Plato himself examined these questions in *Philebus* and *Laws*, discussed in the present chapter and Epilogue, respectively.
2. Several commentators have identified affinities between the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*: See Skemp (p. 80—also, Skemp, 1942, p. 22); see also Friedländer (pp. 292, 293); Scodel (pp. 15–16); Rosen (p. 96).
3. The *Philebus* commands an extensive secondary literature. The interpretation developed here, as noted, highlights the Good in the complex structure of the dialogue. This perspective has governed sources cited in presenting and justifying this interpretation. The following were especially useful: Cynthia Hampton (1990); J. C. B. Gosling (1975); Robert Fahrnkopf (1977); J. M. Moravcsik (1979); Oliver Letvin (1981); R. M. Dancy (1984). Translations from the *Philebus*, modified when necessary, are based on R. Hackforth's translation.
4. Cf. Skemp (p.213, fn. 1): "The view that all men seek a good 'uncertain in their grasp of it but divining it to be some real thing' is, of course, stated in the *Republic* itself (VI, 595d fin.sqq)." Significant differences obtain, however, between the Good in the *Republic* and its counterpart in the *Philebus*, both as such and with respect to individuals seeking the Good. See also Note 7 below.
5. Cf. the useful observation of Benitez (Benitez, 1995, p. 131): "For although he starts with the ethical question, 'What is the good life for man?' Plato's assumption of the unity of the Good forces him to raise the metaphysical questions as well."
6. Cf. Hampton (p. 88): "Although...Truth, Proportion, and Beauty [the three elements Socrates will stipulate as proper to the Good] make the mixture that is the good life good, note that these three taken together as the Good would likewise be responsible for any mixture whatsoever."
7. Citing *Philebus* 64c, Paul Shorey (Shorey, 1895, p. 217; cf. p. 225) summarizes the point as: "...the triple allegory [which] describes the discipline and the pilgrimage which will lead the soul to the very vestibule and doorway of the Good." For discussion comparing the Good in the *Republic* with the Good in the *Philebus*, see Hampton

(pp. 88–9, 90; also sources cited, pp. 125–6, fns. 14, 15). For additional discussion of the Good primarily from the standpoint of the *Republic*, see Richard J. Ketchum (1994) and Samuel C. Wheeler (1997); see also the article by Benitez (Note 5 above).

The development of the Good in the *Republic* sets in relief differences displayed by the Good in the *Philebus*. But even in the *Republic*, the Good functions essentially in statecraft—VII (540a–b):

> We shall require them [Guardians] to turn upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself [τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό—540a8–9] they shall use it as a pattern [παραδείγματι] for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn, devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but as a necessity.

8. The foundational affinity between good and beauty verges on the metaphysically axiomatic for Plato: in addition to the *Statesman*'s frequently stated pairing of the two realities, see *Symposium* 201c, 204e; and *Crito* 48b.
9. Cf. Skemp (1942, p. 22):

> ...the constant Platonic principle of the royal rule of νοῦς underlies the *Politicus* as surely as the *Republic*. But since the *Sophistes* has been written, this must have a deeper metaphysical significance which will come to full expression in the *Philebus*, but which is none the less there all the time. Its most notable outcrop is the myth, but we must not ignore its presence underground in the rest of the dialogue.

In the *Sophist*, the Stranger had asked rhetorically (249a): "...are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, wisdom have no place in that which is perfectly real...?" The answer is no, and since wisdom presupposes understanding [νοῦν] and change is granted its share of reality, the conclusion must be that "the philosopher who values knowledge...must declare that reality or the sum of things is both at once—all that is unchangeable and all that is in change" (249d). This metaphysical principle presupposed, the *Philebus* inserts understanding (mind) and develops it as one of the four new tools.

10. Cf. *Symposium*, 207a: "*Eros* necessarily desires immortality with the good...since its object is to possess the good for itself forever." It follows then that *eros* is also love of immortality. The inherent desire for the Good arising from *eros* underlines, again, how the lack of an analysis of *eros* in the *Statesman* intensifies the importance of the parallel lack of the Good in this dialogue. The connection between desire and the Good as proper object of desire is also crucial in grounding the possibility of seeking happiness, a possibility requiring diverse directions of activity depending on the concrete situation of individual human beings.
11. Cf. Hampton's apt summary (pp. 89–90):

> The *Philebus* makes clear that the Good does have parts or aspects, and through them the sensible realm—on both the cosmic and human levels—is structured. The Good is not transcendent in the sense of being somehow disconnected from the rest of reality, but it is ontologically superior and prior to all else in that if it did not exist, nothing else would be in Being, neither the other Forms nor, of course, the sensible world. Plato is hinting that the Good enables everything, each individual entity and the whole of reality, to be the best it can be.

12. Cf. Campbell, commenting on the final definition of statecraft at the conclusion of the *Statesman* (pp. 241–2; also p. liii):

> It may be noted that nothing is said of the point made so prominent in the *Republic*: that the 'weaving of the web' will require an insight into the supreme principle of cosmic order, the 'form of good'.... This silence about the 'form of good' is another example of what I have called, speaking of the *Sophistes*, the change of tonality in Plato's latest dialogues....

But cf. Guthrie (pp. 172–3):

> Plato did not give up his belief in a universal Form of Good. ... [But he] is coming closer to the Aristotelian position that for practical purposes knowledge of the highest Good is insufficient unless one know what means to it (subdivisions of it?) are immediately applicable. ... The statesman must continue until he can grapple with situations in this space- and timebound world. To this development Plato's increasing use of the method of *diairesis* made an obvious contribution by bringing down the Forms as nearly as possible, within the necessary limits of knowledge, to the individual level.

It is not, however, just the method of diairesis, or dialectic, which brings the Good down to earth, as it were; rather, the *Philebus* demonstrates that the Good itself must be modified by being integrated into the fabric of reality rather than, as in the *Republic*, kept apart in a state of pristine metaphysical separation. The "change of tonality" Campbell discerns in the explicit metaphysical interests developed in the *Statesman* (and *Sophist* as well) is, if the standpoint of the present study is correct, only an aporetic relocation, a transitional position requiring the speculative scrutiny and analysis introduced in the *Philebus* and consummated, in the political sphere, in the *Laws*.

Chapter 7

1. Cf. Hackforth (p. 122, fn. 2).
2. Cf. Guthrie (p. 174, fn. 2): "...I have already spoken of 'Forms' to emphasize Plato's point that the method must have an ontological basis; but he says nothing there inconsistent with supposing that the objective realities which he insists on might be within the nature of the phenomena themselves." This comment (concerning the *Statesman*'s treatment of collection and division) assumes that Forms exist, are fully functional with respect to causality, and have instantiated particulars—none of which is explicitly asserted in the *Statesman.* The *Philebus* addresses all these crucial metaphysical matters, thereby rectifying and completing aporetic conclusions in the *Statesman*. See McCabe (p. 116) for a more tentatively stated version of the thematic relation with respect to Forms in *Statesman* and *Philebus*.
3. The same point is made discursively at *Phaedo*, 66e; see also 67b and 79d.
4. Cf. Friedländer (p. 303), commenting on *Statesman,* 309c–e: "The true knowledge of highest being is alluded to from afar, but Socrates who is listening might well ask whether 'right opinion' is enough, even though the stranger underscores its 'unshakability' [μετὰ βεβαιώσεως]—or whether we should rather look toward a kind of knowledge that rises high above right opinion." See also the discussion of right (or true) opinion in Chapter 5, Note 19.
5. Recall the extended critical assessment of the Lane/McCabe interpretation of the *Statesman* in Chapter 5, Note 18. Appealing to the *kairon* moment will not suffice by itself to account for what the statesman must know in order to rule justly and wisely.

6. The relation, if any, between the *Philebus* notion of Limit and canonic Forms is disputed. Consider one reading relevant to the interpretation to be argued: Hackforth cites and develops Zeller's approach to this relation, that is, that the Forms are equivalent to the cause of the mixture (1945, pp. 39–43, esp. p. 41). The interpretation presented here expands on this development and then demonstrates the consonance between this position and aporetic elements of the *Statesman*. For additional sources discussing this relation, see Note 7 following.
7. Cf. Hampton (pp. 89–90):

   > The *Philebus* makes clear that the Good does have parts or aspects, and through them the sensible realm—on both the cosmic and human levels—is structured. The Good is not transcendent in the sense of being somehow disconnected from the rest of reality, but it is ontologically superior and prior to all else in that if it did not exist, nothing else would be in Being, neither the other Forms nor, of course, the sensible world. Plato is hinting that the Good enables everything, each individual entity and the whole of reality, to be the best it can be.

   Cf. Bobonich (2002, p. 175): "Any account of what is good *for* a creature must be grounded in an account of that creature's essential nature" [italics in text].

   Hampton also draws a valuable conclusion on the relation between Forms and particulars with respect to Limit (p. 92):

   > The fact that sensibles are totally dependent upon the Forms means that thinking that the Forms must be either transcendent to, or immanent in, their sensibles is a mistake. Forms are ontologically prior to, and epistemologically distinct from, their sensibles, but not separate from them since sensibles can neither exist nor be recognized without the Forms.

   This strong sense of dependency of Forms on particulars is congenial to the link established in Chapter 7 between Limit, one of the four tools, and Forms providing this Limit. However, the dependency as formulated above raises problems. For if Forms are immutable and eternal, then it is plausible to maintain that there must have been a time when Forms existed and particulars did not. If so, then relative to that period, Forms are "transcendent to" particulars; if no such time did exist, then no distinction obtains between the eternality of Forms and the equivalent eternality of particulars existing because they participate in Forms. Thus from the standpoint of time, no ontological priority obtains between Forms and particulars (although Forms remain ontologically prior from the standpoint of causality if particulars require Forms in order to exist).
8. Recall that Friedländer (p. 292) asks rhetorically whether *Statesman* 283d8–9, which he translates as "according to the necessary being of becoming," anticipates *Philebus* 26d8, the "coming-into-being as a result of limit and measure." Sayre has similar thoughts (1983, p. 159—quoted in Chapter 4, Note 4). Sayre also cites *Statesman* 285a, the pivotal passage on division according to what appear to be Forms. See Sayre's development of the relation between Forms and limit (pp. 161 ff). Mitchell Miller (1990, pp. 323–59) has argued for a significantly different method which, although described in the *Philebus* is also, according to Miller, applied in the *Statesman.* This method has been effectively criticized by Michael Hoffmann (1993) and de Chiara-Quenzer (1998, pp. 121–5).
9. The emphasis on mind's efficacy regarding particulars appears in Socrates' philosophical autobiography (*Phaedo*, 97c–d), especially mind accounting for each thing's coming into being or perishing or existing. In the *Philebus*, however, mind as the primary causal agent is only one of four primordial elements; thus, the Good encompasses an essential material

setting in conjunction with mind directing everything, material or non-material, toward what is best for each of those things.

10. The connection between all components of virtue and the Good is asserted in *Republic*, 505a: "...the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial."
11. The *Statesman*'s lack of concern for *eros* is noted by Benardete (p.148); see also Scott R. Hemmenway (1994, esp. p. 262). For Socrates, *eros* is essential to dialectic (*Phaedrus*, 266b):

    > ...I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, that I may gain the power to speak and to think, and whenever I deem another man able to discern an objective unity and plurality, I follow 'in his footsteps where he leadeth as a god'. Furthermore—whether I am right or wrong in doing so, God alone knows—it is those that have this ability whom for the present I call dialecticians.

    The dialectician is a preeminently "erotic" personality in, of course, the intellectualized yet passionate sense of *eros* evoked in the *Phaedrus.* For discussion, see David A. White (White, 1993, esp. pp. 120–24; 160–62; 223–26).
12. Minardi, commenting on collection, asserts (p.421):

    > The method of collection and of investigating resemblances, is not a method of identification through the abolition of differences, but it is a method of collecting things into 'families'; this allows us to include a great many things resembling one another—though with different characters (cf. *Phil*. 12e–13a)—under a single representation, in an interlacement which can admit huge differences among its parts.

    This is perceptive and well-stated; however, it remains a question whether a collection including such "huge differences" would, from the standpoint of methodological correctness, encompass the kinds of evaluative differences the Stranger so frequently glosses over in his collections.
13. Cf. Campbell (p. 22): "But in particular inquiries...it is not enough to distinguish logically, *a priori*, between 'this' and 'all that is not this.'" Scodel states the point more generally (p. 28): "While a division of things into those having a single characteristic ('A') and those lacking it ('-A') is always possible, the question is whether -A is a real B or merely the logical or procedural negation of A." For discussion, see Scodel (pp. 53–4, fn. 51; p. 70); Miller (p. 21), Skemp (p. 73).
14. Cf. Julius Moravcsik's summary comment (p. 348): "Within the context of Plato's thought, the Method of Division should be viewed as yet one more attempt to link the theoretical and the practical, and to insist that the latter can be solved successfully only if such solutions are based on an adequate conception of the former." Julius M. E. Moravcsik (1973).
15. Commentators have noted the incompleteness of the final account of statecraft; see Friedländer (p. 305) and Scodel (p. 166). For Miller (p. 110): "...the revelation of the state seems to leave the statesman's essence hidden. To put the same point in another way: the stranger gives a good socratic description of the just state, but he does not explicate the principle which lies at the very core of its justice." But if the principle which lies at the very core of the state's justice is not explicated, how can the Stranger's description of the just state be truly "good"? Skemp notes (p. 51) that the *Statesman*

    > tells us nothing of the training of the statesman or of the source of his art of ruling.... But we must assume (and the *Philosopher* if it had been written would probably have told us this explicitly) that

the true statesman has that gift of insight into the nature of True Reality which gives him moral strength fit for the exercise of his supreme task.

See Chapter 5, Note 20 for additional sources on the incomplete final account of statecraft.

Rosen's mention of the celebrated unwritten dialogue, the *Philosopher*, follows a different tack, especially if credence is given to the hypothetical explanatory weight placed on this work by commentators such as Skemp. For Rosen (p. 162):

It is true but only a first step to say that the wise man is the genuine king. The second step is to describe the wisdom that such a king possesses. Presumably that step would be taken in the investigation of the philosopher. It is typical of Plato's wisdom, as well as of his sense of humor, that this investigation, if it ever took place, was not recorded.

Given the seriousness of the present context, the "sense of humor" Rosen attributes to Plato the man and philosopher is broad indeed.

16. Taylor (p. 393) and Griswold (p. 159) support constitutionalism. But cf. Skemp, who maintains (p. 57, fn. 2) that he cannot accept Taylor's view that the *Statesman* "is really concerned to support constitutionalism against personal rule." See also following Note.
17. Cf. Rowe (p. 172, fn. 48): "Any legal system approved of by [the Stranger], or by the author behind him if he endorses his character's story, ought, therefore, not to be based directly on any existing system or systems, and any actual correspondence should be strictly coincidental." Earlier (p. 158), Rowe held that "...the final estimate of actual constitutions is no higher than was Socrates' in the *Republic*. Such constitutions are somehow 'necessary' (*Plt*. 302e6).... All are 'difficult' to live with, *Plt*. 302b6. This is hardly a firmly 'constitutionalist' position."

Epilogue

1. Friedländer (p. 299), noting that the *Statesman* stands between *Republic* and *Laws* in order of composition, conjectures that many sections of the *Laws* must have been written when Plato was writing the *Statesman*. If so, then looking for aporetic elements in the *Statesman* to be resolved, or at least addressed, in the *Laws* is at least plausible and perhaps necessary. Recall also Campbell's suggestion that Plato completed the *Statesman* in the *Laws* (see Chapter 5, Note 20).
2. Glenn Morrow (Morrow, 1960, p. 573). The translation of passages from the *Laws*—modified when necessary—follows that of A. E. Taylor.
3. Political ramifications derivable from the one and the many were enunciated in *Republic* 462b: "Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together, and makes it one?"
4. For discussion of the formation of the Nocturnal Council, see R. F. Stalley (Stalley, 1983, p. 133). See also V. Bradley Lewis (Lewis, 1998, esp. p. 5). Additional analysis appears in Saunders (pp. 475–6).
5. Cf. Stalley (p. 136) on affinities between the Nocturnal Council and the *Statesman*.
6. Cf. Stalley (p. 135): "In the *Republic* the knowledge of the good provides the means of understanding all reality (505a–509c), while in the *Laws* it is apparently reduced to the more obvious role of enabling the nocturnal council to give moral and political guidance." The Epilogue will show that the Good articulated in the *Philebus* serves as

both an organizational and substantive grid for significant portions of the *Laws*, not only for those sections in XII devoted to the Nocturnal Council.

7. Aristotle agrees (*Politics* IV 1295^{b}5–10): "But he who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth, or wealth, or on the other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced, finds it difficult to follow rational principle." Difficulty in following rational principle includes difficulty in discharging one's obligations as a virtuous citizen.
8. Annas (p. 62, fn. 58) comments that "Plato in the *Laws* reverses himself strikingly on this issue, using the same analogy of the doctor, but now to make the point that a free doctor to free people has to *persuade* the patient of the value of the treatment, not just force it on them as does a doctor to slaves (*Laws* 720a–e, 857c–e)" [italics in text]. The *Statesman*'s aporetic character suggests a reason for this pronounced reversal.
9. For discussion of types of preambles, with examples from *Laws* 718b–23cd and 857c–9b, see Morrow (pp. 553–4). On the import of preambles, Bobonich comments (1991, p. 387): "...it is the first time in Western philosophy that we see an attempt to explicate, at least in part, the freedom of the individual in terms of his or her capacities for rational inquiry and understanding and to foster these capacities and this sort of freedom in all the citizens of a just state." Bobonich also indicates (1991, p. 387, fns. 85, 86) various senses of freedom developed in the *Laws* and comments on an undeveloped sense of freedom in the *Republic.*

   An instructive comparison: At *Laws* VII, 832c, the Athenian refers to what he calls "no constitutions" [οὐ πολιτείας]— "democracy, oligarchy, autocracy." The Athenian insists that "not one of them is a true constitution. In none do we find a willing sovereign with willing subjects; in all a willing sovereign is controlling reluctant subjects by violence of some sort." This conclusion recalls *Statesman* 293e, when the Stranger also asserted that all forms of government other than the one "right" one are not legitimate or really existent. The difference between the two positions is that the Athenian rejects all the stipulated constitutions because they are derived from naked appeals to power and do not base their sovereignty on allowing individual subjects to display freedom; the Stranger's rejection is based on more abstract considerations concerning deficient degrees of reality exhibited by these derivative types of rule.
10. For Bobonich (2002, p. 105), laws aim

> ...to make all the citizens virtuous and the preludes along with the rest of the citizens' education express Plato's continued commitment to the idea that rational understanding is necessary for genuine virtue. The lawgiver should aim to give the citizens the sort of grasp of the fine and the good that is analogous to the grasp of health that a free doctor should give to a free person.

11. Cf. Gill (1995, p. 303): "If we think about the political theory of *Laws* as a whole, there are strong grounds for seeing the work as extending the thinking about πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη and constitutions present, in different forms, in the *Republic* and *Statesman* rather than reverting to conventional constitutionalism"; also Rowe, more tentatively (1996, p.157): "...the final political message of the *Politicus* differs so little, or at least much less than has often been assumed, from that of the *Republic*, or indeed from that of the *Laws.* There *are*, of course, important differences; and the *Politicus* is, by its own account, not primarily a political work" [italics in text].
12. For Saunders (p. 468—quoted in Lewis, 1998, pp. 6–7, fn. 16):

> The most reasonable conclusion is surely that Plato still holds to at least some version of the theory of Forms, and for the purposes of the *Laws* was careful, right to the end of that work, where philosophy is presented as the saviour of the state, to direct the studies of the members of the Nocturnal Council in that direction, so as still to do what he could to ground practical politics in philosophy.

Saunders' guarded appeal to "some version of the theory of Forms" is prudent, given that the *Laws* introduces variable structure for the unity of a Form. However, this potentially problematic feature reinforces rather than militates against the inclusion of Forms in the reflective political and legal agendas of the Nocturnal Council.

The carefully focused metaphysical labor of the Nocturnal Council has not always been appreciated. Thus (Dawson, 1992, p. 76): "It would appear that at the end of his life Plato [in the *Laws*] saw not only the philosopher's city, but the philosophers themselves, recede into myth." However, insofar as the metaphysical reflections and analyses of the Nocturnal Council remain essential as philosophical prerequisites for revising and preserving laws, the members of the Council hardly "recede into myth." Indeed, their active and thoughtful presence is required in order to maintain a constitution with laws reflecting both (a) the demands of virtue and justice in the abstract and (b) continually changing concrete circumstances. See also Note 13 following.

13. Bobonich says (2002, p. 392):

> ...it seems clear that [the education of the Nocturnal Council] includes a broad range of philosophical topics as well as studies of more empirical matters concerning law, such as the law codes of other cities. Given the method of selection, not every member of the Nocturnal Council will have a full philosophical education, but many will have attained quite a high level.

And Bobonich again (2002, pp. 393–4): "Although not every member of the Nocturnal Council will be an accomplished philosopher, the course of education that members go through is quite sophisticated and lasts, on average, five years."

14. The precise function of the Nocturnal Council is disputed: for Saunders (p. 475):

> The Nocturnal Council is in effect an intellectual and moral aristocracy. As far as constitutional machinery goes, it has only a slender connection with the rest of the state; it does not have to seek approval for its decisions; and much of its activity and influence is no doubt intended to be informal, and perhaps covert.

For Stalley (p. 134), "[t]he point seems to be that the guardians protect the laws by overseeing their day to day operation while the nocturnal council preserves their intellectual basis. It studies the laws but leaves to others the task of putting its discoveries into practice." Bobonich discerns a more active Council (2002, p. 395): "We can see members of the Nocturnal Council as both advising and acting together with the guardians of the laws in many different ways in a just and good city"..."This will fall between excluding the Nocturnal Council from any political role at all and seeing its members as philosopher kings in disguise."

Commentators have also discussed whether the Book XII account of the Nocturnal Council is consistent with the rest of the *Laws.* See Lewis (pp. 8, 9–10, and esp. pp. 10–17, where Lewis summarizes and discusses the dispute between George Klosko, with citation, and Morrow's interpretations of the place of the Council within the *Law*'s theory of the state). See also Bobonich's critique of Klosko (1991, pp. 392–4). Even if the Nocturnal Council functions only in an advisory capacity, the *Laws* retains an undeniable conviction that serious and sustained attention to the structure of reality remains essential to producing and revising law as a condition for establishing and preserving the well-being of citizens governed by those laws.

15. A. E. Taylor (Taylor, 1956, p. 463).
16. And echoing *Republic*, 604c: "...nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern...."

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